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 Introduction
Indonesia is home to the largest Muslim population in the world. The 
population census of 1971 indicates that 87.51% or 103.57 million of the 
Indonesians were Muslim. The percentage slightly increased to 88.22% in the 
year 2000 with a total number of 177.52 million. On the other hand, the most 
significant religious minority in the country is the Christians, who comprised 
7.39% and 8.92% of the total population in 1971 and 2000 respectively. The 
Christian population has increased from 8.74 million in 1971 to 17.95 million 
in 2000 with an average rate of growth of 2.4% annually. This rate is higher 
than the rate of growth of the Indonesian population as a whole (1.83%).1 
Moreover, Christianity is the religion of the majority in some provinces out-
side Java, namely, in East Nusatenggara, Papua, North Sulawesi and Maluku, 
while in North Sumatra, West, Central and East Kalimantan and Central and 
South Sulawesi, it is the religion of a large minority.2 
The Islamization of the Archipelago was initially carried out by Mus-
lims of different regional and ethnic origins (apparently from the entire 
coastline from South Arabia to Southern China) around the 13th to 15th cen-
turies. The more intensive process of Islamization occurred in 17th to 18th 
centuries when several indigenous Muslims performed the Hajj and stayed 
in Mecca to study Islam for several years and returned home to be advisors 
for local rulers. Islam continued to develop in the country through the 19th 
and early 20th centuries and at the same time contacts between the Indone-
sian Muslims and their co-religionists increased not only with those in the 
Islamic centre of Mecca but also in those of Cairo and India. The Islamiza-
tion of Indonesia continues up to now and probably will never end. There 
have been various types of Islam coming to Indonesia, from the traditional-
ist Sunni Islam (as the majority) to the reformist Wahhabism, Ahmadiyya, 
Ikhwani activism and Shi’im.3 
Although Islam is the predominant religion, there have been differ-
ences in degree and mode of acceptance of this religion among the Indo-
nesians. In this context, there have been different positions among the 
Muslims concerning the relation between Islam and local religious beliefs 
and practices. Influenced by Muhammad ‘Abduh’s and Rashīd Ridā’s Islamic 
reformism, Muhammadiyah, the Muslim organisation established in 1912 in 
Yogyakarta, propagates the idea of purification of Islam from local religious 
beliefs and practices. There is also Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the traditional-
ist Muslim organisation established in Surabaya in 1926. The NU’s religious 
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view is based on the teachings of the traditional ulama, particularly of the 
Shafi’i school, and compared with Muhammadiyah, the NU is less opposed 
to local religious practices. On the other hand, there are nominal Muslims 
who embrace syncretistic religious beliefs and practices in which Islamic, 
Hindu and local religious traditions are combined. This group sometimes 
even saw Islam as a foreign religion endangering indigenous beliefs. In some 
places, there is antagonism between Islam and local customs or adat.4 In his 
classic study of the Javanese, the largest ethnic group in Indonesia,5 Geertz 
identified the nominal Muslims as abangan and its elite variant as priyayi.6 As 
opposed to the abangan, in Geertz’s typology, both NU and Muhammadiyah 
represent the santri variant, that is, the orthodox and practicing Muslims.
The different religio-cultural positions among the Indonesian Mus-
lims are not inherently antagonistic to one another, but they are usually 
hardened when the proponents of each position compete in the political 
arena. When the draft of the Indonesian constitution was discussed a few 
months before the Proclamation of Independence in 1945, we soon find the 
clash between the santri leaders who wanted to establish an Islamic state 
and the abangan leaders who preferred a nationalist and secular state. The 
political development in the next decade, particularly the national elec-
tions of 1955 followed by the ideological debate in the Constituent Assem-
bly, even hardened the antagonism between santri and abangan groups. 
Moreover, although the reformist and the traditionalist Muslims were ini-
tially involved in the same way in the struggle for an Islamic ideology, in 
some other important cases they have been opposed to one another for the 
sake of their respective political interests. Initially, in the early 1950s, NU was 
together with the reformist Muslims within the Islamic party, Masyumi, but 
when the NU leaders felt that their political interest was neglected, they left 
the Masyumi and declared NU an independent political party. By the late 
1950s, while the Masyumi opposed Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, the NU 
decided to support it. There are certainly other examples of political con-
flict between the traditionalist and the reformist Muslims in the following 
decades. 
As among the Muslims, there are also differences among the Chris-
tians. In general, about two thirds of the Indonesian Christians are Protes-
tant and the rest are Catholic. The Catholic missionaries started their work in 
Maluku, North Sulawesi and East Nusatenggara by sixteenth century under 
the patronage of the Portuguese and Spanish armed power. In the next cen-
tury, when the armed traders of the Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) con-
trolled North Sulawesi and Maluku, they converted the local Catholics to the 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
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Dutch Reformed Church.7 However, during the first two centuries of its rule, 
the Dutch in general did not support Christian missionary activities, particu-
larly if the latter could endanger colonial economic interests. Only by the 
middle of nineteenth century when the colonial power was well established 
did the Dutch support and finance Christian missionary activities. Since this 
period, Catholic and Protestant missionaries intensified their activities and 
gradually achieved much success in several places like Java, North Sumatra, 
parts of Kalimantan, and Central and South Sulawesi.8 In short, the majority 
of the Christian Churches in Indonesia are the product of missionary work 
during the colonial period. These Churches continue to develop in inde-
pendent Indonesia and constitute the mainstream Christians in the country. 
Around the middle of the twentieth century, American evangelicalism also 
penetrated Indonesia and continues to develop up to now.
The presence of Christianity in Indonesia, particularly in the form of 
social services like schools, universities, hospitals and orphanages, is found 
in almost all major cities of the country, including the regions dominated 
by Muslims. Thanks to the missionary schools, at least up to the early 1970s, 
the Indonesian Christians were much better educated than the majority of 
Muslims.9 With their good education, the Christians were qualified to take 
important positions in the new state of Indonesia. Furthermore, although 
many Protestant churches are associated with certain ethnic groups such as 
the Ambonese, Batak, Toraja, Minahasa, Javanese etc., after Independence, 
they tried to unify themselves under a national organisation. In 1945, several 
important Christian leaders in Jakarta established Parkindo (Partai Kristen 
Indonesia – the Indonesian Christian Party) that was intended to channel 
the political aspirations of the Protestants. Moreover, in 1950, the Protestant 
leaders established the DGI (Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia – Indonesian 
Council of Churches), an association for the Protestant Churches all over the 
country. Since 1955, the Catholics have also had a national council called 
MAWI (Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia – High Council of Indonesian 
Bishops), and in 1961, the Pope established the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church in Indonesia, so the status of this country as a region of mission was 
removed.10 Finally, the Catholics also had the Catholic Party (Partai Katolik), 
originally established in early twentieth century during the colonial period, 
and it became a political party in independent Indonesia up to early 1970s. 
For more than two decades after Independence, Partai Katolik and 
Parkindo became the channels for the Christians to defend their political 
interests. However, after the fusion of the two parties with secular national-
ist parties to form the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Indonesian Dem-
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ocratic Party) in the early 1970s, both MAWI (KWI) and DGI (PGI)11 appear 
to have become more active in responding to religio-political issues. As a 
religious minority amid the Muslim majority, the Christians always tried to 
find a suitable ally among the Muslims to defend their interests. In most 
cases, the Christians allied with abangan Muslims, particularly against the 
Islamic ideological ambitions of the santri Muslims. The abangan-Christian 
alliance in a way also meant that the Christians allied with those in power, 
because since Independence up to late 1980s, the state had been controlled 
mostly by the abangan. However, in 1990s when President Soeharto allied 
with santri groups, particularly the reformist Muslims, several secular and 
Christian intellectuals allied with the traditionalist Muslim leader, Abdurrah-
man Wahid, who opposed Soeharto’s alliance.
In this study I shall analyse the religio-political issues that affected 
Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia during Soeharto period (1966-
1998). There exist a number of earlier studies of Muslim-Christian relations 
in Indonesia. Some of them, however, pay almost exclusively attention to 
the Muslim voices, while those of the Christians are less sufficiently or not at 
all taken into account. 12 The result of these studies, therefore, is inevitably 
a one-sided picture (even though it is not necessarily un-objective). There 
are also other studies that try to look at both Muslim and Christian voices 
but they do not concentrate on the Soeharto period.13 In contrast to the 
existing studies, in this study I shall focus on the New Order period and will 
pay attention to the voices of Muslim and Christian leaders, as well as the 
Government. 
The sources of this study include various Indonesian newspapers, 
magazines, books, unpublished documents and a number of interviews 
with important Muslim and Christian leaders. Different voices found in 
these sources will be analysed within the context of power relations among 
the agencies involved. Thus, I shall analyse groups of statements or the so 
called ‘discourses’ produced by respective Muslim and Christian leaders as 
well as the state, particularly those statements that affected Muslim-Chris-
tian relations in Indonesia.14 The questions addressed in this study are: Who 
developed a certain discourse? What was its socio political context? What 
was its line of reasoning (including, sometimes, how a religious tradition 
was interpreted)? How did the contesting discourses relate to one another? 
What was the channel or medium through which the discourse was made? 
What was the effect of the discourses on state policies? What was also its 
effect, if any, on social practices? Which discourse was suppressed or appro-
priated, and why? In this regard, I will analyse the discourses of the Muslims, 
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the Christians and the state in three major areas of contestation, conflict and 
accommodation:
1. The Muslim discourse on the threat of Christianisation and the respons-
es of the Christians and the state to it. 
2. The Christian discourse on the threat of an Islamic State and the Muslim 
responses to it, and how this ideological issue influenced, and was 
influenced by, the state ideological policies.
3. The common discourses developed by the state, the Muslims, the 
Christians in the inter-religious dialogue. 
This dissertation is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 will discuss the 
political transition from Soekarno to Soeharto, and how the short Muslim-
Christian cooperation eventually developed into conflicts in the early years 
of the New Order. Chapter 2 will focus on the Muslim discourse on Christia-
nisation and the Christians’ and the Government’s reactions to it. Chapter 3 
will be developed to cover the Christian discourse on the threat of Islamic 
State or the Jakarta Charter, the Muslim attempts to defend it, and how this 
ideological debate was related to the ideological position of the regime. 
Chapter 4 will focus on the debates on the position of Islamic law within the 
state legal system, while Chapter 5 will cover the debates on culture and the 
position of religion in the state education system. Chapter 6 will focus on 
inter-religious dialogue developed by the Government, the Muslims and the 
Christians. This study will be closed with a general conclusion. 
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1. From Cooperation 
To Conflict
Old and new, hope and fear came together to designate the period 
of political transition from Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (1959-1965) to 
Soeharto’s New Order (1966-1998). There was an assassination of six lead-
ing army generals, followed by the massacre of hundreds of thousands of 
Communists, real or suspected. There were also huge demonstrations of stu-
dents in the streets, supported by the rising power of the army, to voice the 
‘people’s demands.’ There were new faces on the political stage demanding 
a radical reform, in addition to the old faces who took a more cautious posi-
tion of wait and see. A number of old political prisoners were released, but at 
the same time the number of new political prisoners increased beyond the 
capacity of the existing prisons to contain them. Almost anything that was 
previously politically oppressed now reemerged. In short, the political scene 
was changing and moving towards a new structure that was not clear yet.
Both Muslim and Christian leaders were parts of this development. 
It was very unfortunate that the political and social development during 
this transitional period was not helpful in maintaining a harmonious rela-
tion between the two religious groups. Both religious groups were initially 
in the same boat with the army to fight against the Communists, and shared 
the benefits of religious revival afterwards. Nevertheless, not long after the 
defeat of the Communists, both religious groups were eventually trapped 
into conflict. In this chapter, I shall discuss the political development of 
this transitional period and how Muslim-Christian cooperation eventually 
turned out to be conflict in the early years of the New Order.
1. Short-lived Muslim-Christian Cooperation: 1965-1966
Having ‘finished’ the long political struggle for independence and 
integration of the state, in 1962 Soekarno’s Government promised to pur-
sue economic restoration programmes but the promise was not fulfilled. 
For domestic and international political reasons, in 1963 President Soekarno 
called for another political struggle: a confrontation with Malaysia.1 Con-
sequently, western loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the United States for economic restoration were withdrawn, and according 
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to one observer, the year 1963 became “the year of wasted opportunities.”2 
In the following years, the Indonesian economy declined more and more. 
Mackie observes that both in1963 and 1964 the Government deficit reached 
roughly 50% of total expenditure and both prices and inflation almost dou-
bled between December 1964 and June 1965, doubling again in the last few 
weeks of 1965.3 The impact of the economic deterioration on the people 
was horrible. For the civil servants, to supplement their incomes, they had 
to take extra-jobs and become involved in certain corrupt practices.4 For 
ordinary people, the situation was very much worse. Mortimer notes that 
about one million people in Java and 18,000 people in Bali were starving. 
In a district called Wonosari in the south of East Java, it was reported that 
between two and six people starved to death daily. 5 
Soekarno, however, made another radical political move in interna-
tional politics. In response to the seating of Malaysia as a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council, in January 1965, Soekarno 
decided to withdraw Indonesia from membership of the United Nations. In 
addition, domestic politics was also shaking. Soekarno was rumoured to be 
suffering from a serious illness, and therefore the question of power after 
him was at stake, especially within the circles of the two important domestic 
political powers: the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the army. The 
leading political groups started calculating and preparing possible steps to 
face the succession.6
The whole crisis came to a head by the last few months of 1965, espe-
cially after the abortive coup of the so-called ‘Gestapu’, an acronym of Ger-
akan September Tigapuluh (The 30th of September Movement). The Gestapu 
operation was actually enacted in the early morning of 1 October 1965 
when six leading army generals were killed, and another target, General 
A.H. Nasution, the Chief National Army Commander, successfully escaped, 
his adjutant being killed in his stead. Lieutenant General Untung, the leader 
of the operation and the commander of one of the three battalions of the 
Palace Guard, the Cakrabirawa regiment, later in the morning announced on 
the national radio that the Movement was to safeguard the state and the life 
of President Soekarno against the alleged coup planned by the Council of 
Generals. Untung also announced a new organization called ‘Dewan Revo-
lusi’ (Revolutionary Council) of which he appointed himself to be leader with 
others named as members. Nevertheless, later on that day, Major General 
Soeharto, the Chief of the Army’s Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), started coun-
tering the Movement and gradually and successfully defeated and control-
led it. According to the studies of the coup, on the day of 1 October 1965, 
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President Soekarno and the top leader of the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI), D.N. Aidit, were in the Halim airbase, the headquarter of the Move-
ment.7 
There have been scholarly controversies regarding who actually 
planned and masterminded the Movement.8 In terms of the political devel-
opment after the Movement, the question of the involvement of the PKI is 
the most crucial one. On one extreme, there is a theory arguing that the 
PKI was only a scapegoat. According to this theory, certain anti-Communist 
army officers and intelligence services used the Movement to urge the PKI to 
the treacherous action in order to find a rationale to banish the PKI. 9 Another 
theory explains that the Movement was actually an internal army affair, that 
is, the rebellion of the low and middle-ranking army officers against their 
superior generals. According to this theory, the PKI activists, including the 
party leader, D.N. Aidit, were somehow controlled by the rebels rather than 
the opposite.10 Another theory explains that it was actually the PKI lead-
ers who planned and masterminded the Movement as a coup attempt, to 
establish a Communist Government in Indonesia. This theory was accept-
ed and promoted as the official version of the Movement by both military 
and civilian anti-Communist groups in Indonesia.11 In other words, the the-
ory became the winner in Indonesian politics, regardless of the scholarly 
attempts to criticize or doubt the two extreme positions.12
 The contribution of the civilians, including the Islamic and the Chris-
tian groups, to the success of the army in defeating the Communists after 
the coup was quite significant.13 On the evening of 1 October 1965, sev-
eral reformist Muslim activists of the Association of Muslims Students, HMI 
(Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), the Muslim High School students’ organiza-
tion, PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia) and the Consortium of the Unions of Mus-
lim workers, Gasbiindo (Gabungan Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia) had met 
and agreed to form a Muslim Action Command against the Communists. 
All these associations were directly or indirectly affiliated with the banned 
reformist Muslim party Masyumi. The only leading activist affiliated with 
the traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) who joined this movement from the 
beginning was Subchan ZE. 
The idea of having a Muslim Action Command was soon dropped, 
after the Muslims had meetings with the Catholic student activists and the 
Army Commander of Jakarta, Umar Wirahadikusuma. With the support of 
the latter, these activists finally established Kesatuan Aksi Pengganyangan 
Kontra Revolusi (KAP) Gestapu (United Action for Crushing the Contra-Revo-
lution, Gestapu). Subchan was elected to be its head and Harry Tjan Silalahi, 
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the Catholic activist, to be its general secretary. The young Muslim reformist 
activists like Lukman Harun, Mar’ie Muhammad, Husein Umar, and Dachlan 
Ranuwihardjo also joined the leadership of the KAP-Gestapu. 
In contrast, perhaps due to their close relations with Soekarno, the 
senior NU politicians as well as the Protestant activists and politicians were 
at first doubtful about supporting the KAP Gestapu. On 4 October 1965, 
the KAP Gestapu held its first public rally in which the activists made a joint 
statement demanding that Soekarno ban the PKI and its affiliated organiza-
tions and close the media supporting the Gestapu. The representatives of 
the Protestant party, Parkindo and the nationalist party close to Soekarno, 
PNI, who were also invited to this public rally, refused to sign the joint state-
ment, but at the second public rally held on 8 October, a representative of 
Parkindo, G. Mayor Siagian, agreed to sign a similar statement. In the follow-
ing weeks, the KAP Gestapu carried out similar public rallies, demonstra-
tions and attacks on the PKI buildings in Jakarta. 
Later, with the army, the KAP Gestapu leadership called a meeting 
of various student organizations, and on 25 October 1965, they agreed to 
establish a university students’ front, KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indo-
nesia). Both Muslim and Christian student organizations also joined the 
KAMI. On January 1966, the KAP Gestapu was developed to become the 
‘Pancasila Front’ and ever since its activities were much more in ‘high politics’ 
while mass demonstrations were taken over by the KAMI.
Outside Jakarta, cooperation of the army with civilians led to terrible 
violence in which hundreds of thousands of ex-PKI activists and suspects 
were killed, especially during the last three months of 1965 and early 1966.14 
Along with the PKI, the traditionalist Muslim party, NU, had previously sup-
ported Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. However, after the coup, a faction 
within the NU that soon became dominant, decided to cooperate with the 
army to exterminate the Communists. Among the NU members, it was the 
organization’s paramilitary wing, Barisan Serbaguna (Banser) Anshor that 
became the most active group in killing the Communists.15 In contrast with 
the traditionalist Muslims, before the coup the reformist Muslims had been 
more persistently hostile to the PKI. This was partly because the reformist 
Muslims were opposed to Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, and their party, 
Masyumi, was banned in 1960. Thus, it is not surprising if Masyumi sympa-
thizers in Central and East Java were also involved in the massacre.16 
There were also some accounts that Catholic activists took part in the 
killings.17 It is still unclear to me, however, to what degree Catholics were 
involved. According to an informant, the Catholic Church never officially 
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endorsed any violence against the Communists.18 Another informant said 
that in Flores it was the army who invited seminary students to witness the 
killings,19 while another said that in Java the army trained some Catholic stu-
dents to attack the Communists. 20 In contrast, another account suggested 
that in Flores where Catholics comprised a majority, the army elicited the 
cooperation of some of the Catholic activists in the operations against the 
Communists. The Catholic priests in the region, however, strongly opposed 
the killings. This was at least indicated by a Catholic priest working in Bola 
parish, Flores, Yosef Frederikus da Lopez. On 6 March 1966, he tried to save 
the lives of 45 Communist suspects who had been detained by the military, 
but unfortunately, the priest could only save 10 of them.21 
It is not easy to explain why this tragedy happened. For the army, 
this was probably a revenge for the assassination of the six generals and 
at the same time the elimination of their most powerful political rivals dur-
ing the period of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy. For the Muslims, there had 
been confrontation between them and the PKI not long before the 1965 
coup.22 The most noticeable case was when the PKI encouraged its peas-
ant organization, Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI), to apply the land reform law 
(passed in September 1960) through the so-called unilateral actions (aksi 
sepihak) in 1964. This unilateral action inevitably led to clashes between the 
landowners, including the Muslim ones, and the PKI peasants. An observer 
said that at this time, various Surabaya newspapers reported “almost daily 
incidents in the villages, some of them between PKI and PNI supporters, but 
most involving PKI-led peasants in clashes with supporters of the NU and 
ex-Masjumi followers.”23 In addition, the massacre can also be understood 
as a clash between the existing socio-political and cultural antagonism in 
the Javanese society, that is, between the nominal and syncretistic Muslims 
(abangan) versus the practicing and orthodox Muslims (santri). 24
Many of the PKI suspects were not assassinated, but they had to suffer 
a terrible life in prisons. An Australian journalist, Hamish McDonald notes 
that: 
The country’s prisons, particularly in Java, became packed with detainees. Also 
new prison camps were quickly constructed. Between 1966 and 1972 over half 
a million people passed in and out of this prison system. Isolated from their 
families and any resort to legal protection, the prisoners were in many cases 
not even interrogated but simply thrown into gaol and forgotten. Miserably 
provided for, they were at the mercy of guards often nearly as deprived as 
themselves. Parcels sent in by relatives were plundered, bribes were exacted 
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to allow authorized family contact, and in some cases the families of prisoners 
were harassed and blackmailed. 25
For the anti-Communist groups, however, the physical annihilation or 
containment of the Communists was not enough unless it was followed by 
eradication of the Communist ideology in the country. From the end of June 
to early July 1966, the army leaders successfully organized the session of the 
Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS).26 It was in this session 
that the PKI as a political party and its Communist ideology were formally 
banned in Indonesia. In a decree issued by the MPRS, the Assembly stated 
its determination to ban the PKI because of its attempt to overthrow the 
Government of Indonesia. In addition, because Communism conflicts with 
the state ideology, Pancasila, the MPRS decided to ban any effort to spread 
and develop the ideology of Communism/ Marxism-Leninism in the whole 
country.27 
Certainly, Soekarno – whose political power now gradually decreased 
– was very unhappy with the MPRS’s decree. For Soekarno, it was an open 
challenge to his ‘synthetic’ ideology of NASAKOM (Nasionalis, Agama dan 
Komunis) in which nationalism, Islam and Communism were supposed to 
cooperate under the Guided Democracy system. Since 1960s, NASAKOM had 
become one of the most important of Soekarno’s political slogans, leaving 
aside his earlier interpretation of the state ideology, Pancasila.28 Therefore, 
in response to the decree, Soekarno quoted Confucius saying: “One general 
can destroy a thousand enemy soldiers but one thousand generals cannot 
uproot a man’s conviction.” He also said, “I now say without beating about 
the bush, I am a Marxist, I have said since the year ’28, I am a nationalist, I am 
religious, I am a Marxist…Marxism is contained in my heart.”29
What was then the strategy of the MPRS to replace Soekarno’s NASA-
KOM, especially to eradicate its Communist element? There are at least two 
answers to this question. First, the MPRS adopted the idea of purification 
(pemurnian) of the application of Pancasila. This idea implies that there were 
some deviations from Pancasila during Soekarno’s Guided Democracy that 
should be corrected by the MPRS. By emphasizing the importance of the 
purification of Pancasila, the army who controlled the MPRS session could 
effectively oppose Soekarno’s NASAKOM, particularly its Communist ele-
ment, without offering completely a new ideology.30 The MPRS, therefore, 
established a committee to investigate the teachings of Soekarno in order 
to purify those considered deviant from the Pancasila and the Constitution 
of 1945.31 
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Another ploy for opposing Communist ideology was to identify it 
with Atheism and opposition to religion. The elucidation of the MPRS decree 
No.XXV/1966 to ban the PKI and Communism stated that Communism was 
opposed to the basis of the Indonesian nation that was theistic (bertuhan) 
and religious (beragama).32 This idea was certainly not new: it had been pre-
viously promoted in the writings of Muslim and Christian intellectuals. The 
argument was more or less as follows: if the first principle of Pancasila, Ketu-
hanan Yang Maha Esa, implies a theistic belief, while Communism is identi-
cal with Atheism and opposed to religion, then it is clear that Communism 
is opposed to Pancasila.33 After the extermination of the Communists fol-
lowing the coup of 1965, this idea seems to have gained momentum. In 
addition to the elucidation of the MPRS decree no. XXV/1966 quoted above, 
another related theme was MPRS’s decree No. XXVII/1966. The decree was 
actually concerned with three broad themes: religion, education and cul-
ture. The major concern of the decree was religious education. Article 1 of 
the decree stated that religion had to be a subject taught from elementary 
schools to university, and article 4 of the decree mentioned that one of the 
contents of education should be directed “to uphold noble morality and 
strengthen religious conviction.” According to Harry Tjan Silalahi, a Catholic 
activist and one of the leading proponents of the movement against the 
Communists in the early years of the New Order, the underlying idea behind 
the decree was the assumption that Communism was identical with Athe-
ism and against religion and therefore, religious education was considered 
an effective means to oppose Communism.34 
There is another important thing in the MPRS decree No.XXVII/1966: 
in the elucidation of the decree, it was mentioned that to develop religious 
education in schools and universities “all religions recognized by the Govern-
ment are given the same opportunity.”35 What were the recognized religions? 
The MPRS’s decree did not explain this. The answer can probably be found 
in the Soekarno’s presidential decree number 1, 1965. This decree actually 
determined the rules to prevent “the misuse of and/or blasphemy against 
religion” (penyalahgunaan dan/atau penodaan agama).36 The elucidation of 
the decree mentioned that there were six religions followed by Indonesians, 
namely Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confu-
cianism.37 Thus, the idea that religion was necessary to oppose Communism 
combined with the idea that there were recognized religions would logically 
lead to the understanding that everybody had to have religion or otherwise 
he or she could become a Communist suspect.
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 The physical and ideological attacks on the Communists and Com-
munism proved to be effective in eradicating their political influence on 
the people in the country. As noted, both the Islamic and Christian groups 
were in general the allies of the army in the fight against the Communists 
and Communism. Nonetheless, when the common enemy was obviously 
defeated, conflicts and tensions among the anti-Communist allies emerged, 
including between the Islamic and the Christian groups.
2. Muslim-Christian Conflict in the Early New Order 
As has been noted, since 1966 a formal affiliation with one of the 
recognized religions had been considered necessary to dissociate one’s self 
from Communism. It is not surprising, therefore, that there were ‘sudden’ 
religious conversions in this period, especially to Islam, Christianity, Hin-
duism and even Confucianism.38 However, for some reasons, in the eyes of 
many Muslims, conversion to Christianity was considered a threat. We do 
not know exactly how many people were converted to Christianity at that 
time. According to a statistical survey by a Catholic institution, the increase 
of the Catholic population in Indonesia from 1966 to 1967 reached 7.45%.39 
The survey explicitly notes that this increase was directly related to the 
consequences of the abortive coup.40 It is also reported that after 1965 in 
Central Java, sometimes the number of people waiting for Catholic baptism 
was above the number of the parish members.41 Given the fact that there 
were many Protestant churches and denominations, it is not easy to know 
their actual figures. Fortunately, most of the Protestant churches had joined 
the Dewan Gereja –Gereja Indonesia, DGI (Indonesian Council of Churches), 
which was established in 1950. The retired army general and prominent 
leader of the DGI, T.B. Simatupang, notes that in 1967, compared with the 
data in 1964, there was “an increase of roughly 825,000 in the total mem-
bership of the 36 member-churches,” in addition to “a considerable growth” 
of the members of the churches outside the DGI.42 He also explains that 
the high increase of the church membership was found among three ethnic 
groups: the Javanese in East and Central Java, Karo Bataks in North Sumatra 
and among the Timorese. 43 
In general, the most considerable number of conversions was in Java. 
This is clearly indicated by a DGI survey that almost all of the churches whose 
membership highly increased in the period between 1966 and 1970 were 
churches in Java, namely, Gereja Kristen Indonesia Jawa Timur (17%), Gereja 
Kristen Jawa Timur Utara (15.5%), Gereja Injili Tanah Jawa (12.2%), Gereja-
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gereja Kristen Jawa (9%), and Gereja Kristen Jawi Wetan (9%).44 Although it 
is not an historical account as such, the following description of a Christian 
scholar and the Dean of the Faculty of Theology, Duta Wacana University, 
may help us understand the situation at that time.
In 1965, I was still in secondary school. Thus, I did not know much. But actually 
I saw and read books [on this event]. After 1965, there was a great optimism 
among the Churches, especially here in Java because of many peoples ask-
ing to be baptized to be Christians. There was even a story that in East Java, 
because so many people wanted to be baptized on that Sunday, the minis-
ter did not baptize in the normal way, by spraying water with hands, but by 
spreading water by a hose. I am not sure if it is true or not, but I think it is 
true. Thus, there was a great optimism that although the Gestapu was a tragedy 
and caused a lot of difficulties, it also opened the door to the Bible. The con-
sequences were found everywhere. For instance, in Nusa Tenggara Timur and 
other Eastern areas, there was a kind of spiritual awakening. There were stories 
of miracles that Jesus appeared to somebody in certain places, water became 
wine like the stories told in the Bible and even there was a resurrection of the 
dead etc. We may not believe it, but that was the expression of the situation 
at that time…The story at that time was that the Churches were always full of 
people. There was optimism that in a short period all Indonesia would be fol-
lowers of Jesus. 45
Perhaps, because of this optimism, the DGI survey quoted above 
reported that 16 out of 35 of the missionary bodies in Indonesia had started 
their work after 1965, among them six established in 1968, four in 1969. It 
is also noteworthy that 30 out of the 35 missionary bodies came from the 
United States.46
The Meulaboh Case: Muslim and Christian Parliamentary 
Questions
The conversions to Christianity and the increase of Christian mission-
ary activities did not disturb Muslim-Christian relations until the occasion of 
the Meulaboh case.47 The case concerned the controversy over a newly built 
Methodist Church in Meulaboh, a city in Aceh province. The Muslims in the 
city objected to the existence of the church because, they said, the majority 
of people living in the area were Muslims. This case then developed into an 
issue at the provincial level and the result was, the political authorities of 
the province decided that the church should be moved to another place. As 
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a response to this case, on 17 June 1967, the representatives of the Protes-
tant party (Parkindo) and the Catholic party (Partai Katolik) in the Parliament 
put forward a Parliamentary Question concerning the issue of religious free-
dom.48 This was later commonly known as “Simorangkir’s Question”, because 
it was presented by J.C.T Simorangkir, the top leader of the Parkindo and 
supported by ten other Christian politicians.49 
The Meulaboh case was the first regional Muslim-Christian conflict 
that was brought to the National Parliament and caused considerable public 
debate. During the Soekarno period, at least one similar case had happened 
in Pasaman, a district in West Sumatra, bordering on Tapanuli in Northern 
Sumatra. Around 1950, some people from Sipirok (Tapanuli, North Sumat-
era) migrated to an area of Pasaman called Panti where many of the Muslims 
of Minang ethnic background had already been living. In 1957, the Tapanuli 
people intended to establish a church called ‘Huria Kristen Batak Protestan’ 
(HKBP) in Panti. The Minang Muslims objected to this plan and expressed 
their protest to the bupati (district head) and the Department of Religion 
in Pasaman. The Muslim protest, however, did not lead to their expectation. 
Probably because of the political tensions that led to the PRRI revolt in the 
following years, 50 and because West Sumatra was one of the bases of the 
rebels, the case was naturally neglected.51 
Unlike the Pasaman case, the political transition that was going on in 
Jakarta was more conducive to develop the Meulaboh case into a national 
political issue. Thus, soon after the public knew of Simorangkir’s Question, 
there were some responses to the case by Muslims and Christians as well as 
the army. The army commander, General M. Paggabean, warned the public 
that they should be careful of the new Communist strategy to divide Indo-
nesians along religious lines.52 In contrast, HMI activists demanded that the 
rulers would deal with the Meulaboh case locally, that is, not transform it 
into a national problem.53 There was a rather sharp statement by a Christian 
who said that the Meulaboh case was similar to the Islamic rebellious move-
ment called Darul Islam. He further said that, just as the Darul Islam rebellion 
was successfully eliminated by the army, so it should now be left to the Gov-
ernment to decide on the Meulaboh case.54 It is worth noting that although 
the Meulaboh case occurred in the very early years of the New Order, the 
quoted statements reflect the common political discourse of the Soeharto 
regime: the alleged latent danger of the communist political intrigue (Pang-
gabean’s), the importance of maintaining political stability by restricting the 
scale of the conflict (HMI’s), and the danger of the Muslims who wanted to 
establish an Islamic State (the Christians’). 
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Probably because of Simorangkir’s Question and the hot debates on 
the case in public, on 10 July 1967 the Muslim faction in the Parliament also 
proposed a Parliamentary Question on the issue of foreign aid to religious 
institutions. Lukman Harun, the leader the Muslim reformist youth organiza-
tion, Pemuda Muhammadiyah, promoted the Question supported by other 
important Islamic figures in the country.55 This Question demanded that the 
Government control foreign aid for religious institutions, and it was clearly 
directed at the foreign aid for Christian missionary activities in Indonesia. 
Thus, although this Question was formally proposed to the Government, 
it was in a way also directed at the Christian parties in the Parliament that 
previously put forward the Question on religious freedom. In the words of 
the former general secretary of the Catholic Party, “there was a war of Par-
liamentary Questions”.56 
 On 14 July 1967, the Indonesian Parliament (DPRGR) had a plenary 
session for Simorangkir to deliver an explanatory speech on his Question. 
Simorangkir’s speech, as we shall see, was an important and early example 
of a Christian discourse on religious freedom in Indonesia’s New Order. In 
his speech, Simorangkir began with a defense that the Question was not 
intended to incite tensions among the New Order supporters at all. He 
reminded the audience of the fact that they all had cooperated to extermi-
nate the “Communist Gestapu/PKI” in order to create a political stability in 
the country. Thus, with this sense of togetherness, he said, there should be 
“a goodwill of all of us to create a harmonious condition among us as reli-
gious people” (i.e., as opposed to non-religious Communists).57 Again, Simo-
rangkir’s remarks represent the political discourse of the emerging regime: 
creating political stability, harmony, and identifying the PKI with Gestapu 
and anti-religion.
Simorangkir then explained that the background of the Question was 
the statement of the Ulama Council of Aceh dated 18 April 1967 concern-
ing a newly built church in Meulaboh. In the statement – which was read 
and attached to his speech – the Ulama said that Aceh is a special territory 
of Indonesia where Islam and custom are interconnected.58 According to 
the statement, since 1964, as a “prologue to the Gestapu/PKI,”59 there was 
a church in Meulaboh, located close to the mosque of the Pasar Baru. Later 
on, the existence of the church could not be tolerated by the Muslims of 
Meulaboh. The local Government then gave permission to build a church 
in another part of Meulaboh called Blumer. In this too, the Ulama Council 
of Aceh demanded the local Government authorities of Aceh to withdraw 
the permission and the building of churches in West Aceh, especially in 
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Meulaboh city and its close surroundings, to be stopped. In response to this 
demand, on 19 May 1967, the Government of Aceh decided to follow the 
demand and promised to help the process of moving the church to another 
place “where the Christians can observe their ritual very solemnly.” 60
Having read both the Ulama’s statement and the Government decree, 
Simorangkir eventually came to the matter of the Parliamentary Question 
as follows:
1. Does the Government agree with us that the case [in Meulaboh] can be seen as a 
destruction of the spirit of tolerance among religious adherents in Indonesia?
2. Does the Government agree with us that the case was a kind of skepticism with 
respect to performing a pure application of the first principle of Pancasila?
3. Does the Government agree with us that any attitude of any group or anybody 
that hinders or curtails religious freedom means a rejection of human rights 
respected by all of us?
4. Does the Government agree with us that if no.3 happened, it will destroy the 
climate of national unity under the supervision of the New Order?
5. Does the Government agree with us that this kind of case will influence the 
possibility for the People’s Consultative Assembly [MPRS] to prepare a declara-
tion of human rights?61
6. Is the Government ready to take preventive or repressive steps, directly or indi-
rectly, in order that this kind of case will not occur anymore in the Republic of 
Indonesian state that is based on Pancasila?62
Simorangkir’s questions clearly reflect a Christian as well as the New 
Order’s political discourse. As has been noted above, the idea of the purifica-
tion of the implementation of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution initially 
appeared in the sessions of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in 
June and July 1966. Moreover, in his speech on 1 June 1967 for the cele-
bration of the birth of Pancasila, Soeharto reasserted that the strong-will 
(tekad) of the New Order’s Government is to apply Pancasila in “a pure and 
consistent manner” (secara murni dan konsekuen), 63 a statement that was to 
become like a necessary mantra in the New Order’s discourse on Pancasila. 
It has been clear that Simorangkir used the expression to argue that the 
closing of the church in Meulaboh was a kind of pollution rather than purifi-
cation of the implementation of the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. 
Last but not least, besides mentioning Pancasila, Simorangkir also frequent-
ly mentioned human rights, particularly the right to religious freedom, and 
this was in fact the core of his argument.
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One week after Simorangkir’s speech, on 21 July 1967, Lukman Harun 
delivered his explanatory speech on the Question concerning foreign aid 
for religious institutions. Lukman Harun’s speech is very important because 
it is an early example of Muslim discourse in the New Order against mis-
sionary activities, made by a reformist Muslim activist who played the role 
in the KAP Gestapu and was to become an important leader of Muham-
madiyah and the contact person for the Muslim World League, Rābita al-
‘Ālam la-Islāmī. In the first part of his speech, Lukman Harun described his 
perception of the threat of Christian missions due to the existence of foreign 
aid. 64 It was already known, he said, that foreign aid for the Christians took 
different forms such as money, church buildings, hospitals, means of trans-
portation, scholarships, food etc. Lukman then referred to foreign media 
reports, namely Time, 16 June 1967 and Christian Science Monitor, 5 April 
1967 which both mentioned that Christian communities in the United States 
collected $300,000 for Christian missionary activities in Indonesia. Lukman 
also quoted an Indonesian press report that the Catholic Relief Service in 
New York in cooperation with the Indonesian Bishops Council (MAWI) pro-
vided 30 million pounds of food and medicine for the needy in Indonesia. 
Moreover, he explained that recently there had been a lot of foreign Chris-
tian missionaries coming to Indonesia. For Lukman Harun, the foreign aid 
was a kind of foreign intervention in Indonesian internal affairs. He said, 
“it has often been a historical reality when there is a foreign intervention, 
the positive spirit of tolerance of our nation is disturbed. The intervention 
can be in different forms and ways, one of them is the material and finan-
cial aid for certain religious institutions…” Lukman Harun then explained 
that the Christians developed unacceptable missionary methods to convert 
Muslims. Two examples were mentioned: unexpected door-to-door visits 
of Christian preachers, bringing the Christian scripture and magazines to 
Muslim homes and/or giving material aid such as food, medicine and the 
like to poor Muslims. As an implicit allusion to the Meulaboh case, Lukman 
Harun also said that the Christians often built churches in Muslim villages 
when almost no Christian lived there. For him, these Christian aggressive 
missionary activities were not in line with the tolerance based on Pancasila. 
He preferred to call them “a religious expansion directed to the people who 
are already Muslim. It is true that the expansion is not by armed forces, but 
by the forces of property and materials coming from abroad…” He eventu-
ally suggested that, “like other foreign aid, we are of the opinion that the aid 
for religion or religious institutions should come through the Government, 
that is, the Department of Religion.” 
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Having recommended that the Government should control the for-
eign aid, Lukman Harun also proposed that religious propagation should 
be restricted to those outside the recognized religions. For this matter, he 
referred to the Dutch colonial policy that was, for him, better than that of 
the independent Indonesia. He said, “Although the Dutch Government was 
really a Christian Government wanting to Christianize Indonesia, but more 
or less it still ‘protected’ the Indonesian Islamic community from missionary 
activities. Some regions were closed for missionary activities… But now, in 
our independent state, we can see all regions are open to, and become the 
target of, missionary activities.” For Lukman Harun, this free condition was 
not in line with the religious tolerance stipulated by Pancasila. For him, “Our 
duty as believers, in accordance with the first principle of Pancasila, is to 
invite the whole nation of Indonesia to believe in One Almighty God, which 
means to have a religion. Let us compete to make the people who do not 
have religion yet become religious adherents…” 
In short, Lukman Harun argued that the Christians used unfair meth-
ods to convert Muslims, particularly thanks to the foreign aid, and therefore, 
to protect Muslims from the Christian missions, the Government should (1) 
control the foreign aid; (2) restrict missionary activities only to the people 
who had no religion. These ideas, as we shall see, would be the enduring 
Muslim-Christian controversy in Indonesia’s New Order.
Then, similar to Simorangkir’s Question, Lukman Harun posed six 
questions to the Government. The questions were:
1. How much and what kind of foreign aid has been received by religious groups 
or religious institutions of Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism and Bali Hinduism 
in Indonesia during the last 5 years?65 
2. From which countries does the aid come and what is the procedure for its 
entering Indonesia, and what is it used for?
3. In order that the development of religion in Indonesia should go smoothly, 
does not the Government agree with us to control and observe all kinds of aid 
coming from abroad?
4. How many foreign religious missionaries/preachers are working in Indonesia, 
what is the procedure for them to enter Indonesia, where do they come from 
[their citizenship], where are the places of their current work and what are their 
religions, and does not the Government agree with us to have an investigation 
and control of the religious missionaries/preachers coming from abroad?
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5. How many places of worship for Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism and Bali 
Hinduism (mosques, churches and temples) have been built during the last 5 
years?
6. To maintain public order and to create a pure religious tolerance based on 
Pancasila moral, does not the Government agree with us that to establish new 
places of worship one should also take into consideration the regional and 
socio-psychological factors? 66
The Government’s Responses
After having some contacts with other Muslims and with the approval 
of the Acting President, Soeharto, the Minister of Religion, Saifuddin Zuhri 
was eventually ready to answer Simorangkir’s Question on 21 July 1967. 
Before answering the Question, Saifuddin Zuhri explained the chronology 
of the Meulaboh case. He explained that the residents of West Aceh dis-
trict, especially in the Meulaboh city, were almost all Muslims. Among the 
residents, there were a few Christians, who bought the land to establish a 
Methodist church with the permission of the local Government. According 
to Saifuddin Zuhri, initially, the residents of West Aceh did not really under-
stand the purpose of buying the land. He said, “When it was known that 
the purpose was to establish a church, then there were sharp and strong 
reactions of the people, saying that the church should not be built at the 
centre of the Muslim community because it hurt their feelings very much.”67 
He also explained that on 24 April 1967 the mayor of the district organized 
a meeting between the Muslim and local church leaders to find a solution. 
The next day, the same meeting was reconvened and was also attended by 
a Catholic priest from Banda Aceh and the leaders of the Methodist Church 
from Medan.68 There was a deadlock in both meetings because the Muslims 
and Christians could not come to an agreement. Finally, the problem was 
brought to the regional Government of Aceh and the Government decided 
to (1) postpone the opening of the Church, (2) to find a way of providing a 
new place for the Church, (3) to do this, the Government would provide full 
assistance. 
Saifuddin Zuhri then moved on to talk about religious freedom and 
tolerance and how it should be developed in Indonesia. He said that the 
state ideology, Pancasila, prescribes religious tolerance. However, Saifuddin 
Zuhri argued, any effort to develop religious life “should consider the real 
and specific conditions that may be found in a region.” He also reminded the 
audience that Muslim communities were suffering from economic difficul-
ties and therefore “the degree of their ability to afford religious development 
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projects” was very low. This seems to imply that due to their poverty, Mus-
lims became sensitive to the newly built church of the Christians because 
they could not do a similar project for their own religious life. He eventually 
concluded that religious freedom should be controlled by sensitively: 
Any religious group in our state is entitled to freedom to build places of wor-
ship and to follow the teachings of its respective religions, but it should also be 
considered that to use this freedom one should not offend or hurt the feeling of the 
other groups. Because, to use the right of freedom that exceeds its boundaries 
in the sense that one prefers one’s own interests without considering the feel-
ings of others is a wrong way of using freedom. 69
It seems that Saifuddin Zuhri realized that the psychological argu-
ment could be interpreted the other way around, that is, the Muslims were 
not tolerant to the Christians because the former could not control their 
own feelings and emotions. In this regard, Saifuddin Zuhri argued that 
being a majority, Indonesian Muslims had been quite tolerant toward the 
religious minorities. He said, “there are many examples in other countries 
where religious minorities do not have easiness any more than in Indonesia.” 
This statement seems to imply that it was the Christian minority who did not 
appreciate the Muslim tolerance. 
Thus, Saifuddin Zuhri’s answer to Simorangkir’s Parliamentary Ques-
tion was obviously a support to the position taken by the Muslims in Aceh. 
This was quite different from his answer to Lukman Harun’s Question deliv-
ered on 29 July 1967.70 In his speech Saifuddin said that in principle the 
Government had no objection to foreign aid for religious institutions as far 
as it was not binding. He explained further that due to the economic crisis, 
the Government could not financially support religious developments in the 
country. The foreign aid, he said, might fill this gap. The Christians seem to 
be happy with this part of Saifuddin’s position and their newspapers put 
the heading: “no objection to foreign aid to religious institutions.”71 Never-
theless, within the frame of the Muslim argument, Saifuddin also reminded 
the audience that to receive the foreign aid, one should take into account 
psychological dimensions (i.e., the Muslim feelings) in order to avoid the 
tensions between the haves and the have nots. In addition, Saifuddin agreed 
with Lukman Harun that the foreign aid should be known and controlled by 
the Government. He explained further that due to the lack of time and the 
absence of rules for dealing with the issue, he could not answer adequately 
the matters raised in the Parliamentary Question regarding how much for-
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eign aid had been received by religious institutions in the past five years. For 
the future, he said, the Government would like to investigate and control 
foreign aid. 
About two weeks after Saifuddin’s response, on 16 August 1967, Soe-
harto delivered a formal national speech in front of Parliament in which he 
partly reacted to the Muslim-Christian controversies. He seemed not to sup-
port any of the parties but tried to reconcile the arguments of both sides. 
He emphasized that the state guarantees religious freedom of every citi-
zen but also warned that religious propagation should not hurt the feelings 
of other religious groups. Based on the Pancasila and the Constitution of 
1945, according to Soeharto, religious freedom is guaranteed in the country 
and therefore, there is no reason to make a distinction between a religious 
majority and minority. In the tone of the Christian arguments, he argued 
that, “religious freedom is one of the most fundamental of human rights 
because religious freedom comes from the dignity of the human being as 
God’s creature. The right to religious freedom is not a gift of the state or a 
gift of a group.”72 Soeharto, however, warned the audience that religious 
freedom should not lead to conflicts between religious groups because this 
would benefit the anti-religious Communists. Moreover, in the tone of the 
Muslim position, Soeharto suggested that “to uphold religious tolerance, it 
is very wise that an adherent of a religion should not do something for-
bidden in another religion in front of the adherent of the latter…It should 
also be avoided spreading religion in ways that may hurt the feelings of peo-
ple who happened to have a different religion.”73 Soeharto did not show 
his clear position on the issues raised in both Simorangkir’s and Lukman 
Harun’s Parliamentary Questions either. He did not directly comment on the 
Meulaboh case nor did he show his position if he agreed with either Muslim 
or Christian demand. He only said that, “it is really impressive and makes us 
proud that in a lot of places in Indonesia a church is close to a mosque and 
even in many places both Islamic and Christian communities cooperated to 
build a mosque or a church.”74 In line with the Christians, Soeharto stated 
that religion was universal and, therefore, the state would not prevent Indo-
nesian believers from having relationships with co-religionists outside the 
country in so far they conformed to the Indonesian law.75 In other words, 
foreign aid for religious institutions was welcome. 
Apart from his ambiguous position, according to the former speaker 
of the Catholic faction in Parliament, Soeharto was unhappy with the Parlia-
mentary Questions and asked to stop them.76 Soeharto’s unhappiness seems 
to be understood by the Christians. The Christian faction in Parliament sent 
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a letter addressed to the Speaker of the Parliament and forwarded to the 
President, the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Social Welfare.77 The 
letter – dated 22 August 1967, and read in front of the plenary session of the 
Parliament on 25 August 1967 – explained that having heard the speech of 
the President, especially the part dealing with religious matters, the Chris-
tians believed that the Meulaboh case could be entirely solved through con-
sultation by the authorities in Aceh, and therefore, the Parliamentary Ques-
tion was over and should not be extended by further discussion. The letter 
also mentioned that the DGI distributed a message, dated 14 August 1967, 
encouraging all Christians to maintain religious freedom and harmony and 
to eradicate all inter-religious suspicions.78 By contrast, the Islamic parties 
still proceeded with their Parliamentary Question and felt unsatisfied with 
the Government answer. On 16 December 1967, Lukman Harun delivered 
another speech in which he repeated his view that the Christians utilized for-
eign aid for religious expansion (ekspansi keagamaan) or “to make the Mus-
lim community apostates” (memurtadkan ummat Islam).79 Nonetheless, for 
the sake of political stability, the Government pressured the Islamic groups 
to stop discussing the Question, and to the Muslims’ disappointment, in his 
response to it on 10 September 1968, the Minister of Religion, Mohammad 
Dachlan, tried to neutralize the Muslim complaints against the Christians.80
The Muslim Attack on Christian Facilities in Makassar 
Not long after the tensions caused by the two Parliamentary Ques-
tions, on 1 October 1967, Muslims in Makassar attacked Christian buildings 
in the city. On 4 October Kompas reported that the attack resulted in some 
serious damage to Christian buildings and furniture.81 According to Muslim 
reports, the attack was triggered by a case involving H.K. Mangunbahan, a 
Christian religious teacher at the Economic High School, Makassar, who said 
to his students that Muhammad was a stupid person because he was illiter-
ate, and that Muhammad only married his nine wives and lived in adultery 
with other women. The issue continued from 24 September to 1 October 
1967. By 1 October 1967, the DGI of Makassar confirmed that Mangunba-
han made that statement but considered it as his personal opinion. In the 
evening of that day, people who prayed at the mosques in the city of Makas-
sar went out to the streets and attacked churches and other buildings.82 
Nevertheless, if we read the Muslim account carefully, as Boland observes, 
the main reason for the attack was the Muslim perception of the aggressive-
ness and demonstration of Christian activities amid the Muslim majority in 
39
Makassar: one of them was the coming General Assembly of the DGI to be 
held in the city from 29 October to 8 November 1967. 83
The Catholic magazine, Peraba, published a detailed description of 
the attack. According to this account, the attack was not spontaneous but 
well planned and organized. Peraba reported that the HMI in Makassar had 
two radio stations through which the provocative Muslim preaching was 
aired during the three months before the attack. The local weekly tabloid 
called Progressip also often published provocative views against the Chris-
tians. On the day of 1 October, the Muslim high school student organization, 
PII, gathered in front of a Muhammadiyah health centre in Makassar where 
they made a declaration stating that they were ready to die as martyrs to 
defend Islam. Moreover, on the same day, through the HMI radio stations, 
the HMI leader, Jusuf Kalla (who later, in 2004, was to become Indonesia’s 
vice-president), instructed all members of HMI and other Muslim organiza-
tions to come to nearby mosques at 8 p.m. After the evening prayer (‘ishā’), 
the Muslims started attacking the Christian buildings, and the loud-speak-
ers of the mosques shouting out “Allahu Akbar, defend your religion, be a 
martyr!” The Christian buildings attacked in the incidents were 9 Protestant 
churches, 4 Catholic churches, 1 nuns’ dormitory, 1 Academy of Theology, 1 
office of the Catholic student organization, PMKRI, and 2 Catholic schools.84 
The Makassar attack soon developed into a national issue in Jakarta. 
M. Natsir, the Muslim reformist leader said that the attack was not good but 
for him the case was an excess representing the culmination of Muslim dis-
appointment at the Christians’ aggressive missionary activities – a statement 
that can be interpreted as an excuse for the attack.85 Likewise, the editorial of 
the Muslim traditionalist newspaper, Duta Masjarakat, having described the 
recent Meulaboh case and door-to-door visits of certain Christian mission-
aries to Muslim homes, it stated that the Makassar attack should be under-
stood through its causes.86 In contrast, none of the Christians agreed with 
the Muslim reasoning. The PMKRI activists said that the action was against 
Pancasila and asked the Government to investigate the case and bring the 
suspects to the judgment of the law.87 Likewise, the Catholic journal, Basis, 
besides criticizing Mangunbahan, lamented that the Muslims took the law 
into their own hands, that the local newspapers fanned the situation, and 
that the regional Army Commander did nothing to prevent the attack.88 
Kompas’s editorial in its comment on the attack, however, suggested that 
religious leaders should not exploit religious sensitivity and encouraged 
them to have a continued dialogue.89 
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Like the Catholics, the Protestants made critical statements on the 
attack. The leader of the DGI, T.B. Simatupang, wrote that for some people the 
attack was influenced by the former Islamic rebellious group (implying the 
Darul Islam movement) or the Communists; others said that it was because 
some people considered South Sulawesi as an Islamic region and therefore 
their understanding contradicted that of the Christians who understood 
any region of the country from the Pancasila (read: nationalist) perspective 
rather than that of religion; and some even said that it was a part of a plan 
to narrow the movement space of the Christians in the whole country. 90 We 
can assume that these possible explanations were actually the views found 
among the Christians because all of them tried to represent the Muslims as 
the enemy of Pancasila and the Christians. In addition, none of Simatupang’s 
possible explanations refers to the Muslim claim that the attack was trig-
gered by a blasphemy against the prophet and the aggressiveness of the 
Christian missions. J.C.T. Simorangkir, however, in his speech to the national 
congress of Parkindo in Bandung, 18-22 October 1967, partially respond-
ed to the Muslim claim. “We must acknowledge anyway that certain ways 
have been adopted by certain Protestant and Catholic missionaries that can 
endanger the cooperation and even the duty to proclaim the Gospel itself,” 
he said. However, the main problem for him was not the aggressiveness of 
certain missionaries but religious freedom. He also praised the DGI of South 
Sulawesi that already corrected H.K. Mangunbahan who had committed 
blasphemy against Muhammad, even though it was “due to a provocative 
question of his Muslim student.”91 
Despite the Muslim attack, the military apparently did not want to 
cancel the General Assembly of the DGI in Makassar. General Sjarif Thajeb, 
one of the Vice Speakers of the Parliament (DPRGR), said that the Assembly 
should be allowed to proceed in the city because all regions in the coun-
try should be shared by all Indonesian people regardless of their respec-
tive religious backgrounds.92 Therefore, under the protection of the secu-
rity forces, the General Assembly was successfully held. In response to the 
attack, the delegates of the Assembly said that it was “an internal violation 
(perongrongan) of Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945.”93 The DGI leaders 
also encouraged the delegates in the Assembly to be more enthusiastic in 
proclaiming the Gospel.94 In a published message, the Assembly of the DGI 
reasserted that the Indonesian Constitution guarantees religious freedom 
for all citizens, and the Christians could accept a law concerning inter-reli-
gious relations on condition that it was produced by state authorities and 
based on the Pancasila, the Constitution of 1945 and Human Rights.95
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The Deadlock of the Inter-religious Consultation 
The ‘law concerning inter-religious relations’ mentioned in DGI’s 
message above apparently indicates that the DGI had already heard some-
thing about a certain Government plan to solve the Muslim-Christian con-
flict. Indeed, about two months after the Muslim attack in Makassar, on 30 
November 1967, the Government organized an Inter-religious Consultation. 
T.B. Simatupang noted that, after the General Assembly in Makassar, the DGI 
and MAWI (The High Council of the Indonesian Bishops) received a letter 
from the Government containing a draft of an agreement that was expected 
to be signed by the leaders of the religious groups on the day of the Inter-
religious Consultation. Both DGI and MAWI then asked the Government for 
more information regarding the draft.96 Probably to clarify the intention 
behind the draft and to find common ground among the invited partici-
pants, especially between Muslim and Christian leaders, two days before 
the Consultation, the personal assistant to the President, General Alamsyah 
Ratu Perwiranegara, and the new Minister of Religion, Mohammad Dach-
lan 97 organized a private meeting for direct consultation. 
The crucial issue discussed in the meeting was the draft of a char-
ter proposed by the Government. Both Muslim and Christian leaders could 
agree on one point of the draft, that is, to establish an Inter-religious Consul-
tation Board. However, the Christians disagreed with another crucial point, 
namely that religious propagation should not be directed towards people 
who already had a religion.98 In Muslim circles this idea had been previously 
around. Niewenhuijze noted that, inspired by the policy of the Dutch colo-
nial Government to close some areas, especially the Muslim majority areas, 
for Christian missionary activities, by the early 1950s, there was a fierce 
debate in the Parliament of the State of East Indonesia between Muslims 
and Hindus on the one hand, and the Christians on the other, on this issue.99 
Moreover, as has been mentioned before, in his explanatory speech for the 
Parliamentary Question, Lukman Harun also promoted a similar view. Last 
but not least, this view was also in line, though not identical, with both 
Soekarno’s Presidential Decree No. 1 1965 and the MPRS’s Decree No. XXVII/ 
1966 dictating that there were recognized religions in the country. On the 
other hand, the Christians disagreed with the restriction and proposed an 
alternative formulation in which it was stated that without reducing reli-
gious freedom, religious propagation should avoid ways that could engen-
der inter-religious tension.100 
Despite the disagreement of the Christians with the idea of restricting 
missionary activities, when the Consultation was held, the Government still 
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voiced the earlier proposal. In his opening speech, Soeharto said that the 
Consultation was held because of the current symptoms of inter-religious 
conflict in some regions of the country that might endanger the unity of 
Indonesia. He also repeated what he said in Parliament that the state ideol-
ogy Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 guarantee religious freedom to 
every citizen but at the same time the freedom should not lead to instability. 
In addition, although Soeharto seems to show an accommodation of the 
Christian interest in foreign aid by repeating the argument of the universal-
ity of religion, he tended to argue for the restriction of the Christian mission. 
He said: 101 
The Government will not hinder any endeavor to propagate religion. It is a 
great duty for all religions to invite those who do not have religion, who are 
still in Indonesia, to be convinced followers of religion… But the Government 
must feel annoyed when the propagation of religion is merely aimed at mul-
tiplying the numbers of followers, especially when the ways of propagation 
could create the impression that they were directed to the people who already 
embraced another religion. 
How did the Muslim and Christian speakers defend their respec-
tive positions in the Consultation? The Christian speakers, A.M. Tambunan 
(Protestant) and I.J. Kasimo (Catholic) developed a nationalist rhetoric. A.M. 
Tambunan talked about nationalism as a common historical experience and 
destiny encompassing religious and ethnic differences. 
Our Consultation is a National Consultation because we are trying to overcome 
things that can endanger our unity and integrity as a nation. Our Consultation 
is a National Consultation because we are the participants of the Consultation 
looking at ourselves as the inheritors of our common history as a nation, 
among other things, our common struggle to defend our Pancasila state from 
internal and external danger, as it is witnessed by the graves of the heroes in 
all parts of our country. Our Consultation is a National Consultation because we 
are bound to the same goal by a shared ‘destiny.’ Our Consultation is a National 
Consultation because all of the problems we face will be included and solved 
within the framework of our Pancasila state.102 
The same voice can be heard from I. J. Kasimo, the prominent Catholic 
politician when he said:
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The history of our nationhood shows that the independence struggle of the 
Indonesian nation did not pay attention to religious, ethnic and geographic dif-
ferences; [the people] were united in making sacrifices in the struggle to realize 
the great ideal: the independence of the nation…It should be mentioned here 
that more or less 40 years ago, the Youth Oath was declared: one nation, one 
people, one language. This oath was declared by the Indonesian youth regard-
less of the differences mentioned before.103 
Why did the Christians use a nationalist rhetoric? As a religious minor-
ity, the Christians felt that a nationalist ideology was the best option to pro-
tect their interests in the midst of the Muslim majority. In addition, the politi-
cal context was also relevant to the nationalist rhetoric because, as we shall 
see in Chapter 3, the ideological battle between the secular nationalists 
and the Islamic oriented groups began again in this period. In this regard, 
the Christians, the ruling army and the secular Muslims were all opposed to 
Islamic ideology. 
While the Christians employed a nationalist rhetoric, the Muslims pre-
ferred to resort to historical apologetic. For instance, Idham Chalid, a Muslim 
traditionalist leader and the Minister of Social Welfare said, “Actually if we 
study a bit deeper, we shall find that in this Indonesian soil it is not appropri-
ate to have religiously motivated conflicts because the coming of religions 
to Indonesia was historically quite unique that is called in scientific term 
a ‘peaceful penetration.’”104 In this regard, although Idham did not specify 
what the religion that came peacefully was, in the Muslim discourse it often 
means Islam, not Christianity. This is because among the Muslims, Christian-
ity is often associated with colonialism, regardless of the actual complex 
relations between the two. This historical apology can also be found in the 
speech of the former Minister of Religion and the leader of traditionalist 
Muslims, K.H. Masjkur. He argued that although in Indonesian history Mus-
lims contributed a lot to the struggle for independence, now some people 
tried to neglect this contribution and accuse the Muslims of being non-
nationalists and anti-Pancasila.105 Masjkur, however, did not clearly explain 
the identity of the people who ignored the Muslim contribution, but one 
may guess that he had the Christians in his mind. 
In addition to the historical apologetic, the outspoken reformist Mus-
lim intellectual and the first Minister of Religion, Muhammad Rasjidi, devel-
oped a cultural apologetic in relation to the West and the Christians. He said, 
because the western countries could colonize African and Asian countries 
before the Second World War, they were proud of their success and under-
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estimated anything from the non-western people. For Rasjidi, this attitude 
was nothing but “the arrogance of cultural superiority.” Rasjidi then implic-
itly accused the Christians of having the same arrogance when he said: “We, 
as an old man, still can remember that if one could not speak Dutch, one 
would not be appreciated, and also the religion of the Dutch was considered 
better than the religion of ordinary people.”106
According to Rasjidi, the “arrogance of cultural superiority” is also 
expressed in the ideas of modernism, tolerance and human rights. Rasjidi 
said, the Christians claimed that their duty was to modernize the world. This 
implies that other religions were not modern. For him, the truth was that 
modernization was not inherent in Christianity because there were many 
other Christian countries whose lives were very far from being modern 
such as in Ethiopia, Latin America and others. Like ‘modernity’, ‘tolerance’ 
is another western concept used by Christians. Having summarized the his-
tory of religious conflicts in Europe to the end when the concept of religious 
tolerance was introduced, Rasjidi concluded that, “tolerance is a Christian 
idea for a Christian society.”107 Rasjidi then argued further that: “The toler-
ance promoted by the Christians now means that the Islamic society should 
keep silent whey they see that the Muslims are Christianized everywhere in 
all kinds of ways, including material persuasion. We cannot accept this.”108 
Similarly, for Rasjidi, the origin of the idea of human rights was a reaction to 
the Church’s monopoly of all rights but the Indonesian Christians used it to 
justify their attempts to convert Muslims. With reference to Wilfred Cantwell 
Smith, Rasjidi argued that the arrogance of the West was rooted in the Chris-
tian doctrine that the whole world was divided into two sides: the ‘damned’ 
and the ‘saved’. The duty of the Christians was to save the damned by con-
verting them to Christianity.
The Christian rhetoric on nationalism and the Muslim historical and 
cultural apologetics were certainly developed to support their respective 
positions on the main issue: the restriction of religious propagation. The 
Protestant spokesman, A.M. Tambunan, presented the issue with reference 
to a dialogue between himself and Natsir. Tambunan said: “Last time, in a 
small meeting I explained that as Christians, we are bound to a divine man-
date that among other things, is formulated in what follows:‘…and you will 
be witnesses for me in Jerusalem, in all Judea and Samaria and to the ends of 
the earth’ (Act 1:8). In another place, it is mentioned as follows: ‘Go into the 
whole world and preach the gospel to the whole human race’ (Mark 16:15).” 
According to Tambunan, Natsir who was present in the meeting responded 
to him that in Islam there was also a similar teaching called da‘wah. Tam-
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bunan went on to say: “Muhammad Natsir formulated our problem on this 
issue as follows: ‘Can we achieve a modus vivendi to live in our multi-reli-
gious state without betraying our respective beliefs?’ I think, the problem 
formulated by Natsir, cannot be entirely solved in this Consultation.” 109
Having heard Tambunan’s speech, Natsir who was not scheduled to be 
one of the presenters in the Consultation, took the opportunity to respond. 
Natsir said that to undertake da‘wah, Muslims have their ethical codes as 
a guide. Among the codes is that religious beliefs should not (and cannot) 
be enforced and that the da‘wah should be done through wisdom, good 
advice and sharing opinions in a good way. In addition, according to Natsir, 
Muslims do not consider the Christians as heathens, but as the People of the 
Book (ahl al-kitāb). With regard to the da‘wah, Muslims just invited them to 
the Islamic conception of monotheism and if they do not respond positively, 
the Muslims are advised to declare that they are Muslims, Ishhadū biannā 
muslimūn (QS 3:64). For Natsir, this means that Muslims can coexist peace-
fully with the Christians even though the latter do not accept Islam. The only 
thing the Muslims want from the Christians is to respect their Islamic iden-
tity: “We are the Muslims who already have sibghah, a distinctive identity. 
Therefore, do not disturb our identity! Do not make us the target of Christia-
nisation (pengkristenan) activities! That is the only thing that we want from 
our Christian co-citizens,” Natsir said.110 
Unlike Tambunan and Natsir who referred to the teachings of their 
respective religions, the leader of the Catholic party, I.J. Kasimo, explained 
that to solve the problems of inter-religious disputes, one just has to go 
back to the law of the state. “The solution based on law is the strongest 
way to maintain the stability and harmony in society”, argued Kasimo. 111 He 
explained further that what he meant by law was the existing law within the 
frame of the Constitution of 1945, Pancasila, human rights and Soeharto’s 
presidential speech on 16 August 1967. By referring to human rights, as the 
Protestants did in the Conference in Salatiga and the General Assembly of 
DGI in Makassar, it is clear that Kasimo could not accept the Muslim proposal 
to restrict missionary activities. In this respect, Kasimo proposed that the 
Inter-religious Consultation should call all religious groups in the country 
to be tolerant towards each other without reducing everybody’s right of 
freedom to choose a religion based on one’s conviction and to carry out the 
obligation to spread one’s religion “through ways that do not contradict the 
principles of just and civilized humanitarianism and in line with the noble 
ethics of conscience and the order of the applied law.”112 
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In the Consultation, the Christians also tried to convince the Muslim 
leaders that there was nothing to worry about from Christian missions. The 
Christian explanation, however, did not convince the Muslims. This means 
that there was no mutual trust between the leaders of the two religious 
groups anymore. Tambunan said:
There are two things that I want to say. First is regarding the news that I just 
heard a few days ago, as if there were a plan to Christianize Indonesia within 
several years. 113 Not only to my knowledge that there is no such a plan, but also 
in terms of pure Christian thought, I think that plan cannot be made. According 
to the belief of the Christians, they are the witnesses of the truth and salvation 
in God, Jesus Christ, and only God by His Spirit can lead one to faith. That is why 
I say that within this frame of thought we cannot make a plan to Christianize a 
region in a certain number of years…
The second thing that I want to say is what has been heard sometimes, that 
is, “la conquête du monde musulman”, means conquering the Muslim world. 
To my knowledge, which is not that deep, this term originally came from 
some missionaries some decades ago. This term and the conquering mode of 
thought, I am sure, is not found in the thought of Christian witnesses anywhere. 
What I can assert is that this term and that mode of thought cannot be found 
in the Indonesian Christian thought concerning the divine call and order to 
witness. 114 
In response to Tambunan’s denial, Rasjidi said:
Dr. Tambunan just said that recently there has been an expression, “la con-
quête du monde musulman”, conquering the Muslim world. He said that it is 
not true; the case was some decades ago and there is no intention to conquer 
the Muslim world, that is, to Christianize it. Although Dr. Tambunan said there is 
no such thing, I say there is. I have just finished reading the book by Dr. Hendrik 
Kraemer entitled The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. In this book 
we can read clearly the Christian plans and efforts to Christianize the World, 
especially Indonesia.115
It should be noted that the expression “la conquête du monde musul-
man” was not from Kraemer. It was a title of a special issue of La Revue du 
Monde Musulman, published in 1913 and written by A. Le Chatelier, the edi-
tor of the journal.116 Why did Rasjidi refer to Kraemer not to Chatelier? In 
another work, Rasjidi actually referred to A. Le Chatelier, and it seems that, 
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for Rasjidi, Kraemer’s zeal to convert Muslims and his neo-orthodox theol-
ogy was parallel with that of Samuel Zwemer, the most important of the 
missionaries described in Chatelier’s work.117 In addition, Kraemer’s works 
had been known to the Indonesian Muslims, and his Christian Message in a 
Non-Christian World was mentioned even in the year of its publication (1938) 
in an article of Natsir.118 
The Consultation finally could not solve the whole dispute between the 
two parties. Thus, like what happened in the open talk two days earlier, both 
parties agreed to establish an Inter-religious Consultation Body, but the Chris-
tians did not accept an article of the draft of the charter concerning the restric-
tion of religious propagation only for the people who did not have religion yet, 
while the Muslims could not accept the Christian view that religious freedom 
should not be reduced. On this point, the Consultation came to deadlock until 
midnight, and Soeharto did not come to close it officially.119 A journalist who 
was present at the Consultation reported that T.B. Simatupang “struggled like a 
lion to defend his Christian faith and conviction; his clothes became wet from 
the excessive sweat of his body; Ben Mang Reng Say, a Catholic, just nodded to 
confirm what Simatupang said while Natsir and Masykur did not speak much 
because they agreed with the Government’s proposal.”120 
After the Consultation, the Muslims in general blamed the Christians 
as those who caused the failure of the Consultation. On the other hand, 
on 5 December 1967, A.M. Tambunan met the Acting President Soeharto 
to explain the position of the Christians in the Consultation, and on the 
same day Tambunan said to the press that for him the Consultation had not 
entirely failed, although its result was not satisfactory.121 In response to the 
Christian statement that the Consultation had not failed, HAMKA in his edi-
torial for Pandji Masjarakat sarcastically wrote that as one of the participants 
of the Consultation, he eventually also concluded that the Consultation was 
actually successful and positive for both Muslims and Christians. It was posi-
tive for the Christians because in the Consultation the Christians openly 
declared that it was their sacred mission to proselytize Muslims. He argued 
further that, although in the Consultation Tambunan denied that there was 
a plan to Christianize Indonesia within 50 years, the denial was only of the 
number of years, not of the intention to convert the whole Indonesia! It was 
also positive for the Muslims because now they were strongly convinced 
that the Christians would not be happy unless Muslims followed their reli-
gion, as the Qur’an said (QS 2:120). It was positive for the Muslims because 
they now became much more aware of the Christian threat of “a new style 
of crusade” funded by foreign countries!122 
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On 7 December 1967, the press reported the speech of the Minister of 
Religion, Mohammad Dachlan, to the training of the PII in Palembang.123 In 
the speech, Dachlan said that the year 1967 was “characterized by unpleas-
ant events caused by the activities of a certain religious group trying system-
atically to change Islam, the religion of the majority, into their own religion.” 
Dachlan then explained that the missionary activities such as distributing 
rice to the poor, opening health centres and schools, door-to-door visits to 
Muslim homes and misusing Qur’anic verses to deceive and convert igno-
rant Muslims, all of these eventually led to the Parliamentary Questions and 
tensions among the supporters of the New Order. 
Only two days later, both the Christian newspapers, Kompas and 
Sinar Harapan, published a statement of the DGI and MAWI, in which they 
strongly denied Dachlan’s accusation. After the release of the Christian 
statement, the Islamic groups, both the traditionalists and reformists, soon 
made a joint statement supporting Dachlan’s speech.124 However, perhaps 
due to the ‘warning’ of the military, on 13 December 1967, the Director of 
Information of the Department of Religion explained that the Minister’s 
statement in Palembang should be understood as an attempt to main-
tain national unity and integrity rather than to create tensions and con-
flicts.125
The Controversy on Freedom to Change Religion
Our discussion so far demonstrates that the Christians tried to 
defend the freedom to build churches, to hold an assembly, and to preach 
Christianity to everybody. Despite Muslim opposition, the first and the sec-
ond freedoms are already covered by section 2, article 29 of the 1945 Con-
stitution: “The state guarantees the freedom of each citizen to embrace 
his or her religion and to observe the rituals according to his or her reli-
gion and belief.” The freedom to preach religion to the people of another 
religion, however, is not explicitly mentioned in this article. Likewise, this 
article does not include explicitly the freedom to change religion as it was 
formulated in the article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR).126 Therefore, for Christians, the best formulation of religious free-
dom was only found in the Constitution of 1949 of the Federal Republic 
of Indonesia because it was totally in line with the article 18 of the UDHR, 
while the formulations in both the Provisional Constitution of 1950 and 
the Constitution of 1945 (that had been reapplied since 1959) were still 
unsatisfactory, particularly because they did not explicitly mention the 
freedom to change religion.127 
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As the hope for a more democratic system reemerged after the fall of 
Soekarno, many Indonesian intellectuals were preoccupied with the issue 
of human rights and the Christians were actively involved. From 14-18 June 
1967, a national symposium on human rights was organized by Lembaga 
Pembela Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia (Institute for the Protection of Human 
Rights) and took place in the BAPPENAS building in Jakarta.128 A few months 
later, on 3-5 November 1967, there was another seminar on human rights 
with specific reference to “the rule of law and arrest practices in Indonesia” 
and located in the Parahyangan Catholic University, Bandung. This semi-
nar was also organized by the Lembaga Pembela Hak-Hak Asasi Manusia 
in cooperation with Parahyangan Catholic University, Maranatha Christian 
University and Pajajaran State University. The Bandung seminar’s topic was 
obviously a response to the unlawful arrests of Communist suspects that 
were often carried out by the police or the army.129 Both symposium and 
seminar were also intended as a preliminary discussion before a charter on 
Human Rights was expected to be ratified by the MPRS in March 1968. 
In its account of a session of the symposium on the issue of religious 
freedom, Kompas reported that Muslim and Christian scholars had different 
views of religious freedom without mentioning what the difference was.130 
The respective papers by T.B. Simatupang and Muhammad Rasjidi presented 
to the seminar can probably give us certain clues about this difference. In 
his paper, Simatupang implied that the UDHR had to be totally accepted 
and therefore, religious leaders and the Government should cooperate to 
defend religious freedom.131 On the other hand, Rasjidi mentioned his usual 
view that the Christians deliberately used the idea of religious freedom to 
justify their efforts to convert Muslims. For Rasjidi, religious freedom was 
simply freedom to practice one’s religion in one’s religious community.132 
As has been mentioned, the seminar on human rights was intended 
to be a preparation for a Charter on Human Rights, expected to be ratified by 
the MPRS in 1968. Nonetheless, the MPRS eventually failed to ratify the char-
ter particularly because of the unresolved controversy between Islamic and 
Christian parties on the issue of religious freedom. 133 Unlike the Christians, 
the Muslims could not accept the concept of religious freedom, especially 
freedom to change religion mentioned in the article 18 of the UDHR. Besides 
the Muslim fear of Christian missions, the Muslim objection to this article 
was influenced by the conservative idea that in Islam apostasy is not only 
forbidden but also deserves capital punishment. In this respect, the Islamic 
principle that there is no enforcement of religion (lā ikrāha fi al-dīn) seems to 
be applied only to those who have not become Muslims yet.134
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Muslim-Christian Rivalry in Religious Propagation
For the Muslims, the frequent insistence of the Christians that reli-
gious freedom means “freedom of conversion, freedom to adhere to another 
religion than one’s prior religion and freedom to preach one’s religion to 
persons of other convictions”135 was a clear invitation to a free competition 
in religious proselytism. Accordingly, the Muslim programme after the disa-
greements with the Christians was to reinforce the da‘wah movement. Sev-
eral conferences on Islamic da‘wah were organized only a few months after 
the MPRS’s session of 1968. For reformist Muslims, however, the concentra-
tion on da‘wah had been an option several months before, namely when 
they realized that the hope to rehabilitate their party, Masyumi, had gone 
with the wind. The reformist Muslims were initially optimistic of a return to 
the political stage because they previously proved to be a stubborn enemy 
of the PKI and Soekarno. Their expectation, however, did not come true 
because, by the end of 1966, the army prevented them from rehabilitating 
the Masyumi, and although the army later endorsed the establishment of a 
new party called Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI/Parmusi), the former promi-
nent leaders of the Masyumi were not allowed to lead that party. Thus, with-
out the leaders, the Parmusi could not be the surrogate of the Masyumi.136 
Some former Masyumi leaders then decided to leave the arena of formal 
politics and concentrated on da‘wah activities. Muhammad Natsir, the most 
prominent former leader of Masyumi, on 9 May 1967, established the Dewan 
Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII (The Indonesian Council of Islamic Propa-
gation). When Natsir was asked about his motives behind DDII, he said, “we 
are no longer conducting dakwah through politics, but engaging in political 
activities through dakwah.”137 The Muslim controversies with the Christians 
from June 1967 to March 1968 seem to justify the reformist option further. In 
addition, for the traditionalist Muslims, the da‘wah issue was also important 
because although the position of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) as a political 
party still survived, it was NU members that had more direct contacts with 
the abangan at the grassroots in Java. 
One of the many seminars on da‘wah was that organized by the Ulama 
Council of West Java in Tasikmalaya from 5 to 7 May, 1968. Both reformist 
and traditionalist figures attended the seminar. Idham Chalid, the leader of 
the traditionalists and Muhammad Natsir, the leader of the reformists, pre-
sented their respective papers at the seminar. Both leaders expressed their 
concern with the weaknesses of the Islamic da‘wa activities and suggested 
to reinforce them. As a former leader of Masyumi party who just turned to 
da‘wah activities, Natsir explained that there had been discussions among 
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Muslims on da‘wah programmes because it had been ignored for quite a 
long time. The reason was, according to Natsir, the Muslims had paid most 
of their attention to nurturing the political institution called the State. In this 
regard, Natsir criticized Islamic organizations that transformed themselves 
into political ones or at least divided their attention and energies between 
the social/da‘wah and the political field. This strategy, according to Natsir, 
was wrong because “we forget that no matter how beautiful the political 
building that we want to build is, finally it must have a foundation on which 
it stands.”138 Natsir then reminded the audience that it was not impossible 
that Islam would be annihilated in Indonesia as happened in Spain. For him, 
the Christian position in the Inter-religious Consultation clearly indicated 
that, “the Catholic and Protestant leaders strongly desire to Christianize the 
Islamic community in Indonesia.”139
In line with Natsir, Idham Chalid also referred to the Islamic history 
in Spain and warned the audience that it should not happen in Indonesia. 
Idham, however, did not mention explicitly the context of the current Mus-
lim Christian controversy. He argued that Muslims were to blame, not the 
other, if Islam could not survive in Indonesia. He said:
With regard to the problem of da‘wah, we are often faced with the truth of 
the idea that well-organized falsehood sometimes can vanquish unorganized 
truth…There is no guarantee that Islam will survive in Indonesia…The one that 
can guarantee its survival is only the Islamic community itself…We often feel 
jealous of the development of ‘the other’ in doing their works, but we do not 
have an introspection regarding what we must do.140 
For the da‘wah programmes, the Muslims, particularly the reform-
ist Muslims of DDII, probably developed contacts with the Muslim Middle 
East, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This is clearly shown by a book 
in Arabic explaining the flood of foreign aid for Christian missions in Indo-
nesia, the Meulaboh and Makassar affairs, and the allegedly Christian plan 
to Christianize Java in 20 years and the whole of Indonesia in 50 years. The 
book also includes the Arabic translations of Soeharto’s, Rasjidi’s and Natsir’s 
speeches in the Inter-religious Consultation and Lukman Harun’s Parliamen-
tary Question speech. The book is complemented by a survey of the foreign 
Christian institutions working in Indonesia. The book was probably written 
by a reformist Indonesian Muslim and circulated in the Middle East to gain 
financial support for da‘wah programmes.141
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On the other hand, despite Muslim negative attitudes, the Christians 
continued their missionary activities and the zeal to convert more and more 
people was quite strong or even became stronger in both Catholic and Prot-
estant circles. In an article published in 1969, Simatupang explains that, as 
a response to the varied resistance to the Christian mission, the participants 
of the General Assembly of DGI in Makassar reasserted that the task of pro-
claiming the Gospel is essential to the Christian faith. For Simatupang, “to 
preach the Gospel to all creatures in order that they may believe will remain 
one of the most important aspects of the Christian mission to the end of the 
earth and to the close of the age.”142 In this regard, Islam is seen as a prepa-
ration for, rather than an obstacle to the Christian missions because “Islam 
being a post-Christian religion in one way or another contains the impact of 
the Gospel. So with the coming of Islam to Indonesia, in an indirect way, the 
influence of Christianity reached the country prior to the coming of Christi-
anity itself.”143 In line with Simatupang, Cardinal Darmojuwono said, “to be a 
Catholic is the same as to be a missionary.” He also explained further that, in 
the image of the Church as the mystical body of Christ, every Catholic as a 
part of the body, be they a priest or lay, young or old, villagers or city dwell-
ers, all of them should take their parts in developing the Catholic Church in 
the country.144 
The enthusiasm for evangelization among the Christians was also 
accompanied by the awareness that the most immediate problem to solve 
was how to serve the huge number of new converts. Simatupang said, if 
the number of the Christians were double or triple, then the number of the 
ministers should also be doubled or tripled and the role of the laity should 
be maximized and Christian service to society through schools, universi-
ties, hospitals and orphanages, should be increased. In addition, for him the 
Christian mission should be involved in the struggle for justice amid the 
process of modernization in the country. To do all of these, Indonesian Chris-
tians should cooperate with other Christians all over the world. 145 By the 
same token, the problem of “the harvest is plentiful, but the labourers are 
few” was also discussed among Catholics. An article in a Catholic magazine 
suggested that to overcome the lack of the labourers, the Church should 
provide more roles for the lay-people. The article also argued that one must 
learn from the history of the Church that any successful effort needed cou-
rageous action and control of one’s self to resist the temptation of richness 
because richness often led to weaknesses!146 Due to the shortage of priests, 
there was even a discussion among the Catholics to ask the Holy See for 
permission to ordain married men to the priesthood. Moreover, because the 
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majority of bishops in the country in this period were not Indonesian, some 
argued for an Indonesianization of the Church leadership.147 
As has been stated, the new converts were mostly those Javanese 
abangan who became Communist suspects or at least very vulnerable to 
being accused of being Communists, including their families. It is not surpris-
ing, therefore, if the Christians showed more sympathetic attitudes towards 
these people.148 This attitude seems to have appeared among the Protes-
tants. In their Conference in Salatiga 1967, they clearly said that although 
Communism is opposed to the Christian faith, one should investigate the 
reasons why people became attracted to it and should treat the Communist 
members humanely based on love and patience.149 As has been noted, in 
the Bandung seminar, November 1967, the lay Catholics in the Parahyangan 
University participated in the discussion on the abuses of human rights in 
the unlawful arrest of Communist suspects. However, only after almost two 
years, we find that, on a statement, released on 31 March 1969, Cardinal 
Darmojuwono lamented the fact that there were some people who were 
tortured or arrested without evidence of being guilty. He said this could 
not be accepted because “those who are guilty should be treated justly and 
in accordance with human rights.” 150 He also suggested that the families of 
the political prisoners should be helped mentally and materially and not be 
isolated from social life. 
The Catholic effort to help the political prisoners and their families 
was substantially implemented. A Catholic priest who worked for this men-
tal and material help effort told me that based on his position as a supervisor 
of Pancasila mental guidance (pembina Pancasila) and through a network 
within the army, he could arrange for some other Catholic priests to come 
to the Communist prisoners in Buru island (the penal centre in the Moluc-
cas), under one condition: they were not allowed to talk about the prison-
ers to the public. Under the protection of the army, he also could ‘smuggle’ 
food, especially rice and milk, to the islands. In order to ensure that the food 
would reach the prisoners, he also arranged certain portions of the food to 
be given to the policemen and other staff of the prison. To help the families 
of the prisoners to survive, he arranged a course for their wives to learn the 
skills of operating sewing machines. He also asked some university students 
in Yogyakarta to be the ‘parents’ for the children of the prisoners. For this, 
he rented some houses that could be occupied by a number of these chil-
dren. In addition, he provided clinics for medical services in the prisons of 
the Communists by organizing students of the medical faculty and nurses 
of some hospitals to do this job. To provide the medicine, he tried to find 
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outside resources. He acknowledged that for this material help, he received 
foreign aid from Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, he denied that 
this assistance was intended to convert people to Catholicism. He claimed 
that some of his ‘adopted children’ of Communist parents had even recently 
performed the pilgrimage to Mecca.151 Similarly, the Protestant Churches 
also helped the prisoners on Buru. Under the coordination of the DGI, they 
provided spiritual and socio-economic support to the prisoners and their 
families. Certain skill-training was given to the prisoners in order that once 
they were released they could find jobs and survive. Many of these people, 
unsurprisingly, converted to Protestantism.152
 Conclusion
The emergence of Soeharto’s New Order was mainly designated by 
the political collapse of the Communists and the increasing significance of 
religion in national politics. The identification of Communism with Atheism 
and anti-religion justified the importance of religion in national politics that 
in turn led to the necessity of formal affiliation with one of the recognized 
religions. One of the results of this situation was that both Islam and Chris-
tianity shared a high number of new converts. While in 1965-1966 the Mus-
lim and Christian leaders cooperated with the army in the fight against the 
Communists, the political significance of religion in national politics eventu-
ally led them to conflict and rivalry. Certainly, the Muslim political frustra-
tion towards the ruling army and the Christian alliance with the latter helped 
increase the conflict as well.
Fear of Christian missions exacerbated by political frustration led the 
Muslim leaders to defensive and sharp statements against the Christians. 
The Muslims said that Christian mission was ‘religious expansionism’, ‘foreign 
intervention’ and ‘new style of crusade’; all of them referred to the so-called 
‘Kristenisasi’ (Christianisation).153 The Muslim leaders, therefore, demanded 
that the Government control foreign aid and restrict religious missions only 
to people who had no religion. In response to the Muslim demand, the Chris-
tians argued for religious freedom, including freedom to build new places of 
worships, to hold religious assemblies, to preach religion to the followers of 
another religion, and to change religion. 
 The position of the state in these conflicts was in general ambigu-
ous. The state approved the Muslim opposition to the newly built church 
in Meulaboh but it protected the Christian General Assembly in Makassar. 
The state welcomed foreign aid for Christian institutions but it also tried to 
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support the Muslim demand not to make Muslims the targets of Christian 
missions. In Chapter 2, we will discuss the other cases in which the Govern-
ment demonstrated the same ambiguity. The state’s ambiguity was appar-
ently because its interest was neither in religious freedom nor in contain-
ing Christian missions but in socio-political stability. It was for this reason 
that the Government pressured both Christian and Muslim leaders to stop 
discussing their respective Parliamentary Questions. Likewise, being the 
first inter-religious dialogue initiated by the New Order, the Inter-religious 
Consultation was not primarily intended to build mutual understanding but 
simply to end the conflict. This issue is to be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
It is also important to note that the battle between the Muslim dis-
course on Christianisation and the Christian defense of religious freedom 
was also related to the ideological battle between the proponents of Islam-
ic and secular nationalist ideology. Being the supporters of the latter, the 
Christians usually developed a nationalist rhetoric while the Muslim lead-
ers in return promoted historical and cultural apologetics (that the Muslims 
were in fact true nationalists, and that religious freedom was a Western and 
Christian concept). The Muslim-Christian ideological debate, including the 
debates on the basis of the state, the position of Islamic law in national legal 
system and the position of religion in national education will be discussed 
in Chapters 3 to 5 respectively.
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2. Against Christianisation 
Like a snowball, the discourse on Christianisation versus religious 
freedom discussed in the previous chapter continued to build up in the 
following decades, and the state became more closely involved. In 1967 
Muslims in Meulaboh argued that they could not tolerate a newly built 
Methodist church because the majority of people living there were Mus-
lims; then in 1969, the Government issued a decree in which this religious 
regionalism was accommodated. Lukman Harun’s Parliamentary Questions 
in 1967 demanded that the Government control foreign aid for religious 
institutions; and in the same year, during the Inter-religious Consultation, 
the Muslims argued for the restriction of religious propagation to those out-
side the recognised religions. More than a decade later, in 1978, these two 
Muslim positions were translated into Government decrees. Finally, in 1967 
the Muslims in Makassar opposed the General Assembly of the DGI; then in 
the early 1970s, the Islamic groups opposed the General Assembly of the 
World Council of Churches (WCC) that was to be held in Jakarta in 1975. In 
their reactions to these cases, as in 1967, the Christians consistently argued 
for religious freedom. Besides these continuing problems, a rather different 
issue emerged in 1981: the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) produced a 
fatwa prohibiting Muslims from attending common Christmas celebrations. 
This fatwa eventually resulted in tensions between the Government, the MUI 
and the Christians. In this chapter, I shall discuss these cases in some detail.
1. The Restriction on Establishing New Places of Worship
In September 1968, the Catholic magazine, Peraba, reported that a 
Protestant church in Asahan, North Sumatra, and a storage room of a Catho-
lic school in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, were burned, probably by Mus-
lims. With regard to the case in Samarinda, it was reported that the Muslims 
around the school made a statement, saying that any new building (place 
of worship, school, clinic, dormitory) sponsored by a certain religion should 
not be established, unless it was endorsed by the society in the area.1 The 
Samarinda case apparently did not attract much attention from the Govern-
ment and politicians in Jakarta. 
Some months later, however, on 28 April 1969, a similar case hap-
pened in Slipi, Jakarta. Muslims attacked and burned a newly built church 
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of GPIB (Gereja Protestan Indonesia Barat). When the Muslim leader Muham-
mad Natsir was questioned about the incident, he said that it should be 
understood by looking at the causes. For him, the cause was nothing but 
the Christianisation programmes directed at the Muslim community, one of 
them was to build churches in Muslim majority areas. He explained further 
that in Slipi, there were already five churches for 350 Christians found among 
35,650 Muslims living in that area. This was why, he said, the establishment 
of the GPIB church did not receive permission from the Governor of Jakarta. 
The Muslims, therefore, protested, but there was apparently no measure 
taken by the authorities. The Muslim feeling of powerlessness, he said, even-
tually led to the physical attack. Natsir acknowledged that the attack was 
against the law, but for him this should not have happened if the Christians 
had not broken the law of the Government.2 In contrast, Peraba quoted the 
Protestant newspaper, Sinar Harapan, reporting that the attack was actually 
planned in a meeting of 100 people one day before. Thus, besides criticising 
the late responses of the security forces to the incident, Peraba accused the 
attack of being similar to that of the Communist tactics of unilateral action. 
Last but not least, the Christians demanded that those who were responsi-
ble should be judged by the law.3 Indeed, the Government reacted to the 
case. It was reported that after the incident, the police arrested two activists 
of Anshor, the traditionalist Muslim youth organisation, as suspects, and a 
few months later, the Government dismissed two army officers, one was a 
Muslim and another a Christian, because of their connections with the Slipi 
incident.4
After these similar incidents since the Meulaboh affair in 1967, the 
Government finally decided to regulate and control two important religious 
activities that had become the polemical issues between the Muslims and 
the Christians: religious propagation, and the establishment of new places 
of worship. The Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Machmud, and the Minister 
of Religion, Mohammad Dachlan, issued a joint decree, dated 13 September 
1969, dealing with these two issues. The decree says that the Government 
will not hinder any effort to spread religion as long as it does not contra-
dict the existing law and public order. The decree authorizes the regional 
Government to control both the manner and content of religious propaga-
tion. It is also explained in the decree that religious propagation (1) should 
not lead to inter-religious conflict; (2) should not be carried out through 
intimidation, deception, force or threat; (3) should not break the law, nor 
endanger security and public order. The decree also authorizes the regional 
Government to control the establishment of new places of worship, namely 
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that people will not be allowed to build a new place of worship unless they 
get permission from the Governor or the subordinate authorized officials. To 
give permission, he or she should consider three things: (1) the view of the 
head of the Department of Religion in the region; (2) the city plan; (3) the sit-
uation and condition of the region. In addition, if it is needed (apabila perlu) 
the authorized official can ask the opinions of religious leaders and organi-
sations of the region. Finally, if there is an inter-religious dispute because of 
religious propagation or the establishment of a place of worship, the local 
Government should act as a just and neutral mediator. In case of suspected 
crime in the dispute, the settlement of the case should be brought to the 
legal authorities. 5 
The decree can be seen as a combination and modification of the 
Christian view of religious propagation, and the Muslim position on the 
issue of establishing new places of worship. In line with the Christian view, 
the decree does not restrict religious propagation only to those outside the 
recognised religions, but also, in accordance with the Muslim demand, the 
decree stipulates that to give permission for establishing new places of wor-
ship, the authorised state official must take into consideration the ‘situation 
and condition’ of the region. Moreover, the official is recommended to ask 
the opinions of religious leaders and organisations of the region. In practice, 
this recommendation has become a necessity, and therefore, it has been dif-
ficult to erect a place of worship in an area where the majority of people do 
not belong to that religion. In general, however, the decree reflects the logic 
of ‘law and order’ of the New Order’s Government. The Protestant magazine, 
Ragi Buana, published a full text of the decree and explained the Govern-
ment’s logic: “In order to maintain the unity and integrity of Indonesia and 
to avoid conflicts that could hinder the acceleration of modernization, the 
Government took an important step to overcome this problem through a 
joint decree of the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Religion 
that is expected to be a guide for the policies on religious matters in Indo-
nesia.”6
 Nonetheless, the publication of the decree in Ragi Buana did not 
result in the Christians being happy with it. About one month later, the DGI 
and MAWI issued a joint memorandum criticizing the decree. Again, the 
main argument in the memorandum was for religious freedom.
Having examined the stipulations and articles of the joint decree and heard 
the voices from the regions telling of confusion and anxieties about the pos-
sible effects in enacting these regulations, we are of the opinion that the joint 
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decree of the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs could open 
the possibility that the freedom of every citizen to follow his or her religion, 
to perform the rituals based on his or her religion and belief, and to develop 
religion in accordance with the teachings of one’s religion will not be guaran-
teed: in other words, it opens the possibility of prohibiting or refusing permission 
for something that is related to Human Rights.7 
In addition, the memorandum stated that the decree was not clear 
regarding the authority of the regional Government whether it refers to the 
province, district or sub-district authority and whether the regional Gov-
ernment had a total authority on the issue or it still depends on the central 
Government. Last but not least, the memorandum argued that because the 
decree touches the fundamental issue of Human Rights, according to the 
Indonesian legal system the ministers did not have the authority to make 
such a decree. Both the DGI and MAWI finally asked the Government to 
review the decree.8 
 Actually, the Christians’ main objection to the decree was to the 
regulations on the establishment of new places of worship. Ever since, the 
Christians have been in difficulties in establishing new churches, especially 
in Muslim majority areas. To solve the problem, the Christians sometimes 
used a house as a place for conducting the divine service. This strategy, how-
ever, did not always work because sometimes Muslims around the house 
also protested. In May 1975, the Minister of Home Affairs sent a telegram 
to all governors explaining that, based on a report of the state intelligence, 
there were disputes between Muslims and Christians in two places in Jakar-
ta because the Christians made use of a house for divine services, while the 
Muslims opposed this activity because the majority of people living in the 
environment were Muslims. The Minister of Home Affairs then instructed 
all governors to persuade people not to use a house as a church because it 
might disturb security. On the other hand, the telegram also instructed the 
governors to take security steps to avoid possible excesses. The ambiguity 
of the telegram eventually led to different interpretations. The Department 
of Religion in certain provinces held that the telegram meant that the Min-
ister of Home Affairs prohibited people from using a house as a place of 
worship. In reaction to this issue, the General Directorate of the Protestants 
of the Department of Religion in Jakarta sent a letter to all Departments 
of Religion in the provinces stating that the telegram was not intended to 
prohibit people from worshipping in a house, but to persuade them not to 
make a house a place of worship. Nonetheless, this interpretation was then 
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annulled by another telegram of the Minister of Home Affairs to all gover-
nors explaining that what was prohibited was to “to make use of a house as 
a church”, while gatherings of Christians in a house for familial purposes was 
not prohibited.9 
Despite these telegrams, and because of the difficulties in getting per-
mission to establish new churches in Muslim majority areas, the Christians 
still often used a private house or rented a hall for services and sometimes 
even established a new church without permission, and the Government 
usually did not react unless security was disturbed due to Muslim protests. 
In this respect, the Muslims often referred to the decree to justify their oppo-
sition to church buildings.10 In 1996, when a systematic attack on churches 
in Situbondo, East Java, occurred, Muslims said that only 3 out of 24 targeted 
churches had legal permission to operate.11 In reaction to this criticism, the 
Christian leaders sent a letter to the President, asking him to withdraw the 
decree based on the argument that it was against religious freedom.12 More-
over, some Christian leaders questioned whether the existing mosques also 
had legal permission. In other words, for the Christians, the implementation 
of the decree tended to be discriminatory.13 
In fact, the decree also caused difficulties for Muslims living in a Chris-
tian majority area to establish a mosque. Gerrit E. Singgih said that where 
the Christians are a majority, “even in some parts of Java, for instance those 
who live in Christian villages in East Java, they act like Christians in a Chris-
tian country. In those villages, they do not allow Muslims to buy houses or 
lands, much less to erect mosques.” 14 
 While the Christians sometimes mentioned the Muslim difficulty in 
order to justify their opposition to the decree,15 the Muslims concerned with 
Christianisation hardly talked about it, probably because they were used to 
thinking as a religious majority or perhaps for them it was a lesser evil com-
pared with allowing Christians to build new churches more freely in Muslim 
majority areas. 
The large number of denominations and the lack of ecumenism 
among the Protestants have also been among the reasons behind the emer-
gence of new church buildings. Gerrit Singgih observes that Christians usu-
ally demanded the Government provide a church in a national housing area 
(Perumnas) but if there were two different denominations of Christians liv-
ing there, they did not want to share the church, and so another denomina-
tion carried out their service in a house that would later on be transformed 
into a church. For Singgih, it is understandable if non-Christians saw this 
phenomenon as a “bad sign of trying to dominate the religious scene” and 
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if the Government did not give permission for the establishment of this 
“metamorphosing church.” He also observes that in some Perumnas areas 
one could find two church buildings of two different denominations stand-
ing side by side and even having the same service hours. On this, Singgih 
lamented: “What a bad advertisement for Christian fellowship and ecumen-
ism! If Christians cannot get together to respond to their situation, how 
much more can they get together with the non-Christians?”16 
2. Muslim Opposition to the WCC Assembly of 1975
During the New Order period, a person who played a central role in 
the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) was T.B. Simatupang. As a young 
man, T.B. Simatupang joined the Dutch colonial army and had his education 
in the Military Academy at Bandung from which he graduated in 1942. Later 
in the same year, he was captured by the Japanese and subsequently joined 
the nationalist movement. After the proclamation of independence in 1945, 
Simatupang was involved in the fight against the returning Dutch. Sima-
tupang reached the peak of his military career when he was appointed Chief 
Staff of the Armed Forces in 1951. Nonetheless, in October 1952, he had a 
strong disagreement with President Soekarno and since then was gradually 
removed from the army leadership. He was eventually pensioned off in 1959 
at the very young age of 39. 17
One day in the early 1960s, Tudung Sutan Gunung Mulia (1896-1966),18 
the founding father of three important Christian institutions: the Indonesian 
Council of Churches (DGI), the Indonesian Bible Society (LAI) and the Indo-
nesian Christian University (UKI), visited T.B. Simatupang in his house. On 
this occasion, Mulia asked Simatupang to participate in the DGI activities. 
Simatupang agreed and ever since started his new career within the DGI. 
His involvement in the DGI was dealing with the issue of the relationship 
between church and society, an issue that was to become his main concern 
for the rest of his life. For this issue, the major question was, according to 
Simatupang, how to bridge the gap between theological thought and social 
realities. Since 1962, Simatupang had been involved in the conferences on 
church and society, both at national and international levels. In 1964, he 
was invited by the World Council of Churches (WCC) to stay some months 
in Geneva to prepare for an international conference on that theme.19 Sima-
tupang chaired the section on politics when the conference was successfully 
held in 1966 in Geneva. It seems that after his involvement in the Geneva 
conference, Simatupang had become well known among the WCC function-
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aries. In the fourth Assembly of the WCC held in Uppsala, Sweden, in 1968, 
Simatupang was appointed a member of the central and executive commit-
tees of the WCC. 
It was very likely that the close relationship between Simatupang and 
the WCC was one of the reasons why Jakarta was chosen to be the place 
for the fifth Assembly of WCC (planned to be held from 23 July to 8 August 
1975). According to Simatupang, in a meeting of the executive committee 
of WCC in Sofia in 1970, there was a discussion on where the next Assem-
bly of WCC was to be held. Because the previous Assembly took place in 
Europe (Sweden), the executives wanted the next Assembly to be held in 
Asia. The success of the second Assembly, held in New Delhi, India, 1961, 
was also the reason why the committee wanted to have another Assembly 
in Asia. In India the delegates for the Assembly had the opportunity to see 
the world of Hinduism, and it was expected that in the next Assembly they 
could see another world, the world of Islam. The first choice was Lebanon, 
but after considering the political situation in the Middle East, the commit-
tee decided to drop it. One of the members of the executive committee from 
India, M.M. Thomas, asked, “Why not in Indonesia?” Then everybody agreed 
and Simatupang had no choice but to try to find the possibility of holding 
the Assembly in his country.20 
When Simatupang came back to Indonesia, he asked the NU lead-
er, Idham Chalid, about the Assembly and the latter responded positively. 
Simatupang also came to see Soeharto, and the latter also welcomed the 
Assembly. According to Simatupang, Soeharto suggested that some of 
the delegates of the Assembly should stay in people’s houses so that they 
could enjoy the spirit of cooperation among Indonesian people inspired by 
Pancasila. In August 1972, the representatives of the DGI, Lutheran World 
Federation and World Alliance of Reformed Churches met Soeharto in the 
Netherlands to talk about the Assembly. In response to them, the President 
said that Indonesia would be honoured to be the host of the Assembly. One 
year later, by the end of August 1973, the WCC confirmed that the Assembly 
would be held in Jakarta and decided to provide $1, 211,700 for it.21 
Based on the positive responses, Simatupang started preparing all 
the matters related to the Assembly. Since mid December 1973, Simatupang 
released the details of the planned programmes of the Assembly to the 
public. The programmes included not only the meetings of the Assembly, 
but also other programmes such as film shows, music, puppets, drama and 
dance. All delegates were also invited to attend a religious service at the 
opening ceremony of the Assembly, and Sunday services held in different 
A G A I N S T  C H R I S T I A N I S A T I O N
64
F E E L I N G  T H R E A T E N E D
churches in Jakarta. The DGI expected about 3000 delegates and 500 for-
eign journalists to come. They would stay in humble hotels in Jakarta and 
travel by bus like ordinary people. To do this, they would be guided by their 
respective ‘adopted families’ in Jakarta. This ‘assimilation’ was expected to 
help the delegates understand the uniqueness of the unity in diversity of 
the Indonesian people and their high religious tolerance. T.B. Simatupang 
also explained that these programmes were not intended to be a show of 
force at all.22
Furthermore, the DGI had prepared some ideas to respond to the 
theme of the Assembly: “Jesus Christ as Liberator and Integrator.” Accord-
ing to the DGI, these two themes of liberation and integration were very 
relevant to the condition of Indonesia. The DGI argued that Christianity in 
Indonesia had liberated people from primitivism, feudalism and colonial-
ism. With regard to the New Order’s development programmes, based on 
the Christian liberation perspective, Christians should have a positive, crea-
tive, but critical and realistic approach. The Christian liberation, therefore, 
does not only mean liberation of souls, but also from injustices and abuses 
of power. This liberation could not be enacted without the unity and integ-
rity of the people. The DGI should develop an ecumenical movement among 
its members and non-members, with the Catholics and with all Christians all 
over the world. In addition, based on the Pancasila, the DGI should develop 
cooperation with the people of other faiths in Indonesia, including the Mus-
lims. Again, this cooperation should be based on religious freedom guaran-
teed by the state. However, it was also noted that any religious propagation 
should not be through methods that were against human dignity and the 
noble values of religion.23 
Despite of the Government’s endorsement and the relevance of the 
Assembly to Indonesia according to the DGI’s arguments, the Muslim lead-
ers could not tolerate the Assembly. Commenting on the planned programs 
of the Assembly, the Muslim magazine Panji Masyarakat said that although 
T.B. Simatupang denied that the Assembly was a kind of show of force of the 
Christians, “for the Muslims who are very weak now, it is felt that it is a show 
of force.”24 In May 1974, the reformist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, 
sent an official letter to the President, asking him not to allow the Assembly 
because “it will bring about widespread anxieties among the Islamic com-
munity.”25 In June 1974, there were similar protests from the reformist Mus-
lim students, PII, and the traditionalist ulama of the major Islamic board-
ing school, Jombang. In addition, the Rābita al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī, (the Muslim 
World League) that carried out an international meeting on da‘wah in Mecca 
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in April 1974, also sent a letter to the President voicing the same objec-
tion.26 
The political climate from the end of 1973 to the second half of 1974 
had probably contributed to the negative Muslim reactions. As we shall see 
in Chapter 4, by the end of 1973, there was a debate on the Marriage Bill in 
the Parliament. For the Muslims – despite the compromise that was finally 
reached – the proposed bill, which in some aspects contradicted Islamic law, 
was a conspiracy of the Christians and certain army officers of the regime 
to attack Islam. Less than a month after the Marriage Bill affair, serious riots 
occurred in Jakarta on 15 January 1974 (later popularly called ‘Malari’, an 
acronym of ‘Malapetaka 15 Januari’). On that day – the day of the visit of 
the Japanese Prime Minister, Kaukuei Tanaka, to Jakarta – the students pro-
tested the Government policy on foreign investment, which in their opinion 
only benefited those in power and their cronies. Some observers explained 
that the Malari affair was strongly related to internal army rivalries. However, 
the regime, through the voice of Ali Moertopo, the Personal Assistant to 
the President, eventually pointed his finger at the critical civilian groups. 
He claimed that the incident was created by the agents of the former Indo-
nesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the Muslim reformist party, Masyumi. Based 
on this one-sided accusation, the Government closed several newspapers, 
including Abadi, the newspaper of the Muslim reformists.27 Ali Moertopo’s 
alliance with the Catholics in the Centre for Strategic and International Stud-
ies (CSIS) had convinced the Muslims that this was partly an army-Catholic 
conspiracy against the Islamic group.28
The WCC Assembly and the Muslim Discourse on Christianisation
Within this political context, what were the Muslim reactions to the 
Assembly? The Muslims considered it a provocative and aggressive move-
ment of the Christians against the Muslims in Indonesia. Again, the term 
“Kristenisasi” (Christianisation) was at the very centre of the Muslim dis-
course. Some prominent Muslim intellectuals, especially the modernists, 
wrote articles and even a booklet about the danger of Christianisation and 
the necessity of strengthening Islamic propagation programs (da‘wah) in 
cooperation with the Muslims of other countries. 
Djarnawi Hadikusuma, the prominent Muhammadiyah leader and the 
former chairman of the reformist Muslim political party, Parmusi, wrote a 
long article entitled “Christianisation in Indonesia: Its Strengths and Weak-
nesses.”29 For Djarnawi, Christianisation means “to christianise people mas-
sively by all possible efforts so that customs and relationships in society 
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should reflect the teachings of Christianity. This kind of society will pave the 
way for the spread of Christianity. In the end, the spiritual and social life of 
people would be directed from and centralized in the church.”30 Djarnawi 
explained further that Christianisation in a political sense was, “attempts to 
produce laws, regulations, actions or attitudes of the political authorities 
that open more opportunities for the spread of, or benefits for that religion 
(read: Christianity).” 31 Djarnawi’s definition of Christianisation clearly ech-
oes the political atmosphere described above, especially the Muslim’s per-
ception of the army-Christian conspiracy against Islam. Djarnawi, however, 
did not directly relate the Assembly of the WCC to Christianisation. He only 
said that the WCC Assembly was against the principle of religious harmony, 
that is, the principle of mutual understanding, hence not holding a religious 
Assembly “in a place where the majority of the people adhere to a different 
religion.”32
Mohammad Natsir, another reformist Muslim leader, also wrote an 
article in which he alluded to the WCC Assembly. Natsir claimed that the 
DGI had produced a map in which Indonesia was divided into different areas 
of missions to be carried out by the churches under the DGI. Perhaps, Natsir 
said, in the coming Assembly of the WCC in Jakarta, the plan of the Christian 
missions would become clearer. With reference to the Christian newspaper, 
Sinar Harapan, 10 January 1973, Natsir explained that Christian missions had 
developed a new approach, that is, of socio-economic development. For 
this, an organization called The Council of Church’s Participation in Develop-
ment (CCPD) had been established and Indonesia was one of the targets of 
the CCPD’s programmes. For the development programmes in 1973 – again 
with reference to Sinar Harapan, 25 May 1973 – Natsir said that the Inter-
national Christian Aid had provided $ 150,000 and the WCC gave $200,000. 
Natsir argued that it would be very naïve not to think of the development 
programmes as a means to convert people. After the Inter-religious Consul-
tation in 1967, he said, there had been a ‘free fight for all’ and ‘survival of the 
fittest’ in the field of religious propagation in Indonesia. In this regard, how 
could Muslims compete with the Christians, “how could a cart compete with 
an express train?” he said.33
Muhammad Rasjidi, another prominent Muslim reformist leader, 
wrote a booklet in response to the plan for the Assembly under the title: The 
Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Jakarta 1975 is a Challenge to the 
Islamic World.34 The introduction to the book – written anonymously by a 
person representing DDII – clearly reflects both the Muslims’ fear of Christia-
nisation and their political frustration towards the regime at this period. The 
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DDII author explained that according to the Indonesian Christian media, the 
Assembly would be attended by thousands of delegates from 82 countries. 
The delegates would not only visit Jakarta, but also other places such as 
Medan, Bali, East Java and Central Java. For the DDII author, Indonesia was 
chosen to be the home for the Assembly because it was related to the Chris-
tian programmes to convert Muslims in that country. The DDII author then 
referred to an article, published in The Washington Post of 7 September 1973, 
saying that the Assembly in Jakarta would be an opportunity for other Chris-
tians to witness the success of Christian missions in Indonesia.35 Finally, the 
DDII author did not forget to express that, while the Muslims did not have a 
public voice anymore, the Catholics still had Kompas and the Protestants still 
had Sinar Harapan. As noted above, the Muslim reformist newspaper, Abadi 
was banned by the Government soon after the Malari affair in 1974. 
Besides the introduction, the content of the book is interesting. Ras-
jidi started with a sketch of the modern development of Christian theology 
describing two important modern theological trends in Christianity: liberal-
ism and neo-orthodoxy. For Rasjidi, the liberal views that Jesus is not God 
but a great master, that there is no original sin and that the Bible contains 
some inaccuracies but as a whole it has a very valuable historical meaning, 
all of these are very close to Islam. The neo-orthodox views, however, reaf-
firmed what the liberals had negated and therefore, were opposed to Islam. 
Besides Karl Barth, among the proponents of neo-orthodoxy, according 
to Rasjidi, was Hendrik Kraemer. Again, Rasjidi referred to Kraemer’s book, 
Christianity in a Non-Christian World that was originally written for the Inter-
national Mission Conference in Tambaran, India, 1938. Rasjidi explained very 
briefly several other similar conferences and indicated that the WCC was one 
of the results of a Christian ecumenical conference held in Utrecht, 1938. 
Nonetheless, because of the Second World War, the first Assembly of WCC 
was postponed to 1948, and took place in Amsterdam. Based on this analy-
sis, Rasjidi concluded that if the WCC Assembly declared that it dealt with 
social problems such as human rights, education and health, these were 
actually a pretext for the real aims of the neo-orthodox theology, that is, to 
convert others to Christianity. Therefore, instead of receiving social aid from 
the WCC, Rasjidi preferred the other neutral institutions under the United 
Nations such as WHO, FAO and UNESCO. 
Rasjidi explained that there were ‘wise liberal Christians’ in the West 
who warned the WCC not to hold the Assembly in Jakarta because it would 
disturb the relationships between Muslims and Christians.36 Rasjidi also won-
dered whether the proposal for the Assembly in Jakarta had come originally 
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from the DGI rather than the WCC. If that was the case, he said, then it should 
be related to the psychology of the convert who, according to Stephen Neill, 
considers “the old world as the world of evils” and “wishes not to turn back in 
any way to be associated with that which to him is evil through and through.” 
Rasjidi then suggested that instead of following the psychology of converts, 
it would be better for the DGI to go after “the wise liberal Christians” in the 
West. Last but not least, Rasjidi said, “the ink has not dried up yet to write 
protests and the tears are still dropping to counter the Christian efforts to 
impose a marriage law containing a lot of things against Islamic teachings 
in September last year. Now, we are faced with a new problem: Jakarta has 
been chosen to be the place for the WCC Assembly, 1975.”37
Within the Muslim circles, the discourse on Christianisation was soon 
paired with the discourse on Islamization or da‘wah. By now, the Indonesian 
Muslims had developed stronger relations with the Muslim Middle East. In 
1973, Mohammad Natsir was appointed to be a General Advisor to the Sec-
retariat of the Rābita and this was soon followed by his appointment to be 
the head of the Rābita office in Indonesia.38 As has been said, in May 1974, 
Rābita held a meeting in Mecca dealing with da‘wah issues. Besides Moham-
mad Natsir of the DDII, Rasjidi and H.M. Sanusi of the Muhammadiyah were 
among the Indonesian delegates who came to the meeting. 
In June 1974, there was a Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs 
of Islamic Countries that took place in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. On this occa-
sion, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tunku Abdul Rahman announced 
his da‘wah project, started by establishing a huge building of 26 floors in 
Kuala Lumpur. The da‘wah programmes were organized under an organiza-
tion called the Body for the Advancement of Islam in Malaysia (Pertubuhan 
Kemajuan Islam Malaysia, PERKIM). Abdul Rahman’s project received signifi-
cant supports from other Muslim leaders, especially those of the Arab Middle 
East. It was reported that the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Sayed Omar 
al-Sakkaf, donated $ 50,000 and Abdel Ati al-Obeidi, the Foreign Minister 
of Libya, donated $16.5 million for Abdul Rahman’s project. Commenting 
on the da‘wa project in Malaysia, an Indonesian Muslim author, Rusydi, the 
son of HAMKA, said that the development in Malaysia was in contrast to the 
situation in Indonesia where not the Muslims but the Christians who were 
going to celebrate the success of their missionary activities in the Assem-
bly of the WCC. Rusydi accordingly suggested that the Indonesian Muslims 
should follow the steps of their neighbour.39 It is noteworthy that between 
1971 and 1973 the Indonesian Association of Muslim Students (HMI) and 
the Indonesian ‘ulama significantly contributed to the da‘wah courses for 
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Malaysian students. 40 Nonetheless, it seems that in 1974, for the Indonesian 
Muslim youth like Rusydi, Indonesia had been left behind by Malaysia in the 
field of da‘wah.
On the other hand, there was also an International Congress on World 
Evangelization from 16 to 25 July 1974, in Lausanne, Switzerland. An Indone-
sian Christian magazine of the DGI reported that ninety Indonesian Christian 
delegates came to the congress. It was also reported that in his speech at the 
opening ceremony of the congress, the American evangelist, Billy Graham, 
suggested that Christian missions should be based on the Bible and this 
issue should be discussed in the next Assembly of the WCC in Jakarta.41
The Murder of an Anglican Church Minister
Apart from the more positive discussions on da‘wah and mission, an 
incident occurred on 29 June 1974. An Australian minister of the Anglican 
Church, Eric Constable, was killed at night when he was staying in a guest-
house of the Anglican Church in Jakarta. There was a controversy over the 
motives behind the violence. According to the official report of the police, 
the motive behind the killing was purely criminal. It was said that the kill-
er wanted to rob Constable who had $ 500,000 in cash with him. Both the 
Anglican Church and the Australian embassy in Jakarta, however, denied 
this account. Furthermore, one of the suspects later identified as Hasyim 
Yahya was not a poor man. He was a director of a company belonging to his 
family.42 So what was then the real motive behind this? In his account of the 
failure of the Assembly, Simatupang also mentioned the case with the fol-
lowing remarks: “it was said that the killing was a signal that similar incidents 
would happen more if the Assembly were held in Jakarta.”43 To my knowl-
edge, however, there was no Muslim writer who endorsed the violence in 
this period. Rusydi’s article in Panji Masyarakat tended to believe that the 
case was a robbery based on the assumption that foreign ministers coming 
to Indonesia often brought a lot of money. Accordingly, he said, if Constable 
had $ 500,000, one could imagine further how much money there was in the 
hands of hundred of foreign ministers working in Indonesia!44 
Nonetheless, more than two decades later, a Muslim hardliner, Adian 
Husaini, the general secretary of KISDI (the Indonesian Committee for the 
Solidarity with the Islamic World), an organization close to DDII, claimed that 
in 1997, he met Hasyim Yahya in Mecca, a place where the latter escaped 
from Indonesia. According to Adian, Hasyim was a humble and religious per-
son and calmly told him about the incident. Hasyim explained to Adian that 
the main reason behind his violent action was his resentment towards the 
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perceived aggressive Christianisation indicated by the Marriage Bill affair 
and the planned Assembly of the WCC in Jakarta. According to Adian, based 
on some consultations with certain ulama, Hasyim believed that Christiani-
sation is analogous to or even worse than physical attack on the Muslims 
and therefore, physical retaliation against a missionary is religiously justifi-
able.45
The Cancellation of the Assembly in Jakarta
The Muslim protests and the killing of the Anglican minister had 
pushed the DGI into a very difficult position. The DGI finally decided to talk 
directly to both traditionalist and reformist Muslim leaders. Simatupang 
then made the appointments with the Muslim traditionalist politician, K.H. 
Masjkur and the Muslim reformist leader, M. Natsir. In his meeting with Masj-
kur in the Parliament office, T.B. Simatupang started with a formal question: 
“Was the DGI still in the borders of its rights to invite the WCC Assembly 
to Jakarta?” Masjkur answered, “The problem is not about right, but how 
to find something good for all of us.” Masjkur continued, “It often occurs 
that when we are angry at our parents, we hit our younger brother.” Hav-
ing heard this point, Simatupang concluded that the Muslim protests were 
actually directed not against the DGI but the Government. With this idea in 
mind, Simatupang went to the house of the leader of the Muslim reformist, 
Mohammad Roem. Roem had been waiting there along with Rasjidi, but 
M. Natsir was absent. According to Simatupang, although Rasjidi explained 
about the Muslim fear of Christianisation, the meeting was very friendly. 
Nonetheless, there was no substantial change with regard to the Muslim 
objection to the Assembly.46
Was the objection of the Muslim leaders to the Assembly only an 
expression of their anger at the Government, as Masjkur said? I think it is 
only partially true because the Muslim fear of Christian missions was real, 
although this was exacerbated by the Muslim political frustration towards 
the regime. 
In any case, having contacted the Muslim leaders, Simatupang also 
met with President Soeharto on 27 July 1974. After this meeting, it was 
clear to the public that Soeharto also wanted to cancel the Assembly in 
Jakarta.47 In order to save the face of the Government, however, thanks to 
Simatupang’s diplomacy, it was the WCC rather than the Government that 
formally cancelled the Assembly. The decision was made in a meeting of the 
central executive committee of the WCC in Berlin, 12 August 1974 with the 
hope that “on another occasion in the future the WCC could enjoy the hospi-
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tality of the Indonesian church and nation.”48 Commenting on the failure of 
the Assembly, Simatupang bitterly quoted a saying of the Irish Republican 
Army, “It is better to have fought and lost than never to have fought at all.”49 
Thus, the Christians were actually disappointed, but they could do nothing 
to avoid the cancellation.
In his Address to the Nation on 15 August 1974, Soeharto also alluded 
to the cancellation of the Assembly. He said that he was relieved by the 
cancellation of the Assembly. In the beginning, he said, the Government 
thought that the Assembly was a sign of trust and appreciation of religious 
tolerance of the Indonesian people. However, he explained further that the 
Government also wanted the Assembly not to be harmful to the national 
unity and stability. Thus, “if the Assembly could disturb the current national 
stability, then it should be held at another appropriate time.” Soeharto also 
suggested that Indonesian society should be careful of certain rumours trig-
gered by religious zeal because religion was a sensitive issue. To play with 
the issue of religion, he said, was like playing with fire that finally would burn 
one’s self. Last but not least, Soeharto did not forget to say that to main-
tain inter-religious harmony, “religious propagation should not be directed 
to the people who already have religion.”50 Thus, as we can see, Soeharto 
consistently promoted the idea of political stability as the most important 
goal for the Government, even if it was achieved at the expense of religious 
freedom.
What was the response of the Muslim leaders to the cancellation? 
HAMKA, the Muslim reformist leader also expressed relief that the Assem-
bly was cancelled. He hoped that this decision could be a good start for 
the Indonesian Christians to develop their tolerant attitude towards Mus-
lims. He said further that religious harmony in Indonesia could actually be 
achieved and had been only disturbed by the coming of foreign missionar-
ies.51 In contrast, the editorial of Suara Muhammadiyah said that the cancel-
lation of the Assembly was truly a relief for the Muslims, but it did not mean 
that the Christians had become tolerant to them. The editorial also quoted 
a DDII activist who said that, the cancellation of the Assembly should be 
followed by stopping Christianisation activities in the country!52 In short, 
the cancellation of the Assembly did not significantly change the negative 
attitude of the Muslim leaders towards the Christians. 
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3. Control of Religious Propagation and Foreign Aid 
So far we have discussed the Government’s accommodation of two 
Muslim demands: the restrictions on building new churches in Muslim 
majority areas and the cancellation of hosting the WCC Assembly in Jakar-
ta. Nonetheless, there were two other Muslim demands since 1967 not yet 
considered by the Government: to control foreign aid as it was demanded 
by Lukman Harun’s plea in Parliament, and to restrict religious propagation 
only for those outside the recognised religions as had been debated during 
the Inter-religious Consultation. The debates on these two issues on both 
national and international occasions continued in the 1970s, and the Gov-
ernment finally took the initiative to accommodate the Muslim demands in 
1978.
The Debates on International and National Occasions: 1972–1976 
In 1971, Abdul Mukti Ali was appointed to replace Mohammad 
Dachlan as the Minister of Religion. As a scholar interested in comparative 
religion, Mukti Ali was the first Minister of Religion who initiated inter-reli-
gious dialogue as a Government project. On the other hand, he was also 
concerned with the issues of religious propagation and foreign aid.53 In July 
1972, the WCC organized a Muslim-Christian dialogue in Broumana, Leba-
non. There were 42 Christians and Muslims from 20 countries in this meet-
ing, and among them were Mukti Ali and P.D. Latuihamallo of the DGI. One of 
the important issues discussed in Mukti Ali’s paper for the dialogue was the 
issue of foreign aid for religious institutions. In contrast to Lukman Harun 
who suggested in 1967 a Government control of the aid, Mukti Ali said:
I should like to suggest that the churches in the western countries also give aid 
to the non-Christian religious communities which constitute the majority in 
most developing countries. If such aid is only given to the Christian churches 
tensions will arise because of the unequal development of religious life in these 
developing countries.
The issue of religious propagation was also discussed in the dialogue, 
but Mukti Ali did not touch on it explicitly in his paper. On the final day of 
the dialogue, the participants produced a Memorandum. It was stated in 
it that religious freedom should be guaranteed for any religious minority, 
but at the same time it was emphasised that in doing religious missions, 
“proselytism should be avoided, whether by a majority intent upon pressing 
a minority to conform, or whether by a minority using economic or cultural 
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inducements to swell its ranks.” In addition, in line with Mukti Ali’s sugges-
tion on foreign aid, the Memorandum stated that: “We welcome the emerg-
ing willingness for religious communities’ gifts of material and practical aid 
to be channelled not through a particular religious community but given for 
the whole community, wherever the need is greatest.” 55 As we shall see, the 
memorandum was to become one of the reference documents in Muslim-
Christian controversies in Indonesia. 
Mukti Ali’s concern with the issue of religious propagation was more 
explicitly stated in his speech to the national Christmas celebration in Jakar-
ta, 1972. He said that it was “not possible to invite people who already have 
religion to convert to another religion, either by force or by giving material 
inducements.”56 When I asked about this issue, Mukti Ali said that for him, to 
restrict religious propagation only for those outside the recognised religions 
could effectively prevent inter-religious conflicts.57 Thus, although Mukti Ali 
was known as a promoter of inter-religious dialogue, some people believed 
that he was in fact also concerned about Christianisation.
We have already quoted above that President Soeharto, in his com-
ments on the cancellation of the WCC Assembly in Jakarta during his speech 
on 15 August 1974, also stated the importance of the restriction of religious 
propagation. Later in his speech to the Eighth Assembly of DGI in Salatiga, 
July 1976, Soeharto said that “religious propagation should not disturb the 
stability of society” and “the efforts to increase the number of followers and 
to establish places of worship should not create disturbances in society.” He 
also suggested that foreign aid for religious institutions should be carried 
out through the Government in order to make sure that it was “used appro-
priately.”58 After Soeharto’s speech, the next day, the Protestant newspaper, 
Sinar Harapan quoted Cardinal Darmojowono who said that to lead people 
who did not have religion yet (those outside the recognised religions) to 
have religion was hypocrisy because it implied that people were forced to 
have religion and therefore, they would become insincere converts.59 With 
regard to the issue of foreign aid, the DGI Assembly asserted that foreign aid 
for churches in Indonesia was an expression of the universality of Christian 
faith and ecumenism. 60 This seems to be an implicit rejection of Soehar-
to’s suggestion that the aid should be carried out through the Government. 
Thus, the Christians obviously opposed the position of the Muslims and Soe-
harto on these two issues. 
On the other hand, having noticed the Christian negative reactions, 
the Muslim leaders also made sharp comments against the Christians. 
Muhammad Natsir said that he could not understand Darmojowono’s state-
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ment because there were missionary activities in Kalimantan to convert 
those who did not yet have a religion. Natsir claimed that there were 45 air-
strips for the operation of helicopters and airplanes of the Christian mission-
aries in the region.61 Another Muslim leader, HAMKA, cynically stated that if 
Cardinal Darmojowono considered the missions to convert those who did 
not yet have a religion was hypocrisy, then one might conclude that the real 
aim of the Christian missions was to convert Muslims, while the missionary 
activities carried out to those who did not yet have a religion were simply a 
pretext. Darmojowono’s statement and T.B. Simatupang’s rejection of Gov-
ernment control of foreign aid, for HAMKA, indicated that the Christians felt 
strong vis-à-vis the Government. The spirit of Muslim jihad, he said, now was 
apparently found among the Christians!62
Besides the debates on the issues in Jakarta, just one month before the 
DGI Assembly in Salatiga, the WCC in cooperation with two co-convenors, 
David Kerr, the Director of the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations in Birmingham, and Khurshid Ahmad, the Director of the 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester, organized a conference on Christian Mission 
and Islamic Da‘wah, held in Chambésy, Geneva, 26-30 June 1976. The confer-
ence was actually a meeting of Muslim and Christian leaders, especially the 
representatives from Asia and Africa. Among the invited participants, there 
were two Indonesian representatives: the Muslim reformist, Muhammad 
Rasjidi and the prominent Christian scholar and Rector of Sekolah Tinggi 
Teologi (The Academy of Theology) Jakarta, Ihromi.
On the normative and theological basis, both Christian and Muslim 
speakers in the Conference acknowledged the missionary character of their 
respective religions.63 Nonetheless, if we look at the papers and discussions 
of the conference, we shall find that the major issue was Christian missionary 
activities among Muslims rather than the opposite. In fact, Lamin Sanneh, 
who presented a paper on Christian experience of Islamic da‘wah in Africa, 
only discussed the historical development of the propagation of Islam and 
Christianity among the pagans in Africa rather than Islamic da‘wah among 
Christians.64 This was in sharp contrast to the Muslim perception of Christian 
missions in Indonesia and East Africa described in the papers of Mohammad 
Rasjidi and Ali Muhsin Barwani respectively. 
In his paper, Rasjidi described in detail his resentment at what he saw 
as Christian abuses of social services (diakonia) to convert Muslims such as 
giving money and food to the poor Muslims, and building new churches, 
schools and hospitals in Muslim majority areas.65 In response to the Muslim 
criticism of diakonia, Arne Rudvin argued that if we look at the New Testa-
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ment, diakonia is actually considered secondary to evangelism. However, 
modern missions tend to institutionalise and internationalise the diakonia, 
and the Christians had “too often succumbed to the temptation to make 
these institutions means of influence or of evangelisation.” For him, this 
was unacceptable because “If we have any ulterior motive for our service, 
however good, diakonia is no longer an expression of agapé but becomes a 
propaganda instrument.” Thus, he said, “I believe our Muslim brethren have 
a right to blame us for this.”66 
While Rasjidi’s paper criticised the abuses of diakonia, Barwani criti-
cised the Christian missionaries who cooperated with colonial power to 
attack Islam in East Africa. For Barwani, although East Africa had already 
obtained independence, it was still controlled by the colonialists, “not colo-
nialists from abroad but people belonging to the Christian minority group, 
people who are the products of the colonial era of the missions and who still 
enjoy their blessings.” 67 The discussion on colonialism then touched Indone-
sia as well when a Muslim scholar, Ismail R. al-Faruqi made a sharp comment: 
“I personally do not agree to discuss with anyone who argues that there is no 
neo-colonialism today in, for example, Indonesia. And what concerns us very 
much here is the linkage between the missionary movement and neo-colo-
nialism.” Ihromi, the Christian representative from Indonesia, immediately 
reacted: “But we Christians in Indonesia feel a deep sense of solidarity with 
our Muslim fellow-citizens. We would like to see the growth of a sense of 
single citizenship shared by Muslims and Christians in Indonesia. You seem 
to disregard this when you accuse all the Christians in Indonesia of being in 
the hands of neo-colonial powers.”68
The Christians, on the other hand, criticised the Muslims with regard 
to the issue of religious freedom. Rudvin said, “Surely one of the main rea-
sons for the negative attitudes between Muslims and Christians is the treat-
ment meted out to converts, probably on both sides. In Pakistan, I would 
go so far as to say that a convert in a major city will survive with his life, 
but probably not so in a village. ” He then suggested that, “we as Christian 
and Muslim leaders should tell those for whom we are responsible not to 
abuse converts, not to ostracize them from the family nor from society, mak-
ing them lose their inheritance, their jobs, etc.”69 The Muslims’ answer to the 
question was that in Islam there is freedom to convert. The prohibition of 
conversion from Islam should be understood as a political idea. Al-Faruqi 
argued that conversion out of Islam was not tolerated during the Madinah 
period because conversion at that time meant: “joining the polytheistic 
camp of Makkah which was in a constant state of war against the Muslims.” 
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In the case of Indonesia, Al-Faruqi tended not to allow freedom to convert 
for Muslims because “what we have heard [i.e., from Rasjidi’s paper] about 
the situation confronting Islam in Indonesia is like a re-enactment of Madi-
nah and Makkah.”70 
  The Christian concerns with religious freedom and the Muslim 
resentment of colonialism and the abuses of diakonia were all finally covered 
in the statement made on the final day of the conference. It was stated that, 
“the Christian participants extend to their Muslim brethren their full sympa-
thy for the moral wrongs which the Muslim world suffered at the hands of 
colonialists, neo-colonialists and their accomplices.” With regard to religious 
freedom, it was stated, among other things, that “the Muslims as well as the 
Christians must enjoy the full liberty to convince and be convinced, and to 
practice their faith…[and] that an individual is perfectly entitled to maintain 
his/her religious integrity in obedience to his or her religious principles and 
in faithfulness to his or her religious identity.” On the abuses of diakonia 
and the distribution of foreign aid, the conference “strongly urges Christian 
churches and religious organizations to suspend their misused diakonia 
activities in the world of Islam.” Moreover, “the conference urges strongly that 
all material assistance donated by outside churches and religious organiza-
tion henceforth be distributed wherever possible by the Governments and 
local communities of people for whom they are intended, respecting the 
dignity and integrity of the people concerned.”71 
The statement of the Conference quoted above could be a good foun-
dation for creating better Muslim-Christian relations. Nonetheless, it is often 
the case that a well-formulated statement on paper does not work in reality 
at all. Further, neither the participants of the conference nor the WCC had 
any formal political authority to implement the stipulations of the state-
ment. So, what was the significance of the conference? In the case of Indo-
nesia, the conference, or more precisely the statement of the conference, 
has been referred to by both Muslims and Christians when a controversy on 
religious freedom and foreign aid emerged in the following years. In addi-
tion, after their return from the conference, both Ihromi and Muhammad 
Rasjidi almost immediately published accounts of the conference in the 
Christian and Muslim media respectively. Rasjidi and Ihromi, however, had 
different if not contradictory interpretations of the meaning of the state-
ment of the conference. 
In his account of the conference published in Berita Oikoumene, Ihromi 
did not touch the issue of religious freedom directly. He just emphasized the 
concept of citizenship for all Indonesians regardless of religion and ethnic-
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ity. As has been noted above, Ihromi had a discussion on this issue with al-
Faruqi. According to Ihromi, he explained to al-Faruqi and the other partici-
pants that the Indonesian word ‘warga’ and the term ‘warga negara’ used in 
the Indonesian Constitution contributes a deeper dimension to the concept 
of citizenship. The word ‘warga’ for Ihromi also means ‘keluarga’ (family) and 
therefore, the term ‘warga negara’ means that all Indonesian citizens are one 
family regardless of religious and ethnic background. In addition, there were 
at least two other important points in Ihromi’s account. First, in the open-
ing of the statement of the conference, it is said that: “In recognition that 
mission and da‘wah are essential religious duties in both Christianity and 
Islam…” For Ihromi, this statement is very important because it acknowledg-
es the integrity of the religion in question, that is, both Islam and Christianity 
are missionary religions. As we shall see, this part of the statement of the 
conference was to be frequently quoted by the Christian intellectuals when 
the Muslims tried to restrict missionary activities only for those outside the 
recognized religions. Second, Ihromi also touched the issue of diakonia. He 
said that on the fourth day of the conference, he explained to the partici-
pants that the Christians themselves would be the first to feel humiliated if 
people converted to Christianity only because they were hungry and need-
ed some rice or homeless and needed a shelter from the Christians. Ihromi 
explained further that in order to avoid “cheap accusations” of the misuse of 
the diakonia (an implicit criticism of Rasjidi’s paper in the conference), it was 
decided in the wording of the statement to put the clause “respecting the 
dignity and integrity of the people concerned.”72 
Unlike Ihromi, in the Muslim magazine, Media Dakwah, Rasjidi made 
a more complete report of the conference by giving a summary of the pre-
sented papers, translating the whole statement of the conference accompa-
nied by his personal comments.73 Rasjidi’s personal comments appear to be 
the most interesting part of the account. Commenting on the words of the 
statement that “the Muslims as well as the Christians must enjoy the full lib-
erty to convince and be convinced”, Rasjidi said that this is a true way to do 
the da‘wa or mission because it suggests that one’s conversion to a religion 
is not because of material temptation nor to enter school and get education 
but because he or she has been convinced by the truth of the beliefs of that 
religion. As we shall see, this comment is quite different from the comments 
of the Christians who used the statement to argue that religious propaga-
tion cannot be restricted only to those outside the recognized religions. 
Similarly, it is mentioned in the statement that, “the conference was grieved 
to hear that some Christians in some Muslim countries have felt themselves 
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limited in the exercise of their religious freedom and have been denied their 
right to church buildings.” To read this statement from the Indonesian case, 
particularly for the Christians, one should remember at least the controversy 
on the Methodist church in Meulaboh in 1967 and the joint decree of 1969. 
In contrast, commenting on the statement, Rasjidi said that the incident, 
according to Bishop Kenneth Cragg, occurred in Afghanistan, but there was 
no convincing evidence about it. It was said, according to Rasjidi, that the 
church was built without permission from the Government and that there 
was no Christian living in the area. Because of the lack of evidence, Rasjidi 
said, the statement used the word ‘to hear.’ Rasjidi then jumped to another 
case that during the war in Cyprus, the Greek Christians destroyed more 
than 100 mosques, while the churches in the area controlled by the Muslim 
Turks were not disturbed at all. Besides commenting on the issue of religious 
freedom, Rasjidi also commented on the issue of diakonia mentioned in the 
statement. He said that it was for the first time that the Christians acknowl-
edged that there were abuses of diakonia. Rasjidi also welcomed the stipu-
lation of the statement that any foreign aid for religious institutions should 
be distributed through the Government in order to prevent the abuses of 
diakonia.
Alamsyah’s Attempts at Reconciliation with the Islamic Groups
The Indonesian elections in 1977 and the session of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) in 1978 had 
proved that the Islamic groups, in the words of an observer, had become 
“the principal opposition force.” 74 The Islamic party, PPP, despite its small 
number of representatives compared to the Government’s party, Golkar, 
had made a walk-out protest against the Government’s accommodation of 
Javanese Mysticism (Aliran Kepercayaan) in the Mainlines of State’s Policies 
(Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara,GBHN) and the Government’s proposal on 
the Guidelines for Internalisation and Application of Pancasila (Pedoman 
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, P4). Both reformist and tradition-
alist Muslim leaders, inside and outside the PPP, were united in opposing the 
Government’s accommodation of the Aliran Kepercayaan because they were 
afraid that it could be developed to be one of the recognized religions. The 
Muslim efforts to prevent Javanese Mysticism from gaining an official status 
had actually started in the early 1950s and they were relatively successful. 
Nonetheless, fortune had come for the mystical proponents when the MPR 
dominated by Soeharto’s supporters, decided to include the Aliran Keper-
cayaan in the GBHN of 1973.75 There were Muslim protests against it, but 
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not as strong as in 1978. Perhaps, because of stronger Muslim opposition, 
although the Aliran Kepercayaan was not eradicated altogether from the 
GBHN of 1978, the Muslim concerns were also accommodated. It was stated 
in the GBHN that the Aliran Kepercayaan was not a religion and should not 
be developed towards establishing a new religion.76 In addition, the Muslims 
could not accept the Government’s concept of the P4 – that was to become 
the primary text for civic indoctrination – because it elaborated the values 
of Pancasila as guidance for personal and individual life. According to the 
Muslims, this interpretation of Pancasila would not only intervene in the reli-
gious sphere but also overshadow the responsibility of the state to imple-
ment the Pancasila values demanded by the Constitution.77 In this case, the 
Muslim protest did not bring significant change.
On one evening of early March 1978, in the private residence of Presi-
dent Soeharto in Cendana Street, Jakarta, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara was 
in a serious conversation with the President. Soeharto explained to Alam-
syah the current tensions and controversies during the session of the Peo-
ple’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Soeharto was worried about the increas-
ing Islamic opposition to the Government and wanted Alamsyah to be the 
Minister of Religion to deal with the problem of how to accommodate the 
Islamic groups. In the beginning, Alamsyah was hesitant to take the job, but 
he eventually decided to do so. 78 Before becoming the Minister of Religion, 
Alamsyah was known as one of the prominent army Generals close to Soe-
harto since the beginning of the New Order. He previously held some impor-
tant political positions: as the Coordinator of the President’s Personal Staff 
(1966-1968); the State Secretary (1968-1971); the Indonesian Ambassador to 
the Netherlands (1972-1974); and the Vice Chairman of the State Advisory 
Council (1975-1977). Because he came from a military background, in the 
beginning, some Muslims were not happy with him and he was even black-
mailed on the first few days of his work in the Department of Religion.79 
Nonetheless, after several months in office, Alamsyah had success-
fully established warm relationships with important Islamic political leaders 
and showed his willingness to accommodate certain ‘Islamic interests.’ One 
of Alamsyah’s often quoted sayings to win the heart of the Muslims was to 
explain to the public that it was unfair to say that Muslims were anti-Pancasi-
la, because “Pancasila was actually a gift of the Muslims to the Indonesian 
state.” In addition, after a two-hour meeting with the President, Alamsyah 
explained to the public that the Aliran Kepercayaan would not be admin-
istered by the Department of Religion but by the Department of Education 
and Culture because, as the GBHN stated, they do not constitute a distinc-
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tive religion.80 Alamsyah’s moves were relatively effective to win the heart of 
the Muslims who regarded him as an ‘Islamic General’ in contrast with other 
Generals like Soedjono Humardhani and Ali Moertopo, known to be close to 
Javanese Mystical groups and the Catholics; and General T.B. Simatupang, 
the leader of the Protestants in the DGI. 81 
Another move of Alamsyah that attracted public attention was his 
policy on Islamic da‘wah. With the support of Soeharto and the Commander 
of Security and Order, Soedomo, Alamsyah tried to loosen the Government’s 
control of Islamic preaching throughout the country. Previously, especially in 
the period close to the 1977 elections, da‘wah activities were considered a 
security issue. Any Muslim gathering had to have permission from the civilian 
and military authorities, or at least to inform them 24 hours before. The main 
reason was because the Government was unhappy with the Islamic preach-
ers who often criticized the Government’s policies in their speeches. On May 
1978, Alamsyah issued a decree regarding Islamic da‘wah. It is mentioned in 
the decree that Islamic da‘wa activities do not need prior permission from the 
Government authorities. However, the decree also mentions that the da‘wah 
should not endanger national stability, national development, Pancasila and 
the Constitution of 1945.82 Given the ambiguity of the decree, the Muslim 
responses were rather cautious. In general, however, the Muslims looked at 
the decree as a signal of the Government’s accommodation of Muslim aspira-
tions, especially because da‘wah was not considered a security issue anymore 
and was returned to its ‘original’ place, the Department of Religion.83 
In an interview with a leading Muslim magazine, Panji Masyarakat, 
in October 1978, Alamsyah explained openly that what he tried to do with 
the above moves was to establish a harmonious relationship between the 
Government and the Islamic groups. He offered an explanation that sounds 
like a political compromise between the regime and the Islamic groups. 
He said that both the Islamic groups and the Government should know 
what each of them disliked most and expected most. According to Alam-
syah, what the Muslims disliked most was to consider Aliran Kepercayaan 
a distinctive religion, while what the Government disliked most was to find 
anti-Pancasila people among religious believers. What did each group most 
expect? According to Alamsyah, what the Muslim groups expected most 
was that religious preaching should not be strictly restricted, while what the 
Government expected most was that religious groups, in cooperation with 
the Government, should help maintain political stability and enact develop-
ment programmes. The Government had already given what the Muslims 
wanted, and now they should in return give what the Government wanted.84 
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The ‘give and take’ relation between the Government and the Islamic groups 
seems to be what Alamsyah means by harmony between Government and 
religious groups, an element of his concept of ‘the triad of harmony.’ The 
other two are harmony among different religious groups or the so-called 
‘inter-religious harmony’ and harmony among different groups of the same 
religion or ‘intra-religious harmony.’85
Alamsyah’s Decrees of 1978: Taking the Steps Further
What were Alamsyah’s policies on inter-religious harmony? In August 
1978, Alamsyah issued two controversial decrees, one on religious propaga-
tion and another on foreign aid for religious institutions. As has been dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, these two issues had been at stake since 
1967 and Alamsyah himself was very much involved in organizing the 
Inter-religious Consultation in that year. We have already mentioned that 
the Minister of Religion before Alamsyah, A. Mukti Ali, was also concerned 
with these two issues but – probably due to his weak political position – he 
did not take any radical step. Now, Alamsyah, without further discussions 
with the religious leaders, issued two decrees in which he clearly favoured 
the Muslim positions on these two issues. The decree no. 70 stipulates that 
religious propagation is not allowed (1) to be directed to the people who 
have another religion; (2) to use money, clothes, medicine etc. as a means 
to convert people; (3) to be carried out by spreading pamphlets, books, bul-
letins and magazines to the houses of people who have another religion; (4) 
to be carried out by a door-to-door visit to the houses of people who have 
another religion.86 As has been noted, the people who already have religion 
are the followers of one of the recognized religions. Thus, the followers of 
native religion are excluded. 
With regard to the foreign aid for religious institutions, Alamsyah’s 
decree no.77 mentions that any form of aid (personnel and/or material) given 
by a foreign Government, organization or individual to a religious institution 
should be based on the agreement or recommendation of the Minister of 
Religion. The decree also stipulates that religious institutions should pro-
vide education and training programmes for Indonesians to replace foreign 
religious workers working in the country. The programme should be started 
at the latest after six months following the issue of the decree and finished 
in two years at the most.87 
According to Alamsyah, the decrees were Government policies that 
did not need any formal support from religious groups. He argued further 
that positive or negative reactions to the decrees were acceptable in a dem-
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ocratic state but they would not necessarily influence and change them.88 
Alamsyah also explained that his policy on religious propagation was actu-
ally a follow up of what President Soeharto had suggested in his speech 
on 30 November 1967 to the Inter-religious Consultation and in another 
speech on 15 August 1974 before the Parliament. In addition, Alamsyah 
also referred to the speech of the Commander of the Armed Forces and the 
Minister of Defence, M. Panggabean (a Protestant) in a seminar in Aceh, on 
28 October 1974 and the speech of the Chief Commander of Security and 
Order, Admiral Soedomo (also a Protestant) in Banyuwangi on 20 December 
1975. All of them suggested that religious propagation should be based on 
the rules mentioned in the decree no. 70.89
Alamsyah also explained that the decree on foreign aid for religious 
institutions was not intended to hinder foreign assistance to religious insti-
tutions. The decree simply required that the Government should know “who 
receives the aid, from whom and for what.” He believed that this transpar-
ency would help eradicate suspicions among religious groups.90 He argued 
further that other countries had already adopted the same policy, and Indo-
nesia was rather late. Last but not least, Alamsyah also referred to the State-
ment of the Conference on Islamic Da’wah and Mission in Chambésy, 1976, 
which also recommended the same policy.91
Of course, the Muslim leaders were happy with the decrees, and the 
Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) released a statement supporting the 
decrees on 9 September 1978. Only a few days later, the Indonesian Hindu 
Association (Parisada Hindu Dharma) and the Indonesian Buddhist Associa-
tion (Perwalian Umat Budha Indonesia) also expressed their support for the 
decrees.92 What did the Muslim leaders say about the decrees? HAMKA, the 
head of the Indonesian Council of Ulama, said to the press that the regu-
lation on religious propagation was significant to prevent radicalisation of 
the Islamic community. He explained that religious propagation carried out 
through a door-to-door visit could lead to fatal results because “for a fanati-
cal Muslim, it is permitted to kill such a missionary.”93 Further, Nuddin Lubis, a 
Muslim politician of the Islamic party, PPP, also extended his agreement with 
the decree on foreign aid for religious institutions, although he assumed 
that the regulation would be primarily used to control Saudi Arabia’s aid for 
the Islamic educational institutions.94 Lubis’ statement apparently contained 
some truth because, as has been mentioned earlier, since 1973, Moham-
mad Natsir was appointed to be the head of the Rābita office in Jakarta and 
so Muslim foreign aid from the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia, was 
probably channelled through Natsir.
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Christian Opposition to the Decrees
On the other hand, the Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, 
as one could expect, reacted negatively to the decrees. The DGI and MAWI 
even sent a letter to President Soeharto dated 24 August 1978 asking him 
to withdraw the decree no. 70 and then another letter dated 14 Septem-
ber 1978 asking the President to withdraw the decree no.77. Both the DGI 
and MAWI also asked for an audience with the President, but the latter 
never replied to this request. Nonetheless, they succeeded in arranging a 
meeting with the Vice-President, Adam Malik, the State Secretary, Sudhar-
mono, the Minister of Social Welfare, Surono and the Minister of Religion 
himself.95 The Christian objection was also declared to the public through 
a joint press release of the DGI and MAWI on 15 September 1978. The 
press release also explained that the DGI and MAWI had sent two letters 
to Soeharto asking him to withdraw the decrees. The press release was 
not only published in the printed media but also broadcast on radio and 
television.96 In addition, on 28 September, the DGI and MAWI organized 
a joint team of six to make a critical review of the decrees and the team 
finished their work on 13 October 1978. In addition, from 19-21 October 
1978, all functionaries of the DGI and 51 representatives of the churches 
outside the DGI, including the evangelical group, held a special meet-
ing in Jakarta to discuss the same issue. The meeting finally published a 
message for the Christians in which the participants declared that they 
supported the joint action of the top leaders of the DGI and MAWI to 
oppose the decrees and invited the Christians to strengthen cooperation 
and ecumenism.97 
If we look at the Christian arguments described in the work of the 
team of six, the main issue for the Christians was still religious freedom with 
strong emphasis on: (1) freedom to preach religion to other people of dif-
ferent religion, (2) freedom to convert or to change one’s religion, and (3) 
freedom to cooperate with those who share the same faith anywhere in the 
world. As we have discussed, this interpretation of religious freedom was 
not new among the Christians. Nonetheless, the Christians also developed 
new arguments to support their interpretation. In general, they argued that 
the decrees were unconstitutional because they were not only against the 
religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution of 1945, but also against 
the P4, the interpretation of Pancasila that had been recently ratified by the 
MPR but not referred to in the decrees. In addition, they also referred to the 
Muslim-Christian joint statements at the international conferences organ-
ized by the WCC. As has been discussed above, both Muslim and Christian 
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intellectuals from Indonesia participated in the conferences in Broumana, 
1972 and Chambésy, 1976. With regard to the issue of religious mission, 
the Broumana memorandum said, “while accepting that both religious tra-
ditions have a missionary vocation, proselytism should be avoided” which 
was parallel with the statement of the Geneva conference: “in recognition 
that mission and da‘wah are essential religious duties in both Christianity 
and Islam…” and “the conference upholds the principle of religious freedom 
recognizing that the Muslims as well as the Christians must enjoy full liberty 
to convince and to be convinced.” The Christians argued that these state-
ments clearly indicated that preaching religion is an essential religious duty 
for both Muslims and Christians and therefore, the target of mission cannot 
be restricted. What should be done, therefore, was to restrict not the target 
of mission, but the ways through which the mission was carried out. Thus, 
in principle, the Christians did not have any objection to the point of the 
decree prohibiting religious mission carried out through material induce-
ments because this was a wrong way of doing mission. In addition, the 
Christians were also worried that the restriction of the target of religious 
mission stipulated in the decree also meant a prohibition to change religion. 
In response to the Government’s control of foreign aid, the Christians said 
that this was problematic, because the Church has a universal character 
transcending state boundaries. In this regard, unlike their argument for the 
freedom to preach religion, the Christians avoided referring to the state-
ment of the conference in Chambésy, 1976 that clearly recommended that 
religious aid should be distributed through Government. Last but not least, 
the Christians also objected to the time limit given by the decree to train 
ministers and priests because, they said, priests and ministers could not be 
trained in only two years. 98 
Actually, in September 1978, the Christian criticisms of the decrees 
had been generally reported by the press before the Team of Six had finished 
their work. For instance, a leading Indonesian magazine, Tempo, already 
published the responses of the Christian leaders like T.B. Simatupang of the 
DGI, Leo Soekoto of the MAWI and the Christian politician, Sabam Sirait. 99 In 
addition, Ihromi published an article in Sinar Harapan in which he referred 
to the statement of the Conference on Christian Mission and Islamic Da’wah 
quoted above and said that Rasjidi was one of its participants. According 
to Ihromi, the statement clearly asserted that, “da‘wah and evangelisation 
could not be separated from the integrity of Islam and Christianity” and 
therefore both Muslims and Christians “must enjoy the full liberty to con-
vince and to be convinced.”100
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Muslims’ and Government’s Responses
The Christian criticisms certainly triggered reactions, especially 
from the Muslims. Muhammad Rasjidi, for example, wrote a long article to 
respond to the Christian criticisms. As we have mentioned above, for Rasjidi, 
the right to convince and be convinced meant that everybody has freedom 
to choose a religion after being convinced by the truth of that religion. Thus, 
for him this statement had nothing to do with freedom to propagate reli-
gion by the means of social services. In this respect, it seems to me that for 
Rasjidi, there was no Christian mission in Indonesia that did not use social 
services to convert people. Similarly, according to Rasjidi the statement 
that mission is “an essential religious duty” should not be understood in a 
vacuum. In other words, religious mission should be understood within a 
specific context where the mission is carried out. The Christian objection to 
the decree meant that for them “this world was a vacuum space and so the 
Christian missionaries could enter it at will,” he said. In fact, he said further, 
“the Government’s decree no. 70 was intended to maintain the security of 
the developing nation, not to oppose a religious principle.” In addition, Ras-
jidi argued, if the Christians said that the regulation not to preach religion 
to other people of a different religion implicitly meant a prohibition against 
conversion, then for the Muslims, the Christian objection to the regulation 
implicitly meant that the latter wanted to Christianise the Islamic commu-
nity. Last but not least, Rasjidi quoted a paragraph of the Document of the 
Vatican Council II in which the Catholics indicated their open attitude and 
respect towards Muslims. Rasjidi eventually concluded that, “both the Cath-
olic Church in the Vatican and the WCC had a more lenient attitude than 
the DGI and MAWI…Religious freedom understood by the MAWI and DGI as 
the right to Christianise Islamic communities is a great mistake at which the 
whole world would laugh.”101
Besides the Muslims, the Government also responded to the Christian 
criticisms. On 10 October 1978, after a meeting with Soeharto, Alamsyah 
said that the President instructed him to continue with the application of 
the decrees. On that day, Alamsyah also provided explanations of each of 
the two decrees that in a way was also a response to the Christian criti-
cisms.102 According to the explanations, to maintain national unity, security 
and development, the propagation of religion is not allowed to be directed 
to people who already have a religion. In addition, to be a more independ-
ent nation, the Government would try to reduce its dependency on foreign 
aid, including aid for religious institutions. Nonetheless, there are some 
positive points mentioned in the explanations: (1) the Government would 
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not intervene in the freedom of anybody who voluntarily decides to convert 
to another religion or who wants voluntarily visits or listens to a religious 
preaching of any religion; (2) although the Government prohibits the use of 
material gifts such as food, medicine, cloth etc. to convert people, it would 
not prohibit the social services developed by religious institutions like 
schools and hospitals because they are considered a concrete realization 
of religious teachings and participation of religious groups in the national 
development.103 In addition, it was also explained that the Government’s 
agreement or recommendation stipulated by the decree did not mean that 
foreign aid for religious institutions should be given physically to the Gov-
ernment. It only means that the Government should know “who receives 
what, from whom and for what.”104 
The explanation of the decree seemed to be relieving for the Chris-
tians, though not satisfying. This was particularly indicated by the positive 
comments in the press release of the MAWI, dated 16 November 1978.105 
In general, however, the Christians still could not accept the decrees and 
demanded that the Government withdraw them. In their official response 
to the explanations of the decree, they said that national unity and devel-
opment should not be opposed to the freedom of religion because accord-
ing to the P4, religious freedom is a fundamental human right that is not 
given, but should be protected, by the state. Thus, what should be devel-
oped was not to restrict that freedom but how to use the freedom respon-
sibly. They argued further that as far as the explanation of the decree was 
concerned, the Government still restricted the freedom to preach religion, 
even though the freedom to change religion was protected.106 In addition, in 
their response to the explanation of the decree on foreign aid, the Christians 
re-emphasized the universal character of the Church. They said, the decree 
could not be accepted because it indicated a Government’s intervention in 
the internal affairs of Christian institutions.107
The Government Final Position: the Joint Decree of 1979
The controversy was not over yet. Instead of withdrawing the two 
decrees, on 2 January 1979, the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home 
Affairs issued a joint decree concerning religious propagation and foreign 
aid for religious institutions. In general, the stipulations of the joint decree 
were similar to those of the two previous decrees. In his account, Alamsyah 
tried to show that the joint decree was not intended to displace the previous 
two decrees, but to strengthen them.108 They were strengthened because in 
the joint decree the authority to control the application of the decree lay in 
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the hands of Governors at provincial level, and Mayors at district level, while 
other related Departments, including the Department of Religion at both 
levels, were under their coordination. Similarly, foreign aid did not only need 
the recommendation of the Department of Religion, but also the agreement 
of the Coordinating Committee for Foreign Technical Cooperation (Panitia 
Koordinasi Kerjasama Teknis Luar Negeri, PKKTLN). There was, however, a 
significant difference in the joint decree: the time limit for replacing foreign 
missionary personnel in the previous decree was removed.109 This was prob-
ably an accommodation of the Christian objection to the time limit (i.e., two 
years) mentioned in the Alamsyah’s decree on the foreign aid. 
On 9 January 1979, the representatives of the religious groups were 
invited to a meeting with the Minister of Religion, the Minister of Home 
Affairs, the Coordinator Minister of Social Welfare and the Cabinet Secretary 
to talk about the joint decree. As had happened before, all religious rep-
resentatives agreed with the joint decree but the Christians (the DGI and 
MAWI) asked for more time to review it.110 The DGI and the MAWI then made 
a joint review of the decree dated 14 January 1979. Probably because the 
Christians now realized that the Government really wanted to proceed with 
the regulations, they did not ask the Government to withdraw but to revise 
it. First of all, they suggested that in the light of the issue of the joint decree, 
the previous two decrees should be suspended. With regard to the issue 
of religious propagation, the Christians found that there was a contradic-
tion in the decree because while it was stated that the joint decree was not 
intended to restrict the efforts to develop and propagate religion, at the 
same time it specified some restrictions. Again, the Christians suggested 
that the restriction of the target of religious mission (only for those out-
side the recognized religions) in the decree should be eradicated, because 
what could be restricted was not its target, but the ways of carrying out the 
mission. Therefore, they suggested more or less the following formulation: 
“Religious propagation may not be carried out by methods contradicting 
the freedom and dignity of human beings and the majesty of religion such 
as giving money, food etc. as a means of persuasion; and spreading pam-
phlets etc. to people who do not want to accept them; and paying a door-
to-door visit to the people who do not want to welcome it.” With regard to 
foreign aid, the Christians said that because it was something new for them 
and for the PKKTLN, they hoped that there would not be bureaucratic dif-
ficulties. The Christians also explained that foreign aid for developing and 
propagating religion is not the same as aid for technical programmes and 
therefore they suggested that the Government should formulate a new and 
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suitable regulation for the application of the decree. Last but not least, the 
Christians warned that the Government control at the province and district 
levels should not contradict religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion of 1945.111 
Again, as a support to the joint decree and response to the Chris-
tians, Rasjidi wrote a along article on religious freedom. Rasjidi argued that 
in modern western history there were two different ways to protect religious 
freedom: the European way of ‘jurisdictionalism’ and the American way of 
‘separatism.’ The difference is, while in jurisditionalism the state pays atten-
tion to religious activities, in separatism, the state does not interfere in reli-
gious affairs of the people unless they break the law. Both ways, argued 
Rasjidi, have the same goal: to guarantee the equality of religious groups 
before the law and the state. The difference was only because of different 
historical settings and experiences. In the article, Rasjidi also analysed the 
Documents of Vatican Council II, especially the decrees relating to mission 
and non-Christian religions (ad gentes and nostra aetate) and concluded that 
it was much more progressive than the attitude of the Catholic Church previ-
ously, but at the same time the Church was still trapped in the idea that it 
is only through Jesus and the mediation of the Church that one can attain 
salvation. Accordingly, the zeal to Christianise the whole world is still strong 
in the Catholic Church. Similarly, Rasjidi quoted at length the statement of 
the conference in Chambésy, 1976 and praised the Christian opposition to 
proselytism using the social services. On the other hand, Rasjidi said, accord-
ing to the report in Ecumenical Press Service, 15 June 1978, by the beginning 
of 1979, one billion dollars had been collected for the project of evangelisa-
tion in the world through social activities coordinated by the WCC. Thus for 
Rasjidi, given the real threat of the Christian mission, there was no better 
way to maintain inter-religious harmony than to support the application of 
the joint decree of the Ministers of Religion and Home Affairs. In terms of 
religious freedom, for him, the decree was parallel with the European juris-
dictionalism.112
It is noteworthy that foreign Christian missionary groups also broad-
cast the controversy on the decrees in their media. In Germany, the Asia 
Lutheran News described the decrees as the Indonesian “Anti-Mission Law” 
that banned people from changing their religion.113 Likewise, in Switzer-
land, Eduard Abel, the press secretary for the Swiss Mission Society wrote: 
“the decrees probably represent a concession to traditional Islam which…
made considerable gains at the last elections. Certainly, Indonesia cannot 
be governed today without taking account of the wishes of the Muslims. 
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Behind these wishes, the idea of an Islamic state according to the law of 
the shari‘a is gaining strength, and this idea is being actively supported by 
influential Arab states.” In another article, he wrote, “it is hoped, not only 
for the sake of the Christians but for peace and the future of all people in 
this huge Indonesian archipelago that the Suharto Government will be able 
to restrain Islamic aggressiveness…”114 A European Muslim convert, Ahmad 
von Denffer, responded that the foreign Christian accounts were false and 
likely to create a scary image of Indonesian Islam in the West. He also trans-
lated the decrees into English and published them, primarily as information 
for the Muslims in the world.115 
 
The Implication of the Decrees
 Despite the national and international criticisms and counter-criti-
cisms, the Government, especially President Soeharto, seems to be firm that 
the policy was on the right track and timely. But, why did the decrees appear 
in 1978 and not before? As has been noted, the two previous Ministers of 
Religion, Mohammad Dachlan and A. Mukti Ali, did not make any decree 
dealing with these two controversial issues. Why did Alamsyah do so? I think 
it was probably not because of the “inexperience of the new minister” as A.G. 
Hoekema tried to guess. 116 On the other hand, I think it is rather an exag-
geration to say that “these decrees symbolized a victory for Muslims in their 
long struggle to impose Islamic ideas of religious freedom on the national 
and legal system,” as Hyung-Jun Kim described.117 Apart from the fact that 
the stipulations of the decrees are similar to the Muslim ideas developed in 
1967, there was no indication that they were a direct outcome of their politi-
cal struggle, let alone their victory. In other words, the initiative appears to 
have come from the Government rather than the Islamic groups. I think if 
we go back to the political situation in 1978 and Alamsyah’s appointment 
described above, the decrees could be seen as one of the Government’s 
efforts towards reconciliation with the Islamic groups. 
Nonetheless, there was another side to the decrees: Alamsyah prob-
ably used them to oppose the Muslim discourse on Christianisation. Alam-
syah said that the discourse came from certain Muslims who wanted to vent 
their anger on the Government and to get support from the Muslims in the 
Middle East. On the other hand, argued Alamsyah, the Christians also tend-
ed to exaggerate the success of the Christian mission in the country in order 
to gain more financial support from the West. According to Alamsyah, the 
discourse on Christianisation had created a bad image of the Indonesian 
Government in the eyes of the Muslims in the world, especially in the Middle 
A G A I N S T  C H R I S T I A N I S A T I O N
90
East. Therefore, he tried to convince the Muslim leaders in the Middle East, 
including the leaders of the Rābita al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī that Christianisation 
in Indonesia was an untrue story.118 I believe that one of his ways (not the 
only way) to convince the Arab leaders was to tell them about the decrees. 
In a paper probably presented to an international Muslim audience, Alam-
syah said that, his decrees could successfully reduce the tensions and social 
unrest caused by Muslims’ negative reaction to the efforts of Christian mis-
sionaries to convert Muslims by various means, “particularly through mate-
rial and financial aid.”119 
  Nevertheless, apart from Alamsyah’s relative success in repairing the 
image of Indonesia at the international level, the discourse on the threat of 
Christian missions in Indonesia both at the international and national levels 
did not recede. The Islamic Foundation in Leicester, for instance, published 
at least three booklets on Christian missions in Indonesia, two of them by a 
German Muslim convert, Ahmad von Denffer, published in 1981, and anoth-
er by an Indonesian author, Rifyal Ka’bah, published in 1985.120 In this regard, 
it is interesting to know how the latter sees the decrees. As has been men-
tioned above, in 1979 the Islamic Foundation published the work of Ahmad 
von Denffer explaining the controversy over the decrees and translating 
them into English. After some years following the issue of the decrees, in his 
work, Rifyal Ka’bah said, “according to a Christian source, the two decrees 
remain on the books, and only a few foreign missionaries have been forced 
to leave the country.”121 
In fact, from the very beginning, there is an indication that the Mus-
lims were not sure about the effectiveness of the decrees. In his talks to 
the Muslims during the controversies over the decrees in 1978 Moham-
mad Natsir said that the Muslim groups should participate and not totally 
rely on the Government to secure the application of the decrees.122 Nat-
sir’s warning was not entirely unrealistic because the decrees were to be 
loosely implemented by the Government. In subsequent years, the Muslim 
groups, especially the reformists, recorded many cases related to the prac-
tices of Christian missions that, in their opinion, broke the regulations of 
the decrees and the Government did not pay serious attention to them.123 
In his recent work, a Christian author, Jan Aritonang, also acknowledged 
the loose application of the decrees.124 It should be noted, however, that 
the loose application of the decrees was not only because of the indiffer-
ent attitude of the Government, but also because the decrees do not have 
full legal force. This has been the main reason why some of the Muslims 
concerned with Christianisation have demanded that the decrees should 
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be elevated to the level of law ratified by Parliament, and Alamsyah also 
suggested the same idea.125 
Despite the loose application, what was the impact of the decrees 
on religious groups, especially the Christians? It seems that the effect of 
the regulation on foreign missionaries was almost immediate. In November 
1979, the secretary of the MAWI, Leo Sukoto, explained to the press that 400 
out of 1000 foreign Catholic missionaries were ready to apply for Indonesian 
citizenship.126 Perhaps, this was the most possible step to take by the Catho-
lic Church at that time: to change the formal status of the foreign mission-
aries instead of replacing them with indigenous Indonesians. According to 
Steenbrink, the application for citizenship was more successful than before 
but at the same time, visa applications for new workers had to face more 
difficulties than before.127 In contrast, the Protestant Churches of the DGI 
generally did not have the same problem because they had been mostly run 
by Indonesians, even though to carry out the projects of social services and 
development, they were still financially dependent on foreign funding.128 
Despite the regulation, to my knowledge, there had been no serious obsta-
cle for the churches to receive financial foreign aid, particularly for develop-
ment (pembangunan) reasons. 
What was the effect of the regulation on religious propagation? Per-
haps, one way to answer this question is to see what was not covered in the 
DDII’s accounts of Christianisation in the period after the decrees. Besides 
covering a large number of cases related to the alleged abuses of social serv-
ices for proselytism by the Christians, the accounts hardly mention door-
to-door visiting. Given the extreme sensitivity of the DDII to missionary 
activities, the absence of door-to-door visits in the accounts could be an 
indication of the effect of the decree.129 In 1984, the Government banned all 
publications of the Children of God sect, but there is no clear indication that 
the ban was one of the results of the application of the decree as Steenbrink 
assumed.130 
4. Muslim Opposition to Common Christmas Celebration
On one of his morning Islamic lectures (kuliyah subuh) on the Radio 
of the Republic of Indonesia (RRI) in 1974, HAMKA received a question from 
one of his listeners: what was the appropriate attitude of Muslims if they 
were invited to celebrate Christmas by their Christian neighbours? Due to 
the lack of time, HAMKA could not answer the question directly on the RRI, 
but later he had a written answer to the question published in his magazine, 
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Panji Masyarakat. In his answer, HAMKA explained that it was acceptable for 
Muslims to say “Merry Christmas,” to Christian neighbours as an expression 
of religious tolerance, but they were not allowed to participate in the cel-
ebration itself. He compared Christmas with ‘Idul Fitri for the Muslims: the 
Christians often sent “Happy Idul Fitri” cards to their Muslim friends but never 
participated in the Idul Fitri prayer in the mosque or square. For HAMKA, the 
most fundamental reason why a Muslim is not allowed to participate in a 
Christmas celebration is the theological belief behind Christmas that contra-
dicts the Islamic fundamental faith (‘aqīdah). For the Christians, Jesus is the 
Son of God crucified to save sinful human beings; while for Muslims Jesus 
is only a human being who happened to be one of the prophets sent by 
God. In other words, to maintain the purity of faith, a Muslim is not allowed 
to participate in a Christmas celebration. It seems for him, the prohibited 
participation includes not only attendance but also to be a member of the 
organizing committee of the celebration. HAMKA also explained that, even 
for the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, there had been 
controversies among the Islamic scholars. HAMKA quoted Ibn Taymiyah who 
said that the celebration of the birth of the Prophet is a religious innovation 
(bid‘a) that was never carried out by the pious early generation of Islam. 
In Indonesia, according to HAMKA, the Islamic reformist group, Persatuan 
Islam, followed Ibn Taymiyah’s view, while another group, Muhammadiyah 
could accept the celebration insofar there was no heterodox veneration of 
the Prophet in the celebration. Accordingly, HAMKA argued, if to maintain 
the purity of Islamic faith certain Islamic scholars prohibit Muslims from cel-
ebrating the birth of their own Prophet, then they must be forbidden to 
celebrate Christmas because its underlying belief contradict that of Islam.131 
HAMKA eventually concluded that, if a Muslim participates in a Christmas 
celebration, then there are only two possibilities: (1) the Muslim is a nominal 
Muslim who does not understand the teachings of Islam; (2) there is a pow-
erful Christian who can utilize his or her power to force Muslims to partici-
pate in the celebration under the pretext of Pancasila and “if this successfully 
works, they will make propaganda abroad that the influence of Christianity 
in Indonesia is going deeper. Therefore, new aid will come repeatedly.”132
MUI’s fatwa on Common Christmas Celebration
The above 1974 fatwa of HAMKA on Muslim participation in Christ-
mas celebration did not trigger any controversy at all. In 1975, the Indone-
sian Council of Ulama (MUI) was established and HAMKA was appointed to 
be its first general chairman.133 About five years later, on 7 March 1981, the 
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MUI issued a fatwa on the same matter. This fatwa was more elaborate and 
argumentative than that of HAMKA, but the conclusion was similar. 134 It was 
mentioned in the fatwa that the MUI was concerned with some Muslims who 
had recently participated in Christmas celebration because of their wrong 
assumption that Christmas celebration and the celebration of the birth of 
the prophet Muhammad were the same. The fatwa was, therefore, aimed at 
guiding Muslims to the right religious path. According to the fatwa, Muslims 
are allowed to cooperate with non-Muslims on worldly affairs but not to mix 
their belief with that of non-Muslims. In view of that, some Qur’anic verses 
were quoted to explain that for Muslims, Jesus is only a prophet and that the 
Christian belief in the Incarnation and the Trinity is not acceptable. It was 
argued that Christmas celebration cannot be separated from the Christian 
belief in the nature of Jesus and therefore to participate in the celebration 
for a Muslim implies or at least can lead to syncretism and impurity of the 
Muslim belief. 
But, was it possible to participate in the celebration without harm-
ing one’s Islamic faith? Perhaps, to anticipate this question, the fatwa refers 
to the idea of shubha, something that cannot be clearly identified as reli-
giously lawful or unlawful, a grey area between the two. Because it is an 
unclear area, if one enters it, one may enter the forbidden part. It is better 
for a Muslim, therefore, to avoid entering that area because according to a 
hadith: “anybody falls into a shubha, falls into a religiously forbidden action 
(harām).” In addition, an Islamic legal maxim was also quoted: “the preven-
tion of harms should be given a priority over the search for benefits,” (dar’ 
al-mafāsid muqaddam ‘alā jalb al-masālih). Perhaps, this legal maxim was 
quoted to argue against the arguments that there are good things if a Mus-
lim participates in a Christmas celebration. The fatwa was concluded with 
an assertion that it is harām for Muslims to participate in Christmas celebra-
tion. 
Unlike HAMKA’s fatwa in 1974, the MUI’s fatwa soon triggered ten-
sions, especially between the MUI and the Government. There were at least 
two interrelated reasons why the Government was unhappy with the fatwa. 
First, it was worried about the rigid and inflexible stipulation of the fatwa 
that might disturb relations between Muslims, Christians and the Govern-
ment. Second, the Government was annoyed by the unexpected circula-
tion of the fatwa in society. According to Syukri Ghozali and E.Z Muttaqin, 
the chairmen of the MUI, besides the request of the Islamic community, 
the fatwa was originally requested by the Minister of Religion for internal 
use as a matter to be discussed with other religious groups before a pub-
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lic policy was made. Unfortunately, the fatwa leaked out to the public and 
naturally the Minister was angry. 135 On 27 March, the MUI sent the fatwa 
to its branches in the provinces throughout Indonesia. The fatwa was also 
published in Buletin Majlis Ulama No. 3 (April, 1981) that was only printed in 
300 copies. The fatwa, however, reached many people, including journalists. 
In a meeting between Minister Alamsyah and the leaders of the MUI on 23 
April 1981, the Minister explained that he felt pushed into a corner by the 
circulation of the fatwa and therefore would like to resign. In response to 
Alamsyah’s remarks, HAMKA said, “It is illogical for the Minister to resign. I 
am the one who is responsible for the circulation of the fatwa, therefore, I 
will resign.”136 On 5 May 1981, the national daily Pelita, published the fatwa, 
but the next day, the same newspaper published a decree – dated 30 April 
1981 and signed by HAMKA and the General Secretary of the MUI, Burhani 
Tjokrohandoko – explaining that, based on the consultation with the Min-
ister of Religion, the MUI decided to withdraw the fatwa from circulation. It 
was also explained in the same letter that a Muslim was only prohibited from 
participating in ritual practices of a Christmas celebration.137 
The decree was probably a compromise between the Government 
and the MUI. Nevertheless, it triggered some questions in society, especially 
among Muslims. Did the decree mean that the MUI withdrew its own fatwa? 
The answer could be positive because in the decree, only participation in 
ritual aspects of the Christmas celebration was prohibited, while in the 
MUI’s fatwa the prohibition seems to be absolute. Because many questions 
emerged concerning the decree and its relation to the status of the fatwa, 
HAMKA made a press statement – dated 7 May 1981 and published in some 
national newspapers – in which he explained that the decree only withdrew 
the circulation, not the validity of the fatwa.138 Following the press release, 
HAMKA explained in an article that the fatwa was quite reliable because 
it was produced by the ulama from different Islamic organizations in the 
country. The problem was, he said, that the Minister of Religion expected it 
only for Government’s information, not for the public. According to HAMKA, 
although the Government had the power to prevent the circulation of the 
fatwa, it could not invalidate the fatwa itself. He also explained that, based 
on some information from the Christians, Christmas celebration was a ritual 
practice. This was in line, he said, with the attitudes of the Ministers of Reli-
gion in the past to assign only Christian officials to attend Christmas celebra-
tions.139 
Thus, by the explanation, HAMKA clearly reaffirmed the absolute pro-
hibition stipulated by the fatwa without directly invalidating the decree. 
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This also indicates that HAMKA could not cooperate with the Government 
anymore. Accordingly, on 19 May 1981, he publicly declared his resignation 
from the chairmanship of the MUI. But, why should he make a compromise 
if he was ready to resign? In his letter of resignation read in a closed meeting 
of the MUI, HAMKA explained that the MUI was still needed in Indonesia and 
through the compromise he wanted to secure the existence of the MUI.140
Responses to the Controversy of the Fatwa 
There were at least two important issues discussed among the Mus-
lims following the conflict between the Government and the MUI. The first 
was to question the independence and role of the MUI in relation to the Gov-
ernment. The MUI was created by the Government in 1975 as an organiza-
tion representing different leaders (usually not the top leaders) of the exist-
ing Islamic organizations in the country. There was unwillingness among the 
ulama to accept the Government’s proposal, but they finally agreed, hoping 
that the MUI could function as a bridge between the Government and the 
Islamic community.141 In an article written a few days after his resignation, 
HAMKA explained that his involvement in the MUI was based on a sincere 
intention to serve Muslims and the country. Therefore, he said, when he was 
asked to be the General Chairman of the MUI in 1975, he proposed one con-
dition: he would not be given a salary and pension by the Government. He 
realized, he said, the General Chairman of the MUI was not the same as muftis 
in Islamic countries who were paid by the Government. By this explanation, 
HAMKA probably wanted to show his relative independence from the Gov-
ernment.142 Indeed, according to the reformist Muslim leader, Mohammad 
Roem, HAMKA’s reluctance to receive a Government salary was his political 
strategy to assert that an Islamic scholar could not be bought.143 This self-
assertion was also indicated by another article of HAMKA after his resigna-
tion. He wrote a story of Imam Anas Ibn Mālik (d.795), the founder of one of 
the four Sunni schools of law. The story was about the attitude of the Imam 
to the ruler (khalīfa) of the Abbasid Dynasty who invited him to be the mufti 
in Baghdad and asked for his permission to make his work, al-Muwatta, the 
second authoritative religious text after the Qur’ān and therefore, its copies 
would be multiplied and distributed to the regions ruled by the dynasty. 
The Imam refused both offers and decided to stay and teach in Medina to 
his death. For HAMKA, this was an ideal example of an Islamic scholar’s rela-
tionship to a ruler. He said, “if we read the biographies of Islamic scholars, we 
would be embarrassed to be called an Islamic scholar, because we are too far 
from that ideal.”144 As has been said, despite his concerns with the independ-
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ence of the ulama, HAMKA and some others like him still hoped that the 
MUI could function better in the future.145 HAMKA passed away just about 
two months after his resignation. If he had lived longer, he would have been 
annoyed to witness some cases in which the MUI could not avoid but to be 
silent if not a legitimising voice for the Government’s interests.146 In fact, the 
fatwa on common Christmas celebrations was the only case in which the 
MUI was opposed to the Government during the New Order.147 
The second Muslim discussion was on the MUI’s fatwa itself. There 
were various criticisms of the fatwa during the controversy and most of them 
based on socio-political arguments, rather than scriptural or religious argu-
ments. It should be noted here that the fatwa was also a response to a social 
phenomenon, namely, the growing practice of celebrating common Christ-
mas celebration (Natal Bersama), especially at Christian schools and Govern-
ment offices. This common celebration did not only include the Catholics 
and the Protestants, but also the Muslims. It was reported in certain media 
that some Muslim students at certain Christian schools were obliged to par-
ticipate in Christmas celebrations in various ways: from giving financial sup-
port and singing religious songs to acting in a play as Mary, Jesus etc. during 
the celebration. Some Government offices also often organized common 
Christmas celebrations with non-Christians in those offices were involved.148 
It was also not uncommon that the President, Ministers and other high-rank-
ing officials were invited to come to Christmas celebrations, even though 
they were Muslims. For the MUI, this growing culture would lead to a nega-
tive impact on Muslim faith and therefore, could not be tolerated. In this 
regard, the MUI’s fatwa can be seen as an absolute opposition to the existing 
social phenomenon. 
In contrast, for Minister Alamsyah, the MUI’s fatwa was too rigid by 
ignoring the socio-political reality of Indonesia. He said, we should remem-
ber that Indonesia is a religiously plural society; and to attend a religious 
celebration of another religion was a positive act to enhance the unity and 
integrity of the nation. He also argued that one could maintain one’s reli-
gious faith and at the same time participate in a religious celebration of 
another religion but only in non-ritual aspects of the celebration. Samudi 
Abdullah, a Muslim author, responded rather positively to Alamsyah’s view. 
He tried to find a compromise between Alamsyah’s idea and the MUI’s fatwa. 
For him, what was prohibited in the fatwa was participation not attendance 
at a Christmas celebration. For him, the participation included singing car-
ols, dancing and praying, while attendance means: “just sit, keep silent and 
eat if a meal is offered.”149 Nonetheless, to draw a clear distinction between 
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the ritual and non-ritual was not as easy as a Muslim like Samudi expected. 
S.A.E Nababan, the General Secretary of the DGI, explained that for Prot-
estants, the ritual and non-ritual in a Christmas celebration could not be 
separated. In contrast, J. Riberu of the MAWI explained that for the Catholics, 
it was a ritual or cult only if there was a Eucharist, that is, a priest offering a 
Mass. Beyond that, including burning candles, was not a cult.150 
Another criticism of the fatwa came from Abdurrahman Wahid who 
was a prominent columnist at that time. In his column, he covered both 
issues: the position and authority of the MUI and the nature of the fatwa. 
For him, the MUI was created to be no more than a mediator between the 
Government and the Islamic community and this was the basic problem for 
the MUI. Because MUI’s leaders were appointed by the Government, not by 
the Islamic community, its authority was unclear. He asked, if the MUI “was 
intended to be able to formulate a framework of decision making by itself, 
why did the top leaders of the existing Islamic organizations not become 
representatives in it?” With regard to the second issue, Abdurrahman Wahid 
said that the inflexible nature of the fatwa was a result of religious thought 
based on absolute postulates. It would be unfortunate, he said, if other reli-
gious groups also had the same exclusive view and consequently a Muslim 
who wanted to participate in a Christmas celebration should go secretly 
(because he or she was afraid of the MUI) but when the Muslim arrived 
at the place of the celebration, he or she would be expelled by the Chris-
tians! Abdurrahman Wahid eventually suggested, instead of dealing with 
the Christmas issue, it was better for the MUI to concentrate on more fun-
damental problems of society such as how Islam could help fight against 
poverty and ignorance; and the answer to this question should be detailed 
and concrete.151 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s criticism of the fatwa, no matter how strong 
it was, did not provide clear alternative religious arguments, nor direct 
responses to the social issues described by the proponents of the fatwa.152 
This was the reason why the criticism did not force the proponents of the 
fatwa to develop new arguments. For instance, Hasan Basri, one of the MUI’s 
chairmen, said that Abdurrahman Wahid did not understand the problem. 
Hasan Basri claimed that there had been some cases in certain regions where 
Muslims were invited and even forced to participate in a Christmas celebra-
tion. He said, as a response to this phenomenon, the fatwa was made to 
guard the purity of Muslim belief.153 Similarly, Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima said 
that the fatwa was not about religious absolutism, but to guard a fundamen-
tal belief of Islam. He then referred to the statement of S.A.E Nababan of the 
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DGI who said that in a Christmas celebration, the Protestants did not sepa-
rate the ritual and non-ritual aspects. Finally, Saimima argued that Abdur-
rahman Wahid’s suggestion that the MUI should provide detailed and con-
crete answers to the social problems of poverty and ignorance went too far 
because MUI was an organization of religious scholars, not technocrats.154
Alamsyah’s Circular on the Celebration of Religious Days 
Apart from the Muslim polemics on the fatwa, Minister Alamsyah 
wanted to proceed with his plan to talk to the leaders of all religious groups 
about the issue under a more general theme: “celebrations of religious 
feast days.” This issue was then discussed in the Wadah Musyawarah Antar 
Umat Beragama (Forum for Inter-religious Consultation), a surrogate of the 
Badan Konsultasi Antar Agama (Body of Inter-religious Consultation) of 1967 
that had no noticeable activities after its establishment. Since May 1979, 
Alamsyah had tried to revive the 1967 body through a series of discussions 
between the Government and the representatives of five recognized reli-
gions and about one year later, on 30 June 1980, the Wadah Musyawarah 
was finally established.155 Alamsyah then urged the Wadah Musyawarah 
to discuss the above issue and after several preliminary meetings, on 25 
August 1981, all religious representatives in the Forum signed an inter-reli-
gious decree on the celebrations of religious feast days. 
There are some important points stated in the decree, but as a result 
of negotiation and compromise, sometimes we may find unclear wording 
or an ambiguous meaning of a sentence. It was stated that, “the celebra-
tions of religious feast days are basically held and attended by the followers 
of the religion in question, but it is normal if a follower of another religion 
respects them (turut menghormati) according to the principles of familial, 
neighbourly and cooperative relations, as far as it does not contradict the 
teachings of one’s own religion.” The word ‘respect’ was likely chosen as a 
compromise between those who allowed one’s participation and those who 
did not. Another crucial point in the decree was that every teacher “is urged 
to equip him/herself with religious knowledge in order to ensure that the 
spirit of harmony among students would be established, as far as it does 
not reduce their respective religious convictions and beliefs.” Perhaps, this 
statement was also a compromise between the Muslim representatives who 
wanted to prevent Muslim students at Christian schools from being involved 
in any Christian religious feast days and the Christian representatives who 
tried to find a more moderate solution. Last but not least, there are two 
recommendations mentioned in the decree, one for the Government offi-
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cials and another for the leaders of social institutions. It is suggested in the 
decree that the Government should pay attention to the need of religious 
life for all religious groups based on the principle of justice. If a Government 
official attends a religious ceremony of another religion, he or she should 
be “passive but respectful.” It was also suggested that leaders of social insti-
tutions should provide the same opportunities for the people under their 
leadership to celebrate their respective religious feast days. They were also 
urged neither to enforce nor to prohibit their subordinates from performing 
the celebration and not to mix the beliefs and practices of different religions 
in that celebration.156
Christian Opposition to the Circular 
According to the constitution of the Wadah Musyawarah, any decision 
made in the organization is morally binding and at the same time it becomes 
a recommendation for the Government.157 Accordingly, only one week after 
the decree was signed by the representatives of religious groups, Minister 
Alamsyah sent a circular (surat edaran) on the celebrations of religious feast 
days, dated 2 September 1981, to the high officials of the state, including 
the ministers, the speaker of the Parliament, the Commander of Security 
and Order, the Police Chief Officer and the Governors of the provinces.158 The 
circular soon triggered controversy, especially between Minister Alamsyah, 
some members of the Parliament, the Islamic leaders and the Christian lead-
ers of the DGI and the MAWI. The circular was controversial mainly because 
it tried to differentiate clearly between the ritual and non-ritual aspects of 
every celebration of religious feast days. For some of the Members of the 
Parliament and the Christians of the DGI and the MAWI, the circular was 
a kind of state intervention in internal religious affairs of the people and 
therefore, it was against the Constitution, the P4, and Soeharto’s speech on 
the working session of the Department of Religion a few months before. In 
response to the criticism of the circular, on 23 September 1981, Alamsyah 
explained that in his consultation with the President one day before, the 
President suggested that the circular should not be linked with anything 
but the goal of achieving the unity and prosperity of the nation. He said 
that the circular was not intended to intervene in people’s internal religious 
affairs, but to avoid the possible negative effects of religious celebrations 
that might endanger the integrity of the nation. 
The DGI and the MAWI, however, were not satisfied with Alamsyah’s 
explanation. In their basic thoughts delivered to the Government, the Chris-
tians explained that the circular did not have a legal and constitutional 
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basis. They argued that the circular consciously or unconsciously opened 
the door for the application of the Jakarta Charter (in which the application 
of the shari‘a is prescribed) and this “contradicts the New Order’s commit-
ment to the Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 in a pure and consistent 
manner.” In short, the circular disturbed the certainty of law within the state. 
“Accordingly, the circular directly destroys the prestige of the Government 
altogether because the character of its content is threatening (=enforce-
ment of will) that really contradicts the basis of Pancasila Democracy.”159 
In addition, for them the circular did not have moral force, because 
it contradicted the inter-religious decree on the celebration of religious 
feast days. In this regard, they mentioned at least four important points: 
first, as has been quoted above, the decree said that, “the celebrations of 
religious days are basically held and attended by the followers of the reli-
gion in question…” In the circular, the word “only” is inserted as follows: 
“the celebration of religious feast days is basically only held and attended 
by the followers of the religion in question…” The circular, however, does 
not cut out the rest of the statement of the decree that opens the pos-
sibility for anybody to ‘respect’ a religious celebration of another religion. 
For the Christians, however, the insertion of the word ‘only’ really matters 
because it gives the impression as if the Government wanted to regulate 
and intervene in the rituals of religions. Second, it was mentioned in the 
decree that Government officials are urged to pay attention to the reli-
gious need of their subordinates based on the principle of justice and 
their presence in a religious celebration of another religion should be pas-
sive and respectful. This statement is different from that of the circular 
because the circular only mentions that “if a Government official attends a 
religious celebration…” and does not mention the recommendation that 
the Government should pay attention to the religious need etc. Third, it is 
mentioned in the decree that every teacher is “encouraged to equip him/
herself with religious knowledge…” while in the circular it is stated that, 
“those who are responsible for schools and teachers…” The difference is, 
while the decree only indicates the teacher as a profession, the circular 
clearly puts the teacher in a school context. This means, for Christians, the 
Minister of Religion infiltrated the area of authority of the Minister of Edu-
cation.160 Finally, in the circular there is suggestion for those who want to 
perform a religious celebration to consult with the Government official 
and religious leaders of the region; this is not mentioned in the decree at 
all. For the Christians, this gives the impression that a Government official 
can regulate religious worship.161 
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Accordingly, in a meeting with Alamsyah on 26 September 1981, 
the Christians demanded that he arrange another session of the Wadah 
Musyawarah to discuss the issue. Alamsyah replied that he would invite the 
religious representatives to the session in two weeks. On the other hand, 
there had been support for Alamsyah’s circular from some members of the 
Parliament and the leaders of Islamic organizations, including the reform-
ists of the Muhammadiyah and the traditionalists of the Nahdlatul Ulama. 
162 In response to the Christian demand, the MUI sent a letter to the Minister 
suggesting that such a session was not needed anymore.163 In the end, the 
session of Wadah Musyawarah never took place.
Rusydi, the chief editor of Panji Masyarakat, wrote an article as a 
response to the controversy about the circular. He said, the circular was a 
normal matter because it was the duty of the Government to protect the 
beliefs of the people. To support the circular, Rusydi then repeated the argu-
ment underlying the fatwa on Christmas celebration, i.e., according to the 
reports received by the MUI, some Muslims had been persuaded and even 
forced by the Christians – sometimes by using authority and power – to 
attend a Christmas celebration. In contrast, he wondered: Was there any 
case where “a Christian was forced to attend Idul Fitri or Friday prayer?”164 
In line with Rusydi, one of the chairmen of the MUI, Hasan Basri said that 
there was nothing in the circular contradicting the inter-religious decree 
as the Christians claimed. For him, the circular was not an intervention in 
religious worship because it was just a guide (petunjuk) regarding celebra-
tion of religious feast days. Sulaiman Fadli, a Member of Parliament even 
suggested that the Government upgrade the status of the circular to be a 
joint decree of Ministers. For the Muslims, the Christian negative reactions 
were evidence that the Christians considered the circular as an obstacle to 
their interest to develop an under-cover Christianisation campaign through 
common Christmas celebrations.165 
As the time for Christmas celebration in 1981 came closer, the DGI and 
MAWI sent a joint letter to the Commander of Security and Order, Soedomo, 
explaining that despite the controversies, both the DGI and MAWI would 
tell the Indonesian Christians that Christmas celebrations would be held as 
usual.166 The DGI and the MAWI also published a joint message for Christ-
mas, in which they encouraged the Christians to be involved in contribut-
ing to future development of the country, establishing national harmony, 
living a humble life and respecting the dignity of human beings. Although 
this message did not touch directly on the current controversy, it tried to 
describe the birth of Jesus as both astonishing and frightening. King Herod 
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was astonished and extremely frightened to hear the Good News (Matthew 
2:2-3) because he felt that his position was threatened. In addition, many 
people refused the news of the Birth of Jesus that was certainly beyond 
reason (Philip 4:7), namely that “the Word became flesh and dwelt among 
us” (John 1:14). The message eventually asserted that Christmas is the Good 
News of the Birth of Jesus Christ, God, the Saviour for all nations (Luke: 2:10-
12).167 
1993: The Fatwa Reintroduced 
As we can see throughout our discussion on this issue, the contro-
versy seems to have hardened the existing mutual suspicions between the 
Muslims and the Christians. About twelve years later, in December 1993, 
the top leaders of four Islamic organizations, Achmad Azhar Basyir of the 
Muhammadiyah, Ilyas Ruchiyat of the Nahdlatul Ulama, Anwar Haryono of 
the DDII and Hasan Basri of the MUI, issued a joint statement on Christmas 
celebrations, not only addressed to the Muslims but also to the Christians 
and the mass media. For the Muslims in general, the statement suggested 
to them that they should be faithful to the MUI’s fatwa of 1981 on common 
Christmas celebrations, while Muslims who happened to be Government 
officials should follow the guidance of Alamsyah’s circular. The statement 
also recognised the right of Christians to celebrate Christmas, but at the 
same time it suggested that they should not make the Christmas an extrava-
gant and glamorous show because this might trigger social jealousy and 
disturb the integrity of the nation. Finally, the statement also persuaded the 
mass media to be aware of the fact that the majority of their clients were 
Muslims; and in view of that, they were expected to produce a proportionate 
and appropriate coverage and presentation of Christmas celebrations.168 
How did the Islamic leaders explain the joint statement? Hasan Basri 
and Ilyas Ruchiyat said that they primarily wanted to remind Muslims who 
might forget the fatwa or even did not know of it. This meant that, as HAMKA 
had previously explained, the validity of the fatwa was still maintained, 
although its circulation was withdrawn. Hasan Basri explained further that 
he hoped that Christians would also respect the Muslims by not inviting 
them to Christmas celebrations. On the other hand, he said that it was 
allowed for Muslim Government officials to attend a Christmas celebration 
but not to participate in its rituals.169 The Muslim leaders also explained that 
recently, Christmas had been celebrated in luxurious and glamorous ways 
by certain people and this should be avoided in order not to trigger social 
jealousy. Moreover, they were concerned with the printed and electronic 
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media that often published and broadcast programmes during the period 
around Christmas that were not in line with Islamic ethics.170 The latter issue 
seems to refer to the increasing pop culture, especially in urban areas, to cel-
ebrate Christmas and the New Year (with more emphasis on the latter). But 
why did the statement appear in 1993, not before? Perhaps, this was related 
to the development of national politics. Since the 1990s, when his relations 
with certain influential army generals had become weak, Soeharto decided 
to be allied with the Islamic groups.171 Within this context, the Muslim lead-
ers seemed to be confident enough to publish the joint statement.
If the Muslim leaders felt it necessary to remind Muslims about the 
fatwa, does it mean that it did not have any influence on society? As early 
as 1981 following the controversy on the fatwa and the circular, a Catho-
lic magazine explained that the Christians became sceptical and feared to 
invite Muslims to Christmas celebrations, although it was previously a com-
mon practice. In a village in the Yogyakarta province, it was reported that a 
Catholic had passed away and the Muslim neighbours made a visit of condo-
lence to the Catholic family. Surprisingly, when the priest came to perform 
the ceremony for the dead, all of the Muslims decided to leave because they 
did not want to participate in a Catholic ritual. According to the magazine, a 
similar case had never happened before in that village.172
 Conclusion 
The Muslim discourse on Christianisation apparently reflects what an 
observer said that the Islamic groups in Indonesia were a majority with a 
minority mentality.173 The political marginalisation of the Islamic groups dur-
ing the first two decades of the New Order helped create this mentality, that 
is, the Muslim feeling of being weak in relation to a very powerful enemy, 
particularly the ruling army. In this context, within the discourse on Chris-
tianisation, the Muslims expressed their feeling of being weak and power-
less as against the religious expansion of the apparently powerful Christians 
supported by foreign aid. The logic of this discourse is that the state should 
protect the weak through certain regulations. For the Government, to fulfil 
the Muslim demands was apparently much easier than making other more 
significant political concessions. Moreover, the Muslim demands run paral-
lel with the New Order’s attempts to put all social forces under state control 
and to neutralise anything considered harmful to political stability. On the 
other hand, based on religious freedom, the Christians consistently opposed 
the state policies. Partly due to the Christian protests, in practice, the regula-
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tions have been only loosely implemented by the state. The state’s ambigu-
ous position finally left the controversy unresolved and it could resurface at 
any time. 
We have also seen that the discourse on Christianisation versus reli-
gious freedom was developed by Muslim and Christian leaders respectively 
through public media and meetings. Given their influential positions in 
their respective religious communities, we can be sure that the effect of the 
discourses on society was significant. In other words, the antagonistic dis-
courses helped increase distrust and suspicion between the two religious 
groups. Likewise, although the MUI had no authority to force people to fol-
low its fatwa prohibiting Muslims from attending Christmas celebration, 
some accounts suggested that it had actually influenced people.
Thus, after the fall of the New Order, the problems continued to 
develop. In 2002, there was a discussion in the Department of Religion on 
the possibility of having a Religious Harmony Law. This idea was nothing 
but an effort to enhance the legal status of the decrees to the position of 
law ratified by Parliament. In October 2004, a group of Muslims barricaded a 
Catholic school in Cileduk, Jakarta, because it was used illegally for religious 
services, and for the same reason, 23 churches have been closed by Muslims 
in West Java in September 2005. On the other hand, voices condemning 
these actions and arguing for religious freedom and tolerance were also 
heard among the Christians and some Muslims. The stage is not closed yet; 
and the game is not over.
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3. Against The Islamic 
State 
In February 1969, in his paper for a consultation of the DGI, T. B. Sima-
tupang wrote: “Many Christians are preoccupied with the fear of an Islamic 
state…Most of the Christians assume that in their hearts, many of the Mus-
lims want to attain a situation similar to that of Egypt or Malaysia where 
Islam is given the position of a state religion, and that the position of non-
Muslim citizens is not entirely equal to that of the Muslims.”1 The Christian 
fear of being treated as second-class citizens under an Islamic state was 
certainly not new in the history of the Republic of Indonesia. On 18 August 
1945, just one day after the Proclamation of Independence, the Christians in 
the East of Indonesia asserted that they would not join the newly born state 
if it would apply the shari’a (Islamic law). 
Simatupang’s statement, however, indicates that the fear of an Islam-
ic State was quite strong among the Christians in the late 1960s. Indeed, 
after the political collapse of the Communists and Communism, the contest 
between the Islamic ideology and the nationalist ideology re-emerged. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, during the Guided Democracy (1959-1965), Soekar-
no tried to combine the three major ideologies of Nationalism, Islam and 
Communism in his NASAKOM (Nasionalis, Agama, Komunis). Now when the 
Communists were defeated and Communism was banned in 1966, the con-
testing ideologies that remained in place were only Islam and nationalism. 
By the absence of the Communists, the Islamic groups felt politically more 
confident to pursue their ideological ambition. However, the Islamic ideol-
ogy had to face its enduring rival, namely secular nationalism whose pro-
ponents were not only secular civilian Muslims and Christians but also the 
ruling military. The reason was, in addition to the fact that the Islamic groups 
were now the most viable political rivals for the military, the latter also had 
bitter memories of war against the Darul Islam movement that had launched 
armed struggle against the central Government between 1948 and 1962 to 
establish an Islamic State.2 Thus, a clash between the proponents of Islamic 
ideology and secular nationalism could not be avoided. 
Because the military was in favour of the nationalist ideology, the 
Christians naturally allied with the former. A certain group among the Cath-
olics even cooperated very closely with the military, not simply in opposing 
the Islamic ideology but in creating and supporting the political policies 
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of the regime in general. The Christian-military alliance eventually helped 
create bad relations between the Christians and the Muslims, particularly 
the ideologically Islamic-oriented Muslims. On the other hand, by the mid 
1980s, the New Order regime had forced all social and political organisa-
tions to take the ideology of the nationalists, Pancasila, as their sole basis. 
Although most religious organisations, including Islamic and Christian, 
eventually accepted the regime’s demand, some of their leaders developed 
certain interpretations of Pancasila that were different from, or opposed to, 
that of the regime. In the present chapter, I shall discuss these issues in some 
detail.
1. Ideological Debates in the Early New Order
The ideological debates in the early years of the New Order were 
closely connected with the history of the Indonesian constitution since the 
preparation for independence. As a realization of the Japanese promise of 
Indonesian independence, on 1 March 1945, the Investigating Committee 
for the Preparation of Independence called ‘Dokuritsu Zyunbi Tyoosakai’ or 
‘Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan’ (BPUPK) was established. 
Besides the Indonesians, a few of the Japanese also became members of 
the BPUPK.3 In May, June and July, the 62 members of the BPUPK had some 
sessions to discuss the drafts of the state basis (dasar negara) and constitu-
tion. On the issue of the state basis, one group proposed Islam to be the 
ideology, while another aspired to a nationalist and secular ideology. To 
find a compromise, a sub-committee consisting of nine members was set 
up to concentrate on the formulation of the draft of the state basis that was 
also intended to be the preamble of the constitution and the statement to 
proclaim Indonesian independence. On 22 June 1945, the sub-committee 
finished its work, which was to be called ‘the Jakarta Charter.’ In a plenary 
session of the BPUPK in July 1945, without much debate, the Jakarta Charter 
was accepted. One basic point of the Islamic group’s proposal accommo-
dated in the Charter was the obligation of the Muslim citizens to observe 
the shari’a. This point, later known as ‘the seven words’,4 was put as the first 
and one of the five principles of the basis for the state.5
On 17 August 1945, on behalf of the Indonesian people, Soekarno 
and Mohammad Hatta declared Indonesian Independence. Ten days before, 
on 7 August 1945, the Japanese military administration allowed the estab-
lishment of the Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence (Pani-
tia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI) whose members were wholly 
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Indonesians.6 On 18 August, the PPKI discussed the draft of the Preamble 
(i.e., the Jakarta Charter) and the Constitution of 1945. It was on that day 
that ‘the seven words’ were dropped due to the objection of the Christians of 
the Eastern parts of Indonesia. As a substitute, the first principle of the state 
basis was decided to be ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.’7 This formulation is 
untranslatable; and as we shall see, its translation and interpretation was to 
become the centre of Muslim-Christian debates. Moreover, this formulation 
was later considered to be the distinctive feature of the basis of the state 
called ‘Pancasila’ as opposed to the seven words of the Jakarta Charter.8
After the 1955 elections, on 10 November 1956, a Constituent Assem-
bly was inaugurated. The major responsibility of the Assembly was to make 
a decision on the ideology as well as the constitution of the state. The 
debates on the ideological basis of the state took place from 11 Novem-
ber to 7 December 1957. There were three visions for such a basis: some of 
the parties wished to see Islam as the basis of the state, others Pancasila 
and yet another, social-economic justice. 9 The first two views had more sup-
porters than the last one and therefore a compromise between the two was 
necessary. However, neither the Islam nor the Pancasila bloc could achieve 
the required two-thirds majority, and attempts to reach a compromise 
also failed. The Government eventually offered a suggestion that the state 
should return to the Constitution of 1945. The Islamic groups could accept 
the Government’s proposal on the condition that the ‘Islamic words’ of the 
Jakarta Charter were incorporated. The Pancasila bloc, however, could not 
accept this proposal and another deadlock was unavoidable. Partly because 
of the deadlock and partly because of the political circumstances outside 
the Assembly, with the support of the military, President Soekarno finally 
issued a Decree on 5 July 1959 in which he proclaimed the return to the 
Constitution of 1945.10 To accommodate the Islamic groups, it is mentioned 
in the consideration of the Decree that “the Jakarta Charter, dated 22 June 
1945, inspires the Constitution of 1945 and constitutes a coherent whole 
with the Constitution.”11 On 22 July 1945 the decree was finally accepted by 
acclamation in the Parliament. 
Soekarno’s decree had become a tentative solution to the ideologi-
cal conflict until the collapse of his regime. Up to early 1966, the ideologi-
cal conflict between the proponents and opponents of the Islamic ideology 
had not yet resurfaced. In January 1966, on the occasion of the 40th anniver-
sary of the NU, there was a parade in which people expressed some slogans 
written on the banners demanding a return to the Jakarta Charter. During 
the NU’s celebration, the Christians did not show openly their opposition to 
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the Jakarta Charter, and they even participated in the celebration. Feillard 
records the participation of priests, nuns and students of Catholic schools 
in the NU parade.12 Likewise, Sinar Harapan reported that the Protestants 
contributed the traditional music called ‘angklong’ to the NU’s anniversary 
celebration in West Java.13
The ideological tensions apparently occurred for the first time after 
the coup of September 1965, in the session of the Provisional People’s Con-
sultative Assembly (MPRS) in June and July 1966. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
in order to establish a constitutional legitimacy for the rising power of the 
army and the illegitimacy of the previous regime, particularly its Communist 
elements, the MPRS session took the idea of a pure application of Pancasila 
and the Constitution of 1945. For the Islamic groups, this idea opened the 
question of the position of the Jakarta Charter mentioned in Soekarno’s 
decree of 1959. In other words, if the decree was the main reason for the 
constitutional position of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, while the 
decree somehow mentioned the Jakarta Charter, would the idea of a pure 
application also include the Jakarta Charter? 
In this context, the memorandum of the Parliament (DPRGR), dated 9 
June 1966, on the sources of Indonesian law that was ratified by the MPRS 
Decree No.XX/1966, dated 5 July 1966, may reflect the ideological battle 
in the legislative body. The underpinning idea of the memorandum was 
to determine the constitutional basis of all state decisions, so they could 
become a true application of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In gen-
eral, the memorandum reflects a compromise between the proponents of 
Pancasila and those of the Jakarta Charter. It is mentioned in the memo-
randum that Pancasila is the source of all legal sources, but at the same 
time, it was mentioned that, with reference to Soekarno’s decree of 1959, 
the Jakarta Charter is considered to inspire the Constitution of 1945, and 
to make up one whole with it. It is also mentioned that: “The formulation of 
the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution was actually based on the spirit of 
the Jakarta Charter, and at the same time the Jakarta Charter was based on 
the spirit of Bung Karno’s speech on 1 June 1945 that is now known as ‘the 
Speech on the Birth of Pantja Sila’” Nonetheless, the decree also declares 
that the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution which contains the basis of the 
state (i.e., Pancasila) cannot be changed by anybody, even by People’s Con-
sultative Assembly (MPR), because to change the Preamble means “to dis-
solve the state.”14 Thus, compared to the high status of Pancasila, the posi-
tion of the Jakarta Charter was unclear if not very weak, but it is somehow 
still mentioned in this decree.
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The Debates on the Position of the Jakarta Charter (1968-1969)
The tensions between the opponents and the proponents of the 
Jakarta Charter occurred more sharply in the session of the Provisional 
People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS) in March 1968 in which the Islamic 
groups failed to include the Charter in the Mainlines of State Policies (GBHN) 
due to the opposition of the military, the Christians and the secular nation-
alists. After this MPRS session, we find several polemical writings on the 
Jakarta Charter by both sides. With regard to the views of the opponents, we 
shall concentrate here on the Christian writings that sometimes also refer to 
those of the Muslim secular nationalists. 
In general, by contrast with the ideological debates in the Constitu-
ent Assembly in which both the proponents of the nationalist and Islamic 
ideology tried to show why their respective ideologies were the best,15 the 
debates during the early years of the New Order were much focused on the 
interpretation of historical facts. Both Muslims and Christians seem to agree 
on basic historical facts around the Jakarta Charter (more or less as has been 
described above) but they developed different interpretations of these his-
torical events to support their respective positions, that is, the Muslims 
wanted to prove the significance of the Jakarta Charter and consequently 
of Islam in the state, while the Christians tried to leave out or minimize its 
significance in order to keep a religiously neutral position of the state. 
We have mentioned that the seven words of the Jakarta Charter stipu-
lating the application of the shari’a for Muslim citizens were dropped on 18 
August 1945, just one day after the Proclamation of Independence. How did 
the Muslims interpret this event, especially in the late 1960s? First of all, the 
Muslims tried to show that the Proclamation of Independence was strongly 
related to the Jakarta Charter. In his speech to the anniversary celebration of 
the Jakarta Charter, June 1968, the traditionalist Muslim leader and Minister 
of Religion, Mohammad Dachlan, said that, “the Jakarta Charter was a step 
forward for Independence” that was to become “the mover and the source 
of the spirit of the struggle of the Indonesian nation to defend its Independ-
ence.”16 With reference to Muhammad Yamin, a nationalist and one of the 
members of the sub-committee who made the Jakarta Charter, Dachlan 
argued further that the content of the Proclamation of Independence is in 
accordance with the statement in the Jakarta Charter, and that the Charter 
actually designated the closing of the movement for Indonesian Independ-
ence in the twentieth century. 17 Mohammad Roem, the reformist Muslim 
leader argued further that the first sentence of the Proclamation was even 
taken from the Jakarta Charter.18 
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Dachlan’s and Roem’s arguments appear to imply that the Indonesian 
state declared on 17 August was a state based on the Jakarta Charter. For 
the Muslims, therefore, the eradication of the seven words by the next day 
was nothing but an unfair political move of the secular nationalists. In this 
respect, the prominent reformist Muslim leader, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, 
argued that the decision made in the PPKI session on 18 August 1945 was 
much less representative than the agreement made by the sub-committee 
of the BPUPK on 22 June 1945. In the sub-committee, four persons repre-
sented the Islamic groups (Abdoelkahar Moezakir, Agoes Salim, Abikoesno 
Tjokrosoerojo and Wachid Hasjim), and five persons represented the nation-
alist groups (Soekarno, Mohammad Hatta, Achmad Soebardjo, Mohammad 
Yamin and A.A. Maramis). 
 This 4:5 power-balance was almost the same as the result of the dem-
ocratic elections of 1955. Later, the votes for and against the Jakarta Charter 
and the Pancasila in the Constituent Assembly reflected the 4:5 power-bal-
ance as well. In contrast, the members of the PPKI were 27 and only 3 of them 
representing the Islamic groups. In addition, during the lobbying arranged 
by Mohammad Hatta in the morning of 18 August 1945, none of the Islamic 
group’s representatives who were previously involved in the sub-commit-
tee was present. Wachid Hasjim who was invited to the lobbying, could not 
come because he was on the way to Surabaya.19 The only representative of 
the Islamic groups in the lobbying was Ki Bagus Hadikusomo who was not 
a member of the sub-committee. In short, for Prawoto, the decision made 
on 18 August 1945 to drop the seven words was far from representing the 
political reality of the Indonesian people.20 The reformist Muslim leader, 
HAMKA, even made a sharper comment on this historical event. He argued 
that before the existence of the Jakarta Charter, the movement of the strug-
gle for independence in Indonesia was divided into two groups: the Islamic 
and the nationalist groups and there was no mutual respect of either group. 
It was only after the compromise formulated in the Jakarta Charter that both 
groups agreed to unite. Nonetheless, he said, only one day after the goal 
was achieved, that is, the Proclamation of Independence, the nationalists 
left the Islamic group behind. For HAMKA, therefore, the eradication of the 
seven words on that day was nothing but a reflection of “dishonesty, if not 
cheating” of the nationalists.21 
There is a remarkable contrast between the Muslim interpretations of 
the historical events in 1945 and those of the Christians. Following the fail-
ure of the Islamic groups to include the Jakarta Charter in the GBHN during 
the MPRS session of March 1968 mentioned above, the Catholic magazine, 
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Peraba, published a series of articles criticising the arguments of the pro-
ponents of the Jakarta Charter, one of the articles was a statement by the 
Catholic Party, while the others were written by the editor of the magazine 
or secular nationalists. With regard to the events of 1945, with reference to 
an article written by Sajuti Melik, one of the former members of the PPKI, the 
Catholic Party argued that the Jakarta Charter never had any legal force in 
history because it was simply a draft of the Preamble of the 1945 Constitu-
tion. Sajuti Melik even said, (argued the Catholic Party further), that there 
was no hard evidence that the sub-committee of the BPUPK really signed 
the draft of the Preamble on 22 June 1945, and that it was only Mohammad 
Yamin who initially called this draft the Jakarta Charter. Thus, for the Catho-
lic Party, because the Jakarta Charter was simply a draft, there was nothing 
wrong with PPKI’s decision to drop the seven words.22 Moreover, for the edi-
tor of Peraba, the eradication of the seven words was very significant for the 
unity of the whole nation. Therefore, the editor argued, those who currently 
demanded the recognition of the Jakarta Charter were “against the unity 
and integrity of the nation.”23 The editor also argued that the dropping of the 
seven words also indicated that the proclaimed state was never meant as 
an Islamic state; and on the contrary to the Muslim claim, the Proclamation 
of Independence had nothing to do with the Jakarta Charter.24 According 
to the history of Proclamation, argued the editor, Soekarno and Hatta were 
initially sceptical of making the Proclamation, until the youths forced them 
to do so. These youths, who did not want to cooperate with the Japanese 
colonisers, did not want Indonesian independence to be associated with 
the Japanese, and therefore they refused to use any word from the Jakarta 
Charter, which was made by the Japanese-sponsored BPUPK, to be included 
in the Proclamation. This historical account, for the Peraba editor, was clearly 
set out in an article by Adam Malik, one of the youths who took part in that 
very historical event.25 
The second important historical event related to the Jakarta Char-
ter was Soekarno’s decree of 1959 in which it was stated that the Charter 
inspires the 1945 Constitution and constitutes a coherent whole with it. Like 
their view of the historical events of 1945, the Christians saw that Soekarno’s 
decree of 1959 did not provide any legitimacy for the application of the 
Jakarta Charter. For the Catholic Party, there are some reasons why the posi-
tion of the Jakarta Charter in the decree was insignificant.26 First, the state-
ment that the Jakarta Charter inspires the 1945 Constitution is mentioned 
in the considerations not in the dictums of the decree. It is agreed that in 
any decree, only the dictums, not the considerations have a legal force to be 
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implemented. Secondly, the statement that the Charter inspires the 1945 
Constitution is preceded by a clause, “we are convinced that…”and ‘we’ here 
refers to President Soekarno.27 Thus, for the Catholic Party, the statement is 
in fact Soekarno’s personal conviction, and therefore, the validity of this con-
viction is still questionable. Third, the meaning of the word ‘inspires’ (menji-
wai) should be that the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution originates from 
the Jakarta Charter, minus the seven words. If the word ‘inspires’ means that 
the seven words should be taken into the Indonesian legal system, then the 
Jakarta Charter does not inspire but replaces the Preamble of the 1945 Con-
stitution. Fourth, the statement of the decree that the Charter “constitutes a 
coherent whole” (merupakan suatu rangkaian kesatuan) with the 1945 Con-
stitution should be understood as an historical description, namely that the 
1945 Constitution was preceded by the Jakarta Charter and that the lat-
ter was preceded by Soekarno’s speech on the birth of Pancasila. The MPRS 
decree No.XX/1966 mentioning the same chronology, for the Catholic Party, 
should be understood in the same way as an historical description. In short, 
the Jakarta Charter does not have any significant constitutional position but 
an historical one. 
In contrast, the Muslims tried to show that Soekarno’s decree of 1959 
truly gives the Charter a significant constitutional position. Mohammad 
Dachlan argued that the two key statements in the decree: ‘inspires’ and 
‘constitutes a coherent whole with the constitution’ clearly indicate that the 
Charter is a valid legal source in the country and “one does not need to be a 
lawyer or professor to understand this.”28 On the other hand, HAMKA men-
tioned the views of the leading professors of law and ‘secular’ intellectuals 
such as Soepomo, Muhammad Yamin and Hazairin who recognized the high 
political and juridical status of the Jakarta Charter.29 Another argument is 
to revisit the history of the decree. Prawoto argued that the wording in the 
decree for the Charter was clearly a response to the deadlock in the Con-
stituent Assembly in which neither the Islamic nor the nationalist bloc could 
achieve the required two-thirds majority. The acceptance of the decree by 
Parliament on 13 July 1959, for Prawoto, indicates that both the Islamic and 
the nationalist blocs somehow felt that their respective aspirations were 
accommodated in the decree.30 In line with Prawoto, Dachlan and HAMKA 
tried to present some historical accounts of the political negotiation in the 
Constituent Assembly. HAMKA mentioned Soekarno’s speech in the Con-
stituent Assembly entitled “Res Publica, Sekali Lagi Res Publica” in which 
Soekarno wanted to include the Jakarta Charter for the sake of national 
unity and development.31 Moreover, both Prawoto and Dachlan mentioned 
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the draft of the Bandung Charter proposed by the Government to end the 
deadlock in the Constituent Assembly. In the draft it is mentioned that the 
Jakarta Charter is a historical document that inspires the Preamble of the 
1945 Constitution. In response to this draft, Ahmad Sjaichu, the politician of 
the NU party, asked the Government whether the statement on the Jakarta 
Charter was simply to recognise its historical position or whether it also 
influenced the article 29 of the 1945 Constitution concerning religion. The 
Government’s answer was that the Jakarta Charter did not only influence 
the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945, but also the article 29.32 Despite 
the fact that the draft of the Bandung Charter was finally not accepted by 
the Constituent Assembly, for the Muslims, it gives a picture of the political 
negotiations that eventually led Soekarno to issue the decree.33 
Besides the ‘historical’ arguments, the Muslims also responded to the 
view that the position of the Jakarta Charter was insignificant because it is 
mentioned in the considerations not in the dictums of the decree, and that it 
is simply Soekarno’s personal conviction. Against these arguments, a certain 
Abdullah Sjahir said that any decree should be understood as a coherent 
whole. In other words, although the Charter is mentioned in the preliminary 
considerations, not in the dictums, it has a legal force. Moreover, the state-
ment on the Jakarta Charter in the decree is obviously not Soekarno’s per-
sonal conviction because he made it as the President of Indonesia.34 Finally, 
in contrast with the Christian view, for Dachlan, the memorandum of the 
DPRGR on the Indonesian legal sources ratified by the decree of the MPRS 
No. XX/1966 also includes the Jakarta Charter as a legal source.35 
We have seen that in their ‘historical’ arguments, the Muslims tried 
to show that the Jakarta Charter was a political compromise between 
the Islamic and the nationalist blocs and that this compromise was taken 
because each bloc was almost equally strong (4:5 power balance), both in 
the sub-committee of the BPUPK and in the Constituent Assembly. If we look 
at the political context of the late 1960s, this proportionalist argument was 
probably an implicit criticism of the New Order regime that did not accom-
modate proportionally the Islamic groups in the political arena. If HAMKA 
wrote that the dropping of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter on 18 
August 1945 was dishonesty if not cheating of the nationalists, this state-
ment was somehow also directed at the nationalists, particularly the mili-
tary, in 1968, the time when HAMKA wrote it. 
On the other hand, for the Christians, to accept the Jakarta Charter 
was nothing but surrender to an Islamic state in which they would be dis-
criminated against. In other words, while the Islamic groups considered the 
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Jakarta Charter as a compromise between the idea of an Islamic state and a 
secular one, for the Christians the compromise was only found in Pancasila 
that still designates a religious nature for the state, but not a specifically 
Islamic religious nature. Therefore, like the military and the Muslim secular 
nationalists, the Christians emphasized that the acceptance of the Pancasila 
was necessary to maintain the unity and integrity of the state; and in con-
trast to the Muslim proportionalist arguments, the Christians politically pre-
ferred to argue for the shared national identity in which all other identities, 
including religious ones, melted away. The Christian fear of the Islamic state 
in this period was justified by the fact that not only were the Muslim leaders 
in Jakarta openly struggled for a constitutional recognition of the Jakarta 
Charter but also some regional Governments were trying to apply the shari’a 
in their respective areas.36 
The Christians, however, had strong political allies to oppose the 
Jakarta Charter. As noted above, in the MPRS session of March 1968, the 
Islamic parties proposed that the Jakarta Charter be included in the GBHN, 
but the military, the Christians and the secular nationalists disagreed. The 
debate eventually came to a deadlock that “resulted in retention of the 
status quo, a situation which left secular nationalists pleased at the con-
tinued semi-separation of mosque and state and left Islamic organizations 
hurt and angry.”37 Likewise, in June 1968, an association of Muslim youths 
and students called ‘PMPI’ (Pemuda Mahasiswa dan Pelajar Islam) 38 wanted 
to celebrate the anniversary of the Jakarta Charter, but the Jakarta Military 
Commander did not give a letter of permission to carry out the celebration, 
and the Government asked the civil servants not to make any statement on 
the Jakarta Charter and discouraged them from participating in the celebra-
tion. By the next year (1969), Kiblat reported that the Military Commander 
of Tanjung Pura Division based in Pontianak, Colonel Soemadi, forbade any 
group to celebrate the anniversary of the Jakarta Charter because for him 
the ideology of the state was already clear in the Preamble of the Constitu-
tion of 1945. 39  
Being in alliance with the ruling military, by 1968 the Christians, par-
ticularly the Catholics, apparently became more confident in attacking the 
proponents of the Jakarta Charter. Articles and cartoons published in Peraba 
in this period clearly demonstrate this point. For instance, a report describes 
how “Muslim girls with head covering and sandals” applauded Mohammad 
Natsir when the latter mentioned the Jakarta Charter in his speech in Gad-
jah Mada University.40 The overall report gives the impression that the sup-
porters of the Jakarta Charter were stupid Muslim villagers mobilised by the 
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Muslim leaders. Another example is a cartoon in which a stubborn Muslim 
man wants to impose his own opinion on the Jakarta Charter saying: “We 
don’t care about the opinions of others because we are always right.”41 This 
cartoon seems to indicate that it was only the Islamic groups who wanted to 
impose their own opinion on the others, not the opposite. 
On the other hand, the regime’s policy to suppress the Islamic ideo-
logical discourse (particularly on the Jakarta Charter) in the following years 
helped increase the Muslim disappointment. Indeed, this policy was later 
criticised by both HAMKA who clearly supported the Jakarta Charter, and 
Abdurrahman Wahid who preferred Pancasila.42 For Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the policy of prohibiting people from discussing the Jakarta Charter would 
hinder the healthy process of achieving a consensus on the national ideol-
ogy. 
In addition to the opposition of the military, the Christians and secu-
lar nationalists, another problem faced by the Islamic groups regarding the 
Jakarta Charter was the difficulty of defining what actually the obligation of 
the Muslim citizens to perform the shari’a was. It was reported that in April 
1968, besides giving a warning to the public not to endanger political sta-
bility, Soeharto demanded that the Islamic leaders explain what really the 
meaning of “the Jakarta Charter that inspires the Constitution of 1945” was, 
in order to erase the suspicions of those who opposed it.43 In this context, 
Feillard notes that, on 8 April 1968, Soeharto asked the leaders of the Islamic 
parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti) to make an agreement on the defini-
tion of the position of the Jakarta Charter. For this purpose, a committee 
led by Prawoto Mangkusasmito was established. The committee, however, 
eventually did not reach their goal and the military asked them to stop.44 
Likewise, from mid-1968 to early 1969, there was a discussion among the 
Islamic groups to hold a Congress of Islamic Community. The congress was 
intended to be the occasion for the Islamic groups to talk about the possibil-
ity of integrating their forces, and to discuss the concretisation of the Jakarta 
Charter. The Government, however, did not support the Congress, and after 
a series of postponements, it finally never took place.45
If we look at some views of the Muslims on the application of the 
shari’a in 1968-1969, we find that there was no clear consensus among 
them. The prominent Muslim intellectual, Hasbullah Bakry wrote that when 
the Muslims talked about the shari’a, they often referred to Islamic law con-
tained in the classical books of the four Sunni schools. For him, many ideas in 
the books were outdated because they were written centuries ago in a very 
different socio-political context. Therefore, he said, the Muslims needed the 
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Cartoon from the Catholic magazine, Peraba (III July, 1968), 7. 
The cartoon shows a stubborn Muslim man wants to impose his 
opinion on the Jakarta Charter.
– He said: “The Jakarta Charter”
– “Without this, your Pancasila does not exist”
– “This is the spirit of your constitution”
– His opponent said: “That is Soekarno’s conviction”
– He replied: “That is our conviction.”
– “We do not care about the opinion of others.”
– “Because we are always right.”
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fresh and critical thinking of their own religious tradition to create concrete 
examples of Islamic law suitable to the Indonesian situation where non-Mus-
lims also lived.46 However, apart from identifying the problem, Bakry himself 
did not explain what kind of Islamic law that was, in his opinion, suitable to 
the Indonesian situation. The other Muslim intellectuals tried to define more 
explicitly what the application of the shari’a was. In his comment on the plan 
for the Congress above, Kasman Singodemidjo expected it could establish 
an Islamic Council that could play a major role in developing Islamic con-
cepts of all aspects of life such as the issue of determining the beginning 
and end of Ramadan, Islamic civil and criminal law, distribution of Islamic 
alms (zakat), and the treasury of Baitul Mal.47 Mohammad Saleh Suaidy, a 
former Masyumi activist, said that for the late 1960s, the realization of the 
Jakarta Charter was: (1) to finalize the draft of the Islamic marriage law that 
was still in the Parliament; (2) to manage the collection and distribution of 
zakat; and if this worked well, then a draft of zakat law could be proposed to 
the Parliament; (3) to unify the curriculum of Islamic schools in the country; 
(4) to enhance the efficiency and coordination of Islamic da‘wah; (5) to reac-
tivate the Islamic Scientific Council (Majelis Ilmiah Islam) as an institution to 
develop important Islamic concepts.48
The Muslim leaders in various regions outside Java also had different 
understandings of the application of the shari’a. In his observation conduct-
ed in 1969 Donald K. Emmerson said that the Islamic leaders in Medan and 
Padang were more moderate than those of Aceh. In Medan and Padang, the 
Islamic leaders preferred to make da’wah in the sense of advising people to 
follow the shari’a rather than forcing them through regional Government’s 
regulations. In Aceh, however, they considered both da’wah and regulation 
were important. For instance, the regional Government of Aceh issued a 
regulation that on every Friday, from the period of the prayer-call to the end 
of the prayer, all offices and shops had to be closed. In a sub-district called 
Djeunieb where the pilot project of the application of the shari’a was carried 
out, on Friday, the Government provided the list of those present to check 
who came to the mosque for prayer, and those who did not. If a man were 
absent without acceptable reason, he would be warned, then advised and 
finally excommunicated. Emmerson said that there were only a few cases 
where a citizen broke the regulation and none of them reached the level of 
excommunication.49 The regional Government of Polewali Mamasa district 
in South Sulawesi, besides obliging Muslim men to go for Friday prayer, also 
obliged the Christians to go to church on Sundays, and there was a prohibi-
tion of worshipping idols.50 In Bima, West Nusa Tenggara, part of the applica-
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tion of the shari’a was the prohibition of propagating non-Islamic religions 
and establishing their places of worship in Muslim areas.51 
Nonetheless, like its policy of suppressing the Muslim discourse on 
the Jakarta Charter, the Central Government eventually forced the regional 
Governments to terminate their respective initiatives to apply the shari’a. 
In 1989, Amir Machmud said that when he was the Minister of Home Affairs 
(1973-1983) he ordered the regional Governments of Aceh, Riau, Jambi and 
West Nusa Tenggara to withdraw certain regional regulations based on the 
shari’a.52 On the other hand, although there was no more intensive debate 
on the Jakarta Charter than the one in the late 1960s during the New Order, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4, this controversial issue re-emerged in 1973 and 
1989 during the controversy on the Marriage Bill and Religious Court Bill 
respectively. 
 
The Debates on Pancasila’s ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’
As has been noted, on 18 August 1945, the seven words of the Jakarta 
Charter were dropped and substituted by the phrase ‘Yang Maha Esa’, so 
the first principle of the state philosophy, Pancasila, became: ‘Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa.’ This sentence is difficult to translate and became the cen-
tre of controversy. The first word ‘Ketuhanan’ consists of the word ‘Tuhan’ 
combined with a prefix ‘ke’ and a suffix ‘an.’ While the word ‘Tuhan’ means 
‘God’ or ‘Lord’, the meaning of the word ‘Ketuhanan’ is not that clear. Some 
simply think that ‘Tuhan’ and ‘Ketuhanan’ have the same meaning, i.e., God, 
while others tried to differentiate them: if ‘Tuhan’ means ‘God’ or ‘Lord’, then 
‘Ketuhanan’ means ‘Godliness’ or ‘Lordship.’ The rest of the words, ‘Yang 
Maha Esa’, are an adjective describing, or an attribute of, the ‘Ketuhanan.’ 
The word ‘Yang’ is a conjunction to indicate an adjective, and the adjective 
is ‘Maha Esa.’ The word ‘Maha’ is used to indicate greatness, while ‘Esa’ means 
‘One.’ The problem is, how are we to translate and explain the combination 
of ‘Ketuhanan’ and ‘Yang Maha Esa’? 53 How did the Muslims and Christian 
translate them and why? 
For the Muslims, the most important part of this principle of Pancasila 
is the attribute ‘Yang Maha Esa’ because, first, it substitutes for the seven 
words; and second, for them, it means the Islamic theological principle of 
monotheism, tawhīd. By emphasizing this meaning, the Muslims tried to 
affirm the Islamic dimension of Pancasila. If we go back to the ideological 
debate discussed above, this Muslim interpretation of the first principle of 
the Pancasila can be seen as the third stage of their ideological struggle. The 
first is the idea to make Islam the ideology of the state and as we have seen, 
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the nationalists opposed this idea. Second, because the first idea could not 
be accepted, the Muslims tried to make a compromise with the nationalists 
and the result was the seven words of the Jakarta Charter. However, the 
seven words did not stay long, as less than one month after its formulation, 
they were dropped. Finally, without the seven words, the Muslims tried to 
give an Islamic meaning to the Pancasila by interpreting ‘Yang Maha Esa’ as 
the Islamic theological concept of monotheism. 
In contrast, the Christians tried to emphasize the neutrality of the state 
towards religious groups. They and the other nationalists basically preferred 
the secular idea of separation between religion and state, but because of 
the opposition of the Islamic groups, the former finally made a compromise. 
For the Christians and the other nationalists, the compromise is the neither/
nor concept of the state, that is, Indonesia is neither a secular state nor an 
Islamic state, but a ‘Pancasila state’ in which religious groups, not only the 
Islamic groups, can develop their religious life under the protection and sup-
port of the state. In this context, for the Christians, the word ‘Ketuhanan’ 
provides the possibility to interpret the first principle of Pancasila in terms 
of the religious pluralism in the country. The grey area between a secular 
and an Islamic state, however, is certainly difficult to define and frequently 
became an area of conflict. In other words, while the Muslims often tried to 
push the state towards more involvement in religious affairs, the Christians 
frequently attempted to push the state towards a more secular and neutral 
position. 
The debate on the interpretation of the Pancasila had already start-
ed at least in the early 1950s, when different ideological orientations were 
prompted to gain political dominance in the country. In this respect, per-
haps one of the best examples of the early Muslim interpretation of the 
Pancasila with the emphasis on the ‘Yang Maha Esa’ is a booklet written by 
HAMKA in 1952. 54 The main argument of the book is that the ‘Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa’ is the very foundation of Pancasila and the other four princi-
ples are based on and derived from it. For every Muslim, HAMKA argued, the 
“Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa” cannot be but the Islamic theological concept 
of monotheism (tawhīd). With the belief that the One God is the alpha and 
omega of all things in the universe, a Muslim will see and act in this world 
on the guidance of God. HAMKA went on to argue that the other principles 
of the Pancasila are acceptable to the Muslims because of their belief in the 
One and only God. Humanism is inherent in Islam because the corollary of 
the monotheistic concept of God is the oneness of humanity. Similarly, Islam 
contributes to the national unity because this religion transcends ethnic and 
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cultural differences. Democracy is also important for Muslims because Islam 
affirms the principle of egalitarianism, and the Qur’an requires Muslims to 
have consultation (shūrā) to solve their social problems. Finally, Islam also 
pays attention to social justice because according to the Qur’an and the 
Hadith, someone is not considered a Muslim if he or she does not care about 
the weak and the needy people.
Most of the Christian interpreters of the Pancasila in this period also 
argued that the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is the very foundation of the Pan-
casila. However, they cautiously interpreted it in such a way that religious 
freedom would be secured. For example, Helmut Rosin, a Protestant mission-
ary of Swiss origin working in Indonesia, argued that Pancasila can be under-
stood as an ideology to achieve freedom, welfare, happiness and peace. The 
belief in God to be the guiding principle, while the other four principles of 
humanism, national unity, democracy and social justice depend on it. This 
idea is in line with the Christian doctrine that God became a humble human 
being who was allied with the poor and the weak and then was crucified to 
save people from sin, that is, to give them true freedom, welfare, happiness 
and peace. Within this framework, what is the role of the state for him? To 
say that God is the source of freedom, argued Rosin, means that we must 
let God seek for humans and let humans seek for God freely. In other words, 
with regard to religion, the state should protect the religious freedom of the 
people. Similarly the belief in God as the source of welfare, happiness and 
peace means that the state should maintain peace among different religious 
groups and at the same time provides them with welfare and happiness in 
this life. Nonetheless, it is not the state, but God who can provide the ulti-
mate welfare, peace and happiness.55 
In line with Rosin’s view, a Jesuit of Dutch origin living in Indonesia, 
J.W.M. Bakker, who wrote a book on the Pancasila under the pseudonym 
of Rahmat Subagya, argued that Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is the founda-
tion of Pancasila. For him, this principle means that the Indonesian people 
believe in monotheism as opposed to atheism, polytheism and pantheism. 
In this context, he argued that Communism is opposed to Pancasila because 
for Marx religion is the opium of the people. In addition, Bakker also warned 
that the principle must not be interpreted only in terms of Islamic doctrine 
of tawhīd, because the idea of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was the culmi-
nation of a long Indonesian history that includes not only Islamic but also 
Buddhist and Hindu traditions. 56 In other words, the other religious groups 
could also interpret the principle in terms of their respective beliefs. Unlike 
Rosin, Bakker developed a nationalist rather than a theological interpreta-
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tion of Pancasila. He argued that the Ketuhanan principle only means that 
the Government and the people should realize that they are, in their nation-
al life, responsible to God. He complained that the leading position of the 
Ketuhanan was eventually used by some people to justify state intervention 
in religious affairs at the expense of nationalism and religious freedom.57
Bakker and Rosin indicated the importance of the word ‘Ketuhanan.’ 
Rosin argued that unlike the word ‘Tuhan’ that means ‘God’, the word ‘Ketu-
hanan’ has a vague meaning because it refers not to God as such, but to 
something divine (yang ilahi) and divine power (kuasa ilahi). Rosin eventu-
ally concludes that, “it cannot be denied that the formulation of ‘Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa’ is a compromise between Islamic, Javanese and modern 
assumptions of religion that in turn opens the opportunity for various inter-
pretations.”58 In line with Rosin, Bakker argued that, as an abstraction of the 
word ‘Tuhan’, ‘Ketuhanan’ “is the best word that opens the opportunity for 
various interpretations according to one’s religion and beliefs,” and there-
fore, “the word ‘Ketuhanan’ in itself removes us from having a religious state,” 
that is, a state based on Islam.59 
There is another important argument developed by another Jesuit 
scholar, N. Driyarkara. He argued that like love, religion is a deep side of 
human life, and therefore, if the state cannot force someone to love anoth-
er, then the state cannot force people concerning religious matters either.60 
But, does this mean that for him the Pancasila state is a secular and a profane 
state? The answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no.’ The Pancasila state is a secular state 
in the sense that it is not a manifestation or embodiment of religion, but it 
is not secular in the sense that the state is not opposed or indifferent to reli-
gion. In other words, the Pancasila state is neither a secular nor a religious 
state but something in between. Then Driyarkara said: “We acknowledge 
one risk, that is, the Pancasila state will sometimes pay less attention to reli-
gion and sometimes wants to intervene more than it deserves. But what is the 
system that does not have any risk? The existence of the risk only means that 
we must try to apply Pancasila in a truly pure manner.”61
In his PhD thesis submitted to Princeton Theological Seminary in 1960 
and published in 1965, the Protestant scholar, W.B. Sidjabat, also argued for 
the meaning of ‘Ketuhanan’ as a principle of religious pluralism. In line with 
Rosin and Bakker, Sidjabat said that the origin of the concept of Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa should be traced back to the pre-Hindu period of the Archi-
pelago, and therefore it should not be understood in terms of Islamic con-
cept of God but “rather a general and neutral concept of God that gives 
room for everyone who worships God without becoming indifferent in mat-
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ters of religion.” 62 In addition, Sidjabat proposed a new thing that could not 
be accepted by some Muslims. He translated Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as 
‘Divine Omnipotent.’ For Muslims, this translation was a deliberate attempt 
of the Christians to conceal the Islamic monotheistic meaning of ‘Yang Maha 
Esa’ (the One God) into ‘Yang Maha Kuasa’ (the Omnipotent).63 
After the coup of 30 September 1965 leading to the fall of Soekarno, 
the debate on the relationship between religion and state and the mean-
ing of the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa continued. In this context, the Islamic 
groups appear to have been in a difficult position. The reason was that when 
the Islamic groups tried to reassert the important position of the Jakarta 
Charter, their opponents, including the Christians, charged them with being 
anti-Pancasila. This means that in addition to the defeated Communists, the 
Islamic group was the other enemy of Pancasila. For the Christians, the Ketu-
hanan Yang Maha Esa of Pancasila somehow contradicts the seven words 
of the Jakarta Charter, while the Muslims tried to argue that based on the 
decree of 1959, the Jakarta Charter inspired the Pancasila. This difficult posi-
tion frequently pushed the Islamic groups to reassert their loyalty to Pan-
casila. In this context, perhaps, an article of HAMKA, written in this period 
is a good illustration of the Islamic group’s difficult position. In November 
1966, HAMKA wrote that when he paid some visits to certain regions of 
Indonesia, some Muslim youth activists told him “that recently there have 
been rumours accusing the Islamic groups of being anti-Pancasila” and “that 
the majority of the Islamic groups half-heartedly accept the Pancasila.” There 
was even “an accusation that the Muslims want to replace the Pancasila 
with an Islamic State.” HAMKA then rhetorically asked: “Is it plausible to you 
that the Islamic community whose religious foundation is tawhīd, that is, 
the belief in the One Almighty God…does not accept the basis of the state, 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa?…No! For us, the first basis of the state is the 
principle of our life.”64 
In the following years, the leaders of the Islamic groups tirelessly 
emphasized that the Pancasila, especially the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is 
identical with the Islamic doctrine of tawhīd. In 1967, the former Masyu-
mi leader, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, said that the Islamic party (probably 
Masyumi in his mind) was always loyal to the Constitution and the Pancasi-
la. He asked rhetorically: “Please tell me which cabinet led by the Islamic 
party in the past broke the Constitution or abused Pancasila?”65 In 1968, 
in his Idul Fitri preaching in front of the Presidential Palace, HAMKA reas-
serted that, “Pancasila is void without the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.” Hav-
ing identified the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa with tawhīd, he compared the 
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Pancasila with ‘10000,’ in the sense that the first principle is mark 1 followed 
by four of zeroes, and therefore, without the 1, the four zeroes are nothing.66 
In addition, Kasman Singodimedjo and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, argued 
that the reason why Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa for them means tawhīd was 
the explanation made by Ki Bagus Hadikusomo, the Muslim leader who was 
present during the lobbying on 18 August 1945 when the seven words were 
dropped.67 
In this context, how did Muslims consider the other interpretations, 
including the Christian views of the Pancasila? As has been discussed, in 
1950s, the Christian writers were worried about the Muslim monopoly of 
the interpretation of the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. In 1968 HAMKA, wrote 
that in the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945, it is mentioned that Inde-
pendence was achieved due to the blessing of Allah. Therefore, he argued, 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa must refer to the Muslim belief in the One God, 
Allah.68 HAMKA then explained that certain Christians argued that the Ketu-
hanan has a plural meaning, including the Christian doctrine of the Trin-
ity. In this regard, although HAMKA assured that the Christians, the Hindus 
and the Buddhists have the right to interpret the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 
according to their respective beliefs, he warned the Muslim leaders that for 
the Muslims it means nothing but tawhīd.69 Nurcholish Madjid who was the 
Chairman of the Association of Muslims Students (HMI) made an explicit 
statement that the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa contradicts the Christian doc-
trine of Trinity. In his Idul Fitri preaching in 1968, Nurcholish called for saving 
the Pancasila from the Trinity: 
Save the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa from being replaced with Trinitarianism. 
Save the Pancasila from being falsified for a second time, [that is], after few 
years ago the PKI tried to eradicate the role of the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa; 
now the Christians, both Protestants and Catholics, indigenous and foreigners 
with the support of the foreign aid, are working hard to change the Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa with the Trinity! Let us prove who actually the safeguards or is 
the saviour of the values formulated in the Pancasila, and who closely or openly 
tries to undermine it.70
The context of Nurcholish Madjid’s words was the deadlock in the 
Inter-religious Consultation of 1967 discussed in Chapter 1 because the 
Christians refused to restrict their missionary activities only to those outside 
the recognized religions. In this regard, to attack the Christian’s missionary 
activities, Nurcholish Madjid identified the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa with 
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tawhīd as opposed to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity to claim that the 
Christians were against Pancasila. 
On the other hand, the Christians continued arguing that Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa implies religious pluralism and religious freedom. In his paper 
for a consultation of the DGI in November 1969, T.B. Simatupang argued that 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa should be understood as a constitutional rather 
than theological principle. If it is interpreted from a certain theological per-
spective, he said, then it becomes exclusive for a certain religion. In other 
words, for him, the state should not be based on theology, but the state 
should protect the freedom of people to develop their respective theolo-
gies. So what is the meaning of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa as a constitutional 
principle? For Simatupang it means that the state recognises that human 
life includes not only social but also transcendental aspects, and that the 
character of the state is neither atheistic nor theocratic.71 
There were also similar views found in some articles published in the 
Catholic journal, Basis. For instance, M.S. Pusposaputro argued that exis-
tentially a human by nature realises that he or she is finite and contingent 
and therefore needs something absolute and transcendent. For Pusposapu-
tro, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is the principle of the state recognising this 
human existential and natural need. Thus, based on this principle, the state 
should create positive conditions for religious lives of all citizens but at the 
same time it should not intervene in their internal religious affairs. In other 
words, he said, the state based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is the state that 
recognises theism, “not theocratic but democratic theism.” In this democratic 
theism, religious freedom is guaranteed because no religion becomes exclu-
sively the basis of the state (negara agama) or becomes its official religion 
(agama negara).72 
Another author named John Liku, in line with Pusposaputro’s existen-
tial argument, said that because of their finiteness, human beings naturally 
realise something absolute, that is, God. However, he argued further that 
atheism is unnatural and therefore, people can declare that God does not 
exist or that God is dead but because of their natural religious inclination, 
they will create a certain type of devotion that is in a way similar to the 
devotion of religious believers in God. Thus, for Liku, the principle of Ketu-
hanan Yang Maha Esa means that the state recognises this human natural 
inclination and at the same time it guarantees religious freedom. Religious 
freedom is necessary because like the belief in God, freedom is also natu-
rally embedded in human existence. If freedom and belief are both natural, 
then they should not contradict each another. If freedom should be guar-
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anteed, then is it wrong for the state to ban Communism (assumed to be 
anti-religious and atheist) in Indonesia? For John Liku, this ban is acceptable 
because the intrinsic goal of the state is to achieve the public interest. In 
other words, because Communism for him proved to be harmful to the pub-
lic interest, the state has the right to ban it.73 Thus, John Liku’s interpretation 
of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa is clearly opposed to both Islamic theological 
interpretation and to Communism. 
The Muslim and Christian different interpretations of Ketuhanan Yang 
Maha Esa can be found in the following years of the New Order. Most of them, 
however, repeated similar arguments developed by their predecessors, but 
few of them proposed interpretations of Pancasila different from that of the 
Government. What makes those interpretations important, therefore, is not 
simply their respective arguments but the socio-political contexts in which 
they were produced. We shall discuss this topic later in the section on the 
Government regulation of 1985 that forces all social and political organisa-
tions to accept Pancasila as the basis of their respective organisations. 
The Debates on the Department of Religion
We already discussed that on 18 August 1945, the PPKI that was domi-
nated by the nationalists successfully kept aside the Islamic elements of the 
1945 Constitution. The next day, on 19 August 1945, the aspiration of the 
Islamic group to establish a Ministry of Religion also failed because only six 
of the twenty-seven members of the PPKI could agree with this proposal.74 
With the loss of ‘the seven words’ and the absence of the Ministry of Reli-
gion, the Islamic groups were just left with feelings of discontent. However, 
it seems that the historical development of the new state eventually pushed 
the secular nationalists into accommodating the aspirations of the Islamic 
groups. Deliar Noer said:
As the success of the revolution seemed already threatened by the possibility 
of the return of the Dutch, these feelings of discontent did not help the cause. 
Against this background, the decision for the establishment of the Ministry of 
Religion can be understood. The Government needed the full support of the 
Islamic group, and it was hoped that could be obtained, or at least courted, by 
the establishment of a Ministry of Religion.75 
The Ministry of Religion (Kementerian Agama) was set up on 3 January 
1946 and Muhammad Rasjidi was appointed to be its first Minister, in the 
cabinet led by Sutan Sjahrir. In the first months of his appointment, Rasjidi 
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explained to the public that the Ministry of Religion would put the existing 
religions in their appropriate positions. Probably to reduce the fears of the 
religious minorities, Rasjidi also said that his Ministry would not intervene 
in the internal religious affairs of the people. Based on the Government’s 
decrees issued in March and April 1946, the Ministry of Religion was author-
ized by the Government to take over certain works previously carried out by 
the other Departments during the colonial periods, namely: to take over the 
works of the Department of Home Affairs with regard to Islamic marriage, 
Islamic courts, mosques and pilgrimage (hajj); to take over the authority of 
the Islamic High Court from the Department of Justice; and to take over the 
section on teaching religion in schools from the Department of Education. 
In addition, the Ministry was authorized to take over three authorities of Dis-
trict Government: the so-called ‘shumuka’ during the Japanese occupation 
to be the Regional Religious Offices (Jawatan Agama Daerah); to appoint 
religious advisers for the so-called native courts (landraad); and to appoint 
a Muslim official called penghulu for a mosque. 
However, the emergency situation of the revolutionary war during 
several months of his appointment did not help Rasjidi to develop the struc-
ture and function of the Ministry.76 The structure of the Ministry became 
clearer when Fathurrrahman Kafrawi replaced Rasjidi in October 1946. On 
20 November 1946, Fathurrahman issued a decree about the structure of 
the Ministry of Religion, in which although the majority of sections dealt 
with Islamic affairs, there were two sections for the Christians: one for the 
Protestants and another for the Catholics.77 The creation of the Christian sec-
tions, and later the Hindu-Buddhist section, was probably to indicate that 
the Ministry was not entirely an Islamic Ministry. 
In 1949, when the revolutionary war was almost over, the Minister 
of Religion, Wachid Hasjim defined the work of his Ministry, as covering 
twelve items. Besides the Islamic portfolios previously authorized to Ras-
jidi, the Ministry was also responsible for supporting religious (not only 
Islamic) teaching in schools and prisons; and to grant material help to 
build places of worship for religious groups. In addition, it was stated that 
the first two tasks of the Ministry were: (1) to make Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa an operative principle in public life; (2) to be watchful that every citizen 
had the freedom to embrace his or her own religion and to worship accord-
ing to that religion.78 These two items clearly refer to the article 29 of the 
Constitution of 1945 concerning religion. Thus, according to this defini-
tion, the duty of the Ministry was to realise the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 
principle.
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Towards the end of the 1950s, C.A.O van Nieuwenhuijze wrote that 
the Ministry could be a good solution to the ideological conflicts between 
the nationalist and the Islamic groups, but at the same time he was rather 
sceptical whether the Ministry could eventually satisfy both groups.79 Later, 
another observer, B. J. Boland, seems to be more positive and optimist when 
he said: 
Is it not likely that the existence of the Ministry of Religion tends to promote 
the idea of a multi-religious state rather than the idea of an Islamic State? In my 
opinion the existence of this Ministry can in due course result in an adjustment 
of the Indonesian population to the fact of a multi-religious society where the 
adherents of the various religions have to respect each other and each other’s 
belief…The positive value of having a Ministry of Religion cannot be cancelled 
out by all shortcomings and mistakes, mismanagement and waste of money, 
which sometimes happen and form the debit-side to this Ministry, its regional 
offices and some of its officials.80 
Both Nieuwenhuijze’s scepticism and Boland’s optimism are somehow 
reflected in the debates on the position of the Ministry. In fact, although the 
Ministry has never been abolished since its inception, it has been criticized 
and opposed by Muslims and non-Muslims for different reasons. The roots of 
this problem were consciously identified by the Minister of Religion, Wachid 
Hasjim in his speech to the joint conference of the Ministry of Religion and 
the non-political Islamic organizations in 1951. Wachid Hasjim explained 
that the Ministry was in a difficult position because it had to face three 
different groups: the Islamic groups, the secular groups and the religious 
minorities. The secular groups, according to him, were never happy with the 
Ministry because for them religion was an obstacle on the way to reaching 
freedom and development. For the religious minorities, they were basically 
happy with the Government’s support of religious life, but as minorities they 
were worried that the Ministry would make discriminative policies against 
them. Finally, although the Islamic groups were happy with the Ministry, 
they frequently could not understand the true position of the Ministry in the 
state, and therefore they expected too much. He explained that Indonesian 
Government is not an Islamic Government and the Ministry of Religion is not 
an Islamic Ministry. The Government, therefore, would merely help religious 
groups on specific socio-religious affairs, not all of them. He therefore sug-
gested that the Islamic groups should not be dependent on the Ministry 
because this would endanger the pillars of their own development. Last but 
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not least, he explained that although the Islamic groups strongly supported 
the existence of the Ministry, they suffered from the lack of modern skills to 
run its administration.81 
Perhaps, it is not an exaggeration to say that Wachid Hasjim’s identifi-
cation of the problems faced by the Ministry is true for almost any controver-
sy related to the existence of the Ministry. Too much expectation and often 
combined with the lack of modern skills eventually led the Muslims working 
in the Ministry to misconduct, mismanagement and corruption that in turn 
brought about strong criticism from their fellow Muslims and non-Muslims. 
In addition, the religious minorities and the secular groups often suspected 
the Ministry to be a first step to an Islamic state. For the religious minorities, 
especially the Christians, their suspicions increased when they found that 
a certain policy of the Ministry was discriminative against them. In addi-
tion, because the Ministry was a political compromise between the Islamic 
and the nationalist ideological camps, the controversy on the existence of 
the Ministry naturally emerged when this compromise was disturbed, that 
is, when one group suspected that another group had gone beyond the 
acceptable limits. 
In the meeting of the Council of Indonesian Churches (DGI) in May 
1950, a participant asked Leimena, the prominent leader of the Protestant 
Party (Parkindo) about the existence of the Ministry of Religion. It is report-
ed that Leimena said, “It is better not to abolish the Ministry of Religion 
because the Ministry is needed now. We should use the Ministry of Reli-
gion for our goal to show the essence of the Church (‘t Wezen van de Kerk). 
But we should also know its boundaries and not coerce (forceren).”82 In line 
with Leimena, Sahulata, the chairman of the meeting even argued that the 
existence of the Ministry of Religion was a signal that the Muslims did not 
consider Indonesia an Islamic state. Likewise, in 1952, the prominent Indo-
nesian Catholic leader, Mgr. Soegijapranata stated in a meeting of bishops 
that the establishment of the Ministry of Religion was a compromise, and 
it was intended by the nationalists to prevent Indonesia from being an 
Islamic State in the future.83 Nonetheless, in June 1953, this moderate atti-
tude was soon changed into a demand to abolish the Ministry when the 
Christians knew that the Muslims publicly said that the latter wanted to 
establish an Islamic state in which the Islamic law applied.84 The first Indo-
nesian elections were held in 1955 and probably by 1953 the ideological 
issues already emerged as a prelude to the campaigns for the elections. 
The Christian demand to abolish the Ministry seems to be related to this 
socio-political context. 
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Perhaps, it was the same reason that motivated Rahmat Subagya alias 
Jan W.M. Bakker, a Catholic Jesuit of Dutch origin working in Indonesia, to 
oppose the existence of the Ministry. For Bakker, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa 
only meant that the Government and the people should be responsible 
to God and that religious freedom should be guaranteed by the state. He 
opposed the existence of the Ministry of Religion because for him it was 
politization of religion. He questioned how far the authority of the Minis-
ter of Religion went in relation to the Ministers of Justice, Education and 
Finance. If the authority of the Minister of Religion were below that of other 
Ministers, then that was a subordination and humiliation of religion; but 
if he were above the others, then the Ministry of Religion would become 
“a state within the state.” He was also anxious lest the Ministry of Religion 
should control the theological and spiritual aspects of religious life. If this 
happened, he said, this would endanger religious freedom in the country. 
He argued that the works of the Ministry dealing with Islamic education, 
Islamic courts and marriage etc. made too much intervention in people’s 
religious affairs. He finally suggested that “it is not Ketuhanan Yang Esa that 
must be changed but the Ministry of Religion should be aligned to the spirit 
of Pancasila. If it is impossible, then it is better that the Ministry… be abol-
ished.”85
The Muslims, on the other hand, tried to defend the Ministry of Reli-
gion by developing certain arguments. Wachid Hasjim argued that the Min-
istry paid more attention to the Islamic schools, because unlike the Christian 
schools the Islamic schools were in a very bad condition, partly due to the 
fact that the Dutch gave very little subsidy to Islamic institutions compared 
with the Christian ones; that is, 1: 380. Similarly, he argued that during the 
colonial Government, the position of Islamic law on marriage and inher-
itance was inferior to the civil law because, he said, the major reason for 
the colonial Government to be involved in religious matters was to control, 
manipulate and weaken rather than to enhance the position of Islam in soci-
ety. Therefore, he concluded, after Independence, the colonial policy should 
be reversed, that is, to support and enhance Islamic religious life.86 As we 
shall see in the next Chapters, these arguments were to be developed fur-
ther by the Muslim leaders during the controversies on the Marriage, Reli-
gious Court and Education Bills. 
In contrast, in his PhD thesis completed in 1960, Sidjabat argued that 
the involvement of both Dutch and Japanese colonial administrations in 
Muslim religious affairs somehow “paved the way for the Muslims to be even 
more convinced that the care of Islamic religious institutions is the essential 
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religious duty of the state.”87 He also criticized the Muslims who accused the 
Christians of being favoured by the Dutch in receiving large subsidies for 
their institutions because “some of the money the Christians received was 
collected by the churches abroad, and not from the Dutch Government.”88 
Having criticized the Muslim arguments to support the Department, Sid-
jabat said:
What one encounters in the present Ministry of Religious Affairs is nothing but 
a riddle. To be faithful to the meaning of the principle of Divine Omnipotence of 
the ‘Pantja Sila’ formally and juridically, the non-Muslims and the non-Christians 
should receive a proper place in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. And if this can-
not be accomplished, a contradiction of principle or a grave mistake must be 
present somewhere in the scheme of the Ministry of Religious Affairs.89
After the fall of Soekarno, the debates on the existence of the Min-
istry that became the Department of Religion (Departemen Agama) since 
the 1960s re-emerged. Again, this was related to the re-emergence of the 
ideological issue that previously developed during the Soekarno period. In 
1959, when Soekarno made the decree to return to the 1945 Constitution, 
the NU leader, Wahib Wahab, played an important role in the lobbying proc-
ess behind the decree, and its statement, that the Jakarta Charter inspires 
the Constitution, was partly a result of his efforts.90 Soon after the decree, 
Soekarno appointed Wahib Wahab to be the Minister of Religion. In 1962, 
another NU leader, Saifuddin Zuhri, replaced Wahib Wahab. Not long after 
taking the position, Saifuddin tried to reformulate the work of his Depart-
ment. In this formulation, besides referring to the article 29 of the 1945 
Constitution, it was stated that the work of the Department was “to carry 
out the Presidential Decree concerning the Jakarta Charter that inspires the 
Constitution of 1945.” 91
When Soekarno was removed, in 1967 Mohammad Dachlan, a tradi-
tionalist Muslim leader opposed to Soekarno, was appointed in the place of 
Saifuddin Zuhri. Dachlan reasserted that one of the missions of the Depart-
ment of Religion was to “implement the Jakarta Charter in relation to the 
Constitution.”92 Unlike his predecessors, however, Dachlan had to face the 
unfriendly political circumstances surrounding this issue. As has been dis-
cussed, the debates on the Jakarta Charter versus the Pancasila were very 
serious during the early period of the New Order. In August 1968, the Cath-
olic weekly magazine, Peraba, published an article discussing the current 
celebration of Indonesian Independence. Among other things, the article 
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referred to a statement of the Catholic Youth (Angkatan Muda Katolik) ques-
tioning Dachlan’s formulation of the work of the Department of Religion 
with regard to the Jakarta Charter. For the author of the article, in fact one 
should not ask that question, because the case was already clear, namely: 
“Consciously or not, the Minister of Religion had already broken the Consti-
tution of 1945…Stop the works of the Minister of Religion. If there is no new 
Minister, it is better to dissolve the Department of Religion soon.”93
 In August and September of 1968, Dachlan was the target of sharp 
criticisms in Peraba. An article in the magazine criticised Dachlan’s speech 
to the employees of the Department of Religion in Malang, East Java. It was 
reported that in his speech Dachlan said that every employee of the Depart-
ment should become a fighter for Islam. For Peraba, this statement reflected 
Dachlan’s dream of the Jakarta Charter. The magazine then asked: if every 
employee of the Department should be a fighter for Islam, how about non-
Muslim employees, should they be removed or forced to convert to Islam? 
Thus, for Peraba, Dachlan’s statement was discriminative and against Pan-
casila.94 In addition, Peraba criticised the fact that the Department of Reli-
gion monopolised the arrangement of the hajj, and there was also a report 
that the Department contributed to establishing some mosques. For the 
magazine, all of these indicated that in practice, Islam had become the reli-
gion of the state and the Jakarta Charter was implemented.95
In addition to Peraba, a certain Moh. Bazor published a pamphlet 
entitled “Departemen Agama?” in which the author strongly criticized the 
Department of Religion. According to Karel Steenbrink, Moh. Bazor was 
another pseudonym of J.W.M. Bakker.96 Like the Catholic Youth, he argued 
that Dachlan’s inclusion of the Charter in the formulation of the Department’s 
work was against the 1945 Constitution. If the Jakarta Charter is realized, he 
said, the authority of the Minister of the Department is similar to that of a 
Shaikh al-Islam or a Mufti A’zam in an Islamic theocracy. He also questioned 
why Dachlan did not realize the fact that the struggle for the Jakarta Char-
ter always failed. In addition to this ideological issue, the author mentioned 
the cases of corruption involving high officials of the Department such as 
the Secretary General, M. Kafrawi and the Minister Wahib Wahab who were 
arrested because of allegations of corruption. The author also refers to mis-
management and corruption in the Department concerning the appoint-
ments of religious teachers, distributions of scholarships and the arrange-
ment of the pilgrimage to Mecca. In short, the Department of Religion had 
already discredited the Islamic community and worsened inter-religious rela-
tions. Because of this, he said, more and more voices were heard wanting to 
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dissolve the Department. The author eventually suggested that the Muslims 
must whole-heartedly accept secularisation in which the role of reason and 
science is more prominent than that of religion. The process of secularisation, 
he said, would only prevent religion from intervening in secular matters, but 
not remove religion from its appropriate position as the source of the spir-
itual life of society. In this regard, the Department should be reorganized in 
accordance with secularisation or otherwise it should be abolished.97
The Islamic groups were certainly unhappy with the Christian criti-
cisms. In 1968, the two Muslim magazines Kiblat and Pandji Masjarakat pub-
lished some articles to defend the existence of the Department. An anony-
mous author wrote an article in Pandji Masjarakat as a response to an article 
of a certain S. Broto, published in the Catholic newspaper, Kompas, Sura-
baya edition. In the article Broto had argued that the Department should 
be dissolved because religion is a private matter and not a state affair. The 
anonymous author argued that Broto’s view clearly reflected the Christian 
view of separation between Church and state, and this could not be accept-
ed by Muslims. For the Catholics, the author argued, this separation is fine 
because they already have the Vatican State regulating the religious life of 
all Catholics in the world, while Muslims do not have that kind of institution. 
The author finally quoted a Catholic writer, Louis Veuillot (1813-1883),98 who 
reportedly said that, if the Catholics are a minority, they demand religious 
freedom, but if they are majority, they oppose religious freedom and both 
positions are religiously justified.99 
In Kiblat, two important Muslim reformist leaders, Abu Hanifah and 
Kasman Singodimedjo also tried to defend the existence of the Depart-
ment. Both recognized that there was corruption and mismanagement in 
the Department, but for them it did not mean that the Department was to 
be dissolved. Like a dirty house, they said, what we should do is to clean 
the house, not to burn it. In addition, Kasman argued that as an institution, 
the Department was very important in Indonesia because it reflects the 
true Indonesian personality, the belief in God, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.100 
Moreover, Abu Hanifah warned that if Soeharto’s Government dissolved 
the Department, political stability would be shaken. For Abu Hanifah, the 
demand to dissolve the Department meant that the secular groups consid-
ered the Islamic groups politically weak and therefore he encouraged the 
latter to enhance the integrity and cooperation among them.101 
Despite strong Christian opposition to the Department of Religion, 
Soeharto’s Government never decided to dissolve it. In addition, to my 
knowledge, there was no debate on the Department more intense than that 
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which happened in the late 1960s. There was, however, a debate on the pos-
sibility of changing the name and structure of the Department. As we shall 
see below, in 1978, the MPR made a decree on Pancasila indoctrination (P4), 
despite the opposition of the Islamic party, PPP. In 1981, T.B. Simatupang 
argued that because P4 was already decreed by the MPR, the Department 
of Religion should be changed into ‘Departemen Keagamaan.’ Perhaps, the 
last term could be translated as ‘Department of Religions’ or ‘Department 
of Religious Affairs.’ What he meant by the term was that the Department 
should be the place where all religions have an equal position. He argued 
that, if we look at the history of the Ministry of Religion, we find that it was 
originally intended as a Department of Islam and therefore, the directorates 
for non-Islamic religions only functioned in a supplementary role. Thus, he 
suggested to the Government to change the structure of the Department. In 
this new structure, the personnel of each section of the Department should 
be religiously mixed in line with the principles of the Pancasila.102 Thus, 
instead of demanding the abolition of the Department of Religion as the 
Christians did before, now Simatupang suggested that the Department had 
to be transformed from being an ‘Islamic Department’ to be a ‘Department 
of all religions’.
There were some Muslim negative responses to Simatupang’s pro-
posal. Muttaqien Darmawan wrote in Pelita newspaper that Simatupang’s 
idea was like ‘Nasakomisasi’ (a reference to NASAKOM, Soekarno’s combined 
ideology of Nationalism, Islam and Communism), that is, to put different 
and opposing groups in one organization. Muttaqien also argued that with 
regard to the recruitment of staff, the Department based its decision on Law 
No. 8 of 1974, in which it is mentioned that recruitment should be based 
on objective qualities, regardless of religious background. Muttaqien’s argu-
ment was countered by Agus Matori HP. For the latter, Muttaqien’s argu-
ment was weak because in reality the non-Muslims were only appointed in 
the non-Muslim sections. This is why, he said, Simatupang proposed that 
we should change the structure and then the personnel. Another Muslim 
author, Samudi Abdullah, wrote that what Simatupang suggested was a 
Pancasila theology, a kind of syncretism that is opposed even by Christian 
theology. In his response, Simatupang said that he did not propose a Pan-
casila theology but suggested how to develop Islam, Christianity and other 
religions within the Pancasila state.103 Apart from the debate, Simatupang’s 
idea was never adopted by the Government.
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2. The Catholic-Military Alliance 
In our discussion above, we have noted that the Christians were in 
the same position with the military to oppose the Islamic ideology. One of 
the consequences of this alliance was that some of the Christians became 
less critical, if not totally supportive of the dominating role of the military 
in Indonesian politics. The leader of the DGI, T. B. Simatupang, who was in 
fact a retired Army General, explained that the political role of the military, 
or the so-called ‘dual function of the military’ (Dwifungsi ABRI) was an his-
torical necessity. The idea of dual function was initially introduced in the 
mid-1950s by General A.H. Nasution who said that the “army would nei-
ther seek to take over the Government nor remain politically inactive.”104 
During the New Order period, this doctrine was used to justify the mili-
tary’s dominant social and political role in the country. For Simatupang, 
the political role of the military was justified by its consistent role as the 
saviour of Pancasila from its two enemies: Communism and Islamic ideol-
ogy. Simatupang realised that the dual function could lead to militarism; 
but he argued that although there was no historical example that a military 
regime would develop a democratic political system, it was not impossible 
that the military in Indonesia would achieve the opposite. In order to be the 
pioneer of democratisation, he suggested that the military should become 
both troops and strugglers based on their total commitment to the state 
ideology, Pancasila.105 
Simatupang’s endorsement of the military’s dual function, with the 
hope that it would lead to democratisation, probably indicates that besides 
giving open support, he had certain reservations. Moreover, as has been 
noted in Chapter 2, Simatupang had been retired since 1959, so he had no 
direct influence on the army anymore. In contrast, a certain group among 
the Catholics developed a very close relation with the military. In this sec-
tion, we shall discuss the forms of this Catholic-military alliance and how it 
affected Muslim-Christian relations in Indonesia.
Beek and His Khasebul: Against Communism and the Islamic State
In the debates on the Jakarta Charter, the Catholics were very much 
involved and courageous. One of the reasons was probably that the Catho-
lics had already established strong relations with the ruling military by that 
time. These relations had started at least by the early 1960s, when the Catho-
lics decided to cooperate with the military to oppose the Communists. The 
Catholic-military alliance was closely connected with the role of an influen-
tial but rather mysterious Jesuit, Father Joop Beek (1917-1983).106 Towards 
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the end of Soekarno’s Guided Democracy, Beek was worried about the pos-
sibility of a Communist takeover and therefore tried to prepare a standby 
underground Catholic movement to anticipate this threat. Another Dutch 
Jesuit, Dijkstra, established anti-Communist Pancasila unions of the peasants 
and workers (Petani Pancasila and Buruh Pancasila) to rival those of the Com-
munists. According to Dijkstra, to defeat the Communists, one should win 
the poor people over.107 Dijkstra is described by one of his Jesuit colleagues 
as a person whose concerns were mostly with the economic problem of the 
little people like peasants and workers. He was very much against the idea 
of charitable love and insisted that justice is the most fundamental Christian 
value.108 Unlike Dijkstra’s socio-economic approach, Beek seemed to prefer 
a top-down approach to influence or even control the political power to 
secure the Catholics from the Communist threat. According to Beek’s calcu-
lation, the best political power to oppose the Communists at that time was 
the military. It seems for this reason that before the coup, Beek had already 
made contact with Ali Moertopo and other Kostrad officers.109 
Since the early 1950s, Beek worked with students, particularly the uni-
versity students of the Association of the Catholic Students of the Republic 
of Indonesia (PMKRI). After the coup, Beek’s cadres of the PMKRI like Cosmas 
Batubara and the three prominent Chinese Catholics, Harry Tjan Silalahi and 
the two brothers: Liem Bian Kie and Liem Bian Khoen who took the Indone-
sian names, Jusuf Wanandi and Sofjan Wanandi respectively, were among 
the major players in removing the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and 
Soekarno from the political stage. In 1964, Harry Tjan became the General 
Secretary of the Catholic Party, and in 1966 he was elected as the General 
Secretary of the KAP-GESTAPU, the civilian alliance supported by the army 
to crush the Communists.110 Moreover, as the leading activists of the PMKRI, 
Cosmas Batubara, Liem Bian Kie and Khoen were among the leaders of 
the university students’ front, KAMI, demonstrating against the Soekarno 
regime.111 Agustine Prasetyo Murniati, who was to become a Catholic femi-
nist activist and theologian since 1984, was also involved in the KAMI.112 
Beek’s serious efforts to oppose the Communists were apparently 
related to the situation of the cold war. Thus, unsurprisingly, Beek was con-
sidered an agent of the CIA by the Indonesian leftists.113 More than that, 
alluding implicitly to a kind of conspiracy, W.F. Wertheim claims that Beek 
had already predicted the coup of 1965 and its consequences for the Com-
munists some months before the event.114 The Dutch journalist, Aad van 
den Heuvel, even claimed that it was Beek who became the real puppeteer 
behind Soeharto’s counter coup in 1965.115 It is certainly difficult to verify 
A G A I N S T  T H E  I S L A M I C  S T A T E
136
F E E L I N G  T H R E A T E N E D
these claims; but they at least indicate that Beek was a very influential per-
son in the fight against Communists and Communism in Indonesia.
In the struggle against the Communists, Beek’s students cooper-
ated with the Muslim activists, but when the Communists were obviously 
defeated, Beek considered Islam as another enemy. “At that time, there were 
people in Jakarta who wanted to make Indonesia an Islamic state. And it was 
true. Beek was worried about this, so he used his network to counter this 
movement,” said Paul de Blot.116 The fear of an Islamic state was not uncom-
mon among the Christians in general and the Catholics in particular, but 
“while other Catholics argued that the church should build contacts with 
the Muslims, Beek took a militant, antagonistic approach.”117 For Beek and 
his followers, after the eradication of the Communists, there was an either-
or political option for the Catholics: to go under the Muslims or to embrace 
the army and they chose the latter as the lesser of the two evils.118
For a minority group like the Catholics in Indonesia, to achieve their 
political goal, a militant and well-organized movement was badly needed. It 
seems for this reason that Beek initiated a regular course for young Catho-
lic cadres that was eventually institutionalised after the coup as ‘khasebul,’ 
an acronym for ‘khalwat sebulan’ (one month retreat). This programme was 
initially carried out at the student dormitory, Asrama Realino, Yogyakarta119 
and then in 1967 moved to the newly built retreat house in Klender, East 
Jakarta. There is some information on this retreat house and Beek’s khasebul 
programme in an oral history interview with the nun who was responsible 
to take care of the daily organisation of this place from 1967 to 1977, Math-
ilda Maria van Thienen. 120 She explained that the retreat house was a big 
complex of 3 blocks totalling 72 rooms with 144 beds. Beek came to Klender 
four times a year for his khasebul programme with a group of 100 trainees. 
Among them only 8 to 10 persons were female, while the rest were male. The 
programme was financially supported by parish or diocesan funds as well as 
by overseas sources, particularly from the Netherlands and Germany. 
The khasebul programme was quite special and secret. The trainees 
included highly-motivated university students, activists, and village youth 
recommended by priests and bishops. Some former trainees of khasebul 
explained that a person who was recruited to join the programme should 
not tell anybody about it, including one’s family and friends, otherwise one 
would be returned home. In addition, during the training, the names of the 
trainees were changed to new ones, so that they did not know each other’s 
real identity. The trainees were also given a psychological test to discover 
each one’s talent. This test was important for the future assignment of the 
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trainee after the programme was completed. A former trainee explained 
that the test was quite reliable. He was told after the test that he was to 
become a good writer, and it proved to be true.121 
During the programme, the trainees were taught leadership skills, 
public speaking, writing, group dynamics, and social analysis. The most spe-
cial part of the programme was probably Beek’s methods of disciplining the 
trainees. Tanter noted that “the courses were modelled on a mix of Jesuit 
and Communist techniques, based on self-discipline. They were conducted 
with a large measure of brutality: cadres were often involved in beating each 
other, being reduced to grovelling in the dirt, long daily sessions of mutual 
criticism, being woken in the middle of the night after a few hours of sleep, 
and so forth.” 122 The self-discipline training was obviously designed to create 
a militant, confident and loyal cadre. Mathilda Maria van Thienen explained 
that sometimes the trainees had to fast during the day and pray for the 
whole night. Beek himself also fasted and prayed along with them. A trainee 
who failed to follow the discipline would be punished, and at worst he or she 
would be returned home. Sometimes a trainee was returned home just one 
day before the whole programme was completed. To test the honesty of the 
trainees, Beek put secretly some paper money in a book placed in every bed-
room. He recorded the serial numbers of the money. If the money was lost, 
in cooperation with van Thienen, Beek tried to identify the one who took 
the money, particularly through an investigation whether the money was 
used for transaction in the shop of the complex. Beek then interrogated the 
suspect, and as a result, the latter would be punished or returned home.123
The trainees were also indoctrinated with the teachings of the Church 
in relation to socio-political issues, and with the image of the real threat of 
the enemies and the methods to face them. Cosmas Batubara, for instance 
said that Beek trained the students how to counter Marxism-Leninism and 
how to identify and counter Communist actions, including how to sabotage 
a meeting.124 This was also applied to another enemy, Islam. In his thesis 
that touches on the khasebul case in a few paragraphs, Daniel T. Sparringa 
said that his informants denied that the training was oriented to countering 
Islam.125 My informants, on the contrary, said that besides the doctrine that 
as a Catholic activist one should attempt “to widen the kingdom of God,” 
the trainees were led to believe that Islam is a threatening and scary enemy. 
B. Suryasmoro Ispandrihari, who joined the khasebul in 1988 said, “When I 
graduated from the khasebul, I became suspicious and fearful of anything 
that smelt Islamic such as a Muslim lecturer, a Muslim girl with head cover-
ing, the mosque in the campus, the HMI activists and even nominal Mus-
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lims.” He explained that the method of the training was so effective that after 
graduating from the programme, one became unconsciously convinced that 
“Islam is the enemy of the Catholics…and if it is needed a khasebul graduate 
is ready to take arms to fight against Islam.”126 Damai Pakpahan, a feminist 
and NGO activist said that she joined the khasebul in 1984 but decided to 
stop before the whole programme was completed. One of the reasons was 
that she could not accept the idea of fearing Islam because her mother and 
brother were Muslims. This experience, however, taught her to know that “if 
a Catholic appears to be Islamophobic, then he or she is probably a khasebul 
graduate.”127 
On the last day of the programme, Beek and the trainees amazingly 
became very intimate. Although the trainees felt that Beek had been very 
harsh to them during the training, by the end there was no disappointment 
and hatred anymore. Every trainee, one by one, was given the opportunity 
to express his or her discontents to Beek personally.128 The trainees were 
finally proud of him, and also of themselves. Thus, the result of the training 
was, as Tanter put it, “a cadre completely faithful to Beek personally; Beek’s 
men for life, who would do anything for him.”129 
After the training, the graduates established a network throughout 
the country. Khasebul’s network is developed in a cell system.130 The system 
is probably similar to the work of a vertical cell system described in one of 
a series of books used for this programme.131 It is mentioned that the cell 
system proved to be very effectively used by the Communists to develop 
their movement in the world but that the cell system does not particularly 
belong to the Communists. It was also developed by the Christian leaders 
such as Jozef Cardijn, the founder of the Young Christian Workers (YCW) and 
Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order. The book even claims that 
Jesus also used the cell system when he assigned the twelve Apostles to 
establish the early Christian mission.132 
It is also asserted that the cells are not study clubs, but action groups 
whose aims are (1) “to renew everything in Christ” or “to Christianise all 
aspects of society,” not primarily in the sense of teaching Christianity to 
non-Christians, but to develop a social, economic, political and cultural life 
based on the spirit of Christianity; and (2) “to create true Christian leaders.” 
The major members of the cell are the lay-Catholics and they should be con-
vinced that as Catholics they should become “the salt of the earth.” In addi-
tion, every member of the cells should have a team under his or her lead-
ership that could be mobilised for action. There were primarily two inter-
related activities of the cells: regular meeting, and action. In the meeting, 
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Gospel teachings were discussed in relation to social issues and then a plan 
was drawn up as to how the issues should be dealt with. In a vertical cell 
system, every cell mostly does not know the other cells and all of the cells 
are controlled at the top by a central board.133 
The major responsibility of the members of the network was to make 
regular reports on political developments to Beek, and Beek alone.134 In order 
not to be identified by outsiders, the khasebul alumni were already taught 
during the training to use in their communications certain code-words.135 
Every former trainee is assigned to work in accordance with his or her talent: 
to be a teacher, political activist, journalist etc., in either Catholic or non-
Catholic organisations, including the Government institutions and Parlia-
ment. In short, through the khasebul programme, Beek gradually “built up 
what amounted to a personal intelligence network.” 136
Beek passed away in 1983, but his khasebul training was continued 
by his former student, a Jesuit named Lukas Rustam Alamsyah. The khasebul 
network and training continued to work to the end of the Soeharto period 
and even up to the present.137 Besides some of the priests, Beek’s prominent 
cadres in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies or CSIS (to be 
discussed below) have been certainly involved in the khasebul training.138 
It was not uncommon that a khasebul graduate was given a job in the busi-
ness institutions belong to the Catholic elites. It is also said that some of the 
university students who joined the khasebul network were rewarded with 
scholarships.139 A rebellious person like Suryasmoro Ispandrihari would eas-
ily lose these advantages. Another person, who wanted to keep his job, did 
not have any choice but to hide his personal discontents with the network.
The Catholics in Opsus, CSIS and Golkar
After the political defeat of the PKI in 1966, the cooperation between 
Beek’s group and the army increased partly because both found a common 
interest in opposing the Islamic groups. In this context, May observes that, “fear 
of Moslems led some of the President’s advisers into the arms of Catholic Action, 
with the strange consequence that a Dutch Jesuit played a part in shaping the 
Javanese junta’s political ideas.”140 There were two important personal advisers 
of the president who cooperated with Beek’s group: Ali Moertopo and Soed-
jono Hoemardani. As has been noted, Beek and his students had made close 
contacts with Ali Moertopo before and after the coup. These earlier contacts 
seem to have been more serious in 1967 when Liem Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi) 
became assistant to Ali Moertopo, while Kie’s brother, Liem Bian Khoen (Sofjan 
Wanandi) became assistant to Soedjono Hoemardani.141 
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Beek’s group also cooperated with Ali Moertopo in the intelligence 
network of the so-called Opsus an acronym of ‘operasi khusus’ (special oper-
ation) that was originally set up within the Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve 
Command) in 1964 to find ways to end the confrontation with Malaysia. 
When Soeharto became President, the Opsus “evolved into a body notori-
ous for political manipulation” 142 and Ali Moertopo was appointed to be the 
Deputy Head of the State Intelligence Co-ordinating Body (BAKIN). Ali Moer-
topo actually built up various forces around him, including some former 
activists of Darul Islam.143 However, Beek’s group was apparently the most 
influential one. According to General Soemitro, the important political rival 
of Ali Moertopo in early-1970s, it was through the Opsus channel that since 
1969 some scholars of Beek’s group had taken certain positions in BAKIN.144 
The cooperation in the field of intelligence seems to be natural because, 
as has been discussed, Beek had established an intelligence network of his 
Catholic cadres. 
Richard Tanter observes that Beek’s “preferred Indonesia was nation-
alist, non-Islamic, with Christianity in a favoured position, supporting a 
Golkar-type Government.”145 By the end of 1969, the regime developed the 
Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of the Functional Groups) that was originally 
established in 1964 to counter-balance the PKI and its affiliated organiza-
tions, into a government-sponsored party.146 Before the first election of the 
New Order in 1971, Beek and his group were strongly involved in the estab-
lishment of Golkar. In this respect, while Van den Heuvel claims that Beek 
was “the inventor of Golkar party,”147 Brian May more carefully explains:
There is no evidence that he [i.e., Beek] went so far as to advise them on the 
specific aims of Golkar, although he might well have done so, for he was closely 
in touch with Ali Murtopo’s circle. What he certainly did was to discuss such mat-
ters as to how democracy was possible in a developing country; and he wrote an 
article, circulated in the Defence Department, in which he warned that Moslems 
were using Communist-type tactics to bring about an Islamic state.148 
What is interesting in May’s observation above is that Beek tried to 
convince the army that there were serious attempts by the Muslims to bring 
about an Islamic state. In other words, what seems significant is not whether 
Beek invented Golkar but the idea that the party was partly intended to 
oppose the Muslim interest in an Islamic state. Beek’s Jesuit contemporary, 
Paul de Blot, said: “It was the residue, not Beek’s concept itself that became 
Golkar. Golkar was the waste of the idea to oppose the Islamic state. The idea 
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came from Beek but it melted and eventually became Golkar.”149 Therefore, it 
is not surprising that some of the prominent Catholic figures of Beek’s group 
such as Jusuf Wanandi and Cosmas Batubara took important positions within 
Golkar’s leadership, especially in the 1970s and 1980s.150 Batubara was even 
appointed Minister of People’s Housing in two of Soeharto’s cabinets.151 
Besides the involvement in Opsus and Golkar, in 1971 Beek’s group, 
in cooperation with Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani, established 
the Yayasan Proklamasi, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). 
According to Harry Tjan Silalahi, the origin of the CSIS was a small study 
group started in 1964 consisting of a few individuals who wanted to coun-
ter the philosophical discourse of Communism of the PKI. Besides himself, 
Harry mentioned Liem Bian Kie and Soedjati Djiwandono as members of the 
group. This group also cooperated with the Pancasila Front in 1966 when the 
latter was actively engaged in eradicating the PKI. In addition, in Western 
Europe, among the Indonesian students, there were two opposing camps: 
the rightist and the leftist. In 1965, Daoed Joesoef was still a student in Paris, 
and he was the one who mobilized the right wing of the Indonesian stu-
dents and established the Association of Indonesian Students (PPI) there. In 
1967, Ali Moertopo ordered Sofjan Wanandi to go to Western Europe to talk 
to the students. It was in this period that Daoed Joesoef in Paris, Surjanto 
Puspowardojo in Belgium, Hadisoesastro in West Germany and Biantoro 
Wanandi in Switzerland were contacted. After these contacts, both activists 
in Jakarta and Western Europe agreed to establish a study club. They then 
talked to Ali Moertopo about the idea and his response was very enthu-
siastic and at the same time Soedjono Hoemardani was ready to provide 
financial support, and this was possible for him because he was the personal 
assistant to President Soeharto for economic affairs.152 
In an article entitled “Think Tank” dedicated to Ali Moertopo in mem-
ory of him one year after his death, Harry Tjan explained that CSIS was more 
or less intended to play a similar role to the RAND Corporation established 
in 1948 in Santa Monica, California. In the beginning, the RAND was a think 
tank or ‘ideas factory’ that only gave advice for the US Air Forces, but later 
on RAND was developed to be an institution for research on social, eco-
nomic, and political affairs that helped provide information for the policy 
makers. The work of an institution like RAND (read: CSIS), for Harry Tjan, was 
very significant because as a non-government organization, it could move 
informally to identify national and international problems faced by the Gov-
ernment. The CSIS, therefore, was intended to be the think tank and ideas 
factory for Soeharto’s Government. 153 
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In the above article, Harry Tjan proudly identifies the CSIS with Ali 
Moertopo and Soeharto’s New Order. Indeed, during the 1970s and the first 
half of the 1980s, the CSIS had significant influence within the Government, 
particularly because of the patronage of Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoe-
mardhani as personal assistants to the President. General Soemitro said that 
Ali Moertopo was the one who struggled for the political status of the CSIS 
that in turn paved the way for this organization to have direct access to 
the structural institutions of the state, while “Soedjono looked for the fund-
ing that was widely said to have come from the state owned companies.”154 
Another patron of the CSIS was general Benny Moerdani, a Catholic and jun-
ior to Moertopo. They got to know each other when both were assigned for 
the Trikora operation in West Papua in the early 1960s. Both men became 
closer by the end of 1965 when Moerdani was appointed as the deputy to 
Moertopo who was the Intelligence Assistant of a Fighting Command for 
the Confrontation with Malaysia.155 When the CSIS was established in 1971, 
Benny was assigned in South Korea, but he did not fail to maintain regular 
contact with Moertopo and the CSIS. After the Malari affair in 1974, Moer-
topo successfully persuaded Soeharto to appoint Moerdani to be the G-I 
Intelligence Assistant of Security and Defence. Moerdani’s career moved to 
its peak when he was appointed to be the Commander of the Armed Forces 
in 1983.156 
To recapitulate what has been said, the cooperation between Beek’s 
group and Ali Moertopo was almost perfect: in the Opsus intelligence net-
work, in the Golkar political party and in the CSIS as a think tank, and all of 
them were strongly interconnected. According to Soemitro, on one occa-
sion, Ali Moertopo tried to explain why he cooperated with the Catholics. 
It was reported that Ali Moertopo said, “You should know that this group is 
more dangerous than the Communists and they are adventurous intellectu-
als. Therefore, instead of allowing them to become wild, I put them into a 
stable!”157 This implies that Ali Moertopo felt that he could use them for his 
own political agenda. Nonetheless, who is using whom in politics is not a 
simple question to answer. For the Catholics of Beek’s group, the coopera-
tion was probably considered an effective way to secure their interests as a 
religious minority.
Catholic Political Theology and Integralism of Pancasila
Was there any more serious reason for the Catholics to justify cooper-
ation with the military dominated regime? A prominent Catholic intellectual 
and head of the Research and Development section of the Indonesian news-
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paper, Kompas, Daniel Dhakidae, argues that the involvement of the Catho-
lic intellectuals at the CSIS can be explained in terms of the Catholic politi-
cal theology of the organic state. Within this theology, liberalism is rejected 
because of its emphasis on the role of individuals and Marxist-socialism is 
refused because class struggle is considered destructive to the existence 
of an organic state. This political theology can be traced back to Thomas 
Aquinas (d. 1274) who argued that the elements of cosmic order and the 
social order form a harmonious relation to one another in a hierarchy. 158 
The differences within the structure of the hierarchy are necessary because 
without differences, being is inconceivable. Consequently, to rule and to 
be ruled is something natural and equality for all individuals is absurd. The 
people who have the right to rule are those who have the power of intellect 
and at the same time the power to command. This is analogous to the rule 
of reason over the whole organs of human body. In the modern context, 
those who have the power of intellect are the educated, experts, profes-
sionals and technocrats. For the New Order context, the power to command 
seemed to rest in the hands of the army. Donoso Cartés, an Iberian Catholic 
theologian, argues further for the necessity of state dictatorship over the 
people because the state is considered the source of morality to guide the 
people who are naturally bad and sinful. For him, the role of the state over 
the people is somewhat parallel with that of Jesus, the God incarnate who 
was born and crucified to save sinful human beings. Last but not least, the 
idea of the organic state and the rejection of Marxist class struggle were also 
found in the encyclical, Rerum Novarum of the Pope Leo XII, issued in 1881. 
Later, despite the assertion of the Vatican Council II (1962-1965) that the 
authority of the political community should avoid despotism in its attempts 
to achieve the common good, the strong emphasis on the role of the state 
to maintain order can still be noticed.159 
There were important changes of the Catholic doctrines in Vatican II, 
including the more tolerant and friendly attitude towards Muslims. None-
theless, according to Dhakidae, these changes did not significantly influ-
ence the political attitudes of the Catholic activists in Indonesia, especially 
those in the CSIS who started their careers in late 1950s and early 1960s. In 
other words, they were more influenced by the pre-Vatican II political theol-
ogy.160 This observation is in line with de Blot’s explanation that the mentor 
of these Catholic activists, Father Beek, was a person who was very much 
influenced by the ‘old’ Catholic political theology.161
The Catholic political theology of the organic state is parallel, but 
not identical, with the military’s preferred interpretation of Pancasila as an 
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‘integralism.’ The idea of integralism was originally proposed by the Dutch-
trained Javanese constitutional scholar, Soepomo, during the session of 
the BPUPK in 1945. In his speech to the BPUPK on 31 May 1945, Soepomo 
explained that there are three main concepts of state: the first is liberalism 
that emphasises individual rights, the second is Marxism that is based on 
class analysis, and the third is integralist in which individuals or class do not 
matter because the state and people are considered one and united as a 
family. Among these three concepts, Soepomo preferred the integralist con-
cept because for him it was the most suitable to the Indonesian socio-politi-
cal culture.162 Soepomo’s idea, however, was not accepted by the BPUPK 
that finally preferred a constitutional democracy, even though with a strong 
presidency. Nonetheless, when Soekarno developed his Guided Democracy 
(1959-1965), he often emphasised that liberal democracy is not in line with 
Indonesian culture. After the fall of Soekarno, in 1968, the secretary of the 
MPRS, General Abdul Kadir Besar, in his analysis of the MPRS decrees, referred 
to Soepomo’s integralist ideals as the appropriate source for understanding 
the 1945 Constitution.163 Later, the New Order regime used the integralistic 
ideals of family, harmony, unity and paternalism to interpret Pancasila as 
opposed to the three ideological alternatives: Islam, Communism and Liber-
alism.164 The regime then promoted this interpretation of Pancasila through 
the indoctrination programme on the Guidelines for Internalisation and 
Implementation of Pancasila (P4) decreed by MPR in 1978, and the school 
curriculum on Moral Pancasila Education (PMP) since early 1980s. In 1979, 
the regime established a specific body called ‘BP7’ for this indoctrination 
program organised under the Coordinator Minister of Politics and Securi-
ty. Under the coordination of the BP7 that also had offices in all provinces, 
these courses on Pancasila were given to civil servants, students, teachers, 
lecturers, military personnel and even peasants in the villages.165 
As the think tank for the New Order, the CSIS was involved in devel-
oping and promoting the integralist interpretation of Pancasila. In 1976, the 
CSIS published the speeches of Soeharto on Pancasila in which the President 
clearly emphasises, among other things, the integralist ideals of national 
unity as opposed to Marxist class differences, and the family as opposed to 
liberalism.166 Later the CSIS also published the English translation of the P4 
and GBHN of 1978 that, as noted above, also promoted the integralist ide-
als.167 In the same year, the CSIS published a book by Ali Moertopo in which 
he argued that Pancasila was an Indonesian cultural concept that became 
a constitutional concept. What he means by the cultural concept was noth-
ing but the values of harmony, family and religious tolerance.168 In 1985, a 
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Catholic intellectual of the CSIS, A.M.W. Pranarka published his study of the 
history of Pancasila. In this study, Pranarka argued that Pancasila was the 
true Indonesian ideological thought embedded in Indonesian culture. For 
Pranarka, this original ideology emerged particularly because of its encoun-
ters with two foreign ideological ideas: the western Hellenistic secular ideol-
ogies of socialism and Marxism, and the eastern Semitic ideology of Islam. In 
this encounter, argues Pranarka, it was Pancasila that successfully subsumed 
the two foreign ideological ideas, not the opposite. He then explains that 
unlike the Semitic concept of God that is based on transcendentalism, the 
principle of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa of Pancasila combines both imma-
nent and transcendent views. Moreover, for him, this principle of Pancasila 
indicates that nothing is absolute except God, and that human beings are 
not totally free. This view of human beings, he said, leads to the idea that 
obligation is more important than right, and that every individual should 
develop self-control in order to maintain social harmony and consensus.169 
Thus, Pranarka’s view of Pancasila is obviously parallel with the integralist 
viewpoint. 
Muslim and Catholic Views of Beek’s Group
In the perception of many Muslims, the activities of Beek’s group, 
particularly the CSIS, were considered a blatant Catholic-military conspiracy 
against Islam. In the Muslim perception, the fact that Ali Moertopo himself 
was a Muslim, and another prominent figure of the CSIS, Daoed Joesoef is 
also a Muslim, did not matter at all. For instance, Husein Umar, a long-time 
Muslim activist who currently is the General Secretary of the DDII, believed 
that the Government’s objection to the Muslim demand to rehabilitate the 
Masyumi party and then its intervention in the leadership of the Parmusi by 
the late 1960s “was part of the grand design of the Christians – especially the 
Catholic activists, the offspring of the CSIS and the students of Father Beek 
– to marginalize Muslims in the Indonesian political arena.”170 As we shall see 
in Chapter 4 and 5, the Muslims often blamed the Catholics of the CSIS as 
those who were responsible for making the Government’s secular policies 
such as the Marriage Bill in 1973 and educational policies in 1980s. 
One striking case of Muslim discontent with the CSIS is the polemic 
between A.M.W Pranarka and Muhammad Rasjidi in 1978. As noted in Chap-
ter 2, in 1978 the Islamic party, PPP, made a walkout protest against the 
MPRS’s decision to ratify the Government proposal on Pancasila indoctri-
nation (P4) and to include Javanense Mysticism into the GBHN. Following 
this case, on 14 April 1978, Suara Karya, a newspaper established by both 
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Moertopo and Hoemardani published an article written in interview form by 
A.M.W Pranarka.171 In the article, Pranarka argued that the Muslim protest at 
the MPR session demonstrated the struggle of nationalism against religion, 
especially Islam. “The problem is between Islam and nationalism, Christi-
anity and nationalism…However, because the strongest, the clearest and 
the sharpest reaction in this process mainly came from Islamic leaders both 
inside and outside the PPP, the most significant clash seems to have been 
between Islam and nationalism,” he said.172 Pranarka argued that national-
ism in Indonesia must be analysed in terms of the Indonesian culture that 
developed since the early history of the country, that is, long before the 
coming of religions. For him, this culture of nationalism is the innermost 
dynamism of society, the élan vital or, with reference to Hegel, ‘das werkende 
Geist’ of Indonesian history. In the final analysis, for him, nationalism would 
defeat religion (read: Islam) and Pranarka warned:
Our nationalism is not a nationalism seeking for an enemy [or] against religion. 
The existing conflicts and hostilities were not brought about by nationalism 
but by the other side [i.e., Islamic groups]. Our nationalism seems to have a 
strong accommodative capacity. But perhaps because of this, it also has the 
power to crush (menggilas). It will not initiate fighting, but if it is challenged to 
fight, it has a very great capacity [to crush]. This appears in the history of our 
culture and the history of Indonesian politics.173 
Muhammad Rasjidi took the initiative to refute Pranarka’s view. 
According to Rasjidi, it is very contentious to theorise that nationalism has 
its roots in the early history of Indonesia, because even in Europe national-
ism only began in the eighteenth century. Pranarka’s theory of nationalism, 
for Rasjidi, was only based on his ambition to put Islam and nationalism in 
opposition. In fact, argued Rasjidi, it was the shared Islamic identity that ini-
tially unified various ethnic groups in the country to fight against the coloni-
alists.174 Rasjidi also suspects that Pranarka’s use of Hegelian philosophy was 
because for Hegel the state is a “divine spirit on earth.” Rasjidi said:
What recently happened, according to A.M.W Pranarka was not because of 
nationalism, but because of the other side, that is, the Islamic side. This is a 
very remarkable statement because all people know that those who wanted 
to include Javanese mysticism and to make the P4 decreed by the MPR were 
not the Islamic community. In Pranarka’s logic, the one who disagreed with the 
two issues is the one who brought about the hostility. This is exactly the same 
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as what Hegel said, that people are not allowed to oppose the government 
because the government is the divine spirit on earth.175 
For Rasjidi, Pranarka was clearly anti-Islam and arrogantly threat-
ened the Islamic groups. He then questioned, was it because Pranarka was 
a Catholic? Rasjidi also said, if Pranarka followed the stipulations of the Vati-
can Council II, he would not be that hostile to Islam. Pranarka talked as a 
nationalist, but for Rasjidi it is possible that Pranarka is “a nationalist on the 
surface but a missionary inside.” According to Rasjidi, without the inclusion 
of Javanese Mysticism into the GBHN, its followers would still have freedom 
to practice it. Thus, argued Rasjidi, the effort to have Javanese Mysticism 
mentioned in the GBHN was only to define the religious identity of the Java-
nese abangan as other than Islamic, so the number of Javanese registered 
as Muslims would decrease by 30 to 40 million. 176 
Despite Rasjidi’s sharp and negative reaction, it seems that Pranarka 
did not try to counter it directly. Nonetheless, not long after the publication 
of his criticisms, without any notification, Rasjidi was pensioned off from 
his position as Professor of Islamic law at the University of Indonesia.177 It 
seems this may have happened because the Department of Education and 
Culture was controlled by the CSIS group: Daoed Joesoef was the Minister 
and Pranarka was the Secretary of the Committee for the Reformation of the 
National Education at the Department. 
Indeed, it was not only the Muslims but also some of the Catholics 
who felt unhappy with the alliance of Beek’s students with the regime. Agus-
tine Prasetyo Murniati, one of the first generation of Beek’s students, said 
that Sartono Kartodirdjo, a professor of history in Gadjah Mada University, 
was among the early Catholic intellectuals who opposed this alliance.178 In 
line with Kartodirdjo, one of Beek’s colleagues reportedly said, “in theory 
Beek’s ideas are fine, but in practice they are dirty.”179 It is also reported that 
the involvement of Beek’s group to secure a pro- Indonesian vote in the West 
Irian “Act of Free Choice” in 1969 was strongly attacked by other priests at 
an Indonesian Bishops’ conference in 1971.180 According to Bourchier, “par-
ticularly towards the end of his life, the Jesuit Provincial and other church 
leaders attempted to remove him,” but “the hierarchy was usually unsuc-
cessful against Beek, although at one stage he was forced to return to Hol-
land.”181 There was also a protest movement of the so-called “pastor-pastor 
muda” (the young priests) against the activities of Beek’s group and one of 
the priests was J.B. Mangunwijawa who sent several letters of protest to the 
Church leadership.182 For Mangunwijaya and the like, the Catholics of the 
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CSIS were like Pilate in the New Testament who allied himself with the rul-
ing power and betrayed Jesus and his teachings.183 Likewise, for St. Sunardi, 
the young prominent Catholic scholar said, Beek’s students are the Catholic 
elites who have been obsessed with political interests and excessive fear of 
Islam. “In fact, they fear their own fear”, he said. 184 
It seems, however, that the protests did not force the Church lead-
ership to renounce its endorsement for the activities of Beek’s group. The 
reason is, it seems, instead of supporting one group against another, the 
Church leadership tried to be a mediator accommodating both. This assump-
tion is justified by an explanation made by Father Ismartono, a Jesuit who 
was working in the section of the inter-religious relations of the KWI. When 
I asked him about the difference between Beek’s top-down and Dijkstra’s 
bottom up approach to socio-political issues, he said that the difference was 
positive as a source of creativity and dynamism within the Church. “Instead 
of being contradictory, we considered them complementary,” he said.185 
Whatever the case may be, the priests had various reasons to justify 
Beek’s activities. Paul de Blot, Beek’s contemporary and fellow Jesuit, said 
that to understand Beek, one should understand how a Jesuit works. He 
explained that, before starting his work, a Jesuit should analyse the real 
situation around him and then decide what kind of concrete services he 
can offer to people based on his own skill and ability. Beek was a thinker, a 
genius and intuitive, but not good in making relations with those whom he 
considered to be his enemies. This is why Beek’s strategy was exclusive and 
antagonistic. However, in view of the critical political situation during the 
early period of the New Order, Beek’s approach is understandable. In other 
words, Beek’s ideas and actions were acceptable in that period but were no 
longer so in later years let alone now. Therefore, he disagreed with Lukas 
Rustam Alamsyah and his colleagues who still continue Beek’s khasebul. A 
Jesuit work, he said, cannot and should not be imitated because it is unique 
and conditioned by its historical context. 186 
Father Franz Magnis-Suseno, a Jesuit of German origin who worked 
in Indonesia from 1961 said that Beek’s role “is always exaggerated, perhaps 
because in Indonesia people are interested in all kinds of conspiracy theo-
ries.” He acknowledged that Beek conducted courses on general knowledge, 
Catholicism, public speaking, meeting techniques etc. for the young Catho-
lics. Magnis-Suseno, however, said nothing about the specific features of 
the courses. He also explained that some of Beek’s students became lead-
ing activists after the coup and “like the prominent figures of the HMI, they 
then became the cadres of Golkar.”187 In other words, it seems that for him, 
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there was nothing special about Beek’s courses and cadres because they 
were more or less like those of the HMI. Moreover, Ismartono explained that 
as a Jesuit, Beek was assigned to guide the lay people who wanted to share 
Jesuit spirituality. To do this, Beek then nurtured some groups of the lay peo-
ple, mostly the professionals and students, in the so-called ‘Maria Congrega-
tion’ and he conducted regular meetings with them. The one-month retreat 
was one of the types of these meetings. For Ismartono, Beek’s authority as 
a priest of the Catholic Church was limited to this spiritual realm. In other 
words, whatever these lay people did outside spiritual matters was actually 
beyond Beek’s ability, let alone the Church, to control it. He explained fur-
ther that the CSIS group was not the only group with which Beek worked. 
There were some other groups that did not become a political movement 
like the CSIS, but people do not know about this.188 
In contrast to Magnis-Suseno’s hint, a former khasebul trainee said, 
the secret and hard nature of the training clearly indicates that khasebul is 
incomparable with most of the HMI.189 Likewise, in contrast to Ismartono’s 
explanation of Beek’s only spiritual role, a young Catholic activist said, “If 
the Church cannot control a group like the CSIS, why did she make it? If you 
dare to set a fire, you should know how to extinguish it.”190 In this respect, a 
senior Catholic scholar said, “It is true that there is no formal tie between the 
Church and the CSIS, but there were informal meetings between the two, 
especially during the heyday of the CSIS.”191
3. Pancasila As the Sole Basis
We have noted that the New Order regime took Pancasila and its inte-
gralist interpretation as the only acceptable ideology for the country. Three 
other ideologies, namely Communism, Islam and Liberalism were consid-
ered to be opposed to Pancasila. Since the late 1970s, the regime developed 
an indoctrination programme on Pancasila as an integralist philosophy for 
almost all parts of society. However, this was apparently still not enough. In 
1983, the regime controlling the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) pro-
duced the GBHN in which it was stated that, among other things, all political 
parties should be based solely on Pancasila. Thus, with this rule, the Islamic 
Party, PPP, had to take Pancasila, not Islam, as its basis. Two years later, with 
the agreement of Parliament, the Government issued the Law No.8/ 1985 
requiring that all social organisations should be based on Pancasila. The 
regulation called ‘asas tunggal’ (the sole basis) soon triggered resistance, 
particularly from both Islamic and Christian organisations, even though 
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most of them finally accepted or more precisely, adapted to this regulation. 
The acceptance of the regulation, however, did not mean that all groups 
accepted the Government interpretation of Pancasila.
Among the Islamic groups, the two most influential, the traditionalist 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the reformist Muhammadiyah, accepted the reg-
ulation. 192 The NU even took Pancasila as its basis in its constitution before 
the regulation was issued, that is, in December 1984, while the Muhammadi-
yah formally declared it one year later. On the other hand, other reformist 
Muslims apparently became the strongest opponents of the regulation. For 
instance, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the former leader of Masyumi, sent a 
letter of protest, dated 7 July 1983, to President Soeharto. Copies of the let-
ter were sent to all Ministers, Islamic organisations and mass media.193 In 
the letter, Prawiranegara argued that Pancasila was originally intended only 
to be the philosophical basis of the state, not the sole basis for all politi-
cal and social organisations. All organisations based on Islam, he said, had 
already existed and nobody considered them contradictory to Pancasila. 
Thus, this regulation was for him in fact contradictory to Pancasila. Among 
the reformist Muslim student organisations, two of them resisted this rule: 
the Pelajar Islam Indonesia (PII) and the Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI). 
In the case of the latter, there were two camps: one group accepted and the 
other refused, the former was later identified as the “HMI-Dipo” (referring 
to their headquarter in Jalan Diponegoro, Jakarta), while the latter called 
themselves the “HMI–MPO” (Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, the Council to 
Save the Organization). The PII and HMI-MPO were, therefore, considered 
illegal organizations by the authorities during the period of the New Order.
The Christian organisations also had difficulties in accepting this 
regulation, even though they consistently supported Pancasila as the state 
ideology. For them, the sole basis of Christian organisations was nothing but 
Jesus Christ. In a meeting of the DGI, held in August 1984 in Bali, there was a 
debate between those who argued that Pancasila could be accepted as the 
sole basis and those who opposed it based on the statement in 1 Corinth 
3:11, that only Jesus is the basis of the Church. Finally, the Bali meeting did 
not make any decision on this issue. The issue was discussed again in the 
Assembly of the DGI, held in Ambon on October 1984. In this Assembly, the 
DGI changed its name into PGI194and Pancasila as the sole basis was asserted 
but at the same time Jesus Christ was considered as the basis of the church 
as well. In this regard, to differentiate the two bases, the Assembly used 
the word ‘dasar’ for Jesus and ‘asas’ for Pancasila. The Government, however, 
was not satisfied with the PGI’s way because both ‘dasar’ and ‘asas’ mean the 
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same. After negotiation with the Government, in 1986 the PGI decided to 
revise its Constitution, namely to put Pancasila in the article on ‘asas’ and 
Jesus Christ as ‘dasar’ in the article on Confession.195 
Like the PGI, the Indonesian Bishops’ Council (MAWI) also had cer-
tain reservations about the regulation.196 In a hearing with the Parliament 
in September 1984, the general secretary of MAWI, Leo Soekoto, said that 
the Catholic Church accepted Pancasila since 1945 as the ideology of the 
state. Now the regulation required that all social organisations should be 
solely based on Pancasila. He then questioned: “Where is one’s faith if Pan-
casila is used to be the starting point of all social activities?” Moreover, for 
him, Catholic organisations are not secular social organisations because 
they are strongly dependent on and determined by the central leadership 
in Rome. Because the Government did not respond positively to the MAWI’s 
objection, the latter tried to find the solution, but unlike the Protestants, 
the Catholics discussed the issue in closed meetings. In January 1987, the 
MAWI leaders met Soeharto to explain that in their meeting in November 
1986, they made a decision that the name of the MAWI should be changed 
into KWI.197 In addition, the Statute of the KWI was made in accordance with 
the Government regulation. It is mentioned in the Statute of the KWI that “in 
the light of Catholic faith, KWI is based on Pancasila in social, national and 
constitutional life.” 
As hinted earlier, although most of the social organisations accepted 
the asas tunggal regulation, the ideological discourse did not stop, because 
Pancasila could be interpreted in different ways. In this context, Ramage’s 
study demonstrates how Islamic, secular and military leaders developed 
various interpretations of Pancasila in this period.198 Ramage observes that 
for the military, the integralist interpretation of Pancasila even became more 
important after the wide acceptance of the regulation. Instead of saying 
that the military were the true fighters for Pancasila, since the late 1980s, 
the military argued that if togetherness and family-ness are the prime mean-
ing of Pancasila, then the military’s political role was simply natural. On the 
other hand, the Islamic leaders tried to interpret Pancasila in Islamic terms 
or in line with some secular and Christian intellectuals, they promoted Pan-
casila as the basis for liberal democracy. Thus, it is interesting to see how 
some Muslim and Christian intellectuals interpret Pancasila in this period.
For some of the Muslim leaders, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa was still 
the major reason why they could accept Pancasila. In a discussion organised 
by the Department of Religion, while Ahmad Azhar Basyir, the reformist Mus-
lim leader, reasserted the earlier Muslim arguments,199 Achmad Siddiq, the 
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General Chairman of the NU, developed the arguments further. Achmad Sid-
diq argued that Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa implies that Indonesia is neither 
a secular nor a theocratic state. This means, he said, in the Pancasila state, 
the state supports the development of religion and at the same time religion 
supports the development of the nation and the state. One of the basic val-
ues of Islam, he said, is the middle way (tawassut) between two extremes. 
He suggested that Islam is a revealed religion of God, while Pancasila is an 
ideology, a result of human thought. In this regard, a Muslim should not fall 
into one of the two extremes: either to consider Islam as an ideology or to 
consider Pancasila as a religion. It does not mean, however, that Muslims 
cannot accept any ideology because Islam allows and even encourages its 
followers to think and reflect. Accordingly, an ideology can be accepted by 
Muslims as far as it is in line with the teachings of Islam. In this context, like 
the early Muslim leaders, Achmad Siddiq argued that Ketuhanan Yang Maha 
Esa for Muslims is nothing but tawhīd and “if other religious adherents could 
accept it, we would thank and pray,” he said. He also asserted that within the 
Pancasila state, Islamic law can be developed within the legal system of the 
state and this is in line with the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and the article 29 
of the 1945 Constitution concerning religion.200 
Nurcholsih Madjid, the former HMI chairman and the proponent of 
a non-ideological view of Islam since the early 1970s,201 responded posi-
tively to Siddiq’s arguments. In addition, he developed some interesting 
ideas concerning Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. For Nurcholish, the replace-
ment of the seven words with “Yang Maha Esa” must be welcomed because 
it means tawhīd, something more principled than shari’a in Islam. In addi-
tion, Nurcholish argued that the dropping of the seven words by the PPKI 
on 18 August 1945 was not a betrayal by the nationalists, as some Muslims 
would say, because Mohammad Hatta who played a major role in the lob-
bying process, is a devout Muslim.202 Abdurrahman Wahid, the executive 
chairman of the NU in this period, also offered some interesting arguments 
on the relation between Islam and Pancasila. One of his ways to argue for 
Pancasila was to affirm that the five major purposes of the shari’a, namely 
protection of human life, property, reason, religion and family, is in line 
with Pancasila. In other words, instead of emphasising the relevance of 
Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, he asserted that the protections of human 
rights found in Islamic tradition are the appropriate frame in which to 
see Pancasila.203 As Ramage observes, in the 1990s, Abdurrahman Wahid 
became more outspoken in promoting Pancasila as the basis for democ-
racy and human rights.204 
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Among the Protestant intellectuals, Eka Darmaputera was the one 
who made a critical analysis of Pancasila in 1980s. In his PhD thesis sub-
mitted to Boston College in 1982; and its summary was presented to the 
Seminar of Religions in 1985,205 Darmaputera tried to analyse Pancasila “as it 
operates in Indonesian society”, that is, as it is understood within Javanese 
culture.206 In general, he argues that Pancasila is the very source of national 
identity to face the challenge of modernity or national development. For 
him, the neither-nor logic of Pancasila (the state is neither Islamic nor secu-
lar) was clearly influenced by the Javanese culture that emphasises inclu-
siveness and harmony, and this logic has successfully maintained the unity 
of Indonesia. However, to face the challenge of modernity, the neither-nor 
logic is not suitable, particularly at the level of ethics, that is, to determine 
right and wrong. For him, the ethical uncertainty would easily lead to des-
potism because, in practice, the one who determines right and wrong is the 
ruler. Later, in his paper to the Seminar of Religions in 1986, he argued fur-
ther that the concepts of harmony and unity in the Javanese culture would 
lead to injustice, because within those concepts, differences are suppressed 
rather than protected, and the social gap is accepted as natural.207 In short, 
for Darmaputera, the interpretation of Pancasila should be transformed 
from the Javanese integralism into the liberal values of democracy and 
human rights. In line with Darmaputera, the Catholic priest, J.B. Mangun-
wijaya argued that the most relevant principles of Pancasila are the second 
principle of humanism and the fifth principle of social justice. Unfortunately, 
he said, in practice, these two important principles were clearly neglected 
by the Government.208 
 Conclusion
The Christian fear of an Islamic state or the Jakarta Charter in which 
the application of the shari’a is stipulated, became strong after the politi-
cal collapse of the PKI in late 1960s. This fear was justified by the fact that 
the leaders of the Islamic groups openly tried to assert the constitutional 
position of the Jakarta Charter. On the other hand, the Muslim leaders were 
apparently still unsatisfied with the results of previous ideological debates 
that did not clearly accommodate their ideological interest. The fall of the PKI 
(that had previously supported the nationalists in the Constituent Assembly) 
somehow provided more confidence for the Muslim leaders to reassert their 
ideological interest. However, unlike the power balance of the political par-
ties in the Constituent Assembly, during the Guided Democracy period the 
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military had become another strong political faction, and it became much 
stronger after the collapse of the PKI. Because the military was much more 
in favour of the nationalist ideology of Pancasila, the Islamic groups inevi-
tably had to face this powerful opponent. Because both the military and 
the Christians had the same ideological position against the Islamic groups, 
they became natural allies. Therefore, the Muslim-Christian tensions on the 
ideological issue during the New Order were strongly related to the politi-
cal exclusion of the ideologically-Islamic oriented groups by the military 
dominated regime on the one hand, and the alliance of the Christians with 
the military on the other. In this Christian-military alliance, the Protestants 
apparently were not as close as the Catholics of Beek’s group who cooper-
ated with the regime in creating and developing Government policies in 
general. Because the regime often took suppressive measures on Islamic 
ideology and its proponents, the alliance of the Christians with the regime 
eventually led to Muslim-Christian tensions. 
In the ideological debates, the Christians consistently promoted 
nationalism as the only common ground within which all the differences, 
particularly those with religious differences, could be encompassed. Thus, 
the Christians tried to interpret the first principle of Pancasila, Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa in such a way that religious freedom, tolerance and pluralism 
are guaranteed by the state. Similarly, they attempted to interpret the posi-
tion of the Jakarta Charter in Indonesian political history in such a way that it 
had only an historical and not a constitutional value. Finally, they demanded 
that the Department of Religion should not function as a Department of 
Islam, but of all religions without any discrimination; otherwise it should 
be abolished. The Muslims, on the other hand, often interpreted Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa theologically, that is, as an expression of the Islamic creed, 
tawhīd. Likewise, the Muslims tried to interpret the history of the drop of 
the seven words of the Jakarta Charter as the betrayal of the nationalists. 
To support the significance of the Jakarta Charter, the Muslims posed the 
proportionalist argument, that is, that the proponents of the Islamic ideol-
ogy represented almost half of the members of the Constituent Assembly. 
Finally, for them, the Department of Religion was simply a concrete compro-
mise between the nationalists and the Islamic groups.
The debates, however, were forced to stop by the regime by the late 
1960s, and ever since the Islamic ideological discourse has been suppressed. 
Moreover, since the late 1970s, the regime promoted ideological indoctrina-
tion, in which Pancasila was interpreted in integralistic terms to justify the 
authoritarian regime. In 1985, the regime even forced all social and political 
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organisations to accept the Pancasila as their sole basis. Some of the Islamic 
organisations resisted this regulation but most of them eventually accepted 
it. Both DGI and MAWI also initially had difficulties in accepting the regula-
tion, but finally they did so. The wide acceptance of Pancasila, however, did 
not stop the ideological contest in the realm of interpretation. While the 
military officers still preferred the integralist interpretation, some Muslim 
and Christian intellectuals interpreted Pancasila in terms of democracy and 
human rights. 
Since the fall of Soeharto, the Islamic forces have not been as united 
as in the 1950s and 1960s in demanding recognition of the constitutional 
position of the seven words of the Jakarta Charter. In fact, the supporters of 
the Charter were a minority in Parliament. On the other hand, many Chris-
tians have developed contacts and dialogue with Muslim leaders, particu-
larly those who have been known as the proponents of the non-ideological 
view of Islam. Some of the young Christian intellectuals, both Protestants 
and Catholics, even suggested that their leaders should offer public repent-
ance of their sin of cooperating with the military regime. Other Christians, 
however, still believe that there was nothing wrong with the past, and that 
they still have to be watchful of the Muslim ambition to realise an Islamic 
state.
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4. Religion, Family Law 
and the State  
The ideological compromise between the secular nationalists and the 
Islamic groups that resulted in an unclear and negative definition of the 
nature of the Indonesian state (i.e., neither a secular nor an Islamic state) 
unavoidably created a ‘grey area’ that often became an area of conflict. Per-
haps, one of the best examples of this conflict is the controversy on the posi-
tion of Islamic family law within the national legal structure. While the Islam-
ic groups demanded that the state accommodate the Islamic family law, the 
secular nationalists and the Christians opposed it. The New Order regime was 
initially very much in support of the secular nationalist position but eventu-
ally decided to make certain compromises with the Islamic groups. In both 
situations, however, Muslim and Christian leaders were generally trapped 
into antagonistic discourses. For the Muslims, the state accommodation of 
Islamic family law was necessary because Indonesia was not a secular state, 
while for the Christians such an accommodation was nothing but one step 
further towards an Islamic State. Both Muslim and Christian leaders also 
expressed their respective usual discourses: Christianisation and religious 
freedom. In this Chapter I shall discuss four groups of cases in which Muslim 
and Christian leaders were involved in the antagonistic discourse: (1) the 
debates on secular and Islamic marriage bills in the late 1950s and 1960s; (2) 
the debates on the marriage bill of 1973; (3) controversies on the application 
of the marriage law of 1974 in relation to Islamic and Christian teachings on 
inter-religious marriage; (4) the debates on the religious court bill.
1. The Debates on Secular and Islamic Marriage Bills 
There were two parliamentary debates in which both secular and 
Islamic marriage bills were proposed at the same time, by secular national-
ists and Islamic groups respectively. The first happened in the late 1950s, 
and the second one was in the late 1960s, the early years of the New Order. 
Although the Christians were in general in favour of the secular nationalist 
standpoint, they became apparently more outspoken since the early years 
of the New Order. Perhaps, the political collapse of the PKI made the Chris-
tians more concerned with the threat of Islamic political power. In what fol-
lows, we shall discuss the two cases chronologically. 
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The Soekarno Period: Secular vs. Islamic Marriage bill
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Ministry of Religion was established in 
1946, and it had the authority over, among other things, the administration 
of Muslim marriage affairs. This authority was based on Law 22/1946 that 
was initially applied to the areas of Java and Madura and then to Sumatra in 
1949 and finally to the whole country in 1954. The Law 22/1946 was only a 
procedural statute regulating the registration and control of marriage affairs 
without mentioning any substantive provisions.1 This was in a way a con-
tinuing of the status quo since the Dutch colonial Government established 
Islamic courts called ‘Priesterraden’ (Priests’ Councils) in the late nineteenth 
century to deal with Muslim marriage affairs without specifying a codified 
Islamic family law to be applied. The substantive Islamic law referred to by 
the Islamic courts was simply certain classical Islamic law books, primarily 
of the Shafi‘i school. In 1937, the Dutch Colonial Government proposed an 
ordinance to oblige Muslims to register their marriages, to have a monoga-
mous marriage and to prevent a husband from divorcing his wife unilater-
ally. Having considered that the ordinance would threaten the precepts of 
Islamic law in particular and the political position of Islam in general, the 
Islamic groups strongly opposed it. Thus, by early 1938, the Colonial Gov-
ernment eventually decided to drop it.2 In contrast, since 1933 there had 
already been a codified family law for Indonesian native Christians, called 
the HOCI (Huwelijks Ordonnantie Christen Indonesiers), and this was main-
tained by the independent Indonesian Government.3 
After the Revolutionary War (1945-1949) was over, there were 
attempts by the Ministry of Religion to codify an Islamic marriage law. The 
attempts, however, never succeeded, particularly because of unresolved 
conflicts between the Islamic groups and the secular nationalists. The Islamic 
groups, who primarily controlled the Ministry of Religion, tried to maintain 
its authority to administer Muslim marriage affairs in which Islamic law was 
applied, while the secular nationalists who controlled the Department of 
Justice, and who were supported by proponents of women’s rights, wanted 
to have a unified and national family law regardless of religion. The interests 
of the two groups were apparently difficult to reconcile. 
In October 1950, the Minister of Religion, Wachid Hasjim, established 
the Investigating Committee on Marriage Law, led by the nationalist, Teuku 
Muhammad Hasan.4 The members of the Committee consisted of some Mus-
lims, Protestants and Catholics and women activists. After a series of internal 
discussions and consultation with various social organizations, in May 1953, 
the Committee decided to formulate three marriage bills: (1) the basic bill 
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applicable to all citizens; (2) the substantive bill applied to Muslims, Prot-
estants and Catholics; (3) the bill for those outside these three religious 
groups. In 1954, the Committee completed its work on the Islamic marriage 
bill. The Minister of Religion, however, was apparently dissatisfied with it. 
Perhaps, the bill contained some ideas of reforms of Islamic law and tended 
to abolish the authority of the Ministry of Religion to administer Muslim 
marriage affairs. Whatever the reason was, instead of proposing the bill, in 
1954, the Minister of Religion submitted the Law 22/1946 to the Parliament 
in order to make it applicable to the areas beyond Java and Madura, and this 
was approved to become Law no. 35/1954. With this approval, the Ministry 
secured its authority to deal with Muslim marriage affairs.
Three years later, in September 1957, the Minister of Religion, Moham-
mad Ilyas, gave the Islamic marriage bill to the Cabinet with a note that there 
would be some amendments before it was to be proposed to the Parlia-
ment. Until early 1958, however, there was no further development of the 
bill. Partly for this reason, the nationalist party in the Parliament, the PNI, in 
February 1958, proposed a general bill for all citizens, regardless of religion. 
This bill came to be called ‘Mrs. Sumari’s bill’ because she was the deputy 
proposing the bill. Mrs. Sumari’s bill eventually pushed the Minister of Reli-
gion to propose an Islamic marriage bill (a refined version of the 1954 bill) 
to Parliament. The Parliamentary discussion on the bills, however, was not 
started until early 1959.5 
The Parliamentary debates, however, did not end with a compromise. 
Nani Soewondo, the activist of women’s rights, explained that the Islamic 
parties defended polygamy as if it were a principle of marriage, even though 
the Government’s bill itself put restrictions on it. 6 Thus, the Muslim leaders 
apparently defended polygamy not simply as an expression of religious con-
servatism but more importantly as a symbolic ideological struggle against 
their opponents. On the other hand, Zaini Ahmad Noeh, a former official of 
the Ministry of Religion, noted that Mrs. Sumari’s bill did not mention any 
Islamic court or Islamic judge but only spoke of the civil court and the civil 
judge.7 This meant that the bill would consequently abolish the authority of 
Islamic courts on Muslim marriage affairs. Thus, the conflict of interests was 
finally unresolved, and other efforts at negotiation outside the Parliament 
also failed.
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Early Years of the New Order: Muslim-Catholic Debates
To the end of the Soekarno period, Indonesia did not manage to pro-
duce a substantive law on marriage but the effort continued in the New 
Order period. In the session held several months after the coup, the MPRS 
issued a decree in which it was mentioned that a marriage law should be 
made soon.8 In the following year, on 22 May 1967, the Department of Reli-
gion proposed an Islamic marriage bill to the Parliament (DPRGR). On the 
other hand, the Department of Justice through the Institute for Develop-
ment of National Law (LPHN)9 also prepared a marriage bill and this bill was 
proposed to Parliament on 7 September 1968. The second bill was supposed 
to provide the basic regulation on marriage while the Islamic marriage bill 
was expected to be one concerning its applications.10 The existence of the 
two bills reminds us of the contest between the Islamic marriage bill and 
Mrs. Sumari’s bill in the 1950s, and as Emmerson observes, the bill of the 
Department of Justice was intended to neutralise the Islamic-law project 
of the Department of Religion.11 Nonetheless, it could also be an attempt 
to find a compromise because the idea was to make a consensus on basic 
regulations and then marriage laws were to be made for different religious 
groups with their respective specifications.12 The Ministry of Religion actu-
ally proposed a similar idea in 1959 to find a compromise with the national-
ists, that is, by taking Mrs. Sumari’s bill as the basic regulation and the Islamic 
bill as one of its derivative implementations.13 
Again, Parliament failed to ratify the bills. Now, among those who 
opposed the Islamic marriage bill, the most active and outspoken group 
appears to have been the Catholic Party. It was reported that the members 
of the Catholic Party left the room whenever a discussion on the bill was 
started in the Commission dealing with the issue.14 More than that, as we 
shall see, the party also circulated a memorandum containing their argu-
ments against the bill. The opposition of the Catholic Party was certainly not 
the only reason behind the failure. There were probably certain irreconcil-
able differences between the Islamic marriage bill and the other bill. As to 
this issue, a few years later, Asmah Syahroni, a member of Parliament of the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) party, explained that the Islamic parties could not 
accept the bill of the Department of Justice unless it was entirely in line with 
the Islamic marriage bill.15 Thus, the disagreement was probably not simply 
between the Islamic parties and the Catholic Party, but also between the 
former and the secular nationalist groups. However, according to a Muslim 
account, the opposition of the Catholic Party somehow contributed to the 
failure of the ratification of the bill. They argued that the unwritten rule of 
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the game in the Parliament was that any decision must be based on con-
sensus. Thus, the Catholic Party’s rejection of the bill made the consensus 
unachievable.16 This account also seems to imply that, if a vote were taken, 
the Islamic groups would have won.17 
The Muslim-Christian debate on the bill was generally ideological. As 
has been discussed in Chapter 3, during the early period of the New Order 
the Islamic groups tried to reassert the significance of the Jakarta Charter, 
while the Christians and the military opposed it. For the Islamic groups, 
the Islamic marriage bill was an important example of the realization of 
the Jakarta Charter. In the consideration of the Islamic marriage bill, it is 
mentioned that the shari’a law could be enacted for Muslim citizens in the 
country, because the Presidential Decree of 1959 declares that the Jakarta 
Charter inspires the 1945 Constitution, and makes a coherent whole with 
the Constitution. The elucidation of the bill then stated that: 
Almost all of the contents of the Jakarta Charter are included in the Preamble 
of the 1945 Constitution except the dependent clause following the word 
‘Ketuhanan’ in the fourth paragraph, that is, ‘with the obligation for the adher-
ents of Islam to carry out the shari’a.’ Due to the existence of the Decree of 
the President/ the Highest Commander of the Armed Forces, after the words 
‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa’ in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the 
dependent clause mentioned above should be considered as included. Thus, 
it becomes: Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa with the obligation for the adherents of 
Islam to carry out the shari’a. 18
Harry Tjan Silalahi, who was the Secretary General of the Catholic 
Party, said that the major reason behind the objection of his party to the bill 
was the Jakarta Charter issue.19 In this context, the Catholic party circulated 
a memorandum concerning its basic views of the bills with an accompany-
ing letter dated 1 February 1969 and signed by Harry Tjan Silalahi and F.X. 
Soedijono. In the beginning, the memorandum only reached the Parliament 
members, but later it was also published in the mass media.20 In the memo-
randum, the Catholics argued for an either/or choice between a nationalist 
state and a religious state, Pancasila and Jakarta Charter, and legal unifica-
tion and legal differentiation. They argued that if we accept the bills,21 it 
means that we accept replacing the basis of the state, the Pancasila, with the 
Jakarta Charter and/or with religion. In the Pancasila state, the highest legal 
source is Pancasila, while the bills indicate that the ultimate legal source 
is revelation. Moreover, for the Catholics, the Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa of 
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Pancasila does not only refer to great religions but also to other religious 
phenomena, including the Javanese mysticism and local customs.22 The 
memorandum also opposed the institution of a Supreme Religious Court 
mentioned in the Islamic marriage bill because it might be developed later 
to be a Supreme Court for all other judicial aspects of life. In addition, if 
religious law is accommodated by the state, then there would be various 
laws for various religious groups and this legal diversity would in turn lead 
to a legal chaos. In other words, it is only a single and unified legal system, 
based on Pancasila that could maintain the legal order of the state. Last but 
not least, the enactment of religious laws by the state would be an abuse of 
religious freedom because the nature of law is to force people to be subject 
to it. The memorandum finally concluded that we should take an either/or 
choice: to save the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila or to destroy it 
and replace it with a new Indonesia based on religion. If we chose the latter, 
it would mean: (1) the highest legal source of the national law is the revela-
tion of each religion; (2) the national law in a pure sense is applicable only 
to people who do not have a religion. 
There were various Muslim responses to the Catholic Party’s view, 
and some of them contain voices of anger stating that the Catholics dem-
onstrated an intolerant and unfair attitude to the Muslims, adopting PKI’s 
interpretation of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa and practicing the strategy 
of the end justifies the means.23 In general, instead of drawing a clear-cut 
demarcation line between secular and religious perspectives, the Muslims 
tried to find a compromise and common ground between the two. Again, 
the significance of the Jakarta Charter in the Presidential Decree of 1959 
and the principle of Ketuhanan Yang Esa of Pancasila, were frequently used 
to maintain this position. Based on this, the Islamic groups advocated the 
idea of legal differentiation. They argued that the Dutch Colonial Govern-
ment initiated this legal differentiation system in which the indigenous 
Christians should be subject to a marriage law different from the law for the 
Muslims and this policy was later simply adopted by the Indonesian Gov-
ernment. However, unlike the marriage law specified for the indigenous 
Christians (HOCI), the marriage law for Muslims only regulated the registra-
tion of Islamic marriages, while the substance of Islamic marriage law was 
not yet codified. They argued that it was a pity that after more than twenty 
years of independence, the state still failed to make an Islamic marriage law 
for Muslim citizens who were the majority of the population. The Muslims 
claimed that the so-called nominal Muslims also preferred to have their 
marriage based on Islamic precepts. Thus, it was argued, the absence of the 
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Islamic marriage law resulted in a lack of legal protection for families of the 
majority of the Indonesian population. 
Despite Muslim resentment, why did the Christians argue for legal 
unification even though they already had the HOCI, which implied legal dif-
ferentiation? The answer is, as Daniel S. Lev has suggested, for the Christians, 
legal differentiation on marriage “could lead to similar demands for Islamic 
autonomy in other areas of social, political and economic life, which ulti-
mately would threaten the minority interests of Christians.”24 But why had 
the Catholic Party not expressed such a strong opposition to the Muslim 
demand before? Perhaps, as discussed in Chapter 3, the established alliance 
with the army generals close to Soeharto during these early years of the 
New Order helped increase the confidence of the Catholics. 
2. The Debates on the Marriage Bill of 1973
Since early 1972 up to mid-1973, there were voices in society, par-
ticularly from women, including Soeharto’s wife, Ibu (Mrs) Tien,25 demand-
ing that Parliament and the Government produce a marriage law. 26 In July 
1973, President Soeharto eventually proposed a new marriage bill to the 
Parliament and at the same time withdrew the previous bills, namely the 
Islamic marriage bill of 1967 and the bill on basic regulations on marriage of 
1968. The new bill soon triggered strong negative reactions from the Islamic 
groups both inside and outside Parliament. The Muslim protests took differ-
ent forms such as sending official letters to high state authorities, making 
press statements, organising meetings and demonstrations. Their protest 
reached its peak on 27 September 1973 when the Government representa-
tives (Minister of Justice, Oemar Seno Adjie and Minister of Religion, A. Mukti 
Ali) were scheduled to answer the responses of the Parliament to the bill. On 
that day, when Mukti Ali was almost finishing his speech, some male and 
female Muslim students who were sitting in the gallery of the parliament 
hall shouted at him, while others stood up and held some papers written 
with words of protest against the bill, and the cry of ‘Allāhu Akbar’ was heard. 
Before the time came for Seno Adjie to speak, the situation had become so 
chaotic and noisy that the chairman decided to suspend the session. Having 
noticed the situation, the Ministers and many Parliament members decided 
to leave the room of the plenary session and at the same time students start-
ed occupying the seats in the room. The occupation by about 500 students 
continued for two hours before the security staff could finally control and 
disperse them, and the session was continued afterward without them.27 
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There are at least three inter-related reasons why the Islamic groups 
strongly opposed the bill. First, for them, several articles of the bill contra-
dicted the precepts of Islamic law. Probably the most crucial one was the 
question on the validity of marriage. The bill stipulated that registration was 
the primary condition for the validity of marriage and other rules of mar-
riage could be included insofar they did not contradict the bill. By taking 
the registration rather than religious precepts as a primary condition for the 
validity of marriage, the position of both Islamic family law and the Islamic 
courts was clearly threatened. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Muslims 
were strongly opposed to this secular aspect of the bill. The other articles 
of the bill opposed by the Islamic groups were related to the open permis-
sion for inter-religious marriages, the legal status of an adopted child and 
some other articles relating to women’s issues such as polygamy, divorce 
and engagement. 28 
Secondly, in addition to their objections to several articles of the bill, 
the Islamic groups were anxious that the Islamic interest should be defended 
in the Parliament that was dominated by the supporters of the Government. 
The weakness of the Islamic force in the Parliament was the result of the New 
Order’s first elections of 1971. In the elections, the Government’s party, Golkar, 
obtained an amazing victory of 62.8% of the total vote, while the four Islamic 
parties: NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti (to be fused into a single party, PPP, in 1973) 
only reached 27.12 %.29 Thus, with the additional 100 Government appointed 
members, mostly from the Armed Forces (ABRI), the Parliament was domi-
nated and controlled by the supporters of the Government.30 Being aware of 
this weakness, the reformist Muslim leader, HAMKA wrote:
In writing this article I have not forgotten myself. I am well aware that my com-
munity, the Muslims, is in a very weak condition: politically weak, economically 
weak, weak in every field. There remains only one thing left in which we are still 
not weak, that is, our faith! It is precisely at this moment, when other groups see 
the Muslims outwardly weak and easily controlled, that a marriage bill [has been 
proposed]…If a bill like this is passed through the DPR (Parliament), simply by 
relying on power and the force of a majority vote, we wish to remind people in 
all humility that the Muslims will not oppose nor rebel, because it is very obvious 
that they are weak. However, for the sake of religious awareness, this law will not 
be accepted, and neither will it be implemented. Moreover, ulama who regard 
themselves to be the heirs of the wisdom of the Prophets will issue a fatwa that it 
is FORBIDDEN (harām) for Muslims to marry under this law, and will require that 
marriage is only to be carried out according to Islamic rules. 31 
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Worse than that, the Muslims also doubted that the current leaders of 
the Islamic parties would seriously defend ‘the cause of Islam.’ The editorial 
of the reformist Muslim newspaper, Abadi, for instance, was very unhappy 
with Mintaredja, the executive chairman of Parmusi before the fusion and 
now the head of PPP, who said to the press that the bill did not contradict 
Islamic teachings.32 The Muslims also expressed their scepticism about the 
prominent Muslim traditionalist politicians in the PPP such as Idham Chalid 
and Masjkur.33 Last but not least, they also wondered if the Minister of Reli-
gion, Mukti Ali, was on their side.34 
The third reason was that the Government had not consulted with 
any of the Islamic groups in preparing the bill, nor with the Muslim officials 
at the Department of Religion.35 As noted, because Law 22/1946 authorized 
the Ministry of Religion to deal with Muslim marriage affairs, the Ministry 
had always been involved in the previous efforts at drafting a marriage bill. 
Thus, with regard to the present bill, the Islamic groups felt totally neglected 
by the Government. This was the reason why when the Muslims insisted on 
the necessity for the Government to withdraw the bill, they also demand-
ed to participate in preparing a new one.36 Similar suggestions were also 
heard from people outside the Islamic groups.37 Nonetheless, the Govern-
ment wanted to proceed with the bill and consequently the Muslims tried 
to increase their pressure. 
The above three inter-related reasons apparently pushed the Islamic 
groups to fight by all possible means, and their efforts proved to be effec-
tive. The authorities, particularly the Armed Forces (ABRI) eventually con-
sidered that this tense political atmosphere would endanger socio-political 
stability. Therefore, General Soemitro, the Commander of the Security and 
Order Operations (Kopkamtib) and Soetopo Joewono, the head of the Coor-
dinating Body of State Intelligence (BAKIN), since October 1973 had initiated 
lobbying with the leaders of the Islamic party, PPP, and the Muslim leaders 
outside the Parliament.38 After a series of meetings, the PPP and ABRI finally 
found a compromise by the end of November 1973, but it was not publicised 
until the second week of December.39 Because all politics was ultimately 
controlled by ABRI, the civilian politicians of Golkar, the Government party, 
had no choice but to go along with the compromise reached by the former. 
Thus, on 22 December (the Indonesian Mothers’ Day) 1973, the Parliament 
ratified the marriage bill, and then on 2 January 1974 the Government intro-
duced it as the Law Number 1/ 1974.
There are several earlier studies of the marriage law of 1974. Some of 
them pay more attention to the content of the law itself and how it reflects 
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a compromise between secular legal viewpoints and Islamic law.40 Another 
study is more focused on the political process of conflicts and negotiations 
leading to the birth of the law, and how this process reflects the political 
culture of the New Order regime.41 Some other studies try to find whether 
or not the law significantly affected people’s marriage behaviour.42 In this 
section, I shall discuss some issues which are inadequately dealt with in the 
existing studies, that is, the controversies on the marriage bill of 1973 in 
which Muslim and Christian leaders were involved: (1) the Muslim accusa-
tion of a Catholic conspiracy, (2) the debates on the relation between state 
and religious authorities on marriage affairs, and (3) the debates on inter-
religious marriage.
Muslim Accusations of a Catholic Conspiracy behind the Bill
As noted above, the Islamic groups and the Department of Religion 
were not involved in preparing the bill. The Department of Justice was prob-
ably involved, even though the bill was officially submitted to the Parliament 
by the President, not by the Minister of Justice. However, it was apparently 
not the business of the Department of Justice alone. Harold Crouch noted 
that, “the decision to introduce the legislation appears to have originated 
with Ali Murtopo’s staff, who regarded it as an issue to be exploited in fur-
thering the process of ‘secularizing’ political Islam.”43 Crouch, however, did 
not explain who Ali Moertopo’s staff were. Among the Muslims, rumours 
spread that the drafters of the bill were the Catholics who allied with Ali 
Moertopo and joined Golkar. It was reported that a Muslim preacher (quoted 
anonymously) said in a religious gathering that the bill was intended by the 
Catholics to be an effective weapon to destroy the Islamic society through its 
smallest unit, that is, the family. The preacher also said that the Protestants 
supported this effort, but they were not in the forefront.44 There was also 
rumour that the Catholics wanted Indonesia to be a second South Vietnam 
where the Catholic minority ruled the Buddhist majority.45 Emmerson noted 
that by this time a theory of conspiracy circulated privately among the Mus-
lim leaders. A Muslim leader told him that, “a Catholic priest in Central Java 
had planned the affairs with key Catholic leaders in the Government in order 
to Christianize Indonesia. The priest talked to a Chinese Catholic politician 
in Jakarta, who passed on the plan to two other Chinese, who influenced 
two abangan Javanese generals in favour of the plan, who, in turn, plant-
ed the idea in the president’s mind through his wife.”46 It seems that these 
rumours had become so serious that during the heat of the controversy, 
Admiral Soedomo (a Protestant), the Deputy Commander of the Security 
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and Order Operations (Wakopkamtib) warned the press not to publish any 
news of SARA47 and threatened that the Government would withdraw the 
publication license of the media in question if they did so.48 
Although there was no direct evidence for this accusation, for some 
Muslims, the close relation of the Catholic intellectuals at the CSIS with 
Golkar and the strong opposition of the Catholic Party to the Islamic mar-
riage bill in 1969 were more than enough to justify this rumour.49 In this con-
text, on 14 September 1973, Pedoman newspaper published the translation 
of an article, written by Anthony Reid in the June 1973 edition of Catholic 
Worker published in Australia. The same translation was also published in 
Panji Masyarakat.50 In the article entitled “The Catholics in Indonesia” Reid 
said, among other things, that (1) although the New Order Government was 
mostly controlled by the military and professional technocrats, the Catholics 
were over-represented in it; (2) a number of Catholics had close relations 
with the intelligence institution of Opsus (special operation); (3) although 
the Catholic Party gained very few votes in the election of 1971, they were 
already represented in Golkar; (4) by educating a substantial part of national 
elites in her educational institutions, the Church could establish indirect rela-
tions with branches of the Government; (5) in her attempt to find a secured 
shelter and central position in the national life, the close relations of the 
Church with the regime was a kind of triumph.
As we can see, Reid’s article did not say anything about the bill, but for 
the Muslims, it was no less than a confirmation of their perception that the 
Government of the time disproportionately favoured the Christian minor-
ity,51 and this in turn provided a justification for the accusation against the 
Catholics. In this context, it is interesting to look at an article written by 
Rusydi (son of HAMKA), the editor of Panji Masyarakat, in which he devel-
oped a theory of a Catholic political intrigue behind the bill.52 Rusydi said, 
while the police arrested several students and interrogated each of them 
to find the perpetrator behind the incident in the Parliament House, the 
Muslims wanted to find who the drafter of the bill actually was. Was he the 
President? Rusydi assumed that President Soeharto was too busy to prepare 
the bill himself and therefore, he just signed it and proposed it to the Parlia-
ment. Moreover, Soeharto’s recent speeches, argued Rusydi, indicated that 
the President seems to have had a different understanding of marriage law 
from that of the bill.53 If the perpetrator was not the President, was he the 
Minister of Religion? The answer was also negative because the section of 
public relations of the Department of Religion already denied that. Without 
trying to find another possible perpetrator, he then moved on to say:
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Facing the unanswerable questions, one is naturally reminded by the previ-
ous attitude of the extremist Catholics who opposed tooth and nail the Islamic 
marriage bill. They left the room of the session when the Islamic marriage bill 
was proposed, even though the bill did not apply to them. Attention is now 
more focused on the Catholics because of the recent news from abroad that 
has indicated great development of that religion in Indonesia. For instance, 
they have established cordial relations with important people, have taken up 
vital official positions, and have influenced Golkar, the party of majority [in the 
Parliament].
If Prof. Rasjidi said that the marriage bill is ‘a case of undercover Christianisation’ 
begun by a demonstration [on inter-religious marriage] in the Surakarta court,54 
then it is plausible to assume that the Catholic experts are actually those who 
act behind the bill, causing anxieties in the Islamic community.
Rusydi theorised further that the group who promoted the bill was 
probably those who understood Islamic beliefs and intentionally made the 
bill like that in order to play off the Islamic community against ABRI. With 
this intrigue, he said, whatever happened, they would gain advantages: “If 
the bill is passed, the Islamic community will necessarily decrease quantita-
tively and qualitatively. If the bill is withdrawn, they have already succeeded 
for a certain period in arousing suspicions and hatred of the rulers towards 
the Islamic community.” 
The Catholic magazine, Hidup, published an article in December 1973 
by an author named Sum Ireng (probably a pseudonym) to counter the Mus-
lim accusation.55 Sum Ireng said that the accusation against the Catholics 
should be examined by this question: what do we mean by ‘the Catholics’? 
Sum Ireng then examined alternative answers: the Church leadership or lay-
Catholics? With regard to the former, Sum Ireng explained that in a meeting 
of bishops held in the middle of November 1973, in Jakarta, the bishops 
thought that, based on rational thinking, the bill would be acceptable as a 
state law. Nonetheless, they also proposed an amendment to an article of 
the bill concerning marriage-engagement that justified a forced marriage 
if the woman got pregnant. This indicated, argued Sum Ireng, that the bill 
had not been made by the Church leaders; or else, like Golkar, they would 
accept it without any reserve. With regard to the second alternative, Sum 
Ireng argued that at that time, there was no Catholic Party that was morally 
responsible to the Church. On the other hand, the Church had no right to 
warn and admonish Catholics who joined a non-Catholic organization. Thus, 
he said, “if the bill were made by Catholics (I do not know), then it should 
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have been by those outside Catholic organizations, and therefore, it was 
not related to Catholicism and neither could be put on the shoulders of all 
Catholics.” Sum Ireng eventually concluded that in fact those who had to be 
responsible for the bill were not the Catholics, but the Government, which 
was proposing the bill. It was implausible, argued Sum Ireng, that the Gov-
ernment proposed a bill other than its own or that it should propose a bill 
without a clear understanding of its content. 
Besides the attempt to free the Catholic hierarchy and its affiliated 
organizations from the Muslim accusation, there was an effort to show that 
the Catholics were not a monolithic group. In October 1973, Tempo, wrote, 
“Since the heat of the controversy on the bill of marriage law, inter-religious 
relations in Indonesia have reached their lowest point…In this regard, the 
Catholic group has secretly or openly become the focus of attention.”56 For 
this reason, Tempo assigned George Junus Aditjondro, a lay Catholic and 
reporter of the magazine to cover the internal development within the 
Church.57 In his report, Aditjondro explained that there was a competition 
among the Catholics between those who opted for political involvement 
and those who chose the socio-economic and cultural orientation, and each 
of them tried to influence the young Catholics to be their respective cadres. 
Pater Beek was the prominent figure of the first, while two Jesuits, Chris 
Melchers and F. Danuwinata were among the proponents of the second. 
Probably because Beek’s politically oriented group was more or less already 
known, Aditjondro focused his report on the second group, for whom the 
major problem of the Catholics was Indonesianization not only of the per-
sonnel of the Church hierarchy, but also and more importantly, of the Catho-
lic attitude towards society. They argued that the Church’s dependence on 
foreign aid as well as on the national political power would only alienate 
Catholics from the people, especially the Muslim majority. In other words, 
for them, to support the economic life of the lower class people and to inte-
grate with Muslim society were more fruitful for the future of Catholicism 
than establishing an alliance with the regime. Thus, the second position 
could be better for Muslim-Catholic relations: but nevertheless the report 
said that the development and influence of this group would still depend on 
how far the Church hierarchy would accommodate them.58 
Thus, the efforts to counter the Muslim accusation neither denied nor 
admitted that certain Catholics were involved in drafting the bill. The coun-
tering efforts only argued that the Catholic hierarchy and its affiliated organ-
izations were free from the accusation or that not all Catholics were happy 
with the politically oriented Catholics close to the Government. The second 
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effort, despite the ambiguous response from certain Catholic priests,59 seems 
to have created a positive reaction among Muslims, indicated at least by an 
article by a certain Sarmudi. He argued that Danuwinata’s ideas were in line 
with the stipulations in the document of Vatican II called Nostra Aetate that 
promoted a positive attitude towards Muslims. For Sarmudi, this was also 
parallel with Natsir’s idea of establishing a modus vivendi between Muslims 
and Christians, as both had to maintain their respective religious identities 
by not trying to convert each other. Sarmudi, however, was still in doubt 
whether the Church hierarchy would accept the ideas of Danuwinata and 
put them into practice.60 
Despite the positive response to the non-politically oriented Catho-
lics, there was no indication that the Muslims who already believed in the 
conspiracy behind the bill later changed their mind. For instance, about 
three years after the controversy, in his paper to the Conference on Chris-
tian Mission and Da’wa in 1976 in Chambésy, Muhammad Rasjidi wrote 
that, in 1973 the Government wanted to impose a secular marriage bill that 
“was prepared by Christian experts working in a special department of the 
Government.”61 Rasjidi then said: “Christian missions are prepared to be in 
alliance with anyone, but are not prepared to see Muslims develop their 
individual as well as corporate life in accordance with Islam. Any effort to 
strengthen Islam amongst the Muslims, any effort to see that Islamic law 
and traditions are established in an overwhelmingly Muslim country are 
regarded as a threat by the Christians.”62
Marriage Affairs: Between State and Religious Authority
As noted above, the marriage bill of 1973 determined that the legal 
validity of marriage was primarily based on registration by state authority 
rather than on religious precepts. This indicates that the bill was based on 
the secular idea of separation between state and religion. In this regard, 
the head of the Golkar faction 63 in the Parliament, who was also a Catholic, 
Gregorius Sugiharto, said that marriage law “should not necessarily follow 
the teachings of any religion. Our country is not a religious state, why should 
we keep principles of religion in making the law?” and “if we always keep the 
teachings of religion, we shall never make progress.”64 During the hearing in 
Parliament, the Government explained that the bill was inclusive for all mar-
riages insofar the latter did not contradict the rules dictated in the bill. Thus, 
the bill was not against Islamic law because, argued the Government, Islamic 
marriage law was also applicable for the Indonesian Muslims who accepted 
the law as a customary law (hukum adat).65 In addition, the inclusive char-
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acter of the bill, explained the Government, was intended to accommodate 
a religiously and culturally plural society like Indonesia under a single mar-
riage law applicable to all citizens. This legal unification for the Government 
was in line with the political doctrine called ‘Wawasan Nusantara’ (Archipe-
lagic Perspective) stated in the Mainlines of State Policies (GBHN) of 1973 
dictating that all islands of Indonesia are subject to a single national law 
serving the interest of the whole nation. As the Government party, Golkar 
also made similar arguments.66 
The Muslims, on the other hand, certainly realized that the bill threat-
ened the application of Islamic marriage law and the authority of the Depart-
ment of Religion to administer Muslim marriage affairs. In this context, to 
defend their interests, the Muslims argued that Indonesia was not a secu-
lar state, and therefore, instead of registration, religious rules on marriage 
should be the primary determinant condition for the validity of marriage. 
However, unlike the previous debates on the Islamic marriage bill in 1969, 
during the hearings in the Parliament, the speakers of the PPP did not refer 
to the Jakarta Charter at all (perhaps because it was considered politically 
disadvantageous given the Government prohibition). What they tried to do 
was to interpret article 29, section 2 of the 1945 Constitution stating that: 
“the state guarantees the freedom of all citizens to embrace their own reli-
gion and to worship according to their religion and belief.” Ischak Moro, one 
of the speakers of the PPP faction, argued that marriage in Islam is a part of 
‘ibādah (worship). For him, if article 29 of the Constitution says that the state 
must guarantee the freedom of all citizens to worship according to their reli-
gion, then any attempt to change religious rites of the citizens by the state, 
(in this case the rules in marriage) was against the Constitution.67 Another 
speaker of the PPP faction, Teuku H.M. Saleh went further to say that article 
29 did not mean that the state guaranteed the freedom of citizens not to 
embrace a religion and not to worship according to their religion.68 In other 
words, it seems, if Ischak Moro argued that marriage law must not contradict 
religious rules, H.M. Saleh went further saying that the state must implement 
the religious law of every religious group. The implication of this view is that 
Indonesia had to have different legal provisions on marriage. In this regard, 
another speaker of the PPP, A. Balya Umar, argued that legal differentiation 
did not necessarily lead to legal chaos and disintegration. For instance, he 
said, in the USA, every State had its own marriage law and this did not make 
the country disintegrate or become legally chaotic.69
Unlike the arguments of the PPP speakers, outside the Parliament, 
the editorial of Panji Masyarakat (probably written by HAMKA), still men-
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tioned the Jakarta Charter. The editorial stated that the rulers had been suc-
cessful in prohibiting Muslims from talking about the Jakarta Charter that 
stipulated the obligation of the Muslim citizens to follow the shari’a. The 
editorial then said: “So far, to our understanding, the purpose of shutting 
the mouths of those who still bravely touch the Jakarta Charter is to avoid 
hurting the feelings of the Muslims who claim to follow Islam but do not 
obey the shari’a…For us, [the prohibition] never means that those Muslims 
who obey the shari’a must get rid of it and follow the law of the rulers…”70 
Thus, instead of arguing for the constitutional significance of the Jakarta 
Charter as the Muslims did in the late 1960s, this argument only stated that 
the Charter should be at least applied to the Muslims obeying the shari’a. 
This argument also seems to imply that through the bill the nominal Mus-
lims unfairly imposed their own will on the pious Muslims. 
On the other hand, the bill was in general very acceptable to the 
Christians, even though their support for it was understandably not too 
demonstrative. The support was more apparent in the articles published in 
the Catholic weekly magazine, Peraba. In its second edition of October 1973, 
a Peraba editorial emphasized that the state and religion have their respec-
tive realms with regard to marriage: the state regulates its civil aspects, 
while religion is concerned with its spiritual dimensions.71 This secular view 
was clearly in line with the view of the bill treating marriage as a civil issue. 
In addition, other articles in the magazine strongly supported the idea of 
legal unification (another fundamental idea underlying the bill).72 So far, I 
have not found a published article in the Protestant media supporting the 
bill. However, there exist two-pages of notes by T.B. Simatupang dated 6 
September 1973, a piece provided for a meeting of the DGI leadership to 
discuss the controversy on the bill. In his notes, Simatupang wrote that the 
will of the Government to have a unified marriage law for all citizens regard-
less of their religion had to be supported. However, he also suggested that 
given the strong opposition of the Muslims, a solution was to be found in 
order to avoid the split of the nation.73
We have noted that the ideological conflict around the bill was even-
tually solved through a compromise between ABRI and PPP. Based on the 
compromise, the bill was amended before it was finally ratified by Parlia-
ment. There were five important points in the compromise: (1) Islamic mar-
riage law would not be reduced or changed; (2) the role of Islamic institu-
tions of the Department of Religion dealing with marriage affairs would not 
be reduced and changed; (3) all articles of the bill contradicting Islamic law 
would be eliminated; (4) divorce and polygamy should be regulated in order 
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to avoid abuses; (5) article 2 would become: a. Marriage is valid if it is carried 
out according to the laws of respective religions and beliefs; b. Every mar-
riage must be registered for the order of the state administration.74 It is obvi-
ous that the compromise was very much in favour of the Muslim interests, 
and therefore, the Islamic groups were happy with it. 75 
In contrast, the Christians were unhappy with the PPP-ABRI com-
promise. On 12 December 1973, the DGI and MAWI wrote some important 
points of criticism of the compromise in a piece entitled “Pokok-Pokok Pikiran 
BPH-DGI dan MAWI” (Basic Thoughts of BPH-DGI and MAWI). This piece was 
then sent to the President, the speaker of the Parliament, the Commander 
of Social Security and Order, General Soemitro and other authorities76 and 
also published in Kompas and Sinar Harapan newspapers.77 The “Pokok-
Pokok Pikiran” started with the argument that article 29 of the Constitution 
of 1945 indicates that the essence of religion is based on “kerelaan” meaning 
consent and willingness of the person in question. Then it was stated: “In 
recent discussions on the marriage bill, we are afraid that there is a tendency 
that the state does not only protect religious freedom, but also it gives the 
impression that the state obliges the implementation of religious laws, at 
least in marriage.” If the latter happens, then it contradicts the principle of 
consent and willingness with regard to religion. Moreover, if marriage is only 
valid if it is carried out according to respective religions and beliefs, then it 
will lead to the following fundamental questions:
1. Should a person who does not have a religion be obliged to get married accord-
ing to a certain religion?
2. Is the marriage of a follower of religion valid if he or she for certain reasons did 
not get married according to his or her religion?
3. If the partners adhere to different religions – something that frequently occurs 
– according to which religion should they get married? 
4. If one already got married according to a certain religion and then converted 
to another religion, is the marriage still valid and will he or she follow marriage 
rules of the new religion?
To accommodate these people, based on the article 27 of the 1945 
Constitution in which it was stated that “all citizens are equal before the 
law”, the DGI-MAWI suggested that the state must provide the opportunity 
for them to have a valid marriage according to the state law. Another prob-
lem for the Christians, particularly the Protestants, was that their churches 
do not have a complete marriage law.78 If a valid marriage should be based 
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on religious law, then there would be a legal vacuum. Thus, the Christians 
argued, to fill the legal vacuum, every church would be obliged to set up 
her own marriage law and either the civil courts must know it or that every 
church would have her own court, and this certainly would lead to great 
difficulties. 
The basic thoughts of the DGI-MAWI did not explicitly mention the 
ideological issue of the Jakarta Charter underlying the controversy on the 
bill.79 However, the editorial of the Catholic newspaper, Kompas referred to 
this issue, even though the Jakarta Charter was not explicitly mentioned 
(again, perhaps because of Government prohibition).80 According to Kompas, 
article 29 of the Constitution means that “the Government will not transform 
the norms of religious laws to be the norms of state law,” otherwise, there 
will be abuses of the principle of consent and willingness to follow religion. 
In almost the same tone as that in which the Catholic Party stated, in the 
memorandum opposing the Islamic marriage bill in 1969, Kompas wrote: 
The application of laws of different religions in the field of marriage will also 
open the possibility for efforts to apply the laws of religion to other fields of life. 
In fact, the state’s existence is endangered if different laws are applied in that 
state…The application of laws of different religions is essentially the same as 
the applications of laws of different states within a single state! 
It was based on these considerations, argued Kompas, that on 18 
August 1945, the agreement was made “to use only the words ‘Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa’ in the Preamble of the Constitution of 1945” (an implicit 
statement to remind the readers that the seven words of the Jakarta Charter 
were eradicated). Kompas eventually concluded that the best solution to the 
controversy was “to create a single and unified law that guarantees the order 
of statehood but at the same time opens the possibility for the application 
of religious rules for religious followers.” 
Despite the ideological issue, did the Christians offer an alternative 
wording to that of the PPP-ABRI compromise? If we look at the editorial of 
Kompas above, we do not find such an alternative but this was more explic-
itly mentioned in the editorial of Sinar Harapan published on the same day. 
Without mentioning the sensitive issue of the Jakarta Charter, Sinar Hara-
pan suggested that the PPP-ABRI compromise on the validity of marriage 
could be accepted provided that a clause would be added acknowledging 
the validity of marriage based on state law.81 So, what was really the alter-
native wording? In a joint letter of the DGI and the MAWI to the Deputy 
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Commander of Security and Order Operation, Admiral Soedomo, dated 19 
December 1973, it was suggested that the wording should be: “Marriage is 
valid if it is carried out according to respective religions and beliefs and/or 
according to the state law.”82 
Nonetheless, the ideas of the DGI and MAWI delivered through the 
media, lobbying with the authorities, and public statements of the Christian 
Youths,83 all of these could not change the compromise of the PPP-ABRI. 
Despite the political circumstances, perhaps the Christian opposition was 
rather late for an already-set up-deadline. In other words, if the deadline was 
22 December, the Indonesian Mothers’ Day, then the Christian opposition 
came out just within the week leading to the deadline. Indeed, the edito-
rial of Sinar Harapan believed that the deadline was one of the reasons why 
ABRI decided to make a compromise with the PPP. Both Kompas and Sinar 
Harapan also criticized the fact that the compromise was an extra-parlia-
mentary move harmful to the dignity of Parliament.84 Thus, the Christians 
were disappointed.
The failure of the Christians to change the PPP-ABRI compromise, 
however, did not prevent the Muslim leaders from countering the Chris-
tian views. One of them was the former Masyumi politician, Kasman Sin-
godimedjo, who wrote an article in January 1974 responding to the edi-
torial of Kompas, dated 17 December 1973 (parts of it have been quoted 
above) that actually included the points of the DGI-MAWI’s basic thoughts. 
85 As was discussed in Chapter 1, Communism was identified with atheism 
since the beginning of the New Order. Kasman apparently took this idea 
and argued that the definition of the validity of marriage on a religious 
basis was actually based on the article 29 of the Constitution, section 1, 
indicating that the state is based on Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. For him, this 
means that the Indonesian state and society must be religious. He refused 
Kompas’ view that religious freedom includes freedom not to believe in 
any religion, and that the application of laws of religions would destroy the 
state. “It is easy to prove” he said, “that the fear of Kompas editor is based 
on the idea that is anti-religion and anti-God, at least in its assumption that 
the law of God is worse than the laws and norms of human beings…What 
can we say! That is atheism!” Based on this proposition, Kasman then tried 
to answer a few questions of the Kompas editorial. If the partners adhere 
to different religions, which religion should they follow for their marriage? 
The answer is, for Kasman, if one of the partners’ religions forbids inter-
religious marriage, they should follow the regulation of that religion. If a 
religion does not have a complete marriage law, how can its follower get 
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married? The answer is, they should follow the religion that has a complete 
marriage law (implying Islam). 
Besides the Muslim leaders, the Government also reacted to the DGI-
MAWI’s basic thoughts. As noted, the DGI and MAWI sent the statement of 
their basic thoughts to the President and also asked for time to meet with 
him. President Soeharto then assigned the State Secretary, Soedharmono, 
to handle the issue. On 21 December 1973, one day before the ratification 
of the bill, the delegation of the DGI-MAWI was finally able to have a meet-
ing with Soedharmono. In that meeting, Soedharmono said that the Gov-
ernment would reply to the questions mentioned in the DGI-MAWI’s basic 
thoughts in a letter. On early March 1974, the DGI and MAWI eventually 
received that letter which was dated 31 January 1974.86
Nonetheless, the contents of the letter are unclear and ambiguous.87 
Having explained that the article 29 of the 1945 Constitution guarantees 
religious freedom for all citizens, the letter then set out to answer the DGI-
MAWI questions one by one. First, if a person does not yet have a religion, 
(i.e., does not belong to one of the recognized religions), he or she is not 
obliged to follow a certain religion, and “this person can get married accord-
ing to the ways (one of the ways) based on the applied laws [and] in line 
with this law.”88 Secondly, if a person who already belongs to one of the 
recognized religions but he or she decides to get married not according to 
the ways dictated by his or her religion, “then as long as the way is in line 
with the applied law, that marriage is valid; it means that on performing the 
marriage, that person follows a religion according to the ways that he or 
she chooses.”89 Thirdly, as to the inter-religious marriage, based on religious 
freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, the Marriage Law is not intended 
to force one religion upon another, nor to encourage a person to convert to, 
or to marry with a follower of, another religion. In this context, if an inter-reli-
gious marriage “is carried out according to one of the ways that is in line with 
the Marriage Law – and this is to be chosen and agreed upon by both part-
ners – then that marriage is valid.”90 Fourthly, if a person is married according 
to a certain religion, and then afterward he or she is converted to another 
religion, then that marriage is still valid. If this person, after conversion, takes 
actions related to marriage, then the regulations of the religion that he or 
she is following are applied.
As we can see, the answers to the DGI-MAWI questions were positive 
but still ambiguous. They are positive in the sense that a person who does 
not follow one of the recognized religions; or a person who does not want 
to follow the marriage rules of his or her religion; and a person who wants 
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to have an inter-religious marriage; all of them can have a legally valid mar-
riage. Likewise, conversion will not invalidate one’s marriage entered before 
the conversion. On the other hand, there is still ambiguity indicated by the 
repeated clause in the letter stating that those marriages are valid as long 
as they are in line with the applied laws in general and the Marriage Law in 
particular. If the Law defines the validity of marriage on a religious basis, can 
a couple get married not according to the requirements of religion? Does 
‘religion’ here only include the five recognised religions? We shall come back 
to the problems later.
Inter-religious Marriage: Christianisation or a Basic Human Right?
About two weeks after the Government officially proposed the bill to 
Parliament, Muhammad Rasjidi wrote an article in which he argued that the 
bill was actually an under-cover effort of Christianisation.91 Rasjidi based his 
theory of Christianisation on the recent marriage case (it was on 21 June 
1973) between Kus Supiah, the daughter of Pakubuwono XII, the king of the 
traditional Javanese Surakarta Court, Solo, with the Governor of Central Kali-
mantan, R. Slyvanus. 92 Rasjidi highlighted two things in this marriage: firstly, 
Kus Supiah was a Muslim girl while Sylvanus was a Christian (Catholic) and 
therefore, for Rasjidi, the marriage was prohibited by Islam. Secondly, the 
marriage was held with a glamorous celebration, spending a lot of money, 
and attended by state officials, including the President and Vice President, 
Ministers, Governors and foreign diplomats. The food was arranged from 
Hotel Indonesia, Jakarta, and many of the VIP guests were brought from 
Jakarta by Hercules Aircraft of the Air Force. Rasjidi then said, “all of these 
happened and the Islamic community could only drop tears. Her excellency, 
Kus Supiah, is a victim of an ongoing tactic.”
What was the ‘ongoing tactic’? It was nothing but an under-cover 
Christianisation! For Rasjidi, the marriage in the Surakarta Court (that he 
called a ‘tragedy’) was just a prologue to the marriage bill proposed to Par-
liament. Article 11 section 2 of the bill stated that, “differences in nationality, 
ethnicity, place of origin, religion, beliefs and heredity are not hindrance to 
marriage.” Rasjidi argued that here ‘religion’ was cleverly inserted so that a 
careless reader would neglect the significant difference between religion 
and the other personal attributes mentioned in the article. Anybody who 
has ever read Islamic law would know, argued Rasjidi, that only a Muslim 
man is allowed to marry a Christian woman, not the opposite. With refer-
ence to the Egyptian Muslim reformist, Rashīd Ridā, Rasjidi argued that for 
certain reasons a Muslim man could also be prohibited to marry a Christian 
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woman. Rasjidi did not deny the fact that a man and a woman of different 
religious backgrounds could fall in love and decide to get married, but for 
him, this kind of case was extremely rare and “the emergency exit [for this 
marriage] has been available, that is, civil registration.” The problem with the 
bill, argued Rasjidi, was “it makes an exceptional and rare thing [i.e., inter-
religious marriage] of a normal and basic thing, and the result intended 
through this is to make the normal and basic thing [i.e., marriage between 
co-religionists] exceptional.” But how is it related to Christianisation? As 
quoted earlier, Rasjidi believed that the drafters of the bill were Christians, 
so it seems logical for him to claim that the bill was intentionally formu-
lated in such a way that the Christians could easily develop their strategy to 
make use of inter-religious marriage as a means to convert Muslims. Rasjidi 
even believed that Muslim boys and girls of important state leaders were 
frequently ‘hunted’ by Christian boys and girls to be their future spouses. 
Last but not least, Rasjidi did not forget to mention the memorandum of 
the Catholic Party opposing the Islamic marriage bill in 1969. Quoting Louis 
Gardet, an advisor to Pope Paul VI, Rasjidi said, “Nowadays, it is difficult for a 
Muslim to believe in the goodwill of the Christians in politics.”93 Later, when 
the DGI and MAWI openly opposed the PPP-ABRI compromise, Rasjidi found 
another justification for his theory. He said, after the publication of his arti-
cle on the marriage bill as an under-cover Christianisation, he was accused 
of being the most fanatic Muslim and was asked to abandon his PhD title. 
In fact, he said, he was previously of the opinion that not all Christians were 
influenced by the ideas of missionaries, but “having read the basic thoughts 
of the DGI-MAWI, I just smile and got an idea to write this article under the 
title: Have Not I Reminded [You]?”94 
During the hearings in Parliament, the PPP voiced objections to arti-
cle 11, section 2 of the bill, which opened the possibility of inter-religious 
marriage, but there was no explicit statement on Christianisation. Teuku 
Muhammad Saleh simply asserted that in principle Islam does not allow 
inter-religious marriage, while Asmah Syahroni argued further that the 
woman’s position is weak in an inter-religious marriage because: (1) the man 
is the head of the family, so he has more power to impose his religion on his 
wife; (2) if both the man and the woman still want to maintain their respec-
tive religions, they cannot avoid tensions in their family life and therefore 
it is difficult to prevent such a family from disaster; (3) again in the second 
case, it is often that the woman would like to leave her religion rather than 
break up her family.95 These patriarchal arguments seem to defend the com-
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mon rule of Islamic law that Muslim women are not allowed to marry non-
Muslim men.96
In contrast, R. Tubagus Hamzah, the speaker of the ABRI faction, 
argued that the increasing rate of urbanisation in the country would inevita-
bly lead to relationships between people of different religious backgrounds. 
Therefore, inter-religious marriage was an inevitable social fact and it was 
more likely that the number of such marriages would increase in the future. 
Thus, to maintain social order and to avoid legal confusion, a marriage law 
should take this problem into account.97 In line with Tubagus, K.H. Kodrat-
ullah, the speaker of the Golkar faction, said that based on human rights, 
his faction could agree with the bill allowing inter-religious marriage. He 
argued further that to allow such marriage did not mean imposing a certain 
religion on the people or encouraging them to convert or persuading them 
to have an inter-religious marriage.98 Later, in its reaction to the responses of 
the factions to the bill, the Government also emphasized the human rights 
argument with additional remarks that, “for those religious believers who 
had a strong faith, they will not break the rules of their religion, even though 
in terms of human rights, they are not prohibited by the law to do that.”99 In 
other words, it is fine for any religion to tell its followers that inter-religious 
marriage is prohibited, but this prohibition cannot be a regulation of the 
state because it is against human rights.
When the bill was ratified after it was amended according to the 
PPP-ABRI compromise, the statement allowing inter-religious marriage was 
dropped, and no alternative regulation was made. In other words, inter-reli-
gious marriage was simply left unregulated in the marriage law of 1974. 
However, there is another possibility provided by article 66 of the law stat-
ing that the previous laws such as the Code of Civil Law (Burgerlijk Wetboek), 
the Marriage Law for Indonesian Christians called ‘HOCI’ (Huwelijks Ordon-
nantie Christen Indonesiers S. 1933 No.74) and the Regulations on mixed 
marriage (Regeling op de gemengde Huwelijken S. 1898 No. 158) “are not 
applicable insofar as they are already regulated by this law.” This provided 
the way out for certain problems, including inter-religious marriage. In other 
words, based on the article 66, one can argue that if inter-religious marriage 
is not regulated by the Law, then the previous law that regulates or more 
precisely allows that marriage is applicable.100 The colonial Regulations on 
mixed marriage (i.e., marriage between partners subject to different laws) 
seem to provide this way out. Article 7 section 2 of the Regulations states 
that, “differences in religion, nationality and origin are not obstacles to mar-
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riage.” 101 It is obvious that this section is essentially the same as the article 
11, section 2 that was dropped from the bill. 
On the day of the ratification of the bill, it seems only the PDI faction 
into which the former Catholic and Protestant parties fused, touched this 
issue.102 The speaker of the PDI faction, Sugiarti Salman, said that the arti-
cle 2 and its elucidation, which define the validity of marriage on religious 
basis,103 did not provide a feeling of security for her group. This feeling of 
insecurity, she said, could be reduced by the existence of the article 66 that 
recognizes the applicability of existing laws as far as they are not regulated 
by the new law. 104 Sabam Sirait (Protestant) and V.B. da Costa (Catholic) of 
the PDI party re-emphasized this argument when they were asked by Tempo 
about inter-religious marriage.105 
Besides trying to find a way out, Eka Darmaputera, a Protestant intel-
lectual who was to become a leader of the PGI, wrote an article respond-
ing to the Muslim accusation that inter-religious marriage was used by 
the Christians to convert others.106 He argued that the Marriage Law was 
a combination of two opposite mindsets: the modern and the dogmatic-
traditional thought. He compared the Law with an offspring of a marriage 
between a donkey and a horse. The law, he said, was already good in terms 
of protection of women’s rights, but it still has problem with inter-religious 
marriage or what he called ‘mixed marriage.’ He then said: 
On the mixed marriage as an under-cover Christianisation effort: alas if this 
truly happens! That love can make a person forgets all things, it is normal. But 
if there is a Christian who intentionally makes use of love as a bait to convert 
others, once again: alas! This person cannot be called a hero of faith because 
he/she digresses the holiness and nobility of marriage. Second, this marriage 
is not a Christian marriage because it is not based on sincere love, but polluted 
by hidden intentions. Third, Christianity does not benefit anything from that 
kind of marriage. On the other hand, if a Christian decides to convert to another 
religion because of the pressure of the marriage law or love, then Christianity 
has nothing to lose except its number. 
In short, he said, any religion that makes use of marriage as a means 
to convert people would obtain insincere followers. “Like religion, love is 
very personal. It could be imposed from outside, but it can only live and 
grow from inside. Like religion, love is very human. It must see human as 
human.” “Unfortunately,” he concluded, “in practice, it is not uncommon that 
religion compartmentalizes human beings.” 
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3. Inter-religious Marriage between State Regulations 
and Religious Doctrines
In the Indonesian legal system, a law ratified by the Parliament will 
not be applied unless the Government introduces its implementing regula-
tions. This system provides another opportunity for the Government and 
social forces to negotiate and make a certain ‘modification’ of the applica-
tion of the ratified law. As noted, article 66 of the marriage law provides the 
possibility of applying previous laws not included in the new law. The Chris-
tians then tried to use this possibility by asking the Government to accom-
modate their interests in the coming implementation of regulations of the 
law. In this regard, DGI and MAWI sent a joint letter, dated 1 July 1974 to the 
State Secretary.107 In the letter, both MAWI and DGI suggested that: first, for 
implementing the regulations of the law, the procedure of marriage for the 
Protestants and the Catholics can be taken from sections 19 to 33 of the 
HOCI with appropriate changes. Second, it was stated that: “For legal cer-
tainty, it would be better to be clear regarding which marriage law is appli-
cable for the Javanese mystical groups (Aliran Kepercayaan), [and this] is in 
one way or another related to the regulations on mixed marriage (Regeling 
op de Gemende Huwelijken, Staatblad 1898 No.158) that is by itself related 
to the Protestant, Catholic and other religious groups.” 
The first suggestion of the letter seems to mean not only that sec-
tions 19 to 33 of the HOCI were still relevant, but also that the DGI and MAWI 
wanted them to be applicable to all the Christians in Indonesia (because 
HOCI was originally applied only to the Javanese, Ambonese and Mina-
hasan Christians). With regard to the second suggestion, it apparently dealt 
with two issues: one was on inter-religious marriage that somehow could 
be included in the regulations on mixed marriage, and another was on the 
Javanese mystical groups whose official status was not the same as the five 
recognized religions. In fact, the Islamic groups had strongly opposed state 
recognition of marriages according to the Javanese Mysticism since the par-
liamentary debate on the bill. 108 For the Muslim santri leaders, the followers 
of Javanese Mysticism (who were typically abangan) were already Muslims, 
and therefore, their marriages should be registered as Islamic marriages.109 
On the other hand, the Christians demanded the state recognition because 
for them it was related to their concern with religious freedom. Moreover, 
for the Christians, the abangan was a potential ally, particularly to face the 
political ambitions of the santri.110 
The Government apparently accommodated the Christian sugges-
tions. In the Implementing Regulations of the Marriage Law, introduced on 
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1 April 1975, we find that article 2, section 3 states that the existing specific 
regulations for the registration of marriage are not to be reduced by the 
Regulations. This clearly opens the way for the previously applied law to be 
used, including the HOCI. The accommodation of the Christian suggestions 
was more explicit in the decree of the Minister of Home Affairs concerning 
the registration of marriage and divorce in the Civil Registry Office, dated 1 
October 1975.111 The decree states that registration of marriage and divorce 
at the Civil Registry Office should be carried out according to the previous 
laws, namely, the Codes of Civil Registration for European, Chinese and 
Indonesian Christians respectively and the Regulations on Mixed Marriage. 
These laws are applicable as long as they are not overruled in the Imple-
menting Regulations of the Marriage Law, 1975. In addition, the Civil Regis-
try Office is also authorized to register marriages and divorces of those who 
do not subject themselves to those laws and to the law 22/1946 regulating 
the registration of Islamic marriages and divorces. The last category seems 
to include the Buddhists and the Hindus, and arguably, the other religious 
groups such as the followers of native religions and the Javanese mystical 
groups. 
From 1975 when the Marriage Law began to be applied in Indonesia 
up to early 1980s, inter-religious marriage between Muslims and non-Mus-
lims, particularly Christians, could be contracted at the Civil Registry Office. 
The Implementing Regulations of Marriage Law determines that a marriage 
of a non-Muslim is registered at the Civil Registry Office, while Muslim mar-
riage is performed and registered by the Office of Religious Affairs (KUA). 
In general, the KUA refuses a male or female Muslim asking to marry with a 
non-Muslim unless the latter converts to Islam. Likewise, the Civil Registry 
Office would in the beginning refuse to perform such marriages, but based 
on this refusal, the partners can ask permission to get married from the Civil 
Court (article 21 of the Marriage Law). In general, the Court gave the permis-
sion and ordered the Civil Registry to carry out that marriage. Sometimes, 
the Civil Registry Office was ready to perform the marriage without the per-
mission of the Civil Court, on condition that the partners declared on a legal 
certificate before a notary that they willingly subscribed to the European 
Civil Code applicable in Indonesia. 112 
On the other hand, towards the end of the1970s, the Javanese mys-
tical groups had to face problems to legalise their marriage. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, in the session of the MPR of 1978, the Islamic party, PPP, suc-
cessfully pushed the MPR to decide that Javanese mysticism was not a reli-
gion and should not be developed to be an independent religion. In view 
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of that, in September 1978, the Supreme Judge banned the circulation of 
marriage certificates of Yayasan Pusat Srati Darma, one of the Javanese mys-
tical groups based in Yogyakarta. In October 1978, the Minister of Religion, 
Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara sent a letter to all governors explaining that 
marriage cannot be carried out according to Javanese mysticism because it 
is not a religion.113 In 1981, however, the head of the Supreme Court sent a 
letter to the Minister of Religion and the Minister of Home Affairs explaining 
that inter-religious marriage and marriages between the followers of Java-
nese mysticism should be accommodated under the Regulations on Mixed 
Marriage.114 Despite this letter, in practice, the partners in marriages accord-
ing to Javanese mysticism still had difficulties in legalising their status.115
Although inter-religious marriage was relatively easy in the 1970s, 
since the mid-1980s it gradually became more and more difficult, and in 
the 1990s, it became almost impossible. Why did this happen? As noted, 
inter-religious marriage is unregulated in the marriage law. The solution to 
this legal vacuum was then to apply the previous law on mixed marriage. 
This solution, however, is still problematic because the marriage law states 
that marriage is valid if it is carried out according to respective religions and 
beliefs. If the religion of both or one of the partners prohibits inter-religious 
marriage, can that marriage be legalised? In fact, there has been a strong 
tendency among Muslims (and not less among non-Muslims) to prohibit 
inter-religious marriage.116 In this section, I shall discuss Muslim and Chris-
tian teachings on marriage, particularly inter-religious marriage, and how 
they affected and were affected by the state regulations.
The State and Muslim Opposition to Inter-religious Marriage
In 1952, long before the rise of the New Order, there was a contro-
versy on inter-religious marriage. It was the case of a Muslim woman and 
a daughter of an official of the Ministry of Religion named Soemarni Soeri-
aatmadja who wanted to get married with a Christian man named Ursinus 
Elias Medellu. When they went to the Office of Religious Affairs, the head of 
the Office refused and said that Islam prohibited that marriage. Based on 
this refusal, Soemarni then asked permission from the Civil Court and she 
received it. The marriage was finally performed by a Christian minister and 
registered in the Civil Registry Office of Jakarta. In reaction to this marriage, 
in a huge public gathering in a mosque of Tanah Abang, Jakarta, the Mus-
lims protested about that marriage and declared in a statement that it was 
prohibited in Islam and demanded that the Government annul it. Moreover, 
the General Secretary of the Ministry of Religion sent a letter to the Civil Reg-
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istry Office questioning why a Christian minister performed the marriage. 
The Civil Registry Office replied that it was based on the Regulations on 
Mixed Marriage that a woman will follow the law of her husband. Soemarni’s 
father then had an appeal to the Supreme Court demanding the annulment 
of the Civil Court’s permission on the basis that it neglected his authority 
as the guardian (walī mujbir) of his daughter. Later, in 1955, the Supreme 
Court finally refused the appeal based on the reason that the Regulations 
on Mixed Marriage did not require the Civil Court to consider the guardian’s 
authority.117 
Despite the Muslim disappointment with the case, it was clear that 
they opposed a marriage between a Muslim woman and a Christian man 
and there was no explicit statement prohibiting the opposite case. However, 
in 1960, the Muslim traditionalist organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, issued a 
fatwa prohibiting inter-religious marriage, including the marriage between 
a Muslim man and a Christian woman. The fatwa referred to the classical text 
of the Shafi’ite school, al-Sharqāwi. The argument of the original Arabic text 
quoted from al-Sharqāwi is the following: Basically a Muslim is not allowed 
to marry a non-Muslim, but a Muslim man is allowed to marry a woman of 
ahl kitāb provided that the woman is a kitābiyyah khālisah (purely a woman 
of the Book) meaning that she embraces her religion (Judaism or Christian-
ity) before the principles (usūl) of their religions were changed (tabdīl). In 
other words, the reason behind this exception is that the principles of ahl 
al-kitāb’s religions were in line with those of Islam before they were changed 
or corrupted. Thus, if a woman of ahl al-kitāb embraces her religion after the 
change, or if one is sceptical whether she embraces that religion before or 
after the change, then a Muslim man is not allowed to marry her. Because the 
fatwa said that a Muslim man is not allowed to marry a Christian woman, the 
reference to this text means that the fatwa considered the Christian women 
in Indonesia not to be kitābbiyyah khālisa. The same fatwa was reiterated in 
1962, 1968 and 1989 with additional references to other shafi’te texts, which 
use similar arguments.118 In other words, in contrast to M. B. Hooker’s read-
ing, I find that there is no difference between the fatwa in 1960 and 1989 at 
all.119 
Besides the NU’s strict position, other Muslims did not share this view 
or shared the same view but based on different arguments. As has been 
mentioned, Rasjidi was the man who believed that the marriage bill of 1973 
was an under-cover Christianisation and suggested that he preferred to 
prohibit both a Muslim man or woman from marrying a Christian. In con-
trast, by the middle of 1975, the Regional Council of Ulama (MUI) of Jakarta 
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published a guide for Muslims regarding inter-religious marriage in which it 
was suggested that a Muslim man was religiously allowed to marry a Chris-
tian woman if he was sure that he could educate his children according to 
Islam.120 However, this implied that if the Muslim man could not educate 
his children according to Islam, he was not allowed to marry the non-Mus-
lim.121 
The wider Muslim consensus on the absolute prohibition of inter-reli-
gious marriage apparently emerged in 1980 when the Indonesian Council 
of Ulama (MUI) released a fatwā on this particular issue.122 The conclusion of 
the fatwā was: 
(1) Marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man is prohibit-
ed (harām); (2) A Muslim man is prohibited to marry a non-Muslim woman. 
There are different opinions concerning marriage between a Muslim man and 
a woman of the People of the Book (ahl al-kitāb). Having considered that its 
harms are more than its benefits, the Indonesian Council of Ulama gave a fatwa 
that such marriage is prohibited. 
Atho Mudzhar argued that the fears of Muslim conversion to Christi-
anity combined with the Muslim political frustration concerning the regime 
contributed to the fatwa’s strict position. For him, the fatwa holds “a radical 
position, for it contradicts the explicit statement of the Qur’an” allowing a 
Muslim man to marry a woman of ahl al-kitāb (QS 5:5). In fact it was not radi-
cal if we remember the NU’s fatwa in 1960 mentioned above. The difference 
is only in the arguments: the NU’s fatwa was based on the idea of kitābiyyah 
khālisah, while the MUI’s fatwa relied on the idea of benefits (maslahah) ver-
sus harms (mafsadah) or the interest of Muslim community (masālih mur-
salah). Nevertheless, as Atho Mudzhar noted, the 1980 fatwa was distinc-
tive particularly because unlike other’s fatwas of the MUI that were usually 
issued through regular Fatwa Committee meetings, it was produced in the 
National Consultation of the MUI in which all representatives of the ulama 
of the provinces were present. 123
Besides the fatwa, in1983 Soeharto issued a decree on civil registra-
tion, in which it was stated that one of the authorities of the Civil Regis-
try Office was to register and produce certificates of birth, death, marriage 
and divorce of non-Muslims.124 This decree was then used by the Muslims 
to oppose inter-religious marriage involving a Muslim partner in the Civil 
Registry Office. Tempo reported that since 1984, the MUI-DKI Jakarta often 
criticized the Jakarta Civil Registry Offices regarding inter-religious mar-
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riages involving a Muslim partner. 125 The Muslim protests became stronger 
in 1986 soon after the marriage between a popular singer, Jamal Mirdad 
(Muslim) and a famous actress Lydia Kandou (Protestant).126 Accordingly, in 
July 1986, the MUI-DKI sent letters of protest to the Governor of Jakarta 
and to the High Court of Jakarta. In September, with reference to the MUI’s 
letters, in the name of the Minister of Religion, the Director General of the 
Council for Development of the Organs of Islamic Courts, sent a similar letter 
to the Governor of Jakarta. The letters argued that the current policy of the 
Civil Registry Office to register inter-religious marriages involving a Muslim 
partner was against the Marriage Law and the Presidential decree of 1983 
mentioned above.127
After the protests, the representatives of the Regional Government of 
Jakarta, the Department of Religion, Regional Police of Jakarta and the State 
Intelligence Service held a meeting to discuss the problem.128 The meeting 
finally produced the following agreement: a marriage of a Muslim man with 
a non-Muslim woman should be registered at the KUA, while the marriage 
of a non-Muslim man with a Muslim woman was to be registered at the Civil 
Registry Office provided that the partners obtain the permission from the 
Civil Court. This agreement was stated in the Decision of the Head of the Civil 
Registry Office of Jakarta, dated 12 August, 1986. Likewise, by early Septem-
ber, the Department of Religion of Jakarta instructed all KUAs in Jakarta to 
allow marriages of a Muslim man with a non-Muslim woman. On the other 
hand, the MUI-DKI circulated guidance on inter-religious marriage, dated 30 
September 1986 explaining that marriage between a Muslim woman and 
non-Muslim man is absolutely prohibited but a Muslim man is allowed to 
marry a non-Muslim woman of ahl al-kitāb provided that he is sure that he 
can guide his wife and children to Islam, and this marriage should be regis-
tered at the KUA. 129 
There are at least three important points in this agreement. Firstly, 
unlike the absolute prohibition of inter-religious marriage by the fatwa of 
the MUI in 1980, the MUI-DKI re-opened the possibility of marriage between 
a Muslim man and a non-Muslim (read: Christian) woman. To justify this posi-
tion K.H. Rodhi Soleh of the Consultative Board (Syuriah) of the NU explained 
that although the Shafi’ite school prohibits such marriage, the other three 
Sunni schools allow it.130 Secondly, this allowable inter-religious marriage 
should be officially registered at the KUA. This means that, at least in theory, 
the KUAs in Jakarta had to leave their previous usual policy of refusing all 
inter-religious marriages without any distinction. Thirdly, the agreement 
somehow implicitly justified the legal validity of the civil marriage of a Mus-
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lim woman with a non-Muslim man, even though Islam considered this mar-
riage invalid. In this context, Ichtijanto, the head of Research and Develop-
ment of the Department of Religion argued that (1) although marriage at 
the Civil Registry Office was not performed according to any religious rules, 
it was better than marriages without a legal status; and (2) although the 
woman transgresses the rule of Islam, it was not worse than that she became 
an apostate.131 The last argument seems to imply that the civil marriage at 
the Civil Registry Office was better than requiring the Muslim woman to fol-
low the religion of her husband. 
In contrast, the well-known Muslim Supreme Judge, Bismar Siregar, 
argued that if a Muslim woman decided to marry a non-Muslim man, it means 
she left her religion for the sake of her husband.132 In this context, the case of 
a Muslim woman, Andy Vonny Gany who married a Christian man, Adrianus 
Petrus Hendrik Nelwan, is relevant.133 In 1986, having been refused by the 
KUA, they asked permission from the Civil Court, but the latter also refused 
based on the reason that article 2 of the Marriage Law requires religious 
legitimacy for the validity of marriage. They then appealed to the Supreme 
Court, and in 1989 the Court finally decided to accept their appeal. In its 
decision, the Supreme Court argued that although according to her religion 
a Muslim woman was not allowed to marry a Christian man, her request to 
marry him indicated that she did not care about her religious status any-
more and therefore, the Civil Registry Office could carry out their marriage. 
As we can see, the Court’s argument was similar to Bismar’s view, but the 
latter disagreed with the Court on another point. Bismar basically agreed 
to legalize inter-religious marriage but for him the Civil Registry Office has 
the authority only to register not to carry out the marriage ceremony. In 
other words, the marriage should be carried out according to the rules of 
the religion of one of the partners, and if the man is a Christian it should be 
carried out by the Church and then registered at the Civil Registry Office and 
if he is a Muslim, it should be performed according to Islam and registered 
by the KUA. 134 
In 1991, there was another development relating to the inter-religious 
marriage issue. Since 1985, the Government initiated the project on the 
Compilation of Islamic Law that covered the issues of marriage law, inherit-
ance and religious trust (waqf). This project reportedly had interviewed 166 
ulama in ten cities, held seminars and workshops attended by professors of 
religious law, jurists, judges and Supreme Court justices, and by 1991 the 
project was completed. 135 Perhaps to avoid controversies, the Compilation 
was not proposed to the Parliament. It was simply introduced through a 
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Presidential Instruction in which the President instructed the Minister of 
Religion to publish it in order to be used by the Government authority and 
society as a guide to deal with the legal issues covered.136 Although the 
Instruction does not clearly oblige the state authority and society to use the 
Compilation, it has become the reference for the Islamic courts in Indonesia. 
In this context, articles 40 and 44 of the Compilation respectively state that 
a Muslim man and woman are prohibited from marrying a non-Muslim.137 
However, it is unclear to me what the actual effect of the prohibition is. For 
example, to my knowledge, there is no case in which the Islamic court has 
dissolved a marriage of a Muslim with a non-Muslim based on the Compila-
tion. 
However, as many scholars observed, since the early 1990s, Soeharto 
had become closer to the Islamic groups. Perhaps, this was the reason why in 
practice inter-religious marriage became almost impossible in this period. If 
a couple wanted to maintain their respective religions, sometimes they just 
went abroad to get married because article 56 of the marriage law states that 
marriage outside the country is valid if it is held according to the law where 
the marriage takes place. In addition, people developed certain other tricks. 
First, in certain cases, before registering their marriage at the Civil Registry 
Office, the partners perform their religious marriage twice: one according 
to the husband’s religion and another to the wife’s religion. There are some 
examples of this way of marriage,138 even though religious doctrines would 
have difficulties to justify this practice. Second, one of the partners converts 
formally to the religion of the other partner just for marriage in the sense 
that the person was subsequently not committed to the new religion at all 
or even he or she privately or publicly returns to the earlier religion. Third, 
one of the partners decides to follow the religious marriage of the partner 
without conversion. This method can work if the religion in question allows 
inter-religious marriage.139
State Regulations and Christian Views on Marriage
Not long after the Civil Registry Office of Jakarta made the agreement 
with the Department of Religion that a marriage between a Muslim man and 
a non-Muslim woman was to be registered at the KUA and at the Civil Regis-
try Office for the opposite case, both the PGI and KWI reacted together. 140 In 
a dialogue between the PGI and KWI on mixed marriage held in Malang, 12-
14 March 1987, both organizations considered the policy of the Jakarta Civil 
Registry Office as an enforcement of Islamic view on inter-religious marriage 
through state institutions. The policy was also considered against religious 
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freedom because it hindered the freedom of the partners to choose freely 
where and according to which of the applied laws they will get married. 
Both organizations, however, were careful in expressing their objection to 
the policy, perhaps because the KWI-PGI dialogue was held close to the elec-
tions of 1987. In addition, the scope of the policy was only Jakarta province, 
while other provinces in Indonesia did not have such a policy, even though 
there was fear among the Christians that being the capital city, Jakarta 
would be referred to as an example by other provinces.141
Besides the shared concerns for religious freedom, there is an essen-
tial difference between the Catholic Church and the mainstream Indonesian 
Protestant Churches in their views of marriage. The Catholic Church gives 
marriage an inherent religious value: it is a sacrament. Therefore, similar 
to the Muslim belief in Islamic law, for the Catholic Church, a marriage is 
not valid unless it is carried out according to the Canon law.142 In contrast, 
being the heirs of the Dutch Reformed Church advocating strict separation 
between state and church, the Indonesian Protestants see that it is only the 
state, not the church that has the authority to validate marriage. Therefore, 
the role of the Protestant churches in marriage is only to bless a marriage 
already validated by the state. This does not mean, however, that all kinds 
of marriage legalised by the state will be blessed by the churches because 
every church has certain criteria to determine which marriages are to be 
blessed (for instance, certain churches refuse to bless inter-religious mar-
riage and/or if the girl is already pregnant unless the couple make a confes-
sion.).143 
Fridolin Ukur, the General Secretary of the PGI, noted that up to 1986, 
in general the marriage procedure for Protestant partners was first that they 
went to the Civil Registry Office and then went to the church to receive the 
blessing. This procedure is obviously in accordance with the above Protes-
tant view on the validity of marriage. However, after 1986, some Civil Reg-
istry Offices reversed this procedure, i.e., they refused to register the mar-
riages of Protestants unless they already received the church’s blessing.144 In 
line with this policy, by the end of 1988, the Head of the Civil Registry Office 
of Jakarta instructed his subordinates that from January 1989 on, the Office 
should not register any marriage unless it was already valid according to 
religion, i.e., after the marriage was performed in the Church (for Christians), 
Vihara (for Buddhists) and Pura (for Hindus).145 
Partly as a response to this problem, in July and October 1988, the PGI 
organized regional legal consultations among its members in Medan, Ujung 
Pandang and Ambarawa, and then a national one in Bogor, April 1989.146 The 
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legal consultations discussed two important issues of marriage: the validity 
of marriage and inter-religious marriage. By the end of April 1989, the PGI 
made a Decision on these two issues.147 On the validity of marriage, the PGI 
Decision stated that for the Protestants: “Marriage is valid if it is first carried 
out in front of the official of the Civil Registry Office and then it was to be 
confirmed and blessed by the church.” The Decision explains that marriage 
has both social and sacred aspects. As a social institution, marriage should 
be legalised by the state, i.e., by the Civil Registry Office. On the other hand, 
the church plays her role as “the tool at the hands of God to confirm and 
bless that marriage as something already existing and validated by the Gov-
ernment.” This point of the Decision was likely made to achieve two pur-
poses: (1) to reaffirm the ‘truth’ of the early marriage procedure; (2) to justify 
the procedure on a religious basis in order to conform the requirement of 
the marriage law. Secondly, with regard to inter-religious marriage, the PGI 
Decision reasserted that because it is not regulated by the Marriage Law, 
the Regulation on mixed marriage is applicable and therefore, “marriage for 
partners of different religions must be provided and legalised by the Civil 
Registry Office.” Because there had been various attitudes of the churches 
towards inter-religious marriage, the Decision suggested that marriage was 
to be carried out at the Civil Registry Office and the blessing afterward could 
be done according to the specific rules of the church in question. 
What are the various attitudes of the churches towards inter-religious 
marriage? Fridolin Ukur noted four points: (1) in general, the partners are 
advised to get married at the Civil Registry Office and so each of them can 
maintain his or her religion; (2) in general, the churches will not bless that 
marriage, but there is a certain church that provides a religious service as 
a sign that the marriage is accepted by the members of the congregation; 
(3) there is a church that blesses this marriage on the condition that the 
non-Christian partner makes a written testament that he or she will become 
Christian; (4) there is also a church that does not only refuse to bless, but 
also excludes a member if he or she marries a non-Christian.148 Gerrit E. Sing-
gih gives another explanation. He said that in a certain church, the mar-
riage could be blessed without conversion of the non-Christian as long as 
he or she promises to study Christianity and the children will be educated 
as Christians. However, Gerrit noted that this is often only a formal proce-
dure that is not to be realised afterward. Sometimes if the minister does 
not oppose inter-religious marriage, he takes that procedure just to appease 
the congregation. Gerrit acknowledges that, sometimes there is fear among 
Christians that inter-religious marriage will lead to conversion from Christi-
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anity, but this fear is often heard in Christian majority areas, not in the region 
where Christians are in a minority.149 On the other hand, an Indonesian evan-
gelist wrote in 1990 that inter-religious marriage can be a good opportunity 
to convert Muslims. He said, the “yearning for numerical growth must be 
kept alive in the believing spouse that the unbelieving partner will one day 
accept Christ as the Lord, even though that is not his or her purpose for mar-
rying the non-Christian.”150
The Catholic Church has a different policy on inter-religious marriage. 
A bishop can give a dispensation to a Catholic to marry a non-Catholic with 
certain conditions: (1) that the Catholic promises that he or she will maintain 
Catholicism; (2) that the children should be educated according to Catholi-
cism; (3) that the non-Catholic partner should be told about these two 
promises. In this regard, the non-Catholic should also be told about the two 
basic Catholic doctrines of marriage: marriage must be monogamous and 
divorce cannot be taken. Based on these conditions, the priest can bless the 
marriage. If the non-Catholic wants to convert to Catholicism, he or she will 
be asked to study the religion for about one year.151 
In 1990, a Catholic priest published a book on mixed marriage 
between Catholics and Muslims.152 The book identifies some problems of 
Muslim-Catholic marriage. First, for the Catholic Church such a marriage is 
not considered a sacrament, while for Muslims, if the woman is Muslim, the 
marriage is considered invalid. Secondly, Islam allows polygamy and divorce, 
while the Catholic Church does not. So, what will happen if a Muslim man 
married to a Catholic woman takes another wife? Perhaps, divorce is the 
answer, but because divorce is not allowed by the Church, the Catholic part-
ner does not have any chance to have another Catholic marriage. Thirdly, 
both Islam and Catholicism oblige their followers to educate their children 
according to their respective religions. How should they educate their chil-
dren then? Fourthly, with regard to the procedure of marriage, there are dif-
ferences between the two religions. In Islamic marriage, there should be two 
witnesses and both of them must be Muslims. Moreover, if the Catholic is the 
woman, Islam will not require her to convert, but the Church requires her to 
have a dispensation from the bishop and this dispensation will not be given 
unless she promises to maintain her religion and to educate her children 
according to her religion. This is why the Church cannot accept marriage 
contracted by Muslims at the KUA. On the other hand, Muslims have diffi-
culties in accepting a marriage ceremony held by the Church because they 
assume that the Muslim will convert to Christianity. Moreover, neither Islam 
nor Catholicism can accept a religiously doubled marriage (first according to 
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Islam and second according to Catholicism or vice versa). The priest eventu-
ally laments that so far there has been no clear solution to these problems 
and at the same time it is not easy to convince young people about the risks 
of inter-religious marriage.
4. The Ideological Debates on the Religious Court Bill 
Before the nineteenth century, the policy of the Dutch colonial power 
was just to leave the existing Islamic courts in Java, some places of South 
and North Sumatra, East and South Kalimantan, South and parts of North 
Sulawesi as they were. The authority of the courts related in general to mar-
riage affairs, including inheritance.153 The Colonial Government, however, 
later tried to organise the Islamic courts through a Royal Decree mentioned 
in Staatblad 1882 No. 152. The Decree announced the establishment of 
‘priesterraden’, an Islamic tribunal system operating along with the exist-
ing ordinary courts in the areas of Java and Madura. Later, the Staatblad 
1937 declared the establishment of the same court called ‘Kerapatan Qadi’ 
in South Kalimantan; but at the same time it restricted the authority of all 
Islamic courts to deal only with Muslim marriage affairs to the exclusion of 
inheritance. The elimination of inheritance jurisdiction was influenced by 
the so-called ‘reception theory’ stating that Islamic law can only be applied 
after it is received as a local custom by people.154 
After independence, the above two colonial statutes were still main-
tained. In 1948, the Government issued Law No. 19 on the authority of justice 
in which the religious court (peradilan agama, the term for an Islamic court) 
was not mentioned independently but placed under the authority of civil 
court. This Law, however, was never implemented, largely due to the oppo-
sition of the Islamic groups. In 1957, the Government issued the Regulation 
No. 45/1957 authorizing religious courts outside Java, Madura and South 
Kalimantan to deal with Muslim marriage as well as inheritance affairs. Sub-
sequently, Law No. 19/1964 that was to be revised as Law No. 14/1970 men-
tion that the authority of justice in Indonesia is carried out by four courts: 
general, religious, military, and state administration courts. 155 Based on this 
Law, the Muslim efforts to strengthen religious courts continued in the fol-
lowing years. In 1971 the Minister of Religion, M. Dachlan, asked permission 
from the President to prepare a religious court bill in which the structure, 
authority and procedures of the court were to be determined, and then in 
1972, the next Minister of Religion, A. Mukti Ali sent to the President a draft 
of the bill. Although there was no further development of the religious court 
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bill in the next few years, the marriage law of 1974 (Article 63) explicitly 
affirms the authority of religious courts to deal with Muslim marriage affairs. 
The President finally endorsed the preparation of the religious court bill in 
1983, and by this time, the Departments of Religion and Justice cooperated 
in a team to prepare the bill. After a series of meetings and negotiations 
among the team members up to 1985, and then followed by two meetings 
with Golkar and ABRI factions in 1986, the concept of the bill was finally 
completed and the Government proposed it to the Parliament on 3 Decem-
ber 1988. About one year later, the bill was ratified and introduced as Law 
No.7/1989.156 
The Law clearly strengthens the position of the religious courts.157 
It unifies the name, authority, structure and procedures of the courts. The 
court is called “Peradilan Agama” (Religious Court) and its authority is to 
deal with Muslim legal matters on marriage, inheritance, wills (wasiat), gifts 
(hibah) religious endowments (waqf) and charity (sadaqa). The structure of 
the authority of the courts is set up at three levels: (1) the lowest level is 
Religious Court of the district; (2) in the middle is the Higher Religious Court 
of the province; and (3) at the top is the Supreme Court.158 Moreover, unlike 
the long standing policy since the colonial period, that the decisions of reli-
gious courts should be confirmed by civil courts to be effective, the Law 
dictates that this confirmation is not required and for this, a bailiff (juru sita) 
is appointed in the courts. 
In his analysis of the development of Islamic courts to the early 1970s, 
Lev had negative expectations about their future. Probably because of the 
serious defeat of Islamic parties in 1971 elections, Lev said that, “a major 
political shift in favour of Islam” was “an unlikely development.”159 Indeed, 
the Religious Court Law was produced primarily not because of the strength 
of the Islamic party, PPP, but because of the support of the Government. 
Why did this happen? Andrée Feillard noted that many high ranking state 
officials believed that the Religious Court Law was a reward of the military 
for the Muslim acceptance of the Government regulation on the Pancasi-
la as the sole basis for social organisations.160 In line with Feillard, Bahtiar 
Effendy argued that the state accommodation of religious courts was one 
of the results of the change of political views and strategy among the Mus-
lim middle class, from aspiring to an Islamic state to a struggle for Islamic 
values within the framework of Pancasila.161 Mark Cammack, on the other 
hand, argued that the bill was actually consistent with the regime’s policy 
of controlling Islam. The difference between the 1970s and the late 1980s 
was only a matter of political strategy. He wrote: “Rather than competing 
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with Islam for legislative authority, the Government is seeking to appropri-
ate the power to declare Islamic law. Instead of defeating Islam, the regime 
has decided to confiscate it.”162 
None of the above studies, however, adequately discusses the debates 
on the bill. In fact, there were positive and negative responses to the bill 
inside and outside Parliament.163 It was probably because of the controversy 
that the official responses of the Parliament were given quite late, that is, 
about six months after the Minister of Religion made his explanatory speech 
on the bill to Parliament in January 1989.164 Outside Parliament, there were 
many reports and articles published in newspapers and magazines respond-
ing negatively or positively to the bill.165 I would argue that by looking at 
these debates, we will see that the bill was not only a political shift (substan-
tially or strategically) of the regime towards Islamic groups and vice versa, 
but also a continuity and change of the ideological debates in Indonesia. 
Moreover, as in the previous ideological debates, both Muslim and Christian 
leaders were now involved in a mutually antagonistic discourse. 
Christians’ Arguments against the Bill
As discussed earlier, in 1969, the Catholic Party opposed the Islam-
ic marriage bill particularly because it was considered a realisation of the 
Jakarta Charter and one step further towards an Islamic State. This argument 
was taken up by the Christians but with certain modification due to the fact 
that Pancasila was now already formally accepted by almost all important 
social organisations. A Jesuit named S. Widjojo argued that the Muslim 
attempt to realize the application of the shari’a by the state in Indonesia 
never ended although the strategies changed over time. 166 After the eradi-
cation of the ‘seven words’ in 1945, he said, the Muslim movement called 
Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) took up an armed struggle to 
establish an Indonesian Islamic state but this failed. Then, after the elections 
of 1955, the Islamic parties tried to achieve the goal constitutionally in the 
Constituent Assembly and again this also failed. After these failures, he said, 
this group that he called ‘the extreme right’ changed their strategy: they 
formally accepted Pancasila and condemned the previous efforts to estab-
lish an Islamic state, but at the same time tried to find the ways in which the 
shari’a could be applied by the state. Having said that, Widjojo then rhetori-
cally asked whether it was this extreme right group who prepared the bill 
or whether it was a compromise between this group and the Government. 
In any case, for him the bill was actually one step further towards theocracy. 
He argued that a state became a religious state when it obliges the citizens 
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to obey religious law; and if the law was Islamic law, then it was an Islamic 
state. Moreover, although the bill only accommodated the application of 
Islamic family law, for him, it could be developed later to include other legal 
fields. Finally he argued that Pancasila was a true, indigenous and original 
ideology of Indonesia, while religion (read: Islam) was a foreign ideology. If 
Indonesia was already politically free from the colonial Government, he said, 
then it should also be free from colonialism by “a foreign ideology under the 
pretext of religion.”167
Another Jesuit of German origin known as a public intellectual in 
Indonesia, Franz Magnis-Suseno argued in a different way to oppose the 
bill. His arguments were primarily based on the view that religion and the 
state are separate and different entities. Magnis said that the court is a fun-
damental realization of the state authority over its citizens. If religious law 
is applied in the court, then the legal authority of the state is taken away 
by religion because the state is subjugated to the norms outside itself, i.e., 
religious norms. The reason is, he said, that only religious authorities, not 
the state, have the authority to produce a religious law. The application of a 
certain religious law by the state, therefore, would produce a double loyalty 
of the citizens. Worse than that, it would make the state only a sub-adminis-
tration of the religion in question. He went on to argue that when the seven 
words of the Jakarta Charter were removed, it primarily meant that all social 
groups should not impose their respective exclusive ideals upon the others. 
The elections in 1955 and the debates in the Constituent Assembly indicate 
that those who opposed an Islamic state were in fact mostly Muslims. Thus, 
he said, the problem with the bill was not simply between Muslims and non-
Muslims, but with the nation as a whole. Last but not least, he reiterated 
that a state accommodation of extremist and fundamentalist group would 
not reduce their demands: “if they are given a finger, they will ask for the 
hand.”168
The Protestants also objected to the bill, but unlike the Catholic 
authors, they initially avoided bringing up the Jakarta Charter issue. The 
editorials of the Protestant newspaper, Suara Pembaruan, particularly in 
March and April 1989, focused their arguments on the importance of legal 
unification for national unity rather than explaining it as a realization of the 
Jakarta Charter.169 Here the Protestants repeated the Government’s argu-
ment in 1973, that is, legal unification was constitutionally based on the 
concept called ‘Wawasan Nusantara’ (archipelagic perspective). In general, 
the regime used this concept to suppress all socio-political differences and 
put them into a single Government-defined national identity. The concept 
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dictated, among other things, that there would be only one single law serv-
ing the interest of the whole nation. The concept was initially stated in the 
GBHN of 1973. In 1978, it was included as one of the important concepts 
of the Government indoctrination programme of Pancasila called ‘P4’ and 
in 1988 it was still included in the GBHN. The PDI faction in the Parliament, 
into which the Christian parties previously fused, developed the Wawasan 
Nusantara argument further. The PDI argued that the Law No.14/1970 (that 
justified legal differentiation and became the basis of the religious court 
bill) should be withdrawn because the Law was written before Wawasan 
Nusantara was adopted by the MPR.170 Finally, as in the past, the Christians 
argued that legal differentiation would lead to a legal chaos. However, now 
a new factual thing was added: recently the Hindus had demanded to have 
their own religious court as well. If every religion could have its own court, it 
was argued, the legal system of the country would be chaotic.171
In addition, the Protestants developed another interesting argument 
against the bill: they criticised the title of the bill, “Rancangan Undang-
Undang (RUU) Peradilan Agama” (Religious Court Bill). The word ‘agama’ 
(religion) in this title, they said, implies that the court would be related to all 
recognized religions in the country while in reality it was only for Muslims. 
The PGI also disagreed with the idea to change the title into ‘RUU Peradilan 
Agama Islam’ (Islamic Religious Court Bill) because not all elements of Islam-
ic law would be applied in the court. The Protestants, therefore, suggested 
the title to be changed into a long one: “the law on Islamic courts dealing 
specifically with marriage, inheritance, gift, wills, religious endowments and 
charity affairs”.172 Here we can see that the criticism of the name was related 
to the Christian concerns with the possibility of religious discrimination and 
expansion of the authority of the court to other legal fields. Unsurprisingly, 
this critique was also taken up later by other non-Muslim religious organi-
zations such as the KWI (Catholics), Walubi (Buddhists) and Parisada Hindu 
Dharma (Hindus).173 
Last but not least, the Christians demanded that, if the bill were rati-
fied, Muslim citizens should be free to choose between civil and religious 
courts to deal with their civil legal affairs. Again, here, the Christians were 
concerned with the issue of religious freedom. They argued that the differ-
ence between Pancasila and the Jakarta Charter was that the latter obliged 
Muslims to follow the shari’a while the former did not and therefore, to be 
consistent with Pancasila, the freedom to choose had to be maintained. This 
argument was, more or less, explained by the representatives of the KWI and 
the PGI to Parliament in early July, 1989.174 The PGI went further to suggest 
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that the religious freedom mentioned in article 29 of the 1945 Constitution 
should become the basis of the religious court law. The PGI also argued for 
the importance of a general law on religious freedom that was expected 
to be the umbrella for the religious court law and other relevant regula-
tions.175 
It is noteworthy that there was a Christian minister supporting the 
bill. He was Victor Tanja, a minister of the Western Indonesian Protestant 
Church (GPIB) and a PhD graduate from Hartford Seminary, USA who had 
written a thesis on the Indonesian Muslim Student Association (HMI) and 
had friendly relations with many Muslims. On 6 July 1989, Pelita newspa-
per reported that Tanja distributed his handwritten article on the bill to the 
press,176 and then it was published in Editor by the next month.177 He argued 
that there was no reason to worry about the application of Islamic law in the 
religious courts insofar as it was subjected to the national legal system. For 
him, the bill would not lead to a realization of the Jakarta Charter because 
the authority of religious courts was limited only in personal law. Moreover, 
he said, the Jakarta Charter was the Preamble to the Constitution, while the 
bill was in a lower position, that is, under the Constitution. Tanja also argued 
that for Muslims, Islam without law was inconceivable and the implemen-
tation of the law would depend on the state. The accommodation of the 
Islamic personal law, argued Tanja, was in line with Pancasila and the 1945 
Constitution. He eventually suggested that all citizens should accept the bill 
with an open heart.
Muslim Reactions to Christians’ Arguments 
There were several prominent Muslim leaders, most of them of 
reformist background, who responded to the Christian negative reactions 
to the bill.178 The Muslims accused the Christians of being intolerant, using 
sophistic and a-historical arguments, following the communist-provocative 
tactics, and covering a hidden agenda of Christianisation with a nationalist 
rhetoric. The Muslim arguments were certainly adapted to the fact that the 
regime had successfully forced most of the social organisations to adopt 
Pancasila as their sole basis. 
In Chapter 1 and 2, I noted that the Muslim leaders suggested that reli-
gious tolerance could be achieved if religious propagation was not directed 
to the followers of the recognised religions. Now, ‘tolerance’ in the Muslim 
discourse meant allowing Muslims to regulate their religious life through 
the state legal system. For them, therefore, the Christians were intolerant 
because the latter opposed the bill that would only regulate Muslim reli-
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gious life and would not affect the Christians.179 The Muhammdiyah leader, 
Lukman Harun, said that the non-Muslim Governments of the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand allowed the Muslim minorities to have their own 
religious courts, so he asked why the Christian minority in Indonesia did not 
accept that the Muslim majority should have their own religious courts.180 
In line with Lukman, A. Dahlan Ranuwihardjo said that if the Muslims toler-
ated the application of the western civil law that was inspired by a certain 
religion (read: Christianity) for non-Muslims in Indonesia, why the latter did 
not allow the Muslims to follow their own civil law.181 Muhammad Natsir, 
the most prominent Muslim reformist leader, noted that the Christians were 
consistently intolerant towards Islamic aspirations since what he called the 
‘ultimatum’ on 18 August 1945 to erase the seven words of the Jakarta Char-
ter, to their opposition to Islamic marriage bill in 1969 and now to the reli-
gious court bill. He warned that if any Muslim aspiration should be aborted 
through the opposition of the Christians, then it would not be surprising that 
the Muslims, despite their big sacrifice in the struggle for the independence, 
felt treated as second class-citizens. Natsir also warned that the Christians’ 
tireless efforts to cancel the ratification of the bill through mass media and 
political lobbying would not help create inter-religious harmony because 
there could be “no harmony without tolerance.”182 
How did the Muslims react to the Christians’ view that the bill was 
a realisation of the Jakarta Charter or even of an Islamic State? Unsurpris-
ingly, the Muslim leaders denied any connection between the bill and the 
two things opposed by the New Order regime. Moreover, by this time most 
of Islamic organisations formally accepted Pancasila as the sole basis. Yus-
ril Ihza Mahendra, a lawyer and prominent Muslim reformist intellectual, 
criticized S. Widjojo’s argument that a state applying Islamic law would 
become an Islamic state. This was wrong, he said, because the state would 
not become a Christian state or a Javanese state when the civil court applied 
the HOCI or the Javanese customary law respectively.183 Likewise, the promi-
nent Muslim legal scholar, Ismail Suny, argued that the existence of religious 
courts was far from enough to be an attribute of an Islamic state because 
the authority of the court was very limited. This was the reason why, he 
said, non-Muslim countries like the Philippines, Singapore and Ceylon could 
accommodate Islamic courts.184 Moreover, for Yusril, Magnis-Suseno dem-
onstrated a sophistic argument when the latter said that if the state applied 
religious law, then its authority would be taken over by religion. This argu-
ment for Yusril was false because the religious court was not a private but a 
state institution subject to the Supreme Court.185 In line with Yusril, a recent 
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graduate of the Faculty of Law, Airlangga University, Heru Santoso rejected 
Magnis-Suseno’s proposition that if the state applies religious law, then it is 
subject to the law not created by itself. For Heru Santoso, before becoming a 
state law, the Islamic law was just the raw material processed by the legisla-
tive body and so the final result of the process was a law produced by the 
state.186 Yusril added that one should realize that it was not necessary for the 
state to create an entirely new law because the state could accommodate 
the existing laws, including the Islamic law.187 
Cartoon from the Muslim magazine, Serial Media Dakwah 
(August, 1989), 12. The cartoon shows how the speedy car of 
the Islamic Religious Court Bill was stopped on its way by a big 
cross (symbolising the Christians). 
Likewise, the Muslim leaders denied any connection between the bill 
and the Jakarta Charter. Yusril argued that, what the Christians opposed in 
1945 was not the state accommodation of Islamic law, but the inclusion of 
the seven words in the Preamble of the Constitution. Therefore, argued Yus-
ril, Muhammad Hatta, the nationalist leader who initiated the lobbying on 
18 August 1945 to eradicate the seven words, said that the shari’a law can 
be proposed to the Parliament, and if it is accepted, then it becomes the 
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state law.188 Nurcholish Madjid, a leading Muslim intellectual said that the 
suspicion about the bill as a realization of the Jakarta Charter was caused by 
the political trauma of the past. “Let’s avoid such a trauma and look at the bill 
as a national process,” he said.189 Similarly, Ali Yafie, the Muslim traditionalist 
figure stated that to relate the bill to the Jakarta Charter was “like seeing 
ghosts in broad day light.”190 
As noted, the Jesuit, S. Widjojo said that the Islamic groups simply 
changed their political strategy by adopting Pancasila formally without 
changing their Islamic ideological ambition. In reaction to this charge, 
some of the Muslims accused the Christians of being insincere upholders 
of Pancasila and of having a hidden agenda of Christianisation. History tells 
us, said Yusril, after the eradication of the seven words, the Christians in the 
Moluccas were still not loyal to the Indonesian state because they declared 
the so-called South Maluku Republic (RMS) and rebelled against the central 
Government.191 Afif Amrullah, the reporter of Panji Masyarakat, and Har-
tono Mardjono, a prominent Muslim politician, said that they wondered 
why the Christians always talked about Pancasila to oppose any Islamic 
aspiration while in fact both the PGI and KWI were among the last social 
organizations to accept Pancasila as their sole basis.192 For Hartono, there-
fore, the Christians just pretended to be the upholders of Pancasila because 
they were worried that if Muslims followed the rules of Islam applied in 
religious courts, Christianisation in Indonesia would decrease.193 Likewise, 
for Rasjidi, Magnis-Suseno’s arguments against the bill indicated that he 
spoke, “as if he were a secularist, atheist and allergic to religion, while in 
fact he was a Jesuit.”194 For Rasjidi, therefore, there must be something else 
behind Magnis’ arguments and this was nothing but his missionary goal as 
a Jesuit. Joesoef Sou’yb, a leading Muslim journalist and columnist, argued 
further that the Christian nationalist rhetoric on legal unification actually 
had a hidden purpose, that is, to maintain the application of the Christian 
civil law in Indonesia. He argued that the Civil Code of the Dutch colonial 
Government called the “Burgerlijke Wetboek” (BW) was originally applied 
to the Europeans and indigenous Christians and after independence it was 
applied to all citizens. Joesoef argued, the origin of the BW was the Napo-
leonic Civil Code, while the latter was based on the Roman law, customary 
law and Canon law. Because the Roman Empire had been a Christian empire 
since the fourth century, the Roman law was also a Christian law. Thus, he 
said, the Christians’ strong negative reaction to the bill was motivated by 
the will to maintain “the applicability of the Christian law for Muslim society 
in Indonesia.”195 
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If the Christians said that the bill had something to do with the 
extreme right or Muslim fundamentalist groups, then in return the Muslims 
accused the Christians of using the tactics of the extreme left or the commu-
nists, another enemy of Pancasila in the New Order’s ideological discourse. 
Yusril said that the way the authors in the Catholic weekly Hidup argued 
against the bill was as provocative as the communist newspapers, Bintang 
Timur and Harian Rakyat in the past. In another paragraph, Yusril warned the 
Catholics: “As a good Catholic, please do not imitate Aidit, Nyoto, Nyono and 
other communist leaders whose habit was to manipulate historical facts for 
the sake of group interests.”196 
Last but not least, the Muslim leaders disagreed with the view of the 
Christians on the absolute freedom for Muslims to choose between civil and 
religious courts. A. Ghani Abdullah, an important scholar of Islamic law, said 
that the freedom to choose would create dualism. It would be better, he 
said, to make clear that every Muslim had to bring their cases to the religious 
court.197 Similarly, in a hearing with Golkar faction, Ismail Suny asserted that 
to deal with marriage, inheritance and religious endowment cases, a Muslim 
had to go to the religious court.198 A similar view was expressed by the Indo-
nesian Council of Ulama (MUI) in a meeting called the ‘Orientation Forum 
on Religious Courts’ attended by more than a hundred participants repre-
senting various Islamic organizations. 199 In this regard, Natsir warned that 
Muslims should be aware of the Christian strategy to oppose the bill: first 
they tried to pressurize the Parliament not to ratify the bill and if this failed, 
they would concentrate on certain articles of the bill to find ways to weaken 
the authority of the religious court.200
The Government’s Position and the Compromise
Because the bill was proposed by the Government, it is important to 
see how the Government and its main political forces in Parliament, Golkar 
and ABRI, reacted to the three important issues around the bill: (1) the rela-
tion between the bill and the Jakarta Charter or Islamic State; (2) the issue of 
legal differentiation as against legal unification; (3) the question on whether 
or not a Muslim has freedom to choose between religious and civil courts. 
Unsurprisingly, like the Muslim leaders, the Government denied any 
connection between the bill and the Jakarta Charter. After a meeting with 
President Soeharto, one of the Muhammadiyah leaders, Lukman Harun, said 
that according to the President, the bill had nothing to do with the Jakarta 
Charter. Lukman also said that according to Soeharto, the bill was in line 
with article 29 of the 1945 Constitution guaranteeing the freedom of citi-
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zens to perform their respective religious worship because in Islam ‘worship’ 
(ibadah) includes not only performing rituals but also following religious 
rules contained in the Islamic family law.201 Later, the Minister of Religion, 
Munawir Sjadzali, elaborated this view by arguing that the word ‘guarantees’ 
(menjamin) in the article 29 does not mean that the Government should not 
be involved in facilitating the legal requirements of religious groups or oth-
erwise Pancasila would become secularism.202 Thus, while the Islamic groups 
used the same argument to oppose the marriage bill proposed by the Gov-
ernment in 1973, now the Government took it up to defend the religious 
court bill!
In line with the Government, in Parliament, besides the PPP, Golkar 
and ABRI factions said that they could generally accept the bill because the 
support of the state to religious life was truly based on Pancasila.203 How-
ever, the ABRI faction also said that they could understand the anxieties of 
the people who considered the bill as a realization of the Jakarta Charter 
because historically there were some efforts to replace Pancasila with reli-
gion. Therefore, it was said that although the ABRI faction saw that the bill 
was in line with Pancasila, if there was evidence of efforts to replace Pancasi-
la with religion, then ABRI would be the first group prepared to fight against 
them. In this context, the ABRI suggested that one of the requirements to be 
a judge and administrator in the religious courts was to be untainted by any 
involvement in banned organizations, that is, Islamic or communist ones.204 
Besides responding to the ideological issue, the Government also 
reacted to the Wawasan Nusantara argument. The Minister of Justice, Ismail 
Saleh, wrote a three-part article published in consecutive issues of Kom-
pas.205 He argued that the national law should be developed with three 
provisions: maintenance, reform and creation. To avoid a legal vacuum, 
Indonesia had to maintain the existing laws, even though many of these 
laws were inherited from the Dutch colonial Government. However, certain 
elements of these laws should be reformed and appropriated according to 
the present needs of the country. With regard to the fields untouched by 
the existing laws, Indonesia had to be creative in making new laws. Ismail 
explained further that the development of the national law should be 
based on three ‘wawasan’ (perspectives): first, ‘wawasan nasional’ (national 
perspective) means that the law should serve the interests of the nation; 
second, ‘wawasan nusantara’ (archipelagic perspective) that prescribes the 
unification of national law; third, ‘wawasan bhinneka tunggal ika’ (unity in 
diversity perspective) in which the state accommodates specific legal needs 
of certain groups. Based on these perspectives, the norms of Islamic law 
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could be transformed into the national law as long as they were in line with 
Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution and relevant to specific legal needs of 
the Muslims. 
Ismail Saleh’s arguments were later taken up by the ABRI faction and 
the Minister of Religion, Munawir Sjadzali, to defend the bill.206 In addition, 
Munawir also responded to the demand of the opponents of the bill to with-
draw Law No.14/1970, which states that the authority of justice consists of 
four courts (general, military, religious and state administration courts). As 
noted, the PDI faction argued that this Law should be withdrawn because 
it was against the Wawasan Nusantara adopted by the MPR in 1973, three 
years after the Law was introduced. In this context, Munawir argued that the 
Wawasan Nusantara was not adopted for the first time in 1973 as the PDI fac-
tion argued, but on 13 December 1957, the day of the Djuanda Declaration 
when Indonesia defined the extent of its territorial waters. Moreover, there 
had been three laws produced based on the Law No.14/1970 namely Law 
No.14/1985 on the Supreme Court, Law No. 2/1986 on the General Court 
and Law No.5/1986 on the State Administration Court. Therefore, Munawir 
called the religious court law the youngest that should be born out of the 
Law No. 14/1970.207 Last but not least, the Minister of Religion explained that 
legal distinction in the case of religious court law would not lead to inequal-
ity before the law or discrimination because the law was only to serve the 
needs of the Muslims, and not others.208
In our discussion above, we noted that Muslim leaders demanded 
that Muslims had no choice but to go to the religious court, while the Chris-
tians suggested that Muslims should be absolutely free to choose either the 
religious court or the civil court. The Government, ABRI and Golkar, however, 
proposed another position: for marriage affairs, Muslims had to go the reli-
gious court, while for other cases of inheritance, last testament and gift, they 
had the freedom to choose. 209 The last position was also in line with article 
49 of the bill.210 This position lay somewhere between the two extreme posi-
tions. This was probably also realistic because Islamic inheritance law was 
still not widely practiced, particularly in areas where local customs were com-
monly applied. On the other hand, the freedom to choose did not include 
Muslim marriage affairs because the Marriage Law of 1974 already author-
ized religious courts to deal with them. The Muslim leaders seemed to real-
ize that this was the possible limit of the regime’s accommodation of their 
aspiration. In March 1989, the chairman of the MUI, Hasan Basri, explained 
that article 49 of the bill was a compromise and the MUI would let the Parlia-
ment handle the issue.211 Therefore, it was not surprising that basically the 
R E L I G I O N ,  F A M I L Y  L A W  A N D  T H E  S T A T E
204
Government position supported by Golkar and ABRI was finally maintained. 
Despite this compromise, the Muslims were certainly happy with the rati-
fication of the bill, while for the Christians the compromise was somehow 
relieving. 212 The former leading Catholic politician, Harry Tjan Silalahi said 
that the freedom to choose was a positive side of the Religious Court Law. “If 
the marriage law were also like that, it would have been better,” he said.213
 Conclusion
Our analysis of the debates on the position of Islamic family law has 
been developed by looking at the intricate relations between the triangle of 
the Christians, the Muslims and the Government. The Christians’ opposition 
to the state accommodation of Islamic family law was rooted in their fears 
of an Islamic State. They were worried that if the state accommodated the 
Islamic family law, then the door was open for further expansion of Islamic 
law in other legal fields. As a religious minority, the Christians were worried 
that the state application of Islamic family law would lead to religious dis-
crimination and abuses of religious freedom. For these reasons, the Chris-
tians opted for a secular and unified marriage law for all citizens regardless 
of religion. The leaders of Islamic groups, on the other hand, considered the 
state accommodation of Islamic family law necessary not only because the 
majority of the population was (at least formally) Muslim but also because 
for them family is a “microcosm of moral order”, the last Islamic camp to be 
defended in the world dominated by the secular political order.214 Moreover, 
if Islamic family law were not accommodated by the state, then the author-
ity of the Department of Religion on Muslim marriage affairs would be abol-
ished, and this was a serious political loss for the Islamic groups. Finally, the 
Government (controlled by the secular nationalists and nominal Muslims) 
was initially in line with the Christian position. Many of the secular national-
ists might have the same reasons as the Christians for preferring a secular 
and unified marriage law. However, for the Government, particularly the mil-
itary, to maintain power and political stability was probably more important 
than the ideals of a secular state. Therefore, when the Muslim opposition to 
the secular marriage bill of 1973 reached the point of endangering political 
stability, the Government finally decided to make compromises. In the late 
1980s, the Government even prepared and supported the religious court 
bill. 
Thus, in the debates on whether the state should accommodate the 
Islamic family law, the Government position was not always consistent, while 
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the positions of both Muslim and Christian leaders were generally consist-
ent and therefore the change of the Government position did not change 
but sharpen the antagonism between the Muslim and Christian leaders. 
Likewise, one of the compromises between the Islamic groups and the Gov-
ernment was that the inter-religious marriage was left unregulated in the 
Marriage Law of 1974. This legal vacuum helped influence the inconsist-
ent attitude of the Government towards inter-religious marriage: up to the 
early 1980s it was still very possible to have a legal inter-religious marriage, 
while in the 1990s this became very difficult if not impossible. By contrast, 
the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) consistently opposed inter-religious 
marriage (particularly between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man) 
but a few Muslim intellectuals like Ichtijanto and Bismar Siregar argued for 
the basic right of partners of different religions to have a legal marriage. On 
the other hand, although there were different religious views of inter-reli-
gious marriage among the Christians, they consistently demanded that it 
should be accommodated by the state law. 
However, there was development and exchange of arguments over 
time among the three parties. The Christians, for instance, took the Gov-
ernment argument on Wawasan Nusantara in 1973 to oppose the religious 
court bill in 1989, while to defend the bill the Government took the Muslim 
interpretation of article 29 of the 1945 Constitution in 1973. In addition, 
perhaps, the most disturbing thing in those debates was the mutual accusa-
tions and suspicions between the Islamic and the Christian leaders. No mat-
ter whether the suspicions and accusations were true or not, they already 
spread out to the public and possibly influenced both Islamic and Christian 
communities. The strong Muslim opposition to inter-religious marriage, for 
instance, has been partly influenced by the suspicion of Christianisation. 
Some Muslim scholars have recently tried to promote a new interpretation 
of Islamic sources to justify an absolute permission for inter-religious mar-
riage. The opposition from other Islamic leaders to this idea, however, has 
been very strong, and it is difficult to expect that the idea will be widely 
accepted among the Islamic groups.
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5. Religion, Culture 
And Education
For a country like Indonesia, which consists of so many separate 
islands and more than a hundred ethnic groups, it is certainly difficult and 
problematic to define what Indonesian culture is. Moreover, inter-cultural 
contacts between the people of the Archipelago with people from other 
areas, before and during the colonial period, certainly affected the cul-
tural development of the country. Despite the extreme complexity and 
variety of culture in the Archipelago, the intellectuals and politicians have 
been preoccupied with what Indonesian cultural identity is, and how it 
should develop. What are the elements of the existing culture that should 
be maintained, developed or left behind? What are the elements of foreign 
culture that should be adopted? The debates on these issues inevitably led 
to the questions on what kind of education the country should develop. In 
this context, tensions and conflicts between different ideological groups 
were almost inevitable. Our discussion in the previous chapters indicates 
that in the ideological debate, the Christians usually allied themselves with 
the secular nationalists to oppose the proponents of Islamic ideology. This 
is also the case in the debates on culture and education. In what follows, 
we shall discuss the debates and how they directly or indirectly affected 
Muslim-Christian relations.
1. Contesting Discourses on Indonesian Culture 
The debate on what Indonesian culture is can be traced back at 
least to the1930s during the colonial period. For some decades, most of 
those who were involved in debating this issue were writers of novels, 
poets and journalists. Perhaps, the dominant role of these people was 
because they were seriously involved in developing the most important 
element of the Indonesian culture: the Indonesian language. In the later 
period, Muslim and Christian intellectuals also joined the debate. In this 
section, we shall discuss the development of the debates up to the New 
Order period.
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The 1930s: Is Indonesian Culture Western, Javanese or Islamic?
By the middle of the 1930s, the Indonesian literary personality and 
philosopher, Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana, instigated a debate that was to be 
known as ‘the polemics on culture.’1 For him, there had not been anything 
to be called ‘Indonesian culture’ in the earlier history of the Archipelago. In 
the pre-Indonesia period, the peoples of the Archipelago never had a uni-
fied political and cultural identity. In other words, Indonesian culture was 
something of the future rather than of the past. Moreover, for him, if the 
Indonesian culture was based on the past, it would create problems. One of 
the problems was that each group would try to dominate the national cul-
ture. For instance, he said, if the spirit of the Javanese or Malay culture were 
imposed on the Indonesian culture, then the latter would become a slightly 
modified Javanese or Malay culture only. For the non-Javanese or non-Malay 
groups, this kind of national culture would certainly be unacceptable. In 
addition, for Alisjahbana, the cultural values of the past would only create 
a static rather than a dynamic society. To be a dynamic society, he said, the 
Indonesian culture should be orientated to western cultural values of ego-
ism, individualism, materialism and intellectualism. For him, since people of 
the Archipelago had previously been able to absorb Hindu, Buddhist and 
Muslim cultures, then they could also adopt Western culture. In fact, he said, 
the emergence of the nationalist movement in the country was due to the 
influences of the Western culture. 2 
How could one develop Indonesian culture then? Alisjahbana’s 
answer was clear: through education. Unfortunately, he said, the current ori-
entation of education among the indigenous people was opposed to intel-
lectualism, egoism, individualism and materialism. This orientation, argued 
Alisjahbana, was created by the native intellectuals who were preoccupied 
with the problems faced by Western societies. In fact, he said, the problem 
with the Indonesian people was not too much but too little intellectualism, 
individualism, egoism and materialism. This was the reason why, he said, the 
Indonesians were left behind by the West in the fields of science, technol-
ogy and economy. He also argued that the fatalism and collectivism of the 
Indonesian culture was influenced by the monistic philosophy of India. The 
latter, therefore, should be replaced with dualism of the Semitic worldview 
of the West. Because Islam is also a Semitic religion, Alisjahbana suggested 
that the genuine teachings of Islam could go together with Western values.3 
He finally asserted that only through the cultivation of the Western cultural 
values, could the Indonesian culture be in line with the international cul-
ture.4 In other words, it seems that for him Western values were universal.5
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Alisjahbana’s view triggered strong criticism from some other intel-
lectuals, including the prominent nationalist leader, Soetomo. For Soetomo, 
Alisjahbana’s view indicated that the latter was alienated from his own soci-
ety. Any advancement in society, argued Soetomo, could not be separated 
from what had been achieved before. In other words, for Soetomo, to leave 
the existing tradition behind by cultivating Western cultural values as Ali-
sjahbana suggested would never work in reality. Soetomo also argued that 
when he and his colleagues criticized Western education as too intellectual-
ist, they did not actually refuse intellectualism as such. What they wanted 
was to offer an alternative model of education in which intellectualism was 
combined with loftier feeling and strong moral commitment. Likewise, they 
opposed individualism and egoism not in order to eradicate one’s feeling of 
dignity, but to cultivate a strong personality ready to sacrifice oneself for the 
good of the people. Only through this type of education, he said, could one 
produce students who were proud of their own culture and ready to dedi-
cate themselves in the struggle for independence. Soetomo also explained 
that he opposed materialism because education for the poor natives could 
only be developed if the teachers were not simply motivated by salary. In his 
explanation, Soetomo referred to the traditional ‘pondok’ (boarding school) 
and the current ‘Taman Siswa’ as the ideal model of an education system. In 
the pondok system, he said, teachers and students lived in the school envi-
ronment together, so they could create close and warm relations, while in 
the Taman Siswa, students were introduced to the traditional arts.6 
In fact, the Taman Siswa also adopted the pondok system, and Soe-
tomo’s concept of education was much more in line with that of the Taman 
Siswa rather than that of the Islamic traditionalist pondok where students 
only learned about Islam.7 The Taman Siwa was established by the prominent 
Javanese aristocrats, Soetatmo Soerjokosoemo and Soewardi Soerjaningrat 
in Yogyakarta in 1922.8 Although Soetatmo was the first leader of Taman 
Siswa, its success was at the hands of Soewardi who replaced Soetatmo after 
the latter died in 1924. On his birthday in 1928, Soewardi changed his name 
into Ki Hadjar Dewantara, a name indicating his belief in Javanese mysti-
cism.9 Taman Siswa developed rapidly during the colonial period under Ki 
Hadjar’s leadership, particularly because of his ability to offer an alterna-
tive education in which the Javanese tradition and Western education were 
combined. The relations between students and teachers were put in terms 
of a family in which students were considered as children and teachers as 
parents. The students were called ‘anak’ (child) and the teachers were called 
‘bapak’ (father) and ‘ibu’ (mother). Ki Hadjar emphasised that there was no 
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employer-employee anti-thesis in Taman Siswa because all members are 
one family, and issues within the organisation were dealt with together in 
peace and harmony, but in certain cases the General Leader could act as a 
dictator.10 
Taman Siswa’s family-philosophy was attractive to the people because 
it could provide a strong sense of solidarity and nationalist identity as against 
the colonial system. This nationalist identity was enhanced by the fact that 
the Taman Siswa did not receive any Government subsidies. This was quite in 
contrast with the schools run by the reformist Muslim organisation, Muham-
madiyah, and the Christian schools that received subsidies, particularly 
because they followed the Government curriculum. Taman Siswa, however, 
created its own distinctive curriculum combining traditional and modern 
subjects, including languages (Javanese, Malay, Dutch and English), tradi-
tional arts (singing, music and dance), arithmetic, science, history (includ-
ing Javanese and Indies history), sports, handicrafts and general knowledge 
(current colonial affairs and general religious study).11 
By looking at the cultural ideals of Taman Siswa, perhaps we can see 
more clearly the difference between Soetomo’s and Alisjahbana’s positions. 
Both sides actually wanted to establish a national cultural identity through 
education but to assert that identity, they chose different contrasts. For Ali-
sjahbana, the contrast was the existing traditional culture, particularly the 
Javanese culture influenced by the monistic philosophy of India; while for 
Soetomo, the contrast was western culture embodied in the Dutch colo-
nial power. For Soetomo, Alisjahbana’s position was too Westernised and 
endangering to the nationalist spirit among the people, while for Alisjah-
bana, Soetomo’s synthetic education would simply keep society static and 
pave the way for a certain group (read: the Javanese) to establish a cultural 
hegemony in the country. 
We have noted that for Alisjahbana, the genuine teachings of Islam 
could be parallel with Western cultural values. Alisjahbana, however, was 
actually not an Islamic oriented intellectual and his position was that Islam 
could contribute to the Indonesian culture as long as it was in line with West-
ern cultural values.12 This position is quite different from that of the Islamic 
leaders who put Islam in a high position to which all cultures should be 
subjected. In this context, it is noteworthy that although there was no Islam-
ic leader involved in the polemics on culture, they were apparently aware 
of it. In 1937, the Muslim reformist leader, Mohammad Natsir, published a 
book entitled Cultuur Islam.13 The book does not mention anything about 
Alisjahbana’s polemics, but nevertheless it was published in the period of 
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the polemics. Moreover, the book was dedicated to “the new generation of 
Islamic youth” (dihadapkan kepada pemoeda2 Islam perangkatan baroe). This 
statement reminds us of Alisjahbana’s group who called themselves ‘new 
writers’ (poejangga baroe). In his book Natsir simply describes the achieve-
ments of Islamic civilization in the Middle East during the Middle Ages. 
Almost no Indonesian Islamic culture was mentioned except a few exam-
ples of mosque architecture in the appendix of the book which was writ-
ten by the Dutch convert and prominent architect, Prof. Kemal C.P. Wolff 
Schoemaker. The most important feature of the book is apparently Natsir’s 
opening remarks in which he quotes H.A.R Gibb’s statement: “Islam is indeed 
much more than a system of theology: it is a complete civilization.” For Nat-
sir, Gibb’s statement indicates that the latter was an objective scholar who 
was free from religious fanaticism. Natsir’s approval can be interpreted that, 
because Islam for him was a complete civilization, it could somehow become 
a civilization for Indonesia. In other words, the universal here is not Western 
but Islamic cultural values.
1945-1965: Universalism as a Common Ground and Conflict
After the proclamation of independence, among the Indonesian writ-
ers and poets, a new generation that was to be called the ‘Generation of 1945’ 
emerged. The most prominent among them was the poet, Chairil Anwar, 
whose poetry conveyed individualist and heroic messages. Along with other 
literary men, in 1946, he established an association called ‘Gelanggang’ 
(arena). In contrast to the intellectuals of the 1930s, the 1945 Generation 
suffered the bitter experience of being under the Japanese occupation from 
1942, and the revolutionary war against the returning Dutch about three 
years later. Bitter experiences under both periods proved to them that the 
East-West dichotomy was irrelevant. Both Eastern Japan and Western Dutch 
colonialism were opposed to something universal: human dignity.14 
Therefore, unlike Alisjahbana, they now declared the universalism of 
culture without distinguishing the West from the East. In 1950, the Gelang-
gang activists published a declaration in which it was stated: “We are the 
true inheritors of the world culture, and we shall develop this culture in our 
own way…We do not bind anything with the Indonesian culture…Revolu-
tion for us is putting new values on outdated values that have to be left 
behind. We are of the opinion that revolution in our country is not finished 
yet.”15 We can see here that universalism was asserted, a clear-cut definition 
of Indonesian culture was avoided and the revolution was considered unfin-
ished. Thus, the national cultural identity became fluid, something that was 
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to be continuously sought. In a way, the latter is in line with Alisjahbana’s 
future-oriented conception of Indonesian culture.16 
The declaration of 1950 apparently represented the view of the West-
ern educated group rather than the whole spectrum of the existing views of 
culture. The different views of culture actually penetrated different realms 
of state institutions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Department of Religion 
was established in 1946, and one of its duties was to control Islamic schools 
called ‘madrasah.’ This somehow indicates that the Islamic ideal of culture 
would be cultivated through the madrasah education. On the other hand, in 
the early revolutionary period, Ki Hadjar Dewantara was appointed the first 
Minister of Education of the young Republic. Some Taman Siswa activists 
were also recruited to the state schools and the educational bureaucracy. 
However, this does not mean that the cultural ideals of Taman Siswa strongly 
influenced the Ministry. As Kam Hing observed, the Ministry of Education 
gradually preferred professionalism and therefore, those who had been 
trained in Dutch education became more influential in formulating Govern-
ment policies than the graduates of the Taman Siswa. Moreover, the state 
schools now became much more attractive to promising students than the 
Taman Siswa, partly because the latter still wanted to maintain its pre-war 
curriculum and educational policies.17 However, the role of the Taman Siswa 
in the struggle for independence was still highly respected. After his death 
in 1959, the Government declared Ki Hadjar Dewantara to be the Father of 
National Education, and his birthday, 2 May, to be the Education Day. More 
than that, Ki Hadjar’s cultural ideal of family-ism, particularly the paternalis-
tic democracy in which the leader could act as a dictator, was manifested in 
the national politics through Soekarno’s Guided Democracy.18 
It was during the Guided Democracy period that the debate on cul-
ture revived again.19 In contrast to the previous periods, the debate on cul-
ture was now influenced by the international cold war between the com-
munist and the capitalist blocs. Within the country, the important political 
forces were the triangle of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), President 
Soekarno and the military. By the early 1960s, the PKI-affiliated Institute of 
People’s Culture (LEKRA),20 became very active in campaigning against those 
writers and artists alleged to be the promoters of literature and arts for the 
bourgeois class, the capitalists and the imperialists. The LEKRA activists 
argued that art and literature should be dedicated to the ordinary people 
(rakyat) rather than to the bourgeoisie. In order to serve the ordinary people, 
they said, the art and literature should be based on the so-called ‘socialist 
realism’, which represents the real life of the people through the framework 
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of socialist morals. This ‘socialist realism’ was then contrasted with ‘universal 
humanism’ which was considered a false slogan taken from Western imperi-
alists to conceal their real interests.21 
The clash between LEKRA and its opponents was inevitable. The writ-
ers and activists, who became the targets of LEKRA’s criticisms, with some 
support from the military, tried to defend themselves. After a series of meet-
ings, these writers (some of them were prominent Muslim and Christian intel-
lectuals) eventually produced a declaration on August 1962 called ‘Manifes 
Kebudayaan’ (Culture Manifesto). The Manifesto stated: “For us, culture is the 
struggle for the perfection of the condition of human life. We do not put 
one aspect of culture before the other.” With regard to the national culture, 
the Manifesto stated that it would be developed seriously and honestly as 
“the struggle for defending and developing our dignity as the Indonesian 
nation among other nations. Pancasila is the philosophy of our culture.”22 
Here we find an assertion of universalism similar to that of the 1950 declara-
tion. However, unlike the latter, the Manifesto tried to establish some criteria 
for the national culture, i.e., it was to be developed to enhance the dignity 
of the nation based on Pancasila. The inclusion of Pancasila indicates the 
ideological position of the supporters of the Manifesto. 
While Pancasila was declared to be the ideological basis of the Cul-
ture Manifesto to oppose LEKRA’s Marxism, the Islamic groups asserted 
a rival Islamic ideology. In 1962, the Council of Islamic Art and Culture 
(MASBI) led by the Muslim reformist leader, HAMKA, published their view 
of culture. The MASBI asserted that culture is the manifestation of human 
spirit, emotion and action as a gift from God, and it is called Islamic culture 
if it is based on tawhīd, the Islamic monotheism. In reaction to the LEKRA’s 
slogan of ‘art for people’, the MASBI affirmed that ‘art for devotion to God’. 
The MASBI explained that the devotion to God would by itself benefit the 
inner and outer life of human beings. The MASBI also stated that Islamic art 
and culture should promote noble ethics and be in line with Islamic rules.23 
Later in December 1963, all Islamic parties and organisations cooperated to 
organise a National Consultation on Developing Moral and Islamic Arts. The 
Consultation finally made a “Manifesto of Islamic Culture and Arts”. Besides 
stating that Islamic culture and art should be oriented to God, for the benefit 
of humanity, in its introduction, with reference to Soekarno’s Decree of 1959, 
the Manifesto affirmed that the Jakarta Charter inspired the 1945 Constitu-
tion. Thus, here the Islamic politico-ideological stand was reaffirmed.24 
The LEKRA activists reacted to both the Culture Manifesto and Islamic 
groups. HAMKA for instance, was accused by the LEKRA activists of plagia-
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rism.25 LEKRA’s attacks on the Culture Manifesto group appear to have been 
stronger. They accused the Manifesto group of being opposed to Soekarno’s 
revolutionary political stand and influenced by Western imperialists. LEKRA 
activists referred to the Manifesto by the mocking acronym: ‘Manikebu’ (lit-
erally meaning buffalo sperm). In this fight, the LEKRA eventually was the 
winner. On May 1964, Soekarno declared a ban of ‘Manikebu’. The official 
reason for the ban was that the “Manifesto Kebudayaan” (letter ‘o’ was inten-
tionally added here) indicated that the group was sceptical to accept the 
‘Manifesto Politik’ (Political Manifesto) of the Government.26 As a result, the 
Culture Manifesto group had to meet bitter experiences: they were removed 
from certain official positions, the license of their publication was cancelled 
and their books were publicly burned.27 After the abortive coup of 1965, 
however, the LEKRA was to suffer more: it was banned and its activists were 
imprisoned and some probably killed during the massacre of the Commu-
nists.
Our discussion so far demonstrates that up to the 1960s there were 
four major contesting views of culture in Indonesia: (1) the secular Western 
oriented view that eventually developed to be the universal humanism; (2) 
the Islamic view of culture; (3) the Marxist view of culture; (4) the re-actu-
alisation of the Javanese culture as the national culture. After the abortive 
coup of 1965, the Marxist view was banned but the other three still survived. 
The questions now are: (1) how did the three cultural views compete and 
interact during the New Order? (2) What was the official Government view? 
(3) Because religion became politically much more important during the 
New Order, how did the different views of culture influence Muslim-Chris-
tian relations?
Secular vs. Islamic View: the Kipandjikusmin Affair (1968–1970)
In 1968, an important literary controversy emerged. When HAMKA was 
accused of plagiarism by LEKRA activists in the early 1960s, the prominent 
literary expert, H.B. Jassin defended HAMKA. By this time, both HAMKA and 
Jassin considered LEKRA as the common enemy, even though they actually 
had different views of culture: Jassin tended to a secular and Western view 
while HAMKA to the Islamic viewpoint. Just a few years after LEKRA was gone, 
however, the clash between the two different views of culture emerged. This 
was indicated by the controversy on a short story that appeared in the liter-
ary magazine Sastra in 1968, entitled “Langit Makin Mendung” (The Darken-
ing Sky) written by a person who used the pseudonym of Kipandjikusmin.28 
The story received strong negative reactions from the Islamic groups: Sastra 
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was banned in Medan, its office in Jakarta was attacked by demonstrators 
and the Ministry of Religion prosecuted its editor, H. B. Jassin. The Muslims 
objected to the story’s description of God wearing glasses, of the Proph-
et Muhammad who was bored with the leisurely life in Heaven and of the 
Angel Gabriel whose hair was grey and body was weak because of age, and 
of the moral corruption of the ulama during Soekarno period. Although 
Kipandjikusmin and Jassin later publicly apologized to the Muslim com-
munity, the Islamic groups still demanded that the case be brought to the 
court. When the case was tried in the court by early 1970, Jassin decided to 
take the responsibility for the story, and refused to reveal Kipandjikusmin’s 
identity. In the same year, the court finally decided that Jassin was guilty of 
insulting Islam and was sentenced to one year’s suspended imprisonment: 
he would not be imprisoned if he did not commit a further offence in the 
next two years. Jassin refused to accept the verdict and took the case to a 
higher court, but there was no further development of the case in the fol-
lowing years.29 
Many writers defended Kipandjikusmin including several Christians.30 
The editor of the Catholic magazine, Peraba, for instance, wrote that because 
Kipandjikusmin already apologised publicly to the Muslim community, he 
should be forgiven. To forgive, he said, was also in line with the teaching of 
religion that God is the Most Merciful. Moreover, for the editor, in this case, 
it was God, not human beings that had the right to forgive or punish Kipan-
djikusmin.31 Likewise, although many Islamic-oriented writers opposed the 
publication of the story, one of them, Bahrum Rangkuti, defended it based 
on the argument that Sufi literature in Islam also often described God in 
anthropomorphic terms.32 In his defence before the court, Jassin also quoted 
Sufi literature and some Qur’anic verses describing God in physical terms.33 
Moreover, Jassin explained that Kipandjikusmin was born into a Muslim fam-
ily but studied in a Catholic school. Kipandjikusmin’s imagination, argued 
Jassin, was probably influenced by Christianity that allowed personification 
of God in all artistic works. If Islamic leaders still prohibited imagination, 
argued Jassin, a Muslim artist who preferred freedom would leave Islam.34 
On the other hand, HAMKA, who attended the trial as a witness, disa-
greed with Rangkuti’s and Jassin’s arguments. HAMKA argued that the per-
sonification of God in Sufi literature was based on human love towards God, 
while Kipandjikusmin’s imagination of God wearing glasses simply indicated 
that God’s sight was imperfect. HAMKA was also unhappy with the unflatter-
ing description of the ulama in the story. For HAMKA, although there were 
bad ulama during the Soekarno period, Kipandjikusmin’s description sug-
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gested that it was only the ulama who were corrupt.35 He also could not 
accept the freedom of imagination developed in the Christian arts as Jassin 
suggested. For HAMKA, such freedom would only destroy the sacredness of 
Islam. HAMKA even claimed that since the Crusades, nobody had been able 
to produce, through his creative imagination, more hatred towards Muham-
mad than Kipandjikusmin. If there was no opposition to the story, he said, 
Kipandjikusmin would probably receive high compliment from the Catholic 
world.36 HAMKA’s defence of the ulama and strong words against Christian-
ity were no doubt influenced by the political frustration of Islamic leaders 
and Muslim-Christian tensions in the early years of the New Order.
The CSIS’s Strategy of Culture and Muslim Opposition
We have seen that in the debate between HAMKA and Jassin on the 
Kipandjikusmin case, Christianity was mentioned in opposition to Islam. 
The Muslim-Christian dimension of the debate on culture is more apparent 
in the subsequent period of the New Order. In 1978, the personal assist-
ant to President Soeharto, Ali Moertopo, published a book entitled Strategi 
Kebudayaan (Strategy of Culture).37 As discussed in Chapter 3, in coopera-
tion with some intellectuals, particularly the Catholics, Moertopo estab-
lished a think tank in 1971 called CSIS. Moertopo said that he prepared the 
book in cooperation with the CSIS intellectual, A.M.W. Pranarka (a Catholic). 
The term ‘strategy of culture’ was apparently introduced for the first time 
to Indonesia through the work of the Dutch scholar and Protestant phi-
losopher, C.A. van Peursen, Strategie van de Cultuur, that was translated by 
the Indonesian Jesuit, Dick Hartoko and published with the cooperation of 
a Catholic and a Protestant publisher in 1976.38 In the book, van Peursen 
argues that human beings do not only have to understand but also to plan 
the development of their culture. It is this planning of culture that van 
Peursen called ‘the strategy of culture.’ Moertopo apparently used the term 
in this sense, even though his general analysis of culture was different from 
that of van Peursen.
If we compare Moertopo’s arguments with the previous debates on 
culture, we can see that he tries to combine the idea of universal human-
ism with Taman Siswa’s idealisation of the Javanese culture. The universal 
humanism was ironically developed to justify his essentialist view of Indo-
nesian culture, while the Javanese ideals of family-ism were used to reject 
the political culture of opposition. He argued that the essence of culture is 
humanisation. The humanisation, however, is not understood in an abstract 
sense but in the context of the historical development of the culture in 
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question. Thus, to understand the Indonesian culture or the humanisation 
in Indonesia, one should know the history of the country. He shamelessly 
claimed that the history of the culture of the Archipelago is actually one 
single history. The Indonesian culture, for him, could be traced back to the 
early history of the Archipelago in which people already believed in ani-
mism and even in the ‘Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa.’39 Later, he said, the origi-
nal Indonesian culture continuously survived, even though it was enriched 
by Hinduism and then Islam through the acculturation process. The coming 
of the Westerners to the Archipelago in the subsequent period created a 
cultural dualism that eventually paved the way for the so-called ‘national 
resurgence’, leading to Indonesian independence. In this context, for him, 
Pancasila is the true manifestation of Indonesian culture in the sense that 
the principle of family-ism, cooperation and harmony is embodied in it. With 
regard to religion, he claims that the Indonesian culture never questions 
which religion is the best because the most important thing is how far a 
religion could contribute to humanisation. Now Indonesia had to face the 
challenges of the modern age, that is, economic development supported 
by science and technology. For him, Hinduism and Islam had already con-
tributed to the development of the Indonesian culture in terms of religion, 
language, art and social systems, but not in terms of economics, science and 
technology. Therefore, he continued, the first urgency of the strategy of cul-
ture was economic development supported by science and technology. The 
second urgency of the strategy of culture was a strong national leadership 
and the third was education in which cultural potentials of the people were 
to be mobilised. Moertopo’s point on the strong leadership was apparently 
made to justify the military’s authoritarian rule. 
We have mentioned in Chapter 3 that earlier in the same year (1978), 
the Muslim prominent intellectual, Muhammad Rasjidi engaged in a polem-
ic against the CSIS intellectual, A.M.W. Pranarka, on nationalism and that, 
because of this, Rasjidi was pensioned off from his position as Professor of 
Islamic Law in the University of Indonesia. Now, when the book Strategi Kebu-
dayaan appeared, Rasjidi took the opportunity to criticise it. Rasjidi believed 
that the book was actually written by Pranarka, not Moertopo because the 
ideas of the book were very similar to, if not totally the same as, Pranarka’s 
view on nationalism. Rasjidi’s view of the authorship of the book reflects his 
perception of a Catholic-military conspiracy behind it. There are at least two 
important points in the book criticised by Rasjidi, namely, its secular view of 
culture, and its attempt to identify Javanese abangan (nominal and syncre-
tic Muslim) culture as authentic and separate from that of the santri (practic-
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ing and orthodox Muslims). For Rasjidi, although Pranarka was a Catholic, 
the latter pretended to be a secularist. To say that the essence of culture is 
humanisation, for Rasjidi, is nothing but to affirm a secular view of culture. 
This position was taken, argued Rasjidi, to eradicate Islamic identity from 
Indonesian culture. This is why the book states that Islam only enriched the 
Indonesian culture, while in fact, he said, Islam not only enriched but also 
changed Indonesian cultural identity. Rasjidi also reacted to the claim of the 
book that Indonesian culture is very tolerant in the sense that it does not 
overemphasize religious differences. In fact, argued Rasjidi, this argument 
was used by Pranarka to overemphasize the difference between the Java-
nese abangan Muslims and the other (santri) Muslims.40 In other words, to 
say that the authentic Indonesian culture does not pay much attention to 
religious differences is simply to assert the abangan religious attitude and 
to differentiate it from that of the santri that is considered to be religiously 
exclusive. For Rasjidi and other Islamic leaders, both abangan and santri 
should be put into a single category as Muslim.41 
The reason why Rasjidi was very negative about the book was because 
it was written and published by the CSIS people who were politically very 
influential in the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s. Besides Ali Moer-
topo, another patron of the CSIS was Soedjono Hoemardani known as a 
guru to Soeharto in mystical affairs. Moreover, the head of the CSIS, Daoed 
Joesoef, was appointed as Minister of Education and Culture from 1978 
to1983. Daoed Joesoef was actually born into a devout Muslim family, but 
in politics preferred secularism to Islamic ideology.42 He also showed a very 
sympathetic view of the Javanese mysticism. He wrote that Hoemardani’s 
mysticism represents the national cultural identity. Because of Hoemardani, 
he said, the analysts of the CSIS could combine the scientific approach of 
the West with the contemplative and integrative approach of the Indone-
sian culture. By this combination, he said, the CSIS did not only become “the 
bearer of culture” but also “the developer of culture.”43 In 1978, the Govern-
ment appointed A.M.W. Pranarka to be the Secretary of the Commission for 
the Reformation of the National Education (KPPN). Being politically secular, 
Pranarka also had strong sympathy with Javanese mysticism. He did not 
only write on the teachings of Hoemardani,44 but also on those of Ki Had-
jar Dewantara. By 1984, the CSIS developed cooperation with Taman Siswa 
in which Pranarka became the Head of the Consortium of Cultural Studies, 
Sarjana Wiyata, Taman Siswa. In his paper presented to the Consortium, Pra-
narka claimed that Ki Hadjar “is the authentic expression of the Indonesian 
personality.”45 
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On the other hand, the Islamic leaders always protested against what 
they considered to be the attempts of the CSIS group in the Department of 
Education and Culture to implement their view of the strategy of culture. 
In the next section, we shall discuss some cases in which the Government 
educational policies were opposed by the Islamic groups. Here we shall just 
look at the more abstract level of the debate, that is, on basic views of edu-
cation. We have noted that in 1978, the KPPN was established and Pranarka 
was appointed to be the secretary. The head of the KPPN was Slamet Iman 
Santoso, a Professor of Psychology and Rector of the University of Indone-
sia, Jakarta. Among the members of the KPPN, there were also some Mus-
lim intellectuals. Thus, the KPPN was not totally controlled by Pranarka and 
Daoed Joesoef. However, the Islamic leaders were always suspicious of the 
role of Pranarka. 
After its inception, the KPPN started collecting ideas for education-
al reforms. When the early draft of the KPPN’s concept of reform (that had 
not yet been discussed) reached the Islamic leaders, the latter soon react-
ed negatively. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) stated that “there is 
adequately convincing evidence that in this concept of National Education, 
the Minister of Education and Culture uses the ideas of secularism by giving 
the important role to the Catholics [in its making].”46 In this context, Ras-
jidi even directly pointed his finger at Pranarka and his strategy of culture 
theory. 47 After a series of discussions, in July 1979, the KPPN approved a 
preliminary draft of the educational reform and published it as a book.48 The 
publication of the draft was intended to encourage feedbacks from differ-
ent groups of society, including the MUI. Again the MUI was critical of ‘the 
cultural approach’ mentioned several times in the book. Although the book 
defined the cultural approach as efforts to develop material and spiritual 
qualities of the human being, the MUI was apparently still unsatisfied. The 
MUI argued that the Mainlines of State Policies (GBHN) of 1978 stated that 
one of the goals of education was to cultivate ‘takwa’ (Arabic: taqwā), that 
is, to follow the orders of God and not to break His prohibitions. Therefore, 
argued MUI, unlike the KPPN’s cultural approach, the GBHN dictated that 
education had a religious goal. For the MUI, KPPN’s concept would bring 
education to atheism and secularism.49
Muslim and Christian Discourses on Religion and Javanese Culture
As we can see, the Muslim opposition to CSIS’s strategy of culture was 
partly related to the Muslim negative perception of the role of the Catholics. 
Our questions: What was the Catholic priests’ view of Indonesian culture? 
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Was it parallel with that of the CSIS? In 1979, J.W.M. Bakker (under the pseu-
donym of Rachmat Subagya) wrote a book on the original religion of Indo-
nesia. Like the CSIS intellectuals, he argued that the first principle of Pan-
casila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, reflects the original Indonesian religious 
culture. He also argued that when Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam came to 
the Archipelago, the indigenous people did not entirely change their beliefs 
according to the religions. With regard to Islam, there were three reasons, he 
said, why Islam could not deeply penetrate Indonesian culture: (1) Islamiza-
tion occurred collectively through the conversion of the rulers; (2) the Arabic 
character of Islam made it difficult for the natives to accept its teachings; (3) 
Islam did not have a theological frame to react to the spirituality of other 
religions. In contrast, when Christianity came, it tried to adapt to the indig-
enous beliefs, even though for this adaptation, the Christians still had to find 
the way in which both the universality of Christian message and the local 
culture could go together.50 
Steenbrink has observed that Bakker’s book on the indigenous reli-
gion as well as Y.B. Banawiratma’s work on Jesus as a Guru in the Javanese 
culture and Franz Magnis-Suseno’s work on the Javanese ethics indicate 
that the Catholics considered Javanese mysticism rather than Islam as their 
main partner of dialogue. He also noted that a similar tendency was to be 
found among the Protestants. In his footnote, Steenbrink refers to the ten-
dency among the anthropologists and Catholic and Protestant missionaries 
to obscure the Islamic character of the Indonesian people.51 This last point 
seems to be more important than the dialogue issue. The Christians attend-
ed dialogues with the Muslims but in terms of the Javanese culture, the Mus-
lims often emphasised the Islamic-ness of the abangan while the Christians 
and the secularists tended to describe the abangan as outside Islam. This 
is also indicated by Rasjidi’s criticisms of Pranarka’s view of culture above. 
Moreover, like the Christians, the Muslim intellectuals also studied Javanese 
mysticism. They usually suggest that the Javanese mysticism is a syncretism 
of Islamic and other religious beliefs, but Islam is actually its basis.52 Thus, 
the major issue here is actually a contest of discourses on Javanese mysti-
cism.53 
The discourses of the Muslims and Christians on culture and religion, 
however, did not always lead to antagonism. In 1983, the Muslim tradition-
alist leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, wrote that Islam should be indigenised 
(pribumisasi) in Indonesia.54 He criticised recent tendencies among the Indo-
nesian Muslims to Arabicise everything, from replacing the local religious 
terms with Arabic ones to making the architecture of the mosques similar to 
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that of the Middle East. He argued that the early propagators of Islam in Java 
successfully indigenised Islam and this should be maintained. He asked: if 
the Christians now tried to build churches in the forms of local architecture, 
why should the Muslims leave their indigenous architecture of the mosques? 
Abdurrahman’s arguments for the indigenisation of Islam, however, did not 
mean that he wanted Islam to monopolise the Indonesian culture. In fact, 
he was worried about the Arabisation trend among the Indonesian Muslims, 
because for him it would increase the exclusiveness of Islam. Thus, his con-
cept of the indigenisation of Islam actually ended with a common struggle 
to enhance the dignity of human being, that is, the universal humanism.55
The tendency to see culture from the perspective of universal human-
ism can also be found among the Christians. Mangunwijaya was among the 
Catholic priests who consistently promoted this view of culture. Indone-
sian independence, he said, was only a formal political liberation. The most 
important liberation should be cultural, that is, to liberate people from being 
a nation of coolies and a coolie among the nations through education. In 
this context, he said that to liberate people from exploitation by others and 
to enhance human dignity is the essence of Catholic faith.56 Among the Prot-
estants, we should mention here Th. Sumartana. In his PhD thesis written 
in 1980s, Sumartana analyses the Christian missionaries’ attitudes towards 
Javanese culture. Sumartana showed a great sympathy with the Javanese 
Christian leader of the nineteenth century, Kiai Sadrach, who was opposed 
by some Dutch missionaries because of his syncretism. Sumartana also criti-
cises the prominent Protestant missionary in the early twentieth century, 
Hendrik Kraemer, regarding the latter’s negative view of syncretism. For 
Sumartana, many Christians saw syncretism negatively because they under-
stand syncretism from a theological point of view. For him, to see syncretism 
positively, one should see it for its political meaning. “In this understanding, 
the absoluteness of religious conviction of one person is not set against 
the conviction of another person in a true or false dichotomy. Absoluteness 
must be directly confronted with the social problems that threaten the unity 
and welfare of humanity.”57 Thus, syncretism leads to universal humanism.
The Rise of Islamic Culture in National Politics in 1990s
Since the early 1970s to the late 1980s, we can say that in general 
the politics of the New Order regime was much more secular and abangan 
Javanese cultural oriented. The Department of Education had also been con-
trolled by people who had a similar cultural orientation. The secular cultural 
tendency can still be seen in the papers presented to the Seminar on Culture 
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held in 1987 by the Faculty of Literature, University of Indonesia, Jakarta, 
in cooperation with the Department of Education and Culture. If we look 
at the proceeding of the Seminar, we can see that the term ‘strategy of cul-
ture’ was mentioned in many papers. There was no single paper discussing 
Islamic culture, and there was a paper opposing the view that Indonesian 
culture had been Javanised.58 Moreover, for his 40th marriage anniversary, 
in 1987, President Soeharto published a book containing Javanese prov-
erbs with Indonesian and English translation dedicated to his children. A 
few years before, Soeharto was called the Father of Development (Bapak 
Pembangunan). Now, with this book, Soeharto apparently wanted to affirm 
that he was a Javanese wise father whom his children (Indonesian people) 
should follow.59 In this context, Shiraishi nicely analysed how the New Order 
regime skilfully developed Taman Siswa’s idealisation of family into national 
politics.60
In the 1990s, however, the national politics became closer to Islam. 
Soeharto had problems with important military generals, and to counter-
balance the military, he allied himself with the Islamic groups, particularly 
the reformist. In 1990, Soeharto supported the establishment of the Indo-
nesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI).61 When Soeharto opened the 
ICMI meeting, it was reported that Soeharto demonstrated his skill in beat-
ing the traditional drum called ‘beduk’ used in the mosques in Indonesia 
to invite Muslims to perform daily prayer. The ‘beduk’ somehow symbolises 
santri culture. Moreover, by the same year he and his family went to Mecca 
to perform the Hajj. In 1994 and then 1995, the Government sponsored the 
festival of Islamic culture called ‘Festival Istiqlal’ in Jakarta. Artists and per-
formers from different parts of Indonesia were invited to present Islamic 
arts and performances in the Festival. The intellectuals were also invited to 
several seminars during the Festival to discuss Islamic culture in Indonesia. 
Partly because the leader of ICMI was B.J. Habibie who was also the Minister 
of Technology, Islamic intellectuals also talked about how Indonesian Mus-
lims could develop technology in the spirit of Islam. The proceedings of the 
seminar were then published under the title Ruh Islam Dalam Budaya Bangsa 
(the Spirit of Islam within the National Culture).62 The second Festival Istiqlal 
also featured a big Qur’anic manuscript called ‘Mushaf Istiqlal.’ The manu-
script was designed by Muslim painters and artists in such a way that its 
margin combined different styles of decoration representing 42 regions of 
the country.63 Thus, the Qur’anic text (Islam) and Indonesian culture (deco-
ration) are put together in the mushaf (manuscript). Nationalism and Islam 
were now put into harmony with each other. Islam was not portrayed as 
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an ideology as opposed to Pancasila, but as the spirit within the national 
culture.
During this period, the Muslim intellectuals associated with ICMI 
often emphasised that the abangan-santri dichotomy was irrelevant.64 
The prominent Muslim intellectual, Kuntowijoyo, said that santri-abangan 
dichotomy became fluid partly because religion classes had been given in 
public schools, so the children of abangan could learn Islam.65 To assert the 
Islamic-ness of the Javanese, another Muslim intellectual, Nurcholish Mad-
jid, refers to Marshal Hodgson’s criticism of Clifford Geertz’s Religion of Java: 
“for those who knows Islam, his comprehensive data – despite his intention 
– show how very little has survived from the Hindu past even in inner Java 
and raise the question why the triumph of Islam was so complete.”66 On the 
other hand, as a reaction to ICMI, the secular nationalist intellectuals and 
Christians as well as the traditionalist Muslim leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, 
established ‘Fordem’ (Forum Demokrasi). In fact, Abdurrahman Wahid was 
the only politically influential person in Fordem. He refused to join ICMI 
and argued that the new organisation was sectarian. Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
manoeuvre was somehow relieving for the Christians because there was cer-
tainly fear among them to see the ascendancy of Islam in national politics. 
2. Religion and State Educational Policies 
In the debates on culture, we can see that different ideological out-
looks led to different ideas of Indonesian culture; and these in turn led to 
different ideas of the education which Indonesian people were to receive. 
Although there were different outlooks in Indonesia, when the ideological 
conflict occurred usually two blocs were formed: the Islamic and the secular. 
We already showed in Chapter 3 that the ideological conflict eventually led 
to a compromise. In Chapter 4, we also argued that the ideological compro-
mise was manifest in the dual administration of marriage affairs. 
If we look at the education system of Indonesia, we can also see that 
the ideological compromise is manifest in it. First of all, Indonesia has a dual 
administration of education. The Department of Education and Culture con-
trols general education (public schools and universities), while the Depart-
ment of Religion has the authority over Islamic education, namely the state 
Islamic schools (from elementary to secondary level) called ‘madrasah’ and 
Islamic higher education, State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN).67 Then, 
besides the dual administration, a compromise is manifest in the curriculum 
of both types of education: the schools under the Department of Religion 
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taught secular subjects of the Department of Education and Culture, while 
the general education under the latter should also include religion as one 
of its subjects. The compromise, however, is not always stable. It developed 
according to the political atmosphere in the country. 
Besides the Government educational institutions, there are private 
madrasahs, schools and universities. To be entitled to state subsidies, the 
Government demands that they follow its curriculum and educational poli-
cies. Another advantage of following the Government curriculum was that 
the Government approved the diplomas of these private institutions, which 
means that the holder of the diploma could continue study at the Govern-
ment educational institutions and could apply to be a Government employ-
ee. Many of the Muslim and Christian private educational institutions were 
included in this category and therefore, they were affected by the Govern-
ment educational policies.
The Failure of Attempts to Unify the Administration of Education
There have been attempts to put the state Islamic educational institu-
tions under the Department of Education but these never succeeded, due to 
the opposition of the Islamic groups. During the Soekarno period, there was 
an attempt to transfer the administration of the madrasah to the authority of 
the Department of Education. This was stated in the Eight Year Development 
Plan (1961-1969) that was proposed to the Provisional People’s Consulta-
tive Assembly (MPRS). According to this plan, the role of the Department 
of Religion in the field of education would be limited to the training of its 
employees. In line with this, according to this plan, the programme for reli-
gious teachers’ training that was controlled by the Department of Religion, 
was to be taken over by the Teacher-Training Schools under the Department 
of Education. Nonetheless, probably due to the opposition of the Islamic 
groups, the MPRS decided in 1960 and then in 1963 that madrasahs were to 
remain under the Department of Religion.68
During the New Order, there were at least two occasions in which the 
debate on the single vs. dual administration of education occurred. By the 
late 1970s, the idea of the unification of the administration of education was 
proposed by the officials of the Department of Education, the most influen-
tial among them were apparently of the CSIS background. The involvement 
of certain Catholics on this issue helped create a Muslim negative perception 
of the former. In a study of the Government educational policies from 1968-
1978, Pranarka and Prijono of the CSIS identified the dual administration as 
one of the hindrances to the development of national education.69 Therefore, 
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they suggested that the administration should be unified under the Depart-
ment of Education. Similarly, in a closed meeting between the officials of 
the Department of Religion and those of the Department of Education, the 
representative of the latter, F.X. Soediono (a Catholic) said that to achieve 
the goal of national education successfully, the administration of education 
should be done only by the Department of Education.70 As noted earlier, in 
1978, the Government established the Commission for the Reformation of 
the National Education (KPPN). The KPPN’s book on Basic Thoughts on Edu-
cational Reform, published in 1979 also showed the tendency to unify the 
administration of education, even though it was not explicitly stated.71
The Muslim leaders responded negatively to the idea. For Rasjidi, 
the unification would not only reduce the authority of the Department of 
Religion but also would completely secularise the Islamic schools. In other 
words, for him, the problem was not simply with the formal unification of the 
administration but with the content of education that was to be developed 
by the Department of Education. For Rasjidi, this education would be based 
on Pranarka’s secular strategy of culture.72 In line with Rasjidi, in its letter to 
the KPPN, the MUI criticised the KPPN’s book that did not include madrasah 
as a part of the national educational institutions.73 The MUI demanded that 
the madrasah should be included, and its administration under the Depart-
ment of Religion should be maintained. To secure this, the MUI suggested 
that the provision of the KPPN book that the President was responsible for 
the national education should be added with an explanation that the Presi-
dent should authorise the Department of Religion for the administration of 
religious education and the Department of Education for the administration 
of general education.74 
One of the jobs of the KPPN was to prepare a draft of an education bill. 
When Joesoef was replaced by Nugroho Notosusanto as the Minister of Edu-
cation, the latter continued the preparation of the bill by using the reports 
of the KPPN and other sources. After this long process of preparation, the 
next Minister of Education, Fuad Hassan finally proposed the bill to Parlia-
ment by the end of May 1988.75 We have already discussed how the Muslim 
leaders were very suspicious of the works of the KPPN during Joesoef’s min-
istry. Indeed, the education bill that was somehow originally prepared by 
the KPPN did not clearly accommodate Muslim educational interests. One 
of them, the bill neglected the state madrasahs and the authority of the 
Department of Religion to administer them. However, after the Muslim pro-
tests and a series of lobbying between the Muslim leaders, the Government 
and the Parliament, the bill was amended: madrasah education was men-
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tioned and the authority of the Department of Religion in its administration 
was affirmed.76 Parliament finally ratified the bill and the Government intro-
duced it as the Law No. 2/1989 on the National Education System.
Secular Subjects in the Madrasah Curriculum during the New Order
Although the dual administration of education was maintained, the 
New Order Government tried to make the madrasahs’ curriculum similar to 
that of the public schools under the Department of Education. In 1975 the 
Government introduced a curriculum reform for madrasahs. This reform was 
dictated by the joint decree of the Ministers of Religion (Mukti Ali), Education 
and Culture (Sjarief Thajeb) and Home Affairs (Amir Machmud). The reform 
was directed to include more secular subjects in the madrasah curriculum. 
The new curriculum consisted of 70% secular subjects and 30% religious 
subjects. For the secular subjects, the madrasah would simply follow the 
curriculum of the public schools. With this policy, a graduate of a madrasah 
could be accepted to continue study at the public schools and universities 
of the Department of Education. 
Many Muslims reacted negatively to this policy and accused the Gov-
ernment of going too far to secularise madrasahs. Mukti Ali said that certain 
Islamic leaders outside Jakarta even warned him that he could be killed.77 
Steenbrink noted that since the 1950s, the Department of Religion had 
already tried to reform the madrasah curriculum and the Muslim negative 
reactions seem to be not that strong.78 It seems, for some of the Muslims, 
the proportion of secular subjects (70%) was too much and Mukti Ali’s pre-
vious support for the marriage bill of 1973 helped increase their suspicions 
towards his policy.79 Moreover, many, if not most, of the madrasahs were in 
the hands of traditionalist Muslims of the NU who generally resented Mukti 
Ali.80 Despite the opposition, the curriculum reform was to be applied and 
Mukti Ali proudly recalled this as one of his achievements to improve Muslim 
education.81
We have noted that the position of madrasah education under the 
Department of Religion was affirmed in the Education Law of 1989. One of the 
main consequences of this inclusion was that the madrasah curriculum was 
to be more in accordance with that of the public schools of the Department 
of Education. Following the Education Law of 1989, in 1994 the Government 
decided to increase the secular subjects in the madrasah curriculum from 
70% to 80%.82 This meant that the curriculum of the madrasah has become 
only slightly different from that of the public schools under the Department 
of Education. Moreover, previously, the study streams (jurusan) at the Public 
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Senior High Madrasah (MAN) were divided into three: social science, natural 
science and religion (i.e., Islamic studies). Since 1994, in accordance with the 
study streams at the Public Senior High Schools (SMUN), the study stream 
concentrated on religion was abolished. Like those of the SMUN, the study 
streams of the MAN have become three: social science, natural science, and 
language. The difference between MAN and SMUN is only that MAN stu-
dents have to learn a few Islamic subjects, but compared to the study stream 
on religion that was abolished, their study of Islam was not that profound. 
For better or worse, this change of the curriculum, on the one hand, equal-
ized the position of the MAN graduates with those of the SMUN; but on 
the other hand, they became very much less qualified to be specialised in 
Islamic studies. This has become a serious challenge to the State Institute of 
Islamic Studies (IAIN) whose students have been mostly MAN graduates.83
Religion Classes: From Optional to Compulsory
Another important ideological issue in education is religion classes in 
public schools. Should religion become a compulsory subject or optional? 
From the end of 1945 to the early 1960s, religion was a non-compulsory 
subject in public schools and universities in Indonesia.84 In December 1945, 
the Central National Committee of Indonesia (KNIP) issued a declaration on 
education in which the religion class in public schools was also mentioned. 
It was stated that religion “should be given appropriate attention without 
reducing the freedom of those groups who want to follow their respective 
faiths.”85 This idea of freedom later coloured the provision of the Education 
Law of 1950 on religion classes. Article 20 of the Law states that “religion 
classes are to be carried out at the state schools and parents decide wheth-
er their child follows it or not.” The elucidation of article 20 states that: “(a) 
Whether or not a type of school provides a religion class will depend on 
the age and the intellectual level of its students; (b) Mature students can 
decide to follow the religion class or not; (c) The nature of the religion class 
and its teaching hour will be determined in the regulations on the type of 
the school in question; (d) Religion class does not affect the promotion of a 
child.”86 In line with the Law, in the 1960 the MPRS decided that the religion 
class was to be carried out in public schools and universities and at the same 
time the MPRS reaffirmed its non-compulsory character.87
The above policy seems to be a middle way between the Muslim 
demand to have a compulsory religion class and the view of the secular 
oriented groups and the Christians that Government schools had to be free 
from that class. Lambert Kelabora’s explanation of the conflict of interests 
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behind this policy appears to be helpful. Kelabora observed that for the Mus-
lims, to make the religion class compulsory was important “to protect their 
offspring from possible conversion to Christianity,” while for the Christians, 
this “would lead to the use of the Government funds and forces by the Mos-
lem groups to propagate Islam to the detriment of Christianity.” Likewise, if 
the religion class was compulsory, then “the children of the nominal Mos-
lems would be forced by the Government to study Islam in order to be good 
Moslems,” and this would in turn lead to “the gradual strengthening of the 
Moslem groups and to the weakening of the secular forces,” and therefore, 
“the PNI, which drew its supporters mainly from nominal Moslems, rejected 
this policy.”88 
Up to 1960, besides the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and the 
Christians, the other two strong political powers in the late 1950s, the PKI 
and the army, also supported the non-compulsory religion class policy. The 
political development after 1960, however, paved the way for a realization of 
the Muslim aspiration for the compulsory religion class. This change was not 
because of the increase of the Muslim political power but due to the serious 
political rivalries between the army and the PKI. Based on Soekarno’s ‘syn-
thetic ideology’ of Nationalism, Islam and Communism called ‘NASAKOM’, 
the PKI could introduce Communism at every level of society and in most 
educational institutions of the country. In response to this development, 
the army encouraged religious groups, particularly Muslims and Christians, 
to fight against the PKI. In certain Muslim majority areas in Java, Sumatra, 
Sulawesi and Kalimantan, the army supported the Muslim demand for com-
pulsory religion class. 89 
The competition between the army and the PKI also occurred inside 
the administration of the Ministry of Education itself. Since 1961 to the end 
of the Soekarno period, there were two ministers in the Ministry. The com-
petition happened when, Prijono, a former member of the orthodox Marxist 
party, Murba, was the Minster of Basic Education and Culture and General 
Sjarief Thajeb, an Acehnese and a high ranking officer, was the Minister of 
Higher Education and Science. It was through Sjarief Thajeb that the army 
and religious groups were able to develop a policy of compulsory religion 
class at the tertiary level. For this, they created the “Lembaga Pembina Pen-
didikan Agama pada Perguruan Tinggi” (Institute for Developing Religious 
Teaching of Higher Education) in 1963, headed jointly by the Minister of 
Higher Education and the Minister of Religion.90
On the other hand, in October 1960, Prijono who controlled pri-
mary and secondary education, introduced the so-called Pancawardhana 
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(five principles of development) and later in February 1963, he linked the 
Pancawardhana with ‘Pancacinta’ (five loves) and the latter was formulated 
by the PKI dominated ‘Lembaga Pendidikan Nasional’ (National Education 
Institute). While the Pancawardhana still mentioned religious morality, the 
Pancacinta did not include it.91 For the enemies of the PKI, the inclusion of 
religious morality in the Pancawardhana was just lip-service and its absence 
in the Pancacinta proved this assumption. In other words, for them, both 
Pancawardhana and Pancacinta was nothing but the PKI strategy to eradi-
cate the religious dimension of education in the country. The Muslims, both 
the traditionalists of NU and the reformists of Muhammadiyah, followed by 
the Christians and Hindus, opposed the Pancawardhana and Pancacinta. 
Although the ‘Pancas’ survived up to 1965 due to the protection of Soekarno, 
the debates on the issue paved the way for the compulsory religion class pol-
icy in the primary and secondary schools. In 1964, the Government declared 
that the religion class was one of the basic subjects in public schools and 
therefore, it would also affect the promotion of the child. “Thus, by 1965 
religion was no longer an optional and non-compulsory subject…”92
The compulsory religion class policy became more strongly estab-
lished after the abortive coup of 1965 and the rise of the New Order. In 1966, 
the MPRS released the Decree No. XXVII/1966 stating that religion was a 
compulsory subject from primary schools to universities.93 Moreover, the 
teaching hour and the target of the religion class were extended. In 1951 
the Department of Education and the Department of Religion ruled that 
the religion class began at Grade IV of the Elementary School for 2 teaching 
hours94a week but it could be started at Grade I in specific regions and the 
teaching hours could be extended to no more than 4 hours.95 By contrast, 
in 1967 both Departments ruled that the religion class should be started at 
Grade I of the Elementary School and the teaching hours each week were: 2 
hours for Grade I and II; 3 hours for Grade III; 4 hours for Grade IV to VI and 
all Grades of the Junior and Senior High Schools, while for universities only 
2 hours per week.96 In addition, “the status of religion was elevated further 
to the position of Subject No.1, one of a group of six basic subjects designed 
to develop the spirit of Pancasila.”97
This high status of the religion class, however, had to face some chal-
lenges in the following years of the New Order. The reason was, when the PKI 
had already been defeated, the military and other secular oriented groups 
who controlled the Government wanted to weaken their main political rival: 
the Islamic groups. In the MPR session of 1973, during the debate on the 
GBHN, the Government party, Golkar, wanted to abolish the religion class in 
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state education but it was unsuccessful primarily because of the opposition 
of the Islamic party, PPP.98 The issue of the religion class became hot again 
when the Government proposed the education bill in 1988, because it did 
not mention religion as a compulsory subject. In an interview, the Minister 
of Education, Fuad Hassan, said that religious education was the parents’ 
responsibility rather than the state’s. The Islamic leaders soon opposed the 
bill. They reiterated the old arguments that without religious lessons, edu-
cation would lead to secularism and that the GBHN of 1988 (as had been 
the case since 1978) already stated that one of the goals of education was 
to develop human qualities, including the religious qualities of believing 
and following the commands of God.99 After the Muslim protests, Parliament 
finally amended the bill and religion was included in the Education Law of 
1989 as one of the compulsory subjects. Thus, the Islamic groups success-
fully defended the compulsory religion class policy during the New Order. 
Bahtiar Effendi has argued that the inclusion of religion as a com-
pulsory subject in the Education Law of 1989 was one of the indications of 
the political shift of the New Order regime towards the Islamic groups.100 
This view is only partially true. If we look back to the New Order’s policy on 
religion class since 1966, we find that the Law did not make any substantial 
change to the previous policy. Likewise, if we compare the previous efforts 
of Islamic leaders to defend their interests in education with what they did 
in the late 1980s, we can see that the latter was not as special as Sirozi’s 
estimate.101 Perhaps, the challenge was even greater in the previous period 
than in the late 1980s. When Parliament responded to the bill, not only PPP 
but also Golkar and ABRI supported the inclusion of religion as a compulsory 
subject in the Law, while the PDI into which the Christian parties had fused, 
did not explicitly oppose it.102 Moreover, the National Council of Catholic 
Education (MNPK) also suggested that religion class should be included as 
one of the articles of the Education Law.103
PMP: An Ideological Challenge to Islamic Religion Classes
Although the secular oriented group never succeeded in abolishing 
the religion classes from public schools, they apparently tried another way to 
prevent the religion class from being used by the Islamic groups to enhance 
the latter’s ideological orientation. We have noted that in the MPR session of 
1973, the Government party, Golkar, wanted to abolish the religion class from 
state education but it failed. Golkar actually did not only want to abolish the 
religion class, but also suggested replacing it with Pancasila Moral Educa-
tion. Of course, the Muslim party, PPP, as well as the Muslim leaders outside 
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the Parliament, opposed Golkar’s proposal. They argued that it was nothing 
but efforts to secularise the country because Pancasila without religion was 
empty and this would lead to the re-emergence of Communism.104 
The debate finally ended with a compromise, that is, both the religion 
class and Pancasila Moral Education were accommodated. In the section on 
religion, the GBHN of 1973 stated that part of the efforts to enhance the 
facilities needed for the development of religious life was the inclusion of a 
religion class in the curriculum of state education from elementary schools 
up to universities. On the other hand, in the section on education, the GBHN 
stated that the development in the field of education should be based on 
Pancasila and therefore, the curriculum of all levels of education, from kin-
dergarten to university had to contain Pancasila Moral Education.105 
Thus, although the religion class was not abolished, Pancasila Moral 
Education was also approved. In the following years, the Government gradu-
ally enhanced the position of Pancasila Moral Education. In 1975 the Govern-
ment changed the school curriculum and one of the changes was to replace 
the existing subject on ‘Indonesian Civics Education’ with ‘Pancasila Moral 
Education’ (Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP). The schools started using the 
new curriculum in 1976. This meant that all state schools, including madras-
ahs, had to teach PMP. The position of the PMP became much stronger after 
the MPR approved the Government proposal on the Pancasila indoctrina-
tion program called ‘P4’ in 1978, despite the Muslim protests. 
The ideological controversy around PMP emerged when the PMP text-
books were published. The Government did not provide a standard textbook 
of the PMP until October 1980. Thus, from 1976 to 1980, there were various 
PMP textbooks by different authors but the books were to be approved by 
the Department of Education before they could be used. During the absence 
of the standard PMP textbooks, an interesting case occurred. The PMP text-
books for Junior and Senior High Schools by two Muslim authors named 
Saidihardjo and Moekri S. triggered controversy. 106 When they explained the 
first principle of Pancasila, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa, they wrote: “God does 
not have a father and mother. God does not have a son and is not labelled 
as a son.” This statement is very similar to that of the sūrat al-ikhlās of the 
Qur’an,107 and it could be read as an opposition to the Christian doctrine of 
the Trinity, even though the Holy Spirit was not mentioned. 
A Catholic author named P. Rahardjo soon reacted to the textbooks 
and suggested that they should not be used in the Catholic schools. In addi-
tion, the Government authorities also reacted to the textbooks. The Director 
of Elementary and Secondary Education, Dardji Darmodihardjo, said that 
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PMP was a compulsory subject that should be followed by all students of 
different religions. Therefore, he said, Moekri’s and Saidihardjo’s textbooks 
could make a Christian student confused. More than that, Soegijo, the Head 
of the Department of Education and Culture of the East Java province, pro-
hibited all Junior and Senior High schools in his region from using the text-
books. Indeed, the books were not yet approved by the authorities of the 
Department of Education, but they were already sold in the market. Both of 
the Muslim authors, however, finally agreed to revise their books.108 
After the decree of the MPR on the Pancasila indoctrination in 1978, 
the Government apparently became more serious in preparing the PMP text-
books. The Government finally produced the textbooks in 1980. The Islamic 
leaders soon showed their negative responses, primarily to the ideas related 
to inter-religious relations introduced in the books. For instance, the PMP 
textbook for Grade I of the Junior High School (SMP) explained that different 
religions were actually different ways leading to the same goal, that is, to 
God. To make this idea clearer to the students, the book presented different 
religions by analogy with a group of people who wanted to go to Jakarta 
but each of who took different vehicles, one a train, another a bus and the 
third a ship but all of who finally arrived at the same destination. Moreover, 
the textbooks also suggested that to develop religious tolerance one should 
participate in the celebration of religious festivities of another religion, not 
make friends only among co-religionists, and pray for the people of other 
religions.109 All of these ideas remind us of the ideals of religious tolerance of 
the Javanese mysticism considered to be the authentic Indonesian culture 
by the regime. 
The Islamic leaders could not accept the ideas in the PMP textbooks. 
In this regard, the Islamic party, PPP, made a critical review of the PMP 
textbooks and delivered it to the Government on 13 June 1981.110 The PPP 
argued that the ideas in the PMP textbooks are against Islam. To say that 
all religions are leading to the same goal, for the PPP, is contrary to Muslim 
belief that Islam is the only true religion. Likewise, for the PPP, to attend a 
religious activity of another religion like Christmas celebration and to pray 
for unbelievers are forbidden in Islam, while to make friends among Muslims 
is encouraged based on the so-called called “ukhuwwah islāmiyyah” (Islamic 
brotherhood). For the PPP, all of these indicated that the books contradicted 
the article 29 of the 1945 Constitution protecting the right of every citizen to 
follow his or her religion. Last but not least, for the PPP, to cultivate religious 
tolerance, one should not endanger religious beliefs or otherwise it would 
be counter-productive.
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It is unclear to me how far the Muslim protests were to influence the 
changes of the PMP textbooks in the following years. If there were such a 
change, I think it would not change the Government’s basic ideological view 
of religious tolerance. It is certain that PMP was an important subject in the 
state education system up to the end of the New Order. Moreover, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3, after 1985 all social and political organisations were 
obliged to accept Pancasila as their sole basis. This indicates, though indi-
rectly, that the position of PMP was unchallenged. Moreover, in addition to 
religion and civics, the Education Law of 1989 declared that PMP was one 
of the compulsory subjects. 111 Thus, despite the early Muslim opposition to 
PMP, it was placed side by side with religion as a compulsory subject by the 
Law.
Comparative Religion: Another Challenge to Islamic Religion 
Classes
We can see that the Muslim opposition to the PMP textbooks was 
clearly related to inter-religious issues. However, it was not specifically relat-
ed to Muslim-Christian relations. Perhaps, among the Muslims, the PMP con-
troversy was also considered a Muslim-Christian issue due to the fact that 
the PMP was introduced for the first time by the Department of Education 
during the ministry of the CSIS man, Daoed Joesoef. As noted, Joesoef is a 
Muslim but he preferred secularism to Islamic ideology in politics. Therefore, 
he could cooperate with the Catholic intellectuals of the CSIS who shared 
the same position. Like other secular intellectuals, Joesoef considered reli-
gious education as a family rather than a state responsibility. Joesoef also 
explained that his opposition to the religion class in public schools was 
because the Islamic religion class tended to cultivate the seeds of hatred 
towards other religions, fanaticism and hypocrisy.112 Joesoef’s remark on 
the Islamic religion class is apparently too strong but there is some truth 
in it. In a study of the guidelines of the Islamic religious curriculum of 1975 
and 1976 for public schools, Atho Mudzhar concludes that the curriculum 
paid very little attention (if any at all) to the idea of comparative religion 
or respect of other religions. The socio-political development around the 
religion class policy, he said, contributed to this exclusive tendency of the 
Islamic religious curriculum in the public schools.113
Because Joesoef believed that the Islamic religion class was used by 
Islamic leaders to cultivate inter-religious hatred, the Department of Edu-
cation under his leadership suggested that the religion class should be 
changed from focusing on a single religion to a comparative study of reli-
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gion. In March 1979, in a meeting between the Department of Education 
and the Department of Religion, F.X. Soediono, a Catholic and the head of 
the Department of Education team, proposed this idea. The advantage of 
the comparative study of religion, he said, was that the student’s knowl-
edge would not be limited to a single religion. Soediono argued further 
that religious education as efforts to cultivate and experience religion was 
the responsibility of the family and religious institutions, not the Govern-
ment. 
Certainly this idea provoked Muslim negative reactions. Rasjidi 
for instance cynically said that this was “the core of the core” of what the 
Department of Education called “educational reforms.”114 In the middle of 
1979, Amir Hamzah, a Parliament member of the PPP, questioned Daoed 
Joesoef about this issue. Probably because of the Muslim opposition, Joe-
soef said that his Department never prepared a curriculum on compar-
ative religion for public schools as it was reported in the press. Joesoef 
explained further that the paper presented by F.X. Soediono in the meet-
ing was for a limited audience and it was prepared as a response to a paper 
by the Department of Religion. Thus, he said, this issue was not final and 
had to be discussed among the Government apparatus. He also asserted 
that the publication of the idea in the press was not the responsibility of 
his Department.115 
The attempt to change religion class from focusing on one religion 
to the great religions, however, continued. In 7 November 1979, Kompas 
reported that Prof. Harsja W. Bachtiar, a high official at the Department 
of Education, suggested that the religion class in the universities should 
become a study of the great religions in the country. Bachtiar argued that as 
the well-educated section of the Indonesian society, university students had 
to develop communication and cooperation across religious differences and 
therefore they had to have a minimum knowledge of every religion of the 
Indonesian society. Bachtiar argued further to criticise the existing method 
of religion class in the university. He said that a religion class focused on a sin-
gle faith would sharpen religious differences because first, students would 
be classified on a religious basis before receiving their respective religion 
class; and second, the teacher tended to claim the truth of the religion that 
was taught by discrediting other religions. Bachtiar was also critical of the 
existing method of teaching religion that emphasized memorising rather 
than reasoning and that a lecturer sometimes preferred to teach only a ritual 
practice (an implicit reference to the Muslim daily prayer). Bachtiar recog-
nised that experts on comparative religion were very rare but he suggested 
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that a textbook on this subject called ‘Agama dan Mahasiswa’ (Religion and 
the University Student) should be prepared by various experts of the five 
religions in Indonesia.116 
Again, the Muslim leaders reacted negatively to this proposal.117 While 
both F.X. Soediono and Bachtiar used the term ‘great religions’, the Muslims 
called it ‘Panca Agama’ (five religions), a reference to the five recognized 
religions in the country (Hinduism, Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism 
and Islam). Rasjidi disagreed with this idea because for him as a subject, 
comparative religion or Panca Agama, tended to look at religion in terms 
of knowledge rather than belief, and therefore, it was a secular approach to 
religion. Likewise, Zakiah Daradjat, the head of the Directorate of Education 
of the Department of Religion, said that the religion class should be directed 
to cultivate the religious commitment of the students, and therefore, both 
the teacher and the students should be believers in the religion in question. 
Because the teacher had to be committed to his or her religion, HAMKA was 
of the opinion that neither a Muslim nor a non-Muslim could teach fairly the 
religions other than their own. Moreover, Rasjidi maintains that the Panca 
Agama would create confusion or indifference rather than commitment to 
religion because the religious knowledge of the students in the secular uni-
versities was generally very limited and the teaching period was very short. 
HAMKA eventually claimed that the idea to teach five religions was noth-
ing but another effort of the secular groups to hinder the increasing Islamic 
awareness in society. More than that, Daud Ali, another Muslim intellectual 
and a Professor of Law at the University of Indonesia, suspected that the 
idea was actually to legalise hidden attempts to convert the followers of a 
certain religion (read: Islam).
The Muslim leaders also reacted to Bachtiar’s criticisms of the method 
of teaching the religion class. Both Rasjidi and Deliar Noer (another promi-
nent Muslim intellectual) agreed that certain teachers of the religion class 
emphasised memory rather than reason. However, the emphasis on memo-
ry, they said, was also found in other classes and so it was not distinctively 
the problem of the religion class and it could be improved in the future. Both 
Zakiah and Rasjidi disagreed with the view that teaching a single religion 
would sharpen religious differences and discredit other religions because, 
they claimed, Islam teaches its adherents to be tolerant to the followers of 
other religions. Moreover, Deliar Noer criticized Bachtiar’s assumption that 
to be tolerant to the followers of other religions, one should understand 
those religions. Noer said that this assumption was false and not based on 
factual reality. For example, he said, Rasjidi understood Christianity and T.B. 
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Simatupang understood Islam well, but both were almost always in opposi-
tion to each other because Rasjidi thought that Simatupang supported the 
Christian efforts to convert Muslims while Simatupang considered Rasjidi to 
be too fanatical. According to Noer, religious tolerance would emerge not 
from knowledge of other religions, but from a personal attitude of avoiding 
intervening and disturbing the religion of others. Thus, he said, the idea of 
teaching the subject of the great religions to university students was false 
because its underlying assumption was false.
Both Ministers of Religion and Education eventually talked about the 
issue. Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, the Minister of Religion, said that the 
religion class was under the authority of his Department, not of another 
(that is, not the Department of Education). He also said that Panca Agama 
was a “crazy idea” if it meant that students were guided to be committed to 
five religions altogether. Alamsyah finally said that there was no obligation 
in Indonesia “for the people who already adhered to a certain religion to 
learn about other religions.”118 On the other hand, Harsya W. Bachtiar did 
not try to defend his idea further publicly. In his reaction to the criticism, 
Daoed Joesoef explained that his Department never prepared a subject 
called ‘Panca Agama’ and that there was a certain group (an implicit refer-
ence to the Muslim leaders) who manipulated this issue to attack him.119 
Thus, the study of the great religions or ‘Panca Agama’ in public schools and 
universities was never realised. However, as we shall see in Chapter 6, a more 
sympathetic approach to the study of other religions developed in the IAINs 
and Christian Academies of Theology (STTs).
Should Ramadan be Schooldays or Holidays?
Another Government educational policy that triggered Muslim pro-
tests during the New Order was on Ramadan holidays. Before the New Order 
period, this issue apparently never became a public controversy. In 1957, 
Saadoedin Djambek, a prominent Muhammadiyah leader, noted that up to 
that year, schools were officially on holidays for the whole Ramadan. How-
ever, he also noted that in fact there was almost no school without activities 
during the fasting month. The schools, in consultation with the students’ 
parents, usually decided to give lessons for several days but the teaching 
hours were shortened.120 I do not know exactly what the Government policy 
from 1957 to the end of 1960s was, but it seems the policy was more or less 
the same. However, in 1970 the New Order Government decided that only 
two weeks of Ramadan were to be free. This policy was later changed in 1977 
when the Government made the whole Ramadan free.121 
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The debates on Ramadan holidays during the New Order period 
appear to have been initiated in May 1975 when the Association of the 
Teachers of the Republic of Indonesia (PGRI) in cooperation with the Nation-
al Committee of the Indonesian Youth (KNPI) held a seminar on school holi-
days. The Minister of Education, Sjarief Thajeb, supported the seminar and 
the representatives of the Department of Religion, Department of Education 
and Culture, PGRI, Golkar and private educational institutions joined the 
seminar as speakers or participants. Zakiah Daradjat was the speaker who 
tried to defend the importance of having a full Ramadan holiday. The other 
speakers had different views: Moh. Said Reksohadiprodjo from Taman Siswa 
argued for the abolition of Ramadan holidays, while Sadatoen, a representa-
tive of the Indonesian Doctors Association (IDI) suggested that several days 
of Ramadan should be holidays, but not all.122 
The contrast between Daradjat’s and Reksohadiprodjo’s views 
reflected the tensions between Islamic and secular perspectives, while 
Sadatoen’s position was a compromise between the two positions. For 
Zakiah, the main reason why Ramadan should be a full holiday was because 
it was the period in which Muslim children were educated outside the 
schools to practice and learn Islam. In contrast, Reksohadiprodjo argued 
that Ramadan could not be a holiday because it would disturb the school 
academic calendar, which was based on the Christian calendar (solar year) 
rather than the Muslim calendar (lunar year). Sadatoen, on the other hand, 
suggested that 3 days at the beginning of Ramadan would be better to 
be holidays in order to acclimatize the physical and mental condition of 
the students and teachers to fasting. The schools should then continue 
their activities afterwards, but the teaching hours should be shortened 
and more religion classes could be given. Then the schools should have 
holidays again for two weeks, namely one week before and another after 
the end of Ramadan. The result of the questionnaires distributed to the 
participants of the seminar indicates that most of them preferred this com-
promise position.123
The results of the seminar of 1975, however, did not immediately per-
suade the Minister of Education and Culture, Sjarief Thajeb, to change the 
Government policy. As has been noted, from 1970 to 1977, the policy was 
that only two weeks of Ramadan were holidays, but in 1977 the whole of 
Ramadan was made a holiday. When Daoed Joesoef became the Minister, 
however, he made a different policy. In July 1978, he issued the decree No. 
0211/U/1978 on the academic calendar system of schools. Article 6 of the 
decree stated that, basically, Ramadan was schooldays, but the fasting month 
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was to be respected: 10 days of Ramadan were holidays, namely 3 days at 
the beginning of the month and 7 days around Idul Fitri (‘īd al-fitr).124
The Muslim leaders soon opposed Joesoef’s Ramadan policy. In gen-
eral, for the Muslims the policy was nothing but an attempt to secularise 
the country. In this context, Rasjidi said that the policy was indeed in line 
with Pranarka’s strategy of culture, and it was an expression of “the spirit of 
anti-Islam more serious than that of Dutch colonialism.”125 The reason was, 
as the traditionalist Muslim politician, Mahbub Djunaidi noted, the Dutch as 
well as the Japanese colonisers made Ramadan a full holiday.126 Moreover, 
the traditionalist Muslim leader, Saifuddin Zuhri, claimed that all Ministers 
of Education and Culture before Daoed Joesoef also determined that Ram-
adan was a holiday.127 HAMKA, the head of the Indonesian Council of Ulama 
(MUI) in his Friday sermon said that the policy was a serious ordeal and sug-
gested the Muslims to undertake the qunūt nāzila, a special Muslim prayer 
said when facing an ordeal.128 Amir Hamzah, on behalf the Islamic party, PPP, 
argued that the policy was against the provisions of the GBHN of 1978 which 
stated that the facilities for religious life should be supported, and Article 26 
of the Education Law of 1950, which stated that to determine school holi-
days, religion should be taken into account. Hamzah warned that the policy 
had created anxieties among the Muslims and disturbed the relationships 
between the Government and the Islamic communities.129 
On the other hand, Daoed Joesoef tried to defend his policy.130 He 
said that the policy was not a religious but an educational issue. With ref-
erence to the seminar in 1975, Joesoef said that Ramadan could not be a 
full holiday because that would disturb the school academic calendar. He 
argued further that the Government wanted to have a uniform academic 
calendar for all schools, so that the activities such as upgrading programs 
for teachers, school sport and art competitions and scout and guide pro-
grammes could be arranged without reducing the schooldays. Moreover, 
he said, to study in Ramadan was in line with the teachings of Islam and 
that the first verses revealed to Muhammad was in Ramadan in which God 
ordered human beings to read and study. For this religious justification, 
Joesoef was supported at least by two Muslim leaders: one was a Muslim 
cleric named Kholil Asy’ari who talked along with Joesoef in an Islamic 
preaching programme on the national television;131 another was Ali Hasj-
mi, the general chairman of the MUI of Aceh.132 In addition, Joesoef argued 
that in other Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Malay-
sia, Ramadan was not a holiday either. He also maintained that the policy 
was not opposed to Article 26 of the Education Law, because its provision 
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stated that not only religion, but also education, were to be taken into 
considerations.133
Joesoef’s explanation, however, did not convince the Muslims. The 
Muslim organizations like Muhammadiyah, al-Washliyah, Nahdlatul Ulama, 
the MUI and others, were all equally opposed to the policy.134 From March to 
June 1979, lobbying between the Islamic groups and the Government was 
quite intensive, but nothing could finally change the policy. In a meeting with 
the MUI on 29 March 1979, Daoed Joesoef even said that he would review 
the Government subsidies for Muhammadiyah private schools, if they did 
not follow his policy.135 In the beginning, tensions also occurred between 
the Department of Religion and the Department of Education. The General 
Directorate of Islamic Education sent a letter, dated 2 May 1979, to all state 
madrasahs in which it was stated that Ramadan would be a holiday.136 How-
ever, the madrasahs under the Department of Religion eventually had to 
follow Joesoef’s policy.137 In this respect, in the beginning the Muslims seem 
to have expected the Minister of Religion, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, to 
support them but in fact he did not. In a meeting with the representatives 
of Islamic organisations, Alamsyah said that the Government policy would 
not be changed and at the same time he told them that President Soeharto 
guaranteed that national education would not lead to secularism or the 
destruction of religion.138 By the end of May, a delegation of the MUI had a 
meeting with Soeharto who suggested that, as a compromise, the holidays 
for Ramadan could be prolonged to more than the 10 days the decree stated 
but the MUI disagreed.139
When Ramadan came in July 1979, the Government finally proceeded 
with its policy, by issuing guidelines for teaching and learning activities in 
Ramadan in which it was stated, among other things, that the teaching hours 
were to be shorter than usual, the religion class should be intensified, and 
school canteens had to be closed.140 On the other hand, the Muslim private 
schools affiliated with Muhammadiyah, NU and other Islamic organizations, 
did not follow the Government policy. As has been stated earlier, private 
schools normally received Government subsidies insofar that they followed 
the Government curriculum and policies. In this context, the disobedience 
of the Muhammadiyah schools provided a justification for Joesoef to realise 
his threat. In a meeting with the Heads of Department of Education and Cul-
ture of all provinces, Joesoef instructed them to stop and withdraw Govern-
ment aid for some Muhammadiyah schools. Joesoef’s step certainly made 
the Muslims more disappointed. Ridwan Saidi, the reformist Muslim politi-
cian said that Joesoef actually demonstrated the corruption of power, while 
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Abdurrahman Wahid, the Muslim traditionalist leader, said that it was “the 
arrogance of bureaucracy.”141 
The controversy on the issue, therefore, helped sharpen the tensions 
between the Muslims and the secular-oriented groups. The Christians were 
probably in line with the Government position, even though they were not 
very much involved in the controversy. It is noteworthy that a Catholic priest 
named J.C. Tarunasayoga, wrote a comment on this controversy in Tempo. 
He said that the Catholics also fast for 40 days, leading to Easter, but they 
did not ask the Government to free schools for the fasting, because they 
“tried to be mature.” He also emphasized that Golkar and the military were 
in fact politically strong, but they did not demand Ramadan to be holidays 
too. These remarks clearly indicate support for the Government policy, and 
criticism of the Muslim demand; but nevertheless, I do not find any Muslim 
reaction to it.142 However, for many of the Muslims, Daoed Joesoef’s alliance 
with the Catholics at the CSIS somehow indicated that the Christians con-
tributed to or at least supported Joesoef’s educational policies. 
Other Ministers of Education during the New Order period subse-
quently continued Daoed Joesoef’s Ramadan policy. On the other hand, 
Muslim opposition to the policy seemingly did not increase in the years 
after 1979.143 Perhaps, some Islamic private schools even finally decided to 
follow the policy in order to secure Government subsidies. Perhaps, when 
the policy was applied, the Muslims found that it was not as alarming as 
they expected before. Indeed, the eradication of Ramadan holidays appar-
ently did not decrease, or even arguably increased, the opportunities for the 
young generation to study Islam.
DDC: Christianisation via the Library? 
Our discussion so far demonstrates that the Muslim leaders were 
always suspicious of the Government’s secular-orientated educational poli-
cies. The Muslim leaders also suspected the involvement of the Christians in 
making Government policies, particularly during Joesoef’s ministry. In 1981, 
the Muslims opposed another Government policy on the library catalogue 
system. The case itself is far from being so important but the Muslim reac-
tion to it was rather serious. The Muslim leaders accused the Government of 
doing Christianisation via the library. This reaction can be read as an exam-
ple of Muslim oversensitivity to Christianisation or of Muslim usage of the 
discourse on Christianisation to attack the secularists. 
The origin of the case was the project of the Department of Educa-
tion and Culture on standardization of educational facilities in 1980/1981. To 
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standardise the public school libraries throughout the country, this project 
produced a Guide for the Libraries of Senior High Schools. The Guide, per-
haps unexpectedly, became another target of Muslim protests. Jusuf Hasjim, 
a Muslim traditionalist politician in the PPP, objected to the Guide because 
he found that it was heavily based on a Christian book classification system, 
i.e., the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC), a book classification created 
by an American librarian, Melvil Dewey (1851-1932). Because Dewey was a 
Christian, it was reasonable that the DDC provided a higher proportion of 
classifications of Christian books compared to that of other religions, includ-
ing Islam. Actually there were various modifications of the DDC, but the one 
that was used in the Guide was almost the same as the one used in the 
library of the Christian University, Satyawacana (UKSW), Salatiga.144 
While Dardji Darmodihardjo, the Director of Primary and Secondary 
Education, said that it was only a simple and not serious case, the Muslims 
claimed the opposite. There were various Muslim responses to this case. 
145 The politicians like Jusuf Hasjim and Amir Hamzah used the rhetoric of 
Pancasila. They said Pancasila accommodated not only Christianity but also 
other religions and so the Guide contradicted Pancasila. The Muslim profes-
sional librarians had more scientific responses: Halimah Majid, the librar-
ian of the State Institute of Islamic Studies, Jakarta, said that the DDC sys-
tem should be modified and adapted to Indonesian needs. She herself had 
already developed the DDC according to the Islamic subjects for the library 
in her Institute. Likewise, A. Azis Baco suggested that the Department of 
Education should be open to cooperate with other librarians to develop a 
classification system more applicable to Indonesia. The other respondents 
tried to relate the case with Christianisation. The Muslims argued that the 
intended result behind the policy was that the Government would provide 
a large numbers of books on Christianity and very few on Islam let alone 
other religions. In this regard, HAMKA said that the Guide was related to 
the rumour that the Christians planned to Christianise Java in 25 years and 
Indonesia in 50 years.146 Likewise, an author wrote in Aula, the magazine 
of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), that the Guide was nothing but “Christianisation 
through the library.”147
In this context, it is interesting to see how Aula tried to describe how the 
interest behind Joesoef’s controversial policies finally became more identifi-
able with this case. Aula wrote that the best known Minister among Muslims 
was Daoed Joesoef, the Minister of Education whose name consisted of two 
names of the Islamic prophets mentioned both in the Bible and the Qur’an. 
Aula then explained that in the Christian tradition, it was said that the Virgin 
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Mary was betrothed to Joesoef (Joseph), the son of Daoed (David), and so 
this name was only slightly different from the name of the Minister: Mary’s 
betrothed was Joesoef Daoed, while the Minister was Daoed Joesoef. The 
magazine explained further that Joesoef’s policies, one after another had 
surprised the Muslims. If one analogised Joesoef’s surprises with a pistol to 
shoot Muslim bodies, Aula said, the book classification case helped identify 
“what kind of pistol he used and who actually ordered it.”148 Thus, Joesoef 
was identified with a Christian figure (Mary’s betrothed) and his educational 
policies were accused of being ordered by the Christians.
Against Christianisation: Controversy on Religion Classes in Private 
Schools
The Muslim concern with Christianisation in education is more obvi-
ous if we look at the controversy on the policy on religious instruction in pri-
vate schools. To understand this, we should trace back the historical develop-
ment of the issue. As noted earlier, the Education Law of 1950 dictated that 
the religion class was optional in the sense that students had the freedom 
to follow or not follow the class. In this context, in July 1951, the Minister of 
Religion and the Minister of Education and Culture released a joint regula-
tion on the religion class at schools. The regulation, stated, among other 
things, that: (1) a religion class was to be given according to the religious 
adherence of respective students; (2) a religion class was only given if there 
were at least 10 students of the religion in question in the class; (3) students 
who adhered to a religion different from the one taught in the class, or stu-
dents who adhered to the religion in question but whose parents did not 
allow them to follow the class, were allowed to leave during the teaching 
hour; (4) the religious teacher was forbidden to teach something that could 
hurt the feelings of the followers of another religion and belief.149 
When the New Order emerged, there was actually no change of regu-
lation on the religion class, except that the freedom was restricted. We have 
already mentioned that in contrast to the provision of the Education Law 
of 1950, in 1966 the MPRS decreed that religion class was compulsory and 
therefore, all students had to follow a religion class willingly or not. How-
ever, this did not mean that they had no freedom of choice, because the elu-
cidation of the Decree stated that, “(1) all religions recognized by the Gov-
ernment will have the same opportunity; (2) for the sake of tolerance and 
human rights, every student is free to choose a religion class according to 
personal conviction and will.”150 This decree seems to indicate that, although 
the religion class was compulsory, if the school in question provided differ-
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ent religion classes (supposed that there were 10 Christian students and 
10 Muslim students in the class, so the school could provide two religion 
classes according to the joint regulation), the students were free to choose 
one of them. 
In practice, it is probably safe to claim that in public schools students 
rarely chose a religion class different from their own beliefs. The controversy 
on this issue, therefore, was not primarily related to public schools but pri-
vate schools, particularly the Christian schools. Many Muslim parents pre-
ferred to send their children to study at Christian private schools because 
the latter could provide a high quality of learning and training. As in many 
other countries, the Christian schools in Indonesia have been developed 
since the colonial period when the Christian missionaries started their mis-
sion in the Archipelago. These schools did not only produce the early promi-
nent Christian leaders of the new Republic of Indonesia, but also helped 
eradicate illiteracy among the natives throughout the country.151 With the 
long experience and tradition of managing modern education, the Christian 
schools, particularly in some major cities of Indonesia, successfully proved 
that the performance of their students was often better than that of those 
in the Islamic private schools.152
For many of the Muslims concerned with religious education, the 
enrolment of many Muslim students in the Christian schools has been 
alarming because the students only received a Christian religion class. The 
prominent Muslim leaders said that a Muslim child who studied at a Chris-
tian school would face at least two dangers: the child might be converted to 
Christianity; or become a sceptical and uncommitted Muslim.153 The Muslim 
concerns with this issue seem to be already found in the joint regulation of 
the Ministers of Religion and Education of 1951, which stated that it was 
applicable to private schools if their respective authorities were willing to do 
so, or if parents of no less than 10 students of the school wanted their chil-
dren to be given a religion class of a certain religion. In the latter case, the 
elucidation of the regulation stated that the Government would provide a 
religious teacher for the religion in question and help find the place to carry 
out the class, if the authority of the private school did not allow its school 
building to be used for the class. It was also mentioned that often parents 
could not avoid sending their children to a private school because there 
were no other schools in their area, even though in terms of religion they 
could not agree with the principles and aims of that school. In this case, the 
elucidation of the regulation suggested that those children should not be 
forced to learn a religion different from the religion of their parents.154 
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I have no idea if there was any example in which Muslim parents 
whose children studied in a Christian school tried to manage an Islamic reli-
gion class for their children in accordance with the provision of the joint 
regulation. Nonetheless, it seems to be reasonable to assume that this kind 
of case scarcely happened because parents who wanted their children to 
study at a Christian school usually had to sign a statement of agreement that 
their children would only receive Christian religious education. For the par-
ents, this was somehow simply a necessary consequence for anybody who 
studied in a Christian private school. Moreover, it could be safe to assume 
that only few devout Muslim parents sent their children to Christian schools, 
while many of them were not devout and practicing Muslims and did not 
care too much about the religious education of their children. 
To face this challenge, some Muslim leaders tried to do at least three 
things: first, they tried to convince the Muslim communities through media 
and preaching that to study in a Christian school was harmful to the Islamic 
commitment of children; second, the Muslims tried to establish and develop 
better Islamic private schools to compete with the Christian schools; third, 
they demanded a state regulation obliging every private school to provide 
a religion class according to the religion of the students. The last attempt 
seems to indicate that the provision of the joint regulation of 1951 above 
was far from satisfying the Muslims. On the other hand, this attempt was 
not easy because while the first and second aims were only Muslim internal 
affairs, the third aim had to face opposition from the Christians and others 
who shared or sympathised with the Christian objection. 
The idea to oblige Christian schools to provide Islamic religion classes 
for Muslim students was somehow parallel with the Muslim demand in 1967 
that religious propagation should not be directed to the people who already 
adhered to one of the recognised religions.155 In August 1968, the reformist 
Muslim party, PMI, demanded that the Government should implement the 
compulsory religion class policy dictated in the MPRS decree No.XXVII/1966 
for both public and private schools and universities. The PMI also demanded 
that the religion taught in the class should be the religion of the students.156 
The Muslim concern with this issue continued in the following years. In 1973, 
Muhammad Natsir, the Muslim reformist leader, complained that Muslim 
students in Christian schools were obliged to follow a Bible study and to 
participate in Christian rituals. If one questioned this practice, Natsir said, 
the school’s reply was that it was the regulation of the school and “if you 
object to this, why do you study here?”157 In 1974, Natsir wrote in Media 
Dakwah to urge the Indonesian authorities to follow Malaysia’s policy that 
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Muslim students at Christian schools were provided with an Islamic religion 
class.158 In the conference on Islamic Da’wa and Christian Mission in 1976 
(discussed in Chapter 2), Rasjidi also reiterated Natsir’s complaints.159 Per-
haps, partly because of Rasjidi’s complaint, one of the points of the State-
ment of the Conference was: “It also agrees that the family and community 
should have the right to ensure the religious education of their children by 
organizing their own schools, or by having teachers of their own denomi-
nation to teach religion to their children in the school, or by other suitable 
means.”160 Indeed, in his account of the conference, Rasjidi explained that 
this point of the Statement means that Christian schools should provide 
Islamic religion classes for Muslim students and allow them to go to the 
mosque for Friday prayer.161 Later during the controversy on the Alamsyah’s 
decrees on religious propagation and foreign aid for religious institutions 
in 1978,162 Rasjidi returned to this point of the Statement of the Conference 
and suggested that it should become a regulation because it had not yet 
been included in the decrees.163
On the other hand, the Christians were also aware of the Muslim con-
cerns with this problem. In response to the PMI’s demand in 1968 quoted 
above, the Catholic magazine, Peraba, stated that the compulsory religion 
class policy could only be applied to public, not private schools. Peraba also 
referred to the elucidation of the MPRS decree No.XXVII/1966, which stated 
that students had the freedom to choose a religion class that they wanted 
to take.164 By contrast, in October 1973, Tempo reported that among the 
Catholics, a former priest and a prominent Catholic leader, J. Riberu, and 
a Jesuit, Danuwinata, shared the Muslim concerns. Riberu was reported to 
have said, “If the mission of education is to enhance human dignity, then 
give every student the freedom to follow the religious instruction that he 
or she wants, and do not involve non-Catholic students in prayer and the 
Eucharist.” Riberu, therefore, suggested that the Catholic schools should 
provide religious teachers according to the religions of the students. In this 
context, Danuwinata said that if a student received at school instruction in 
a religion different from that at home, he or she would suffer from “dualism 
and tensions in personality and this contradicts the principles of education.” 
Danuwinata even suggested that non-Catholic students who wanted to 
learn about Catholicism should do so outside the Catholic school. Accord-
ing to Tempo, because of this radical idea, it was rumoured that Danuwinata 
wanted to eradicate the Catholic religion class at the Catholic schools, and 
the Jesuit General in Rome had to come to Jakarta to deal with the case. 
As a result, Danuwinata was removed from his position at the Indonesian 
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Bishops Council (MAWI).165 On the other hand, it was not surprising that the 
Muslims were happy with Riberu’s and Danuwinata’s idea, even though the 
Church hierarchy apparently opposed them.166 
The Christian opposition to the idea of teaching non-Christian reli-
gions in Christian schools, however, was more noticeable in 1985 when 
the Christians became suspicious of a Government regulation.167 In Janu-
ary 1985, the General Directorate of Elementary and Secondary Education 
issued a regulation in which it was stated that a student of Junior High 
School (SMP) and Senior High School (SMA) had to fill in a form to deter-
mine which religion class of the five recognized religions he or she wanted 
to follow and this form also had to be signed by the parents. For the stu-
dents of the elementary schools, the form was to be filled in and signed by 
their parents only. Both the DGI and MAWI soon reacted negatively to this 
regulation. They argued that the regulation was against religious freedom 
because the obligation to choose only one religion meant to reduce the 
opportunities for students to learn about other religions. Leo Soekoto, the 
secretary general of MAWI said that religious freedom means that a person 
had the opportunity to review his or her own religion and compare it with 
other religions. In short, both the DGI and MAWI were worried that due to 
the regulation, every student would have difficulties in changing religion. 
The main concern of both DGI and MAWI, however, was not simply 
religious freedom; they were anxious whether the regulation was to be 
applied to the Protestant and Catholic private schools. If the regulation was 
applied to the Christian schools, then they had to provide a religious teacher 
for every class that had at least 10 non-Christian students who followed the 
same religion. As has been noted, the joint regulation of the Ministers of 
Religion and Education of 1951 dictated that this rule was only applicable 
to private schools if the latter willingly submitted to it. The Christians were 
worried that the ‘willingness’ was to be changed into an ‘obligation’ by the 
new Government policy. In this regard, to defend themselves, the Christians 
did not talk about religious freedom but the right of private educational 
institutions to be independent from state intervention. They said that the 
state had to respect the right of a private school to maintain its own distinc-
tive character. 
In response to the Christian criticisms, the Minister of Education 
and Culture, Nugroho Notosusanto, said that religious freedom at schools 
was still guaranteed. He said that the regulation did not force students to 
embrace any but their own respective religions. Notosusanto also said that 
a student who converted to another religion, could take the religion class 
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of the new religion. The problem with this, he said, was simply with the cur-
riculum because a religion class in Grade I was lower and simpler than that 
of the upper Grades. For this problem, he suggested that the student should 
study the materials of the religion class below the current Grade. Last but 
not least, he asserted that the regulation was only for Government schools, 
not private schools. On the other hand, the leader of the MUI, E.Z. Muttaq-
ien, said that he had no objection to the regulation because it was intended 
to establish exactly the religious affiliations of the students, so the Govern-
ment could provide religious teachers in accordance with the needs of the 
students in that school.168
Despite the Christian criticisms, the Government proceeded with a 
higher level of regulation on this issue. In April 1985, the Minister of Edu-
cation and Culture, Nugroho Notosusanto and the Minister of Religion, 
Munawir Sjadzali, issued a joint decree on the implementation of religious 
education at the elementary and secondary schools. In its introduction, the 
joint decree stated that it replaced the joint decree of 1951. The joint decree 
states, among other things, that: (1) at the Government schools, the religion 
class should be given for at least two teaching hours a week; (2) the students 
are obliged to follow the religion class according to their respective reli-
gions; (3) the students who follow Javanese mysticism (Aliran Kepercayaan) 
must follow the religion class of one of the five religions that the student 
chooses; (4) if there are at least 10 students of the same religion in a class, 
their religion should be taught in the class; (5) if there is no teacher to teach 
a certain religion in a school, then a temporary teacher of the religion in 
question can be appointed; (6) a religion class for the students whose reli-
gion is not taught in the class is to be given by a religious master (pembina 
agama) of that religion.169 
I do not have further information about how the Christians and Mus-
lims responded to the joint decree. One thing, however, certainly happened: 
it was not applied to private schools. This was indicated by the fact that 
during the MPR session of 1988, the Muslims wanted to include in the GBHN 
that the regulation on religion classes was to be applied to private schools. 
Lukman Harun, the Muslim leader of Muhammadiyah said that Muham-
madiyah schools were ready to provide religious teachers of other religions 
if there were students who needed them. However, this idea failed to be 
included in the GBHN apparently because the Government party, Golkar, 
and the military did not support it.170 Several months later, however, the 
Muslims had a phrase successfully inserted into the elucidation of the article 
28, section 2 of the Education Law, 1989. The phrase stated that the teacher 
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of the religion class had to be a believer in that religion and the students 
had to be of the same religion.171 For both Feillard and Effendy, the inclusion 
of this statement in the Education Law was evidence of the New Order’s 
accommodation of Islam.172 As both of them asserted, however, it was not 
eventually applied to private schools. Thus, the final and actual result of the 
inclusion of the statement in the Education Law was nothing but reaffirma-
tion of the Government’s previous policy. This, once again, indicates that the 
regime always tried to accommodate to a certain extent both the Muslim 
and the Christian interests even in the period when the Government was in 
general more favourable to other Muslim interests. 
To illustrate this point, it is important to see the development of the 
controversy on this issue before and after the ratification of the education 
bill. The elucidation of the article 28, section 2, was originally proposed by 
the PPP faction and supported by both the ABRI and Golkar factions in Par-
liament. However, the PDI, which had emerged out of fusion of the previous 
Christian parties with the nationalist PNI, opposed it. The PDI’s opposition 
was consistently maintained up to the end of the debate on the bill.173 The 
formal argument put forward by the PDI was that the elucidation was incon-
sistent with the article 28, section 2 itself, because the article was on the 
qualifications of a teacher174 while its elucidation mentioned the qualifica-
tion of both student and teacher (that is, in religion classes, both student 
and teacher had to be of the same religion). This also meant that the PDI 
would only agree provided the elucidation stated that religious teacher had 
to be a follower of the religion in question, but not the students. In the ple-
nary session on 6 March 1989 for the ratification of the bill, the speaker of 
the PDI faction, Soebagjo stated that his faction could accept the bill with 
a specific note on the elucidation of the article 28, section 2. Besides reit-
erating the above arguments, he warned that the elucidation would create 
a socio-political condition that could disturb or hinder national develop-
ment. When the chairman of the session asked whether all members of the 
Parliament agreed to ratify the bill, Djufri, a PDI deputy, interrupted and 
questioned the continuity of the specific note of his faction. The chairman 
said, because the PDI faction stated that it could accept the bill even with a 
specific note, it meant that all factions agreed to ratify the bill. The bill was 
then officially ratified. 
Outside Parliament, both Catholic and Protestant leaders voiced their 
objection to the elucidation of the article 28. Unlike the PDI’s formal argu-
ments, both Catholic and Protestant leaders clearly stated that their objec-
tions were primarily because they were afraid that the provision of the elu-
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cidation of the article 28 was to be applied to private schools. They insisted 
that the Christian schools should be allowed to maintain their distinctive 
character (meaning to teach only Christianity). With regard to freedom of 
choice, the Christian schools, as usual, would ask the parents of new stu-
dents if they agreed to follow the regulation of the school on this issue.175
In response to the Christian objections, the Minister of Education, 
Fuad Hassan, the General Chairman of Golkar, Wahono, and the Speaker for 
ABRI faction, Sundoro Syamsuri, all said that the distinctive character of pri-
vate schools was to be secured in the Government regulation to implement 
the Law. The Christians were certainly happy with this promise and hoped it 
would become true. On the other hand, the Muslims consistently demanded 
that the rule that both student and teacher had to be of the same religion 
was to be applied to private schools as well. The leaders of Muhammadiyah, 
A.R. Fachruddin and Lukman Harun reasserted that Muhammadiyah schools 
were ready to provide religious teachers of other religions.176 However, the 
Government seems to have acted consistently with the policy that the rule in 
the elucidation of the article 28 should only be applied to public not private 
schools and this was affirmed in the Government regulation no. 29/1990. 
The Muslims, unsurprisingly opposed this regulation, claiming it deviated 
from the Education Law and demanded that the Government review it.177 
However, the New Order Government never changed it.
 Conclusion
Like the debate on the Jakarta Charter as against Pancasila, and on 
religion and marriage law discussed in the preceding chapters, the ideologi-
cal debate on culture and education during the New Order period affected 
Muslim-Christian relations mostly because the Christians allied with the sec-
ular oriented groups to oppose the proponents of Islamic ideology. It is inter-
esting that, in its idea of the strategy of culture, the CSIS (as the think tank 
of the New Order up to the mid-1980s) skilfully combined the secular view 
that the essence of culture is humanisation with the ideal of the family in 
Javanese culture originally developed by Taman Siswa in the pre-independ-
ence period. This combination apparently led to the justification of state 
authoritarianism, and the exclusion of the Islamic ideological view of cul-
ture. Being politically marginalised, the proponents of the Islamic ideology 
reacted negatively to the CSIS’s strategy of culture and blamed the Catholics 
as the brain behind it. Moreover, there was a contest of discourse between 
the Christians who emphasised the non-Islamic character of the abangan, 
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and the Muslims who argued for the opposite. However, we also find that 
certain Muslim and Christian intellectuals took the universal humanist per-
spective. In the 1990s when Soeharto drew closer to the Islamic groups, the 
discourse on culture in national politics changed. Islam was now called the 
“spirit of the Indonesian culture.” This means that the state accommodated 
Islamic culture but not in the politico-ideological sense. The ideology was 
still Pancasila, but its spirit was portrayed as Islamic. Certainly, as a religious 
minority, the Christians were worried to see this political development.
The different ideological views of culture inevitably entered the edu-
cational realm. Again, the Christians allied with the secular nationalists to 
oppose the Islamic ideological interest in education. The support of certain 
Christian intellectuals for the secular nationalists in the state can be seen 
in the debates on educational policies during the New Order such as those 
on single as against dual administration of education, on optional versus 
compulsory religion class policy, on Pancasila Moral Education or Compara-
tive Religion as against Islamic Religion, and on Ramadan as schooldays not 
holidays. Perhaps, the Islamic leaders’ bitter experiences in defending their 
interests in education against the secular nationalists with whom the Chris-
tians allied themselves also helped increase the Islamic groups’ negative 
perception of the Christians.
Moreover, there is one educational issue in which the Islamic groups 
have been more obviously opposed to the Christians, that is, the religion 
class in private schools. The Muslim leaders were worried about Muslim stu-
dents who only got a Christian religion class in Christian private schools. Hav-
ing realised that they could not prevent Muslim parents from sending their 
children to Christian schools, the Islamic leaders tried to use the Education 
Law to force the schools to teach Islam to the Muslim students. The effort of 
the Islamic leaders, however, never succeeded during the New Order. After 
the fall of Soeharto, this issue became the centre of controversy during the 
debate on the new Education Law of 2003. Despite strong opposition from 
the Christians, the Islamic groups successfully included in the Law a provi-
sion stating that students are entitled to religious education in their own 
religion and to be taught by a teacher of the same religion. But an important 
question remains unanswered: is it going to be applied to private schools?
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6. Inter-religious Dialogue 
In the preceding chapters, we discussed the Muslim fear of Christia-
nisation and objection to secularism on the one hand, and the Christian 
fear of an Islamic state and defence of religious freedom on the other. At 
times, when the relations between Muslims and Christians were tense and 
mutual suspicions were strong, the Government intervened as a presumed 
fair and neutral intermediary. However, the political contexts in which a cer-
tain Muslim-Christian antagonism occurred frequently led the Government 
to portray ambivalence: sometimes it supported certain demands of the 
Islamic groups and sometimes, in line with the Christians, it opposed them. 
In any case, the Muslim-Christian antagonisms apparently led some of the 
Christians to believe that their rights as religious minorities could be bet-
ter defended through cooperation with the Government rather than with 
the Islamic groups. Likewise, some of the important leaders of the Islamic 
groups believed that they could realise their interests more easily if they 
allied themselves with the Government. This situation necessarily strength-
ened the polarisation between the two religious groups. 
Nonetheless, there were also efforts to bridge the gap between the two 
religious groups through dialogue. There were two types of dialogue, one was 
sponsored by the Government and another was initiated by private institutions. 
In the former case, the Government usually invited the representatives of reli-
gious groups as participants. The Government also determined the theme of 
the dialogue that was usually focused on how peaceful inter-religious co-exist-
ence could be established and how each religion could contribute to national 
development. The theme indicates that through the dialogue the Government 
primarily wanted to maintain socio-political stability for the sake of develop-
ment. This security approach was indicated by the fact that the Government 
sometimes organised a dialogue simply as a reaction to an inter-religious inci-
dent and it often tended to support the position of the religious majority against 
the minority. The Inter-religious Consultation of 1967 discussed in Chapter 1 is 
a good example. We can also find the same tendency in the Government spon-
sored dialogues in the following decades. 
The dialogue initiated by private institutions was generally pioneered 
by the Christians and responded to positively by the leaders of other reli-
gions. Probably due to the influences of modern liberal ideas and the new 
challenges faced by the Christian missions, by the second half of the1960s, 
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both the Vatican and the World Council of Church (WCC) called for dialogue. 
Following the decision of the Vatican Council II (1962-1965) to look at non-
Christian religions in a more positive way, the Catholic Church encouraged 
her followers to engage in inter-religious dialogue. In 1967 and 1968, a Cath-
olic priest named Cletus Groenen wrote 12 articles in the Catholic weekly, 
Penabur, on the relevance of Vatican II to Indonesia.1 Bakker noted that in 
1968 an inter-religious meeting of Muslim, Catholic, Protestant and Bud-
dhist leaders was successfully held in Sukabumi, West Java. Later in 1970, 
the religious leaders who participated in this meeting visited Cardinal Dar-
mojowono in Semarang and in that visit they asserted their commitment to 
establish inter-religious harmony.2 The dialogue in Sukabumi was probably 
due to the efforts of Groenen who worked in West Java during this period.3
In line with Vatican II, in a consultation held in March 1967, in Kandy, 
Ceylon, the WCC decided to promote dialogue with other faiths. Later in 
1970, the WCC organised an inter-religious dialogue in Ajaltoun, Beirut and 
then in 1971, the Central Committee of the WCC established a Sub-Unit on 
Dialogue with People of Living Faith. Ever since, the WCC has actively organ-
ised international inter-religious meetings in different places of the world.4 
As noted in Chapter 2, since 1968, the leader of the DGI, T.B. Simatupang 
was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the WCC. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that some prominent Indonesian Muslim and Christian 
leaders were invited to participate in the international meetings organised 
by the WCC. These Indonesian participants often wrote their respective 
accounts of the meetings when they returned home.5 
Thus, the Christian and the Muslim leaders were already involved in 
dialogue since the early years of the New Order. However, the proponents of 
inter-religious dialogue were actually a minority among the Muslim and the 
Christian leaders. What I mean by ‘the proponents’ here are those who not 
only participated but also believed in the importance of dialogue for estab-
lishing inter-religious understanding and cooperation. Among the Muslims, 
the proponents of dialogue were mostly the promoters of the non-ideologi-
cal view of Islam that emerged in the early 1970s and became stronger in 
the following decades. For the Christians who had been afraid of an Islamic 
state, these Muslim leaders were certainly the most natural allies. Moreover, 
most of the promoters of the non-ideological view of Islam also did not con-
centrate on Christianisation as their major discourse (even though, they or 
at least some of them were personally concerned with Christianisation too). 
Thus, along with the Christians and others, they developed the common 
discourse on development, democracy and pluralism.
253
Both the Protestant and the Catholic proponents of the dialogue were 
also a minority. Father Ismartono, a Jesuit who worked in the KWI, identifies 
three types of Catholics, and only one of which, ‘the humanist group’ con-
cerned with social issues is interested in dialogue. The other two groups, the 
‘charismatic’ and the ‘ecclesia-centric’, are not, because the former is much 
more interested in the spiritual experience, while the latter is characterised 
by a concentration on internal church affairs.6 Regarding the Protestants, 
one could make a contrast between ‘the ecumenicals’ and ‘the evangeli-
cals’: the former are generally interested in dialogue while the latter are not. 
Given the fact that there are so many Protestant churches, we can certainly 
find a spectrum of positions along the line between ‘the evangelicals’ and 
‘the ecumenicals’. Most of the leaders of the PGI are generally more active in 
dialogue than those of the Indonesian Evangelical Association (PII).7 How-
ever, according to Th. Sumartana, the prominent Protestant intellectual, the 
involvement of the PGI leaders in dialogue did not mean that all churches 
in the PGI were pro-dialogue because the PGI leadership often could not 
effectively influence its members.8 It is noteworthy that like the Muslim pro-
ponents of dialogue, both the Catholic humanists and the Protestant ecu-
menists also opposed the idea of an Islamic state but at the same time they 
developed criticisms of aggressive missionary activities. 
In the 1970s inter-religious dialogue in Indonesia was mostly spon-
sored by the Government. The privately-initiated dialogue started more 
seriously in the early 1980s. Later, in line with the increasing demand for 
democratization, in the 1990s inter-religious dialogue organised by private 
institutions also increased. In this context, Steenbrink pointed out to us a 
very interesting contrast between dialogues sponsored by the state and 
those carried out through private initiatives.9 In what follows, I will pay more 
attention to the two types of dialogue in terms of development, interaction, 
convergences and contrast of their respective discourses. Before discussing 
the two types of dialogue, I shall discuss the emergence of the non-ideo-
logical view of Islam as an important background to the Muslim-Christian 
dialogue in Indonesia. 
1. The Non-Ideological View of Islam 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the ideological debate on Pancasila versus 
the Jakarta Charter soon re-emerged after the fall of Soekarno. The debate 
sharply marked the political tensions and rivalries between the Islamic 
groups on the one hand, and the military and its secular and Christian allies 
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on the other. The military leaders apparently realised that after the collapse 
of the Communist Party, their strongest political rival would be the Islamic 
groups. In this context, in contrast to Soekarno’s accommodating policy in 
relation to ideological differences, Soeharto’s Government tried to impose 
Pancasila as the only valid and legitimate ideology for the country. The 
Government, therefore, tried to remove the Islamic political ideology from 
among the Islamic groups, and at the same time encouraged the cultural 
and ritual dimensions of Islam – a policy that was often considered by some 
Indonesian and foreign observers to be close to that of the Dutch colonial 
Government.10 
The strong Government opposition to Islamic ideology certainly 
made both the traditionalist and reformist Muslims unhappy. However, the 
reformist Muslims had more political frustration because in 1966 the mili-
tary refused the rehabilitation of their party, Masyumi, and subsequently 
prohibited its former leaders from running the newly established reform-
ist Muslim party, Parmusi. This political frustration eventually pushed the 
younger generation of reformist Muslims, particularly the activists of the 
Association of Muslim Students (HMI), to find a way out. It was in this context 
that the so-called ‘renewal movement’ emerged from among the HMI lead-
ers in the late 1960s, and became widely debated in the early 1970s.11 The 
embryo of the movement was a weekly discussion circle called the ‘Limited 
Group’, held in the house of Mukti Ali from 1967 to 1971. Besides Mukti Ali 
himself, the participants of the discussion were the prominent HMI activists 
in Yogyakarta such as Ahmad Wahib, Djohan Effendi and Dawam Rahardjo, 
while Nurcholish Madjid who studied in Jakarta sometimes also came to join 
them. Occasionally, the circle invited non-HMI and non-Muslim participants 
such as the poet Rendra, and the Catholic student activist, Pranarka, as well 
as foreign researchers like B.J. Boland and James Peacock. 
One of the major issues discussed in the Limited Group circle was 
the relationship between Islam and politics and the crucial question was, 
whether the dominant view among the Islamic groups that Islam should 
be referred to as a political ideology was to be maintained or not. In the 
discussions, Djohan Effendi, Ahmad Wahib and Dawam Rahardjo eventually 
found that the ideological view of Islam was theologically and historically 
baseless and politically unpromising. In short, for them, Islam should not 
be an alternative to Pancasila. When Ahmad Wahib and Djohan Effendi dis-
seminated this view among other HMI activists, internal tensions within the 
organization emerged, that eventually forced them to resign from the HMI 
in 1969. After the resignation of these two prominent HMI leaders, however, 
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Nurcholish Madjid, the chairman of the Central Board of the HMI in Jakarta 
who was previously sceptical if not totally opposed to Djohan Effendi’s and 
Ahmad Wahib’s ideas, wrote secretly to them that he personally agreed with 
their views.12 
Accordingly, by early 1970, in a paper presented to a meeting of 
four organisations of young Indonesian Muslims: HMI, PII (Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia – Muslim Students of Indonesia), GPI (Gerakan Pemuda Islam – 
Muslim Youth Movement) and Persami (Persatuan Sarjana Muslimin Indo-
nesia – Association of Indonesian Muslim Graduates), Nurcholish Madjid 
declared the necessity of the renewal of Islamic thought.13 Inspired by Har-
vey Cox’s The Secular City, Nurcholish Madjid argued that while secularism 
as a materialistic philosophy was opposed to Islam, secularisation was not, 
because the latter means a dynamic process in which people acknowledge 
the authority of reason and science to deal with worldly affairs. In other 
words, he said, secularisation was ‘desacralisation’, that is, the profana-
tion of things wrongly treated as sacred. Secularisation in this sense, he 
said, was in line with the Islamic belief that nothing was absolutely sacred 
but God; and that the human was the vicegerent of God (khalīfa). As the 
vicegerent of God, every human being had to use the rational faculty to 
understand and explore the material and social realities of the world, and 
to be ready to learn from, and to be open to, good ideas coming from any 
source. Later in 1972, in his speech delivered in Jakarta’s cultural centre, 
Taman Ismail Marzuki, Madjid said that the roots of the Muslim idea of the 
Islamic state were religious legalism and apologetics. He argued that Mus-
lim legalism was influenced by the Islamic law developed in the Islamic 
traditional discipline called fiqh, while in fact, he said, fiqh had to be radi-
cally reformed before it could be applied to a modern society. In addition, 
for him, the Muslim reference to Islam as a political ideology was nothing 
but an apologetic reaction to Western ideologies like socialism and nation-
alism. Madjid said that apologetics was not the right solution to Muslim 
problems because it was defensive in nature, and in the long run it would 
have a boomerang effect. 
Nurcholish Madjid’s renewal ideas soon reached a wider audience, 
because his paper was published in the media and also distributed to other 
student activists by his friends. The senior reformist Muslim leaders like 
HAMKA, Muhammad Natsir and Muhammad Rasjidi, as well as the promi-
nent HMI leader in Bandung, Endang Saifuddin Ansari, soon reacted nega-
tively to Madjid’s ideas. In fact, Madjid was not the first general chairman of 
the HMI who opposed the Islamic state idea. In the early 1950s, when the 
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tensions between different political ideologies increased before the com-
ing elections of 1955, rather than supporting the aspiration of the Islamic 
parties for an Islamic state, the general chairman of the HMI, Dachlan Ranu-
wihardjo, declared his support for the idea of a national state.14 However, 
it seems, the general political frustration among the reformist Muslims, 
Madjid’s use of such a controversial term as ‘secularisation’ and his ability to 
justify his view in Islamic theological terms thanks to his educational back-
ground in Islamic studies; all apparently helped create stronger and more 
serious opposition to his ideas. Nonetheless, because the New Order Gov-
ernment really opposed the ideological orientation of the Islamic political 
parties, the non-ideological view of Islam promoted by Nurcholish Madjid 
and his associates was, as Boland put it, “in all probability not unwelcome to 
the Government.”15
Positive Christian Responses to the Islamic Renewal Movement 
If the Government welcomed, or even supported, the Islamic renewal 
movement, then what were the responses of the Christians to this move-
ment? This question is important for at least two reasons: firstly, this non-
ideological view of Islam was in line with the political aspiration of the 
Christians who were afraid that Indonesia would turn into an Islamic state; 
secondly, the question of the relevance of religion to modern society both-
ering the proponents of the renewal movement, was actually not a specific 
question for the Muslims, but for all believers of all religions in the world. 
Indeed, there were positive responses to the Islamic renewal move-
ment from the Christians. In 1973, J.W.M Bakker, a Jesuit of Dutch origin, 
wrote an article in the Catholic journal, Orientasi, on the Muslim view of 
secularisation.16 In line with Madjid, Bakker argued that secularisation was 
an unavoidable historical process in which the authority of religion on 
worldly affairs was transferred to the authority of reason. For Bakker, reli-
gious authorities should welcome secularisation because it liberated both 
religion and reason, and put each of them in their respective appropriate 
places. On the other hand, for him, if religious authorities opposed seculari-
sation, secularism would necessarily replace religion. In an apologetic tone, 
Bakker said that compared to Catholicism, Islam had more theological dif-
ficulties in accepting secularisation, because while the First Vatican Council 
(1870) asserted the transcendence of God in relation to the autonomy of 
human beings and nature, the dominant theological view in Islam empha-
sised the all-embracing power of God at the expense of the autonomy of 
human beings and nature. 
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Bakker then moved on to some examples of how Muslims in different 
countries like Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and finally Indonesia, faced the issue of 
secularisation. In the nineteenth century, Turkey introduced secularisation 
through the Tanzimat reform but the ulama opposed it and as a result, in 
the next century, Mustafa Kemal Attaturk proposed secularism. In Egypt, the 
debate on secularisation started in 1925 when the ulama strongly opposed 
‘Ali ‘Abd al-Rāziq’s al-Islām wa usūl al-hukm (Islam and the Principles of Gov-
ernment) in which he argued that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad 
was not to establish a state but to guide the spiritual life of human beings. 
Despite the opposition of the ulama, secularisation in Egypt proceeded, par-
ticularly since the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser and then Anwar Sadat. 
In Pakistan, President Ayub Khan appointed Fazlur Rahman to carry out the 
Islamic reforms; but the fierce opposition of the conservative ulama to the 
reforms eventually pushed Rahman to leave his country. In Indonesia, Bakker 
said, in 1940 Soekarno angered the ulama when he initiated the debate 
on secularisation in his articles on ‘the rejuvenation of Islam’ in which he 
praised ‘Abd al-Raziq’s view and the policy of Kemal Attaturk. Later, argued 
Bakker, the debate on secularisation continued in the debate on Pancasila 
versus Islam in the Constituent Assembly in 1957. Bakker observed further 
that prominent Muslim leaders in general were consistently opposed to 
secularisation, until Nurcholish Madjid declared the Islamic renewal move-
ment in 1970. Bakker lamented that those who opposed Madjid’s view did 
not understand the difference between secularism and secularisation and 
wrongly saw that secularisation was a distinctive problem faced by Christi-
anity in the West. It was regrettable, Bakker argued, that none of the critics 
referred to the problem of secularisation faced by the other Muslim coun-
tries. In his final remarks, Bakker asserted that he believed that the future of 
Indonesian Islam was in the hands of the proponents of secularisation and 
this was nothing but good for the advancement of Islam itself. 
In line with Bakker, Victor Immanuel Tanja, a minister of the Protestant 
Church of West Indonesia (GPIB) also made a sympathetic assessment of the 
Islamic renewal movement. Tanja took a Ph.D. programme in theology at Hart-
ford Seminary, USA, from 1973 to 1979 and wrote a thesis on the HMI and its 
position among Islamic reform movements in Indonesia.17 In his thesis, Tanja 
tried to trace back the history of the HMI and its relation to the early Islamic 
reform movements in Indonesia, like Jong Islamieten Bond, Sarekat Islam, Per-
satuan Islam and Muhammadiyah and the reform movements in the Middle 
East, particularly the two Egyptian reformists, Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashīd 
Ridā. Based on this historical account, Tanja argued that the ideas of reform 
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or renewal proposed by the HMI activists like M. S. Mintaredja, Deliar Noer, 
Dawam Rahardjo and particularly Nurcholish Madjid were much more in line 
with ‘Abduh’s liberal position while the ideas of their opponents like Rasjidi, 
Natsir, Saifuddin Anshari and HAMKA were close to the conservative stand 
of Rashīd Ridā. In this context, Tanja said that he disagreed with Kamal Has-
san who, in Tanja’s view, saw that Madjid’s renewal movement was merely a 
political accommodation to the military regime of the New Order. For Tanja, 
the positive attitude of the proponents of the renewal movement to seculari-
sation and their rejection of the idea of an Islamic state should be seen as a 
religious position validly chosen from within the Islamic tradition itself. Tanja 
also believed that these ideas would be a very good foundation for establish-
ing positive inter-religious relations in Indonesia.18 
There were positive and negative responses to Tanja’s thesis, particu-
larly when it was translated into Indonesian and published in 1982. Perhaps, 
among the books published in that year, Victor Tanja’s book was the one 
most widely discussed and reviewed, particularly among Muslim reformists. 
HMI activists in Jakarta and Yogyakarta organised seminars to discuss the 
book in which Tanja was often invited to speak. Besides numerous reviews of 
the book published in the media, a former HMI activist, Agussalim Sitompul, 
even wrote an entire book to criticise it.19 The fact that the book was about 
the HMI and its author was a Christian minister apparently stimulated 
curiosity, sympathy and criticism among many Muslims. There are at least 
two important points in the criticisms of Tanja’s book: firstly, some histori-
cal accounts of the book are inaccurate; secondly, Tanja was too eager to 
identify Madjid’s renewal movement with the HMI as an organisation. The 
last point seems to be more interesting because some of the HMI activists 
like Agussalim Sitompul and Djohan Effendi, obviously disagreed with Tan-
ja’s position. Sitompul said that Madjid’s idea on secularisation was never 
approved as the official position of the HMI.20 In line with Sitompul, Djohan 
Effendi said that as a student organisation, the HMI was much more like a 
transit station for Muslim activists rather than a permanent place. In this 
context, he said that the HMI as an organisation was always sceptical about 
supporting the renewal movement and therefore, these ideas went out of 
the organisation along with Madjid when the latter finished his chairman-
ship.21 On the other hand, Nurcholish Madjid was naturally happy with Tan-
ja’s book. In his letter to the reformist Muslim leader, Mohamad Roem, dated 
29 March 1983, Madjid wrote: “many people criticise the book but I think, its 
account of myself is ironically better and more honest than the one written 
by my acquaintance, Muhammad Kamal Hassan.”22 
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Both Djohan Effendi and Agussalim Sitompul were probably right in 
their criticisms of Tanja’s analysis. However, if we remember his background 
as an Indonesian Christian minister, we may see that Tanja’s tendency to 
identify Madjid’s ideas with the HMI as an organisation was perhaps moti-
vated consciously or unconsciously by his eagerness to see the HMI as a 
potential partner in dialogue and cooperation. Likewise, Madjid’s happi-
ness with Tanja’s book could be more personal in nature but at the same 
time it could also become the seeds of mutual understanding between the 
two important leaders in particular and the Muslims and the Christians who 
shared their ideas in general. 
The interest of the Protestant intellectuals in the Islamic reform move-
ment is also reflected in the annual programme called ‘Seminar Agama-
Agama’ (Seminar of Religions). Started in 1981, the Research and Develop-
ment Office of the PGI organised a one-week Seminar on Islam for about 
20 students coming from different Protestant Academies of Theology (STT) 
throughout Indonesia. The seminar was designed to give those students a 
general understanding of Islam, particularly the development of Islam in 
Indonesia. The important person behind this programme was Olaf Herbert 
Schumann, a German minister of the Lutheran Church who worked in the 
Research and Development Office of the PGI from 1970 to 1981. From 1964-
1966, Schumann studied Islam in Cairo and then in 1975 wrote a PhD the-
sis on the Arabic Muslim literature on Jesus. When he worked in Indonesia, 
Schumann also taught Islam as a subject in some STTs, and wrote some 
books on inter-religious dialogue. Although he was appointed Professor of 
Missiology in Hamburg University in 1981, he still regularly visited Indonesia 
to teach in the STTs and to support the seminar.23 
The topics of the seminar gradually developed from the phenomena 
of Islam in Indonesia to the topics of common concern like modernisation, 
social justice, the environmental crisis, human rights, and religion and cul-
ture. The number of students who participated in the seminar also gradually 
increased and the speakers were extended from the Muslim and Protestant 
figures to the Catholic, Hindu and Buddhist intellectuals and so it became 
a ‘Seminar of Religions.’24 In this context, besides the fact that many of the 
Muslim speakers invited to the Seminar of Religions were those names com-
monly associated with the same stream of Islamic reform,25 the first two 
seminars clearly paid specific attention to the Islamic renewal movement. 
The first seminar in 1981 discussed the book by Harun Nasution called Islam 
Ditinjau Dari Berbagai Aspeknya (Islam Viewed from Its Different Aspects).26 
In addition to Nasution’s book, Th. Sumartana, one of the important per-
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sons behind the seminar, presented his paper on the controversial diary of 
Ahmad Wahib recently published in that year. Even more than the first semi-
nar, the second one in 1982 was focused on the issue of Islamic reforms in 
Indonesia and the literatures discussed in the seminar were Victor Tanja’s 
thesis, the diary of Ahmad Wahib and the works by Deliar Noer and Harun 
Nasution on Islamic reform.27 
In his paper for the second seminar, having referred to the books by 
Deliar Noer and Harun Nasution, T.B. Simatupang, the prominent leader of 
the PGI, argued that the Islamic modern movements were not competitors 
to, but one of the components of the nationalist movement in Indonesia. In 
other words, both Christians and Muslims were in fact nationalists. In addi-
tion, for Simatupang, the ideas of the Islamic renewal movement of the HMI 
described in Victor Tanja’s thesis should also become the concern of the 
adherents of other religions. Thus, for him, the same nationalist impetus and 
the same concern with the relevance of religion to modern society were the 
very foundation of Muslim-Christian cooperation to develop the country.28
Another book discussed in the seminar was the diary of Ahmad Wahib. 
We have mentioned that Wahib was among the early promoters of the non-
ideological view of Islam in the late 1960s. Wahib was killed in a motorcycle 
accident in March 1973 and his diary was posthumously published in 1981. 
The publication of the diary as a book soon triggered controversies among 
the Muslims: while his friends and sympathizers were fascinated by Wahib’s 
critical and honest view of Islam, others called it a heresy or a tragedy for 
Islam.29 Having investigated the book, the Indonesian Council of Ulama 
(MUI) even asked the Department of Religion to restrict its distribution.30 
Despite the opposition, perhaps because its Islamic view was favourable to 
the Government, the latter never banned the book and it was one of the 
bestsellers in Indonesia in 1981.31 
In general, besides his obvious support for secularisation and his criti-
cism of certain established orthodox teachings of Islam, Wahib made some 
of the Muslims angry because while he was very critical of Islam and Islamic 
leaders, he highly praised certain Catholic priests whom he knew very well. 
In the early 1960s when he was a student of the Faculty of Natural Science, 
Gajah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Wahib used to stay in the Catholic stu-
dent dormitory, Realino. There he experienced direct and warm encounters 
with the Catholics through daily conversation, sports, music etc. It was partly 
this experience that led him to oppose the simple dichotomy of Muslim and 
non-Muslim. His close and warm relations with some of the priests whom he 
considered good and sincere people led him, in his note on 16 September 
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1969, to question the theological view that non-Muslims would simply go to 
Hell in the hereafter.32 On 13 December 1971, Wahib wrote that he dreamed 
of the Virgin Mary wearing a white dress and smiling at him. This dream 
was quite impressive to him as he wrote: “I am not a Christian, but I do not 
know why I found peace and calm in my mind when I faced her. Would this 
happen in my real life?”33 In 1971, Wahib moved to Jakarta and studied at 
the Academy of Philosophy, Driyarkara, an institution established and run 
by the Catholics. If we remember the Muslim-Christian tensions during the 
period of Wahib’s notes (1968-1973) recorded in this book, we shall soon 
realise that he was really a unique person among the Muslim activists. 
Th. Sumartana chose Wahib’s diary as his focus for discussing the 
Islamic renewal movement both in the first and the second seminar. In 1981, 
Sumartana wrote two articles on Wahib’s diary: one in Tempo, and this was 
the paper presented to the first seminar and another in the academic jour-
nal, Prisma, and this was later presented to the second seminar in 1982.34 
Moreover, the second seminar also invited Ismed Natsir, one of the editors 
of the diary, to present a paper on Ahmad Wahib. In his paper, Ismed Natsir 
objected to those who said that, having been influenced by the Catholic 
priests, Wahib eventually lost his faith in Islam. In fact, Natsir said, Wahib 
was born into a committed Muslim family, and when he returned home, 
he often was a preacher in the Muhammadiyah mosque of his hometown, 
Sampang, Madura. However, as a young man, argued Ismed Natsir, Wahib 
opened himself to any influence without fear of losing his religious iden-
tity. Natsir also referred to some notes found in Wahib’s original diary, but 
not included in its published edition to indicate that Wahib was actually a 
very pious and committed Muslim.35 On the other hand, Sumartana argued 
that the dogmatism and exclusivism criticised by Wahib were actually not 
phenomena specific to Islam, and therefore Wahib’s diary should be taken 
as an example of a creative and critical assessment of religion for all believ-
ers, including the Christians. Moreover, for Sumartana, due to the influence 
of their western masters since the colonial period, many of the Indonesian 
Christians consciously or unconsciously believed that Islam was identical 
with underdevelopment and ignorance. In fact, argued Sumartana, he did 
not find any example among the Christians who developed such a crea-
tive and fresh religious thought like Ahmad Wahib. To emphasize his point, 
Sumartana quoted Wahib, who wrote in his diary that secularisation was still 
problematic in the Christian world but the Indonesian Christians immediate-
ly accepted it without criticisms, and therefore, Wahib questioned whether 
this attitude was based purely on ideal reasons or simply because they were 
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afraid of the aggressiveness of the Islamic groups. For Sumartana, this was 
truly an honest question to the Christians.
Our discussion so far demonstrates how the Christians responded 
positively to the emergence of the renewal movement among the reformist 
Muslim activists. In fact, a similar development was also found among the 
Muslim traditionalists of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The most prominent 
proponent of the non-ideological view of Islam in the NU circle was Abdur-
rahman Wahid who was to become the President of Indonesia in 1999. In 
the early 1970s, when he had just come back to Indonesia from his study 
in Baghdad, Abdurrahman Wahid still believed in Islam as an ideology.36 
However, probably after having contacts and discussions with leaders of 
the renewal movement like Nurcholish Madjid, Djohan Effendi and Dawam 
Rahardjo, by the mid 1970s, he had already abandoned the ideological view 
of Islam. By this time, Wahid was often invited to give a lecture on Islam in 
the regular course for the ministers of the East Java Christian Church (GKJW) 
in Malang. In this context, Greg Barton found that Wahid’s explicit support 
for Madjid’s secularisation idea was clearly expressed in a paper presented 
to a meeting of the GKJW ministers in 1976. 37 This evidence indicates that 
at least since the second half of the 1970s, Wahid was already known in 
the Christian circle as a traditionalist Muslim intellectual who supported a 
non-ideological view of Islam. Furthermore, since 1982 Wahid was among 
those who were often invited to speak in the annual Seminar of Religions 
organised by the PGI. The following report of the second Seminar in 1982 
may illustrate how the Christians were happy with Abdurrahman Wahid’s 
serious involvement.
Starting at 9 in the morning, he (Abdurrahman Wahid) talked openly about 
the history and position of the NU in local and national politics. The discussion 
was quite interesting, and he was so generous with his time that he contin-
ued till 3.00 p.m. even though the actual timetable for him was from 10.30 
to 12.00. This lecture provided much new knowledge to the participants who 
were ‘blind’ to socio-political issues and the development of Islamic renewal 
movement in Indonesia.38 
However, up to 1984, Wahid was not yet the top leader of the NU, and 
so the influence of his ideas on the organisation was still limited. In addition, 
the lateness of the development of the renewal ideas in the NU circles was 
also due to its formal political position. Unlike the reformist Muslims, who 
could not rehabilitate their political party, Masyumi, the NU’s participation 
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in national politics was not formally disturbed by the New Order regime, at 
least to the end of the 1970s. However, at every election, many NU activists 
were often pressurised to support the Government party, Golkar. Initially, 
NU played a dominant role in the Islamic party, PPP, and led protests against 
some of the Government’s policies. Being unhappy with the NU’s frequent 
attitude of opposition, the Government tried to subdue the NU faction with-
in the PPP. By the early 1980s, the reformist Muslim politician in the PPP, 
Djaelani Naro who had a close relationship with the Government, eventu-
ally expelled several important NU representatives within the party. By 1983 
NU was under more pressure to choose either accommodation or opposi-
tion to the Government. In the National Consultation of 1983 in Situbondo, 
the NU finally made two significant concesions: (1) to withdraw from formal 
politics, so that its formal ties with the PPP were cut; and (2) to accept Pan-
casila as the basis of the organization.39 The second decision was related to 
the MPR Decree on the GBHN of 1983 in which it was stated, among other 
things, that Pancasila had to be the sole basis of all social organisations. In 
this regard, the NU proved to be the first religious organisation to accept this 
rule before it was officially declared by President Soeharto as the Law No. 
8 /1985.40 Wahid was certainly one of the major proponents of the two sig-
nificant decisions in Situbondo, and by the next year (1984) he was elected 
Executive Chairman of the NU. Ever since, he became increasingly influential 
both inside and outside the NU. 
Under Wahid’s leadership, the NU also became more attractive to 
both foreign and domestic social researchers. In this context, a minister of 
the Huria Kristen Batak Protestant (HKBP) Church named Einar Martahan 
Sitompul wrote an MA thesis on the “NU and Pancasila” that was submitted 
to the STT Jakarta in 1988 and published in the following year.41 In his study, 
Sitompul tried to uncover the historical development of religious thought 
within the NU in response to the socio-political changes from 1926 when 
the NU was established to its 27th Congress in 1984. Sitompul looked at the 
orthodox Sunni tradition and how the NU took those elements of the tradi-
tion to justify its particular position in a certain socio-political context. He 
argued that although the NU took different positions in relation to the socio-
political changes of the country, they should not be interpreted simply as 
evidence of NU’s political opportunism. The rich materials of the orthodox 
Sunni tradition, Sitompul argued, provided the NU with a flexible, adaptive 
and contextual political attitude without losing its basic Islamic principles. 
In this context, Sitompul maintained that the NU’s acceptance of Pancasila 
as its basis was based on serious religious reasoning and therefore, it was 
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not a temporary political tactics but an assertion of the NU’s responsibility 
for the future of the nation as a whole.
We can say that Sitompul’s study was an attempt to see the NU sym-
pathetically from its own religious point of view. No matter whether his 
analysis of the NU was objective or not, Sitompul probably represented the 
view among the Christians who felt very positive about NU’s non-ideological 
view of Islam and its acceptance of Pancasila as the basis of the organisation 
in 1983. In other words, the NU somehow did not represent the threat of the 
Islamic State any more to the Christians. Moreover, when the thesis was pub-
lished, Abdurrahman Wahid wrote an introduction in which he affirmed that 
according to the traditional fiqh, Indonesia was a state based on a peace 
agreement (dār al-sulh) between Muslims and other groups and therefore, it 
should be accepted and defended by the Muslims.42 Wahid also wrote that 
he was very grateful for Sitompul’s study, not only because it was a sympa-
thetic description of the NU but also because it was a good example of how 
all religious groups could learn from one another. “This process of learning 
from one another among us [that is, religious groups] will certainly enrich 
our knowledge and understanding of our own state and the problems it 
faces,” wrote Wahid.43 
2. Inter-religious Dialogue and National Development
We have mentioned that to weaken and control the political force 
of the Islamic groups, the power holders of the New Order suppressed the 
Islamic ideological orientation of the Islamic socio-political forces. The Gov-
ernment’s negative policy towards Islamic ideology, however, was accompa-
nied by a positive call for development, particularly economic development. 
The latter was strongly justified by the fact that the country had suffered 
from serious economic deterioration inherited from the Soekarno regime. In 
this context, the proponents of the New Order often said that if the political 
parties and other social forces during the Soekarno period were ‘ideology-
oriented’, then now they had to be ‘programme-oriented.’ In other words, 
for the New Order supporters, instead of being preoccupied with ideologi-
cal issues that would only bring about unnecessary socio-political conflicts, 
all social forces should direct their energies to the common concern of the 
whole nation called ‘modernisasi’ or ‘pembangunan’. 
The first term (modernisasi) is none but ‘modernisation’ while the sec-
ond term (pembangunan) is more or less a translation of the English word 
‘development’.44 The meaning of the two terms could probably be differen-
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tiated, but for our analysis here the differentiation has a very limited sig-
nificance, particularly because the New Order regime tended to use both 
terms as identical. If we look at the book by the ‘architect’ of the New Order, 
Ali Moertopo, for instance, we find that he refers to the two terms inter-
changeably without clear differentiation.45 In his study of Muslim responses 
to modernisation, Hassan does not clearly differentiate the two terms either. 
Hassan, however, demonstrates that the Muslim ideological responses were 
more directed to modernisasi than to pembangunan.46 Perhaps, this was the 
reason why the Government eventually preferred the term pembangunan 
to modernisasi. 
The Government idea on development probably came from Soehar-
to’s economic advisors since 1966 led by Widjojo Nitisastro, a PhD in econom-
ics from the University of California, Berkeley, who was to become the Head 
of the Body for the National Development Planning (Bappenas).47 ‘Develop-
ment’, however, was not adopted as a formal Government policy until a few 
years later. In his speech to the MPRS in August 1967, Soeharto said that his 
administration was preparing a Five Year Development Programme (REPEL-
ITA) that was expected to be ratified by the MPRS in 1968 and to be imple-
mented by the Government in 1969.48 Indeed, in 1968 the MPRS approved 
the REPELITA and ever since, development or pembangunan had been the 
most central discourse of the New Order regime and almost as sacred as 
Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945. All Government officials repeated 
the word Pembangunan again and again in their speeches; all students from 
elementary to university levels should memorize what Pembangunan was; 
all religious leaders were encouraged to speak about the function of religion 
to support Pembangunan; and Soeharto was eventually called the Father of 
Pembangunan.
Among the religious groups, the Christians appear to be the earli-
est group who responded very positively to the idea of modernisation. In 
June 1967, the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) organised a Confer-
ence on Church and Society in which the major issue discussed was how 
the churches could contribute to modernisation and development of the 
country. Soeharto, who was the Acting President, came to the Conference 
and delivered a sympathetic speech.49 The Conference was probably sup-
ported by the WCC because, as noted in Chapter 2, since 1962 the leader of 
the DGI, T.B. Simatupang, had been involved in similar conferences both at 
the national and international levels. In general, the Conference emphasized 
that the churches had to motivate their members to participate in modernis-
ing the country in the fields of politics, law, economy and culture. In terms of 
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socio-cultural modernisation, the Conference suggested that the Christians 
should maximise the functions of the Christian social service institutions 
such as schools, universities, health centres, orphanages and publications.50 
With regard to the modernisation of politics, the Conference was rather wor-
ried about the dominant role of military officers in the state institutions, but 
it still hoped that the military could lead the country to a democratic politi-
cal system. On economic development, the Conference suggested that the 
churches could motivate their members to participate in cooperatives; to 
create the vocational education needed by modern industries; and to tell 
the real economic situation of the country to foreign churches so that the 
latter could ask their respective Governments to provide aid for Indonesia. 
The Conference was also concerned with modernisation of the national law, 
and it was in this context that Islam was mentioned. The Conference stated 
that the Christians had to reckon with Islam and Islamic law seriously, to 
avoid antagonism and confrontation with the Muslims, and “if there is a view 
that in terms of modernisation Islam is a ‘laggard’, then the concern of the 
Christians was to help them to be ‘innovators.’”51 
In line with the Protestants, the Catholics also made a positive 
response to modernisation. In the above seminar, Father Dick Hartoko, a 
Jesuit and editor of the Catholic cultural magazine, Basis, was invited to 
present a paper on the Catholic view of modernisation. In his paper, Har-
toko explained that Thomas Aquinas (d.1274) was the earliest theologian 
who opened the door for modernisation because he argued that science 
and reason on the one hand, and revelation and faith on the other, had their 
respective autonomous realms. However, in the following centuries, said 
Hartoko, the Church was still unfriendly to science, and her positive attitude 
to it was just introduced in the modern period by Pope Leo XIII (1810-1903) 
and then followed by Pope John XXIII (1881-1963). Accordingly, the Vatican 
Council II and its aggiornamento, said Hartoko, tried to bring the Church 
positively into the middle of the modern world. Hartoko argued further that 
in the past, Christian love was realised by individuals through charities, but 
in the modern period, Christian love should be realised collectively through 
the so-called modernisation. “If the people of Samaria helped others by giv-
ing oil and wine, then we are now to cure the wounds of our nation and all 
human beings by carrying out modernisation,” he wrote.52 Besides Hartoko’s 
paper, it is noteworthy that the major involvement of some Catholic intel-
lectuals and activists in the Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) was also evidence of their serious support for Government moderni-
sation.53 
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In contrast to the Christians, the Muslims responded differently to 
the Government call for modernisation and development. The negative and 
oppositional political attitude of the military towards the Islamic groups in 
the early years of the New Order, particularly to the reformist Muslims, was 
the main reason why the Muslims were sceptical if not totally negative to the 
Government call for modernisation. In his study of this topic, Hassan classi-
fied three types of the reformist Muslim responses to modernisation.54 The 
first was the ideological response characterised by a defensive attitude and 
high concern with the influences of western culture embodied in moderni-
sation. For instance, Nurcholish Madjid wrote in 1968 that modernisation 
was only compatible with Islam as far as it means ‘rationalisation’ not ‘West-
ernisation’. Hassan explained that the reformist Muslims suspected that 
modernisation was nothing but efforts of the secularists in the Government 
to eradicate all traces of Islam in public life. I also would like to add that for 
some of the Muslims ‘Westernisation’ could also means ‘Christianisation.’ The 
second type was what Hassan called ‘the idealist response’, which put the 
national development within the framework of Islam as a comprehensive 
system covering social, economic, political and spiritual fields. The idealists 
generally believed that only through the application of the shari’a by the 
state could the ‘true’ national development be realised. Therefore, among 
their most important agenda were the unification of Islamic political forces, 
the establishment of autonomous Muslim social and economic institutions, 
and the intensification of Islamic propagation (da‘wah) programmes. The 
third type was the accommodationist response characterised by efforts to 
put Islam and Islamic groups in congruence with the Government views, by 
proposing a non-ideological view of Islam and an open attitude to Western 
culture.55 This type of response mainly came from the proponents of the 
renewal movement in the early 1970s.
Government Sponsored Dialogue on Religious Harmony 
and Development 
After the elections of 1971 in which the Government party, Golkar, 
obtained a spectacular victory, the Government became more active to per-
suade religious groups to support Pembangunan. In this context, in Sep-
tember 1971, A. Mukti Ali was appointed to be the Minister of Religion. Ali 
Munhanif has noted that Ali Moertopo and Soedjono Hoemardani, the two 
important Personal Assistants to President Soeharto and the patrons of the 
CSIS, played a decisive role in Mukti Ali’s appointment.56 Mukti Ali was a non-
NU figure, a former activist of the reformist Muslim school student union, 
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PII (Pelajar Islam Indonesia), and in the early 1950s used to work as a secre-
tary in the Central Board of the Masyumi, but in 1955 had decided to study 
abroad.57 As noted, in the early years of the New Order, Mukti Ali hosted 
the ‘Limited Group’ discussion circle, the embryo of the renewal movement 
among the HMI activists.58 Moreover, thanks to his study at McGill with Wil-
fred Cantwell Smith, Mukti Ali had sympathy with other religions, so by the 
late 1960s he initiated an inter-religious dialogue in Yogyakarta, even in his 
own house.59 Mukti Ali’s track record apparently matched the interests of 
the New Order Government. First, as a reformist Muslim, he was expected 
to eliminate the long-established dominance of the NU in the Department 
of Religion. The NU was an important wing of the Islamic party, PPP, and the 
marginalisation of the NU people in the Department was partly related to 
the Government attempts to force all civil servants to be Golkar loyalists. 
Secondly, as the patron of the renewal movement and an activist in inter-
religious dialogue, Mukti Ali was perhaps expected to be able to bridge the 
gap between the Government, the Muslims and the Christians. Thirdly, Mukti 
Ali was politically weak, because he had no personal power base, neither in 
a political party nor in the Islamic organisations like NU or Muhammadiyah.
Before his appointment, Mukti Ali accompanied by Ali Moertopo and 
Soedjono Humardani, met Soeharto in the latter’s house. In that meeting, 
Soeharto said repeatedly that he expected Mukti Ali to pay serious attention 
to development (pembangunan).60 Indeed, during his ministry, Mukti Ali 
always tried to explain the relationship between religion and development, 
and all of his speeches published in nine volumes were entitled “Agama 
dan Pembangunan” (Religion and Development). Actually, about one week 
before his appointment as the Minister of Religion, on 3 September 1971, 
Mukti Ali was invited by the German Cultural Foundation to deliver a lecture 
on religion and development at the Goethe Institute, Jakarta.61 This Eng-
lish lecture was soon translated into Indonesian and delivered to various 
audiences on different occasions in October 1971.62 In this lecture, Mukti Ali 
argued that the ultimate goal of development was “the development of the 
whole man and of all men.” This meant that for him, development should 
include both the spiritual and material dimensions of human life. Thus, he 
rejected the idea that both secularism and Westernisation were inherent in 
development. He also emphasised that development programmes should 
give priority to social justice over economic growth. He strongly believed 
that the teachings of all religions were a positive support to development 
and therefore, religious believers should “move out of their religious ghettos 
and narrow communal interests” to support development.63 
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When Mukti Ali started his ministry, he stressed the importance of 
inter-religious dialogue for national development. Inter-religious dialogue, 
he said, could be an effective means to increase the participation of reli-
gious groups in development and to prevent them from inter-religious con-
flicts.64 This preventive function of the dialogue was certainly parallel with 
the Government view that socio-political stability was necessary for devel-
opment. In an interview with me, Mukti Ali said that the relations between 
Muslims and Christians at that time were “as if they did not know each other” 
and this situation, he said, could easily lead to a dangerous conflict.65 His 
project on inter-religious dialogue, therefore, was strongly related to what 
he frequently referred to as “the harmony of religious life” (kerukunan hidup 
beragama), that is, peaceful co-existence of religious groups.
The harmony of religious life is a social condition in which all religious groups 
could live together without losing their basic right to perform their respective 
religious duties. Everybody lives as a good religious believer in a harmonious 
and peaceful condition. Therefore, the harmony of religious life cannot emerge 
from blind fanaticism and indifference to the rights and feelings of the oth-
ers… . The harmony of religious life can only be obtained if every religious 
group becomes open-hearted [lapang dada] to one another.66 
The harmony of religious life, he said, should be developed within the 
principle of ‘agreement to disagree.’67 This means that in a dialogue one was 
ready to accept and respect the other totally, that is, with all of the latter’s aspira-
tion, customs, mode of life and religious conviction.68 The principle of agreement 
to disagree was related to Mukti Ali’s strong opposition to apologetic discourses 
developed by some Indonesian Muslim intellectuals against non-Islamic reli-
gions.69 Instead of developing apologetics, Mukti Ali suggested Muslim scholars 
should look at other religions in a more sympathetic way, that is, by looking at 
the views of the believers of the religion in question or the insiders’ perspective. 
Some scholars called this approach ‘phenomenological.’ Among the proponents 
of this approach was Wilfred Cantwell Smith with whom Mukti Ali studied at the 
Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University from 1955 to 1957.70 Not long after 
his return to Indonesia, in 1958, Mukti Ali joined the Ninth Congress for the His-
tory of Religions in Tokyo in which many scholars of the subject from all over the 
world participated. This meeting seems to have made Mukti Ali more convinced 
of the importance of this approach to the study of religions.71 In early 1960s, 
Mukti Ali introduced this approach through the subject called ‘the Science of 
Comparative Religion’ (Ilmu Perbandingan Agama) to his students at the Insti-
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tute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta.72 This subject was also 
to be taught in all IAINs all over the country.
As the Minister of Religion, Mukti Ali tried to develop the principle 
of agreement to disagree through the project on the harmony of religious 
life. He appointed Djohan Effendi, the former activist of the Limited Group, 
to be the head of the project. According to Djohan, there were three main 
programmes of the project: meetings of religious leaders, a programme of 
social research and camps bringing together students of different religious 
backgrounds. From 1972 to 1977, there were 23 dialogues of religious lead-
ers held in 21 cities all over the country. The participants of the dialogues 
included Government officials, religious leaders of Islam, Protestantism, 
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and even of Javanese mys-
ticism and local beliefs.73 In general, the dialogue was still far from Mukti Ali’s 
ideal of agreement to disagree but it was quite different from the debate in 
the Inter-religious Consultation of 1967. Djohan Effendi explained: 74
The goal of the dialogue was not to discuss theological issues, but social issues 
as a common concern, or the so-called development issues.75 These were to be 
discussed from the perspective of every religion. The important thing in the 
dialogue was not the decisions taken in it but personal contacts and friend-
ships among the participants. Within two or three days, they stayed in the same 
place, had the same meals together and shared jokes. Thus, they became close 
to one another.
The second activity was a social research programme and this was 
carried out since 1976 in seven regions. The research was carried out by 
a team of seven involving Muslim and non-Muslim scholars and the topic 
of the research was determined by the team.76 Before the field research, 
the members of the team were briefed in the Training Programme on Reli-
gious Research (Program Latihan Penelitian Agama, PLPA). Started in 1975, 
the programme was organised and financed by the Office of Research and 
Development of the Department of Religion. Karel Steenbrink, who also 
taught in the programme, noted that the PLPA was organised in a place 
where “all participants had to stay for three months together” and they 
were “stimulated to select inter-religious relations or even tensions as the 
special topic for their one-year field research, which followed the three 
months training.” 77 In his assessment of this project, without explaining 
whether the results of the research were important or not, Djohan Effendi 
only emphasised that the programme was a good opportunity for people 
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of different religions to develop intimate relations and to learn from one 
another.78
The third programme of the project was student camping. This was 
initiated in 1977 in Jakarta and Medan. In Jakarta, the participants of the 
camping were students of the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), the 
Academy of Theology (STT) Jakarta (Protestant), and the Academy of Phi-
losophy Driyarkara (Catholic). In Medan, the participants were activists of 
Muslim student organisations (HMI and PII) and the Protestant student 
organisations (GMKI). During the camps, the participants had discussions 
with some invited speakers and among themselves. On the final day, they 
performed a voluntary work together for the community where the camp 
was held. Again, for Djohan, the important thing in this programme was 
personal contacts and the experiences of being together with people of dif-
ferent religions.79 The programme, he said, provided the participants with 
early personal contacts from a young age, and so when they graduated and 
became the leaders of their respective religious groups, they would not have 
difficulties in communicating with each other.80 
So what was the result of the project? In this respect, it is important to 
look at Steenbrink’s observation of the programme on dialogue:
Quite often they produced optimistic and sometimes embellished state-
ments about the positions and practices of various communities. The unifying 
Pancasila ideology was very often quoted as a great support for the harmony 
of religions and their cooperation for national development… An important 
result of these meetings was that often for the first time religious leaders came 
together in the pleasant atmosphere of a comfortable conference centre with 
good food and often luxurious facilities, serving as start of informal exchanges 
as well. One of the weak sides of the initiative was that it started as a ‘project’ 
with many single and unique initiatives. There was generally no other follow up 
for an inter-religious meeting than the publication of the minutes, which were 
published in extenso and spread in about 1000 copies.81
With regard to the social research programme, Steenbrink made a 
similar observation:
Several results of this investigation were doctrinal and embellishing as well. 
For instance: Pancasila ideology propagates harmony of religions and this 
was therefore, supported by a vast majority. Nearly all concrete conflicts were 
imputed to non-religious factors or only some individuals were blamed not 
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groups. But quite a few of this research provide us with very concrete data and 
honest reports about mutual perceptions and complaints.82 
Djohan Effendi, the head of the project, was far from satisfied with the 
project as well, and therefore, he would probably agree with Steenbrink’s 
observation. However, as has been indicated, Djohan Effendi thought that 
the project was somehow a good beginning to open the locked door of 
communication among the leaders of religious groups. On the other hand, 
he actually wanted to proceed to a more serious dialogue in which sensitive 
theological issues, for instance, could be discussed. This was the reason why 
he was later more comfortable with, and even became one of the initiators 
of, inter-religious dialogue organised by private organisations.83 
The minimal achievement of the dialogue could also be related to 
the Government’s simple expectation that inter-religious dialogue would 
enhance socio-political stability for the sake of development and therefore, 
the emphasis was much more on peaceful coexistence than on creating 
mutual understanding and cooperation among the religious groups. Further-
more, like other Government development projects, inter-religious dialogue 
was a project from which the civil servants received extra income additional 
to their regular low salaries, and so sometimes they took the project without 
clear understanding of, or commitment to it. Last but not least, because the 
project was a Government initiative, the religious groups were somehow still 
suspicious of the Government intentions. Mukti Ali remembered that when 
he proposed the dialogue programme both Muslims and Christians were 
suspicious: “they said to me, it was meaningless” (mengada-ada).84
The Christians particularly became more suspicious of Government 
intentions when the latter wanted to establish a Body for Inter-religious 
Consultation (Badan Konsultasi antar Umat Beragama). As discussed in Chap-
ter 1, a similar institution had already been established in the Inter-religious 
Consultation of 1967; but since its inception it had no clear activity. The ori-
gin of the idea to establish the body apparently did not come from Mukti 
Ali but from the President and the military.85 This idea was obviously in line 
with the New Order’s corporatism in the sense that religious groups as social 
forces were to be put in an organisation that could be controlled and man-
aged by the power holders. This was also in line with the Government view 
that religious groups should be controlled to create socio-political stability 
for the sake of development. The Christians’ suspicion of the Government 
was related to the latter’s proposal that the body was expected to hold an 
inter-religious consultation on “the ethical code for religious propagation.” 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, like his predecessor, Mukti Ali also wanted to 
restrict religious propagation only to those outside the recognised religions, 
while the Christians consistently opposed this idea. Partly because of the 
Christian opposition to the proposed topic for the inter-religious consulta-
tion, and partly because there was no consensus among religious leaders on 
the position and function of the body, Mukti Ali finally failed to establish the 
body and no inter-religious consultation was held.86
In 1978, Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, a retired army general, was 
appointed to Mukti Ali’s position. Alamsyah continued the dialogue pro-
gramme and at the same time he put it more clearly within the framework 
of maintaining the socio-political stability for development. In this respect, 
Alamsyah proposed that religious harmony should be developed into ‘a 
triad of harmony’, that is, intra-religious harmony (harmony among different 
sects and groups within the same religion), inter-religious harmony and the 
harmony between religious groups and the Government.87 As discussed in 
Chapter 2, as parts of his policy on inter-religious harmony, without further 
consultation with the religious leaders, Alamsyah issued two decrees, one 
on the restriction of religious propagation and another on the Government 
control of foreign aid for religious institutions. Both decrees were certainly 
welcome by the Muslim leaders but strongly opposed by the Christians. 
Moreover, by contrast to Mukti Ali, after a series of meetings between 
the religious leaders and the Government since1979, in 1980 Alamsyah suc-
cessfully created the Forum for Inter-religious Consultation (Wadah Musya-
warah Antar Umat Bergama) in which the organisations of five recognised 
religions were represented. In his speech at the inauguration of the Forum 
on 30 June 1980, Alamsyah said: “Since I have been in office as the Minister 
of Religion, I have always suggested to [you] to strengthen religious harmo-
ny [because] it is a primary factor in the development and strengthening of 
national stability and defence.”88 Alamsyah also said that the inter-religious 
dialogue during the Mukti Ali era was more academic and philosophical, 
while now he would like to develop a more pragmatic one. The Government, 
he said, would support the development of religious life, and if the believers 
of different religions “cannot help each other, at least they do not disturb 
each other.”89
As one would expect, it was the Government that dictated the issues 
to be discussed by the Forum rather than the religious groups themselves. 
As noted in Chapter 2, one of the issues discussed in the Forum concerned 
the celebration of religious feast days. In addition, in 1982, the Government 
asked the Forum to give advice on certain moral and social issues like drug 
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abuse and alcoholic drink; and to organise prayers for rain in a long dry 
season. Moreover, as a former personal secretary to the President, Alam-
syah was able to obtain considerable financial support for his programmes. 
In this context, since 1983, the representatives of religious leaders in the 
Forum, high Government officials and members of Parliament paid a joint 
yearly visit to places of worship and social institutions of different religions 
in the provinces. This activity was financed by the Department of Religion 
and widely covered by press and television. However, later when this pro-
gramme was evaluated, some religious leaders questioned the value and 
sincerity of this way of dialogue. 90 
In interviews, I asked Mukti Ali and Djohan Effendi about their respec-
tive opinions regarding Alamsyah’s policies. Mukti Ali said that Alamsyah 
did not really continue his dialogue programme because he was a military 
man who did not understand religion very well and could not be involved in 
dialogue.91 Djohan Effendi argued further that there was a shift of empha-
sis from Mukti Ali to Alamsyah: while the former believed that religious 
harmony should be developed through dialogue, the latter believed that 
religious harmony could be effectively maintained through regulations.92 It 
seems both Djohan Effendi and Mukti Ali were only partially right. As we 
already discussed above, there is somehow continuity between Mukti Ali’s 
and Alamsyah’s policies on dialogue. The issue was not simply the contrast 
between a religious scholar and a military man or between dialogue and 
regulation but the fact that the Government idea of dialogue was based on 
the top-down approach to maintain the socio-political stability needed for 
development. Both Mukti Ali and Alamsyah were somehow trapped within 
this approach. 
The next Minister of Religion, Munawir Sjadzali (in office from 1983 
to 1993) also continued the project on religious harmony, but it was appar-
ently not his first concern. One important thing that Munawir Sjadzali did 
with the Forum for the Inter-religious Consultation in late 1983 was to invite 
religious leaders to discuss the Government intention to make Pancasila the 
sole basis for all social organisations. His attempt through the Forum was 
apparently not very successful because although all of the religious organi-
sations represented in the Forum later accepted the regulation, this accept-
ance was more a result of internal discussion within the religious organisa-
tions themselves rather than that of the Forum.93 In addition, as we shall see, 
the following Minister of Religion, Tarmizi Taher (in office from 1993 to1998) 
reinforced the project but this was much more in response to incidents than 
a deliberate effort to support the Government development discourse.
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Critical Muslim and Christian Responses to the Government 
Initiatives 
If we look at the Christian writings in the early 1970s, we find that 
there were positive responses to Mukti Ali’s dialogue programme. In his 
book published in 1972, J.W.M Bakker, for instance, described with great 
sympathy how Mukti Ali from the late 1960s until he became the Minister 
of Religion in 1971 tirelessly promoted inter-religious dialogue.94 Likewise, 
Eka Darmaputera, a Protestant minister who was to become the leader of 
the PGI, wrote in 1973 that since Mukti Ali became the Minister, there were 
positive developments in terms of inter-religious relations in the country. To 
show implicitly the contrast between Mukti Ali and his predecessors, Dar-
maputera said that Mukti Ali could put himself as the Minister of all reli-
gious groups, and his dialogue programme was not a reaction to a certain 
inter-religious incident but a preparation to face the future together. None-
theless, for Darmaputera, the dialogue initiated by the Government should 
be considered only as a beginning and therefore, it had to be improved. 
Dialogue, he said, should not be simply “to see each other” but “existential 
encounter” in which everybody was expected to be ready to accept and to 
be accepted by the others without neglecting their respective differences. 
The national development, argued Darmaputera, demanded not only inter-
religious harmony but also inter-religious creativity.95
Almost a decade later, in 1982, the Muslim traditionalist leader, Abdur-
rahman Wahid, also criticised the Government-sponsored dialogue. For him, 
this dialogue was illusory because instead of talking openly about the exist-
ing inter-religious problems, it tended to hide them behind ceremonial 
smiles. The dialogue, he said, was in fact merely a series of monologues in 
which the participants tried to reiterate their respective religious teachings 
in relation to the Government development programmes and their loyalty to 
the state ideology, Pancasila.96 On the other hand, Wahid explained that out-
side the formal dialogues initiated by the Government, informal communica-
tion between religious groups began to emerge and for him this was a more 
promising pattern of inter-religious relations. He observed that in this com-
munication, the young theologians and activists of different religions tried 
“to create a common theology of human development and social justice.” 
What was actually ‘the common theology of human development 
and social justice’? This theology apparently originated from discussions 
among religious intellectuals, particularly Muslim and Christian intellectu-
als on development issues since the early 1970s, that is, in the period when 
Mukti Ali promoted his idea on religion and development. Through both 
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discussion forums and their writings, those intellectuals tried to think about 
the position of religion in relation to development, sometimes from their 
respective religious teachings and sometimes in more universal terms. 
Two articles written by Th. Sumartana in Tempo may serve to illus-
trate this theology. In an article published in 1974, Sumartana criticised two 
popular slogans on religion and development.97 The first slogan was “Religion 
provides the motivation for development”. For Sumartana, this slogan clear-
ly used religion to justify rather than to direct and influence development. 
Behind the slogan, he said, there was a philosophy of a dualism of the human 
being: the soul and the body. The former was considered as the realm for reli-
gion where motivation was supposed to lie, and the latter was the realm of 
action where development actually operated. This would finally lead religion, 
he said, to be left in its own realm without any influences on the concrete 
decisions and actions of development. The second slogan was “to develop a 
human developer”. This slogan, he said, could avoid the soul-body dualism 
of the first slogan, but at the same time it fell into another dualism, that is, 
between humanity and the world. This view, he said, tended to neglect the 
fact that the human being was not such a strong creature as could change 
the world. In other words, this slogan, he said, would lead religion to ignore 
the socio-structural realities involved in the process of development. Within 
these two slogans, argued Sumartana, one could find the traditional and 
established framework of religion in which religion was still considered as 
the centre of everything and the store of prefect truths. This framework even-
tually led religion to lose its power to criticise development, namely human 
beings and their world. Moreover, because the two slogans were based on the 
traditional and established religious framework, they would only contribute 
to harden religious groupings. In short, for Sumartana, religion should func-
tion as a critical voice in the framework of development; and to create this 
function, religion should be freed from its traditional exclusive framework. 
The second article was on religion and social justice, published a few 
months before the above article.98 In this Sumartana proposed some criti-
cal questions on the possibility of enhancing social justice through religion. 
He said, there were many people whose incomes depended on their role as 
religious leaders. Then he asked, was it appropriate for a religious leader to 
become rich? This question was important, he said, particularly if one expect-
ed that a religious leader had to struggle for social justice. It was true, he said, 
that religion did not forbid anybody being rich, but who else could see the 
urgency of social justice better than a poor person? In fact, he said, wealth 
was a primary support in society to develop injustice. Without answering this 
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question, he moved on to another question: should religion specifically serve 
the poor people? Sumartana’s answer to this question was more than a sim-
ple yes or no. A religion that cannot be effectively involved in the issue of 
social justice, he said, was a poor religion and a religion of poverty. However, 
he said, one should not identify the poor with social justice, because like 
the rich, the poor were not free from sin and therefore, they could become 
oppressors when they became rich. What was then the appropriate position 
of religion on the issue of social justice? For Sumartana, to answer this ques-
tion, one could look at how religion dealt with Marxism. He then asked: “Can 
religion seek social justice without being trapped in Marxism and without 
falling into the impasse of Marx’s concept of human being? Can religion 
struggle for the need of the poor without deifying poverty and the poor?” 
Sumartana’s appeal to religion to function as a voice critical of devel-
opment and as a force to enhance social justice was obviously parallel with 
the so-called theology of liberation developed by Catholic theologians in 
Latin America. It is interesting that the theology of liberation was highly 
appreciated in Indonesia not only by the Catholic theologians but also by 
Protestant and Muslim intellectuals. If we look at the articles on religion and 
development published in the prestigious journal called Prisma from 1975 
to 1984, we find that the theology of liberation was introduced by both 
Catholic and Protestant intellectuals.99 The importance of the articles lies in 
the fact that Prisma was not a Christian journal at all. The journal was pub-
lished by the Institute of Research, Education and Information on Social and 
Economic Affairs (Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan & Penerangan Ekonomi 
dan Sosial, LP3ES), a Non-Government Organisation (NGO) established by 
the early 1970s by some intellectuals of Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and 
Masyumi backgrounds. In the first edition of Prisma, its editor, Ismid Hadad, 
explicitly stated that the journal was intended to be a free discussion forum 
on economic development, and social and cultural changes in Indonesia.100 
Thus, it is not an exaggeration to say that Prisma was a medium of dialogue, 
and the fact that both Muslim and Christian intellectuals wrote in the journal 
indicates that it was also a medium of dialogue for them. 
Indeed, the dialogue truly took place and this was indicated by the 
fact that some of the Muslim intellectuals and activists later tried to estab-
lish an Islamic version of the theology of liberation. Dawam Rahardjo, a Mus-
lim reformist intellectual and one of the leaders of the LP3ES, for instance, 
in 1983, organised a seminar by inviting a Catholic priest, Kees Bertens, a 
Muslim theologian, Harun Nasution and a foreign scholar, Karel A. Steen-
brink, to discuss the possibility of developing an Islamic theology of libera-
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tion. To Rahardjo’s disappointment, Harun Nasution said that the issue of 
social justice in Islam was not a theological (‘ilm al-kalām) but legal issue 
(fiqh), and because his expertise was in kalām not fiqh, he could not propose 
something similar to that of the Christian theology of liberation.101 In fact, 
there is a lot of material in Islamic tradition, including ‘ilm al-kalām, which 
can be developed to be an Islamic liberation theology. Why was Nasution 
reluctant to develop this type of theology? Perhaps, he was worried about 
its political implications. As a theologian who worked in the State Institute 
of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta, he was known as supportive rather than 
critical of the Government modernisation programmes. On the other hand, 
the Muslim proponents of liberation theology were generally NGO activists 
who were not dependent on the Government but on foreign funds. Thus, for 
them, to be critical of the Government was normal if not necessary. 
Despite the above seminar, Dawam Rahardjo could eventually find the 
Islamic theological reflections similar to the Christian liberation theology in 
the works of the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi and the Iranian reli-
gious intellectual Ali Shari’ati.102 Rahardjo was certainly not the only Muslim 
intellectual who was interested in Hassan Hanafi’s and Ali Shari’ati’s writings 
in particular and liberation theology in general. In fact, the interest of the 
Muslim intellectuals in the theology of liberation increased in the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. In 1987, the Protestant publisher, Sinar Harapan, pub-
lished a book on the theology of liberation by a Catholic priest named Waho-
no Nitiprawiro.103 The book was originally a thesis submitted to the Catholic 
Institute of Theology and Philosophy, Kentungan, Yogyakarta. The book was 
soon banned by the Government, but it had already reached the hands of 
student activists, particularly in Java, and became the topic of closed discus-
sions among them. In June 1988, the NU activists in Yogyakarta, organised a 
seminar on the Islamic perspectives of the “theology of development”, anoth-
er euphemism for the “theology of liberation.” There were at least two papers 
in the seminar trying to find elements of liberation in Islamic teachings: the 
papers by Masdar F. Masu’di and Moeslim Abdurrahman respectively.104 These 
two Muslim intellectuals later published their respective books on how Islam 
should function as a transforming force to enhance social justice.105 Anoth-
er Muslim intellectual who had the same concern was Mansour Fakih who 
argued that Harun Nasution’s rational Islamic theology should be replaced 
with a theology concerned with the weak and the oppressed.106 
By the early 1990s, several activists of the Muslim traditionalist stu-
dent organisation, PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia), who estab-
lished the Institute of Islamic and Social Studies (Lembaga Kajian Islam dan 
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Sosial, LKiS) in Yogyakarta, translated and published the works of foreign 
Muslim intellectuals who promoted the idea of liberation from Islamic per-
spectives, particularly the works of Hassan Hanafi and the Indian thinker 
Asghar Ali Engineer.107 These activists also frequently visited or invited the 
Catholic theologian, J.B. Banawiratma, to study the Catholic theology of 
liberation. The interest of the PMII activists in the theology of liberation 
was also related to their experience in the field, particularly in the Kedung 
Ombo affair in the late 1980s. The Government constructed a dam in Kedung 
Ombo between 1985 and 1989 and this was to the disadvantage of the 
poor people living in that area who lost their land, without adequate com-
pensation from the Government. The PMII activists were disappointed to 
find that the Muslim leaders in that area supported the Government, while 
the Catholic priest, Mangunwijaya, came there to support the demand of 
the people. This experience inspired these activists to study the Catholic 
theology of liberation and to find a similar perspective within the Islamic 
teachings.108
In fact, both Islamic and Christian traditions contain teachings on 
social justice. Perhaps, the special thing here was that the Muslim activists 
wanted to learn about the concept of social justice from the Christian the-
ology of liberation. Religious boundaries then became irrelevant because 
social justice was considered a common concern for all. It became an alter-
native to the early Muslim-Christian antagonist discourses on Islamic as 
against secular ideology and at the same time it was a criticisms of the Gov-
ernment discourse on development. These Muslim activists, however, were 
a minority among the Indonesian Muslims. Many Muslim leaders were also 
concerned with social justice, but they did not feel it important to learn from 
the Christians or to cooperate with them.
3. Politics, Incidents and Dialogue in the 1990s
By the late 1980s, there were indications that the Government had 
become more accommodating to Islamic groups. In 1989, some Mus-
lim interests were accommodated in the Education Law, and in the same 
year the Religious Court Law was ratified. In 1990, Soeharto supported the 
establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI). In 
1991, Soeharto signed the Presidential Instruction on the Compilation of 
Islamic Law to be applied in the Islamic Courts. Soeharto also supported 
the establishment of the Islamic Bank (Bank Muamalat Indonesia) and the 
Muslim newspaper, Republika. After the 1992 elections, many of the Mus-
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lims associated with ICMI became ministers of Soeharto’s new cabinet, and 
the economic ministries that had been previously controlled by Christians 
were henceforth headed by Muslims.109 There was also a decline of the influ-
ence of the Christians in the higher positions of the intelligence services and 
armed forces. While a group of Catholics in cooperation with certain army 
generals established the CSIS in early 1970s, now the ICMI also established 
a think tank called the Centre for Information and Development Studies 
(CIDES). It was said that some of the ICMI leaders thought that it was the 
time for them to take ‘revenge’ on the Christians.
Why was this? Hefner argued that state accommodation of Islam was 
a positive response to the emergence of the Muslim middle class in particu-
lar and the success of the Islamization of Indonesian culture in general.110 On 
the other hand, without entirely denying what Hefner said, Liddle empha-
sised that this ‘Islamic turn’ was strongly related to Soeharto’s political tactic 
to make sure that he was to be re-elected as President by the MPR, rather 
than a true accommodation of Islam.111 It seems, as Bruinessen argued, both 
the socio-cultural and political explanations were important to understand 
Soeharto’s Islamic policies.112 
In line with the above analysis, in Chapter 4 and 5, I argued that 
although both the Education Law and the Religious Court Law somehow 
indicated Government accommodation of Islamic interests, there were also 
compromises or limits to this accommodation. I also indicated that despite 
the compromises, the debates on the drafts of the two Laws had negative 
impacts on Muslim-Christian relations in the country. In this context, I would 
say that Liddle was probably right to say that Soeharto’s close relation with 
the Muslims was primarily a political tactic to counter- balance the oppo-
sition of some important army generals rather than a genuine accommo-
dation of Islam. However, we cannot deny the fact that Soeharto’s accom-
modation with former Muslim opponents helped increase the fear of the 
Islamic threat among the Christians. Thus, no matter whether this fear was 
groundless or not, it affected their attitudes to and relations with the Mus-
lims. In what follows, we shall discuss some cases to see how inter-religious 
dialogue developed in this political context.
The Monitor Affair and Dialogue
In September 1990, the weekly tabloid Monitor carried out a poll on 
‘the most admired person’ and the result of the poll was published in its 
15 October 1990 edition. The result indicated that President Soeharto was 
top, while the editor of the tabloid, Arswendo Atmowiloto, was ranked 10 
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and below him (11th) was the Prophet Muhammad. This result, particularly 
the low position of the Prophet, soon triggered protests from the Muslims 
who perceived a deliberate provocation. Many Muslim leaders made sharp 
remarks against the case, and there were also demonstrations in the streets 
that eventually led to physical attacks on the office of the tabloid. Many 
Muslims demanded that the Government prosecute Arswendo, and some 
demonstrators even demanded the death penalty for him. In general, the 
Government reaction to this case was in line with the Muslim demands: the 
tabloid was banned, Arswendo was prosecuted and he finally received a 
five-year sentence (but was released after four).113 
The strong Muslim opposition in this case was partly because many 
Muslims considered it as a case of inter-religious relations. First of all, Ars-
wendo was a Catholic (he originally came from a Javanese abangan family 
and converted to Catholicism when he married a Catholic woman). Moreo-
ver, the tabloid belonged to a highly successful Catholic publishing house 
called ‘Kompas Gramedia Group’. Hefner noted that by the end of the 1970s 
the Group had gained a dominant place in the Indonesian print media 
industry. “In the mid-1990s this media conglomerate dominated the pub-
lishing industry, owning all parts of some twenty-three magazines and six 
newspapers, as well as the country’s largest publishing house.”114 On the 
other hand, the Muslims, particularly the reformists, had been very upset for 
a long time because their newspaper, Abadi, was banned in 1974 and sub-
sequently there was no good Muslim newspaper that could compete with 
the Catholic newspaper, Kompas. While many Muslims read and contributed 
their articles to Kompas, among the Muslim hardliners this newspaper has 
been perceived as a Catholic instrument directed against Islam. Its name 
was often mockingly explained as an acronym of ‘Komando Pastor’ (the 
priest command). Moreover, Muslim magazines like Panji Masyarakat and 
Kiblat, could not compete with secular and popular magazines produced by 
the Gramedia Group either. 
In an article published in1980, M. Amien Rais, the Muhammadi-
yah intellectual who was to become the speaker of the MPR in 1999, had 
expressed his resentment of the weak condition of the Muslim media in the 
country with a cry: “save our soul”.115 Amien Rais explained that the influen-
tial printed and electronic media in the United States like the Washington 
Post, the New York Times and Newsweek, and the television networks such as 
ABC, CBS and NBC were very much controlled by the Jewish minority. This 
was the reason, he said, why the Jews could effectively influence American 
politics. Therefore, Amien Rais warned the Muslims that the influence of 
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the Christian media in Indonesia should not be underestimated. He argued 
that media were never neutral and the Muslims should not be so naïve as 
to expect that the Christian media would help them to publish things for 
the Muslim interest. In another article, having mentioned Kompas as the 
major newspaper in the country, Amien Rais said that Indonesian Mus-
lims were so dependent on the Christian newspaper to express their ideas 
and positions as to be like the orphans who relied on the affection of the 
Christians.116 
Many other Muslims shared Amien Rais’ concern, particularly the 
Muslim reformists of the DDII, and their protests against the tabloid were 
obviously related to it.117 The leader of the Kompas Gramedia Group, Jacob 
Oetama, was apparently aware of this problem, so he agreed with the 
banning of Monitor and even fired Arswendo from an important position 
in the company. More than that, Jacob Oetama voluntarily returned the 
licence of another publication of his company, Senang magazine, to the 
Government in order to prevent more protests. Senang No. 34 (21 Sep-
tember–4 October 1990) edition had published a sketch of an Arab man 
without clear face with a halo around his head. The sketch was intended 
to illustrate the content of a letter from a reader who said that while he 
was in Saudi Arabia, he dreamed of the Prophet Muhammad, but he could 
not remember what the Prophet looked like. Many Muslims still believed 
that the Prophet could not be visualised, so the sketch became another 
target of Muslim protest. Jacob’s decision to stop Senang was relatively 
effective because the Muslim protest against Senang was not as strong as 
that against Monitor.118 
What was the effect of the Monitor affair on Muslim-Christian relations? 
If we look at Muslim comments on this case, some of them blamed Monitor 
(read: the Catholics) as a troublemaker amid the existing inter-religious har-
mony. “If you want to maintain religious harmony, do not hurt the feelings of 
another religious group, even though you personally do not like that religion,” 
said Mohammad Natsir.119 In line with Natsir, Amien Rais said that the Monitor 
affair was an insult to the Islamic community and a disturbance of the existing 
inter-religious harmony maintained by the Government.120 Another Muslim 
leader, Nurcholish Madjid who usually spoke for moderation and tolerance, 
now accused those behind the Monitor (probably he had the Catholics in 
mind) of being arrogant. He said, “I do not see Arswendo as a person, but I 
see a mechanism behind it. Its essence is arrogance, carelessness, insensitivity 
and so forth. Therefore, [he] must be given a maximum punishment…[and] 
Monitor must be banned forever.” 121 He also said, because of the Monitor and 
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Senang cases, that inter-religious dialogue should be temporarily suspended. 
The General Chairman of the PGI, Sularso Sopater and Cardinal Darmojowono 
also criticised Monitor and Senang but in more moderate terms.122
On the other hand, the leader of the PGI, Eka Darmaputera, said that 
he believed that Arswendo had not intended to insult Islam. Moreover, Y.B. 
Mangunwijaya, the prominent Catholic priest, said the Monitor affair did not 
disturb Muslim-Catholic relations in the villages. The people who were angry, 
he said, were those who could speak in the media and had vested inter-
ests.123 Among the Muslim leaders, it seems that only Abdurrahman Wahid 
was publicly critical of the Muslim attitudes to the Monitor. The Muslims, he 
said, should not be angry and violent. If they disagreed with the Monitor, 
they could boycott the tabloid; but they should not demand to ban it.124 
He lamented the Muslim violent attack on the Monitor office and accused 
those Muslims of having an inferiority complex. He said, “Islam is a religion 
of peace and love but they made Islam an angry and hateful religion.”125
In response to this situation, the Muslim NGO, Perhimpunan Pengem-
bangan Pesantren dan Masyarakat (P3M) organised a seminar on “religion 
and the plurality of the nation” on 21 November 1990, in Jakarta.126 The 
seminar was more or less an inter-religious meeting because the speakers 
and participants in the seminar were important religious leaders, particu-
larly of Islamic and Christian backgrounds. P3M had been established in the 
early 1980s as a continuation of the LP3ES’development projects for Islamic 
boarding schools in Indonesia funded by Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNS). 
The leadership of P3M included both reformist and traditionalist Muslims. 
The initiative of the P3M seems to have received sympathy from both Mus-
lim and Christian leaders as well as from the Government. The Minister of 
Religion, Munawir Sjadzali, gave a keynote speech to the seminar, and the 
speakers were Franz Magnis Suseno, M. Sastrapateja (both were Catholic 
priests), Victor Tanja (a Protestant minister), M. Quraish Shihab, Ali Yafie 
(both were traditionalist Muslim scholars), Aswab Mahasin (a reformist Mus-
lim intellectual) and Aggi Tjeje (a Buddhist).
What was the effect of the seminar, particularly for the Catholics? 
Franz Magnis-Suseno wrote two articles referring positively to the seminar. 
His positive assessment was probably not free from embellishment but at 
the same time we can see that he was quite happy with the Muslim initiative. 
He wrote that the seminar impressed him very much because many impor-
tant religious leaders came to it and discussed sensitive issues openly and 
critically. He was also impressed by the fact that his paper on the absolute-
ness and relativity of religion from a Catholic perspective was almost paral-
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lel with Quraish Shihab’s paper analysing the same topic from an Islamic 
point of view. In his paper, Shihab explained that Muslims were convinced 
that Islam was the best religion, but at the same time they should leave the 
judgment on the followers of other religions to God. For Magnis-Suseno, this 
was in line with the Vatican Council II statement that did not only require 
the Christians to respect other religious believers but also emphasised that 
the latter could attain salvation if they lived according to their respective 
religious teachings. This humble religious attitude, he said, was a good basis 
for inter-religious tolerance in the country.127
In contrast to the above article, Magnis-Suseno’s second article talked 
much more openly about the socio-political contexts in the year 1990 and 
the relevance of the seminar. He said that as a member of a Christian minor-
ity, he could not deny the fact that the year 1990 was marked by some 
important events for the Muslim majority, among them the establishment 
of ICMI and the Monitor affair. Many of his Christian friends, he said, were 
concerned with these developments, particularly the explosion of Muslim 
anger against Monitor. They could not really understand, he said, why the 
Monitor affair was connected with the inter-religious issue as the tabloid 
did not have any connection with the Catholics. However, he said, he was 
optimistic about the future of religious harmony in Indonesia. Again, Mag-
nis-Suseno praised P3M’s seminar as a good example of how the Muslims 
were ready to develop brotherhood with the Christians. 128 He also argued 
that although there were strong protests against the Monitor, he did not 
find any Muslim statement questioning “the equal rights of the Christians 
as co-citizens.” In other words, in their protests, there was no indication that 
the Muslims wanted to treat the Christians as second-class citizens under an 
Islamic State. As we can see, although it sounds positive, Magnis-Suseno’s 
remarks could also be read to indicate that the fear of an Islamic State had 
actually increased among the Christians. 
Private Initiatives in the 1990s: Dialogue for Democracy and 
Pluralism
In 1991, Th. Sumartana whom we have met before as one of the pro-
moters of liberation theology obtained his doctorate from the Vrije Uni-
versiteit , Amsterdam. By the same year, through his contacts with Chris-
tian leaders in Europe and Muslim and Christian intellectuals in Indonesia, 
Sumartana initiated an institute for inter-religious dialogue called ‘Dialog 
Antar Iman’ (DIAN) or ‘Institute for Inter-faith Dialogue in Indonesia’ (Interfi-
dei), located in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta. The Interfidei was then officially inau-
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gurated on 10 August 1992.129 Sumartana’s initiative was supported by some 
prominent Muslim and Christian intellectuals and student activists.130 
Sumartana highly respected Mukti Ali as the initiator of inter-reli-
gious dialogue in the country.131 However, Sumartana was not satisfied with 
the New Order’s view that dialogue was simply to create religious harmony 
or peaceful co-existence. For him, inter-religious dialogue should have a 
broader goal, namely to develop an open and democratic Indonesian soci-
ety, and this was the main goal of the Interfidei. In his speech at a book 
launch of the Interfidei in 1993, he said: 
The Institute [Interfidei] wants to show its concerns with the movement for 
changes in society towards a more autonomous, democratic and creative com-
mon life. This is probably the most important mission of this Institute, namely 
to create a communicating, mature and democratic society that is used to ques-
tions and able to have different opinions [i.e.,] an open and pluralistic society. 
This pluralistic nature would in turn become the most human way to solve our 
social problems together peacefully.132 
Thus, Sumartana believed that, through dialogue, all religions could 
develop their respective potentials to create a democratic society. As noted, 
by the early 1990s, there was anxiety among some intellectuals that Soe-
harto would use Islam through the ICMI channel for his political interest at 
the expense of religious minorities. As the Chairman of NU, Abdurrahman 
Wahid was the most important Islamic leader who refused to join ICMI. In 
March 1991, Wahid supported by several Muslim, secular and Christian intel-
lectuals established the Democracy Forum (Fordem). Sumartana’s view was 
parallel with, though not identical to, the concern of the Democracy Forum. 
Indeed, the second book published by Interfidei (consisting of the texts of 
lecturers delivered at the Institute) contained a paper by Wahid in which he 
expresses quite similar views to those of Sumartana on the important role 
of religion in developing democracy.133 
Because Sumartana believed that religion could be an effective force 
for democracy, he strongly criticised certain attitudes of the Christians that, 
in his opinion, were opposed to democracy. In Chapter 5, we noted that 
Sumartana was very sympathetic to the Javanese syncretistic Christian lead-
er, Kiyai Sadrach and very critical of Western missionaries. For Sumartana, 
Indonesian Protestantism of the 19th and 20th centuries which the country 
inherited from the Western missionaries was anti-peasants, anti-workers, 
pro- the West, and intolerant of Islam. The Christians in Indonesia, he said, 
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could not be a democratic force unless they were freed from all of these char-
acteristics.134 Moreover, due to the fact that Muslims comprised the major-
ity in Indonesia, Sumartana was very eager to stimulate democratic ideas 
among the Indonesian Muslims.135 This was why among the first projects of 
Interfidei was to make critical summaries of the works of Indonesian Muslim 
intellectuals.136 This idea is apparently in line with Sumartana’s activity in the 
Seminar of Religions in the early 1980s discussed above. 
The activities of Interfidei took different forms including regular dis-
cussions, seminars, publications, research and common prayer. The initial 
funding of the Institute came from the Dutch Reformed Church, particularly 
through Sumartana’s close friend, the Rev. Jaspert Slob. Later, the Institute 
also received support from the Asia Foundation, the Inter-Church Organi-
sation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 
(KAS) etc. Interfidei was also very active in organising conflict resolution 
programmes in the areas affected by the conflicts between Muslims and 
Christians in the late New Order and afterwards. It was in this period that the 
Interfidei developed its network in the outer islands.137 
Like other programmes of dialogue that are generally elitist, one may 
wonder whether the dialogue initiated by Interfidei really helped increase 
mutual understanding and cooperation among religious groups. When the 
attacks on churches in different places happened by the late 1990s, some 
people questioned whether inter-religious dialogue was useful anymore. 
The bloody conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Ambon and Poso 
after the fall of Soeharto increased this scepticism. However, for Sumartana, 
the incidents even indicated that inter-religious dialogue was really needed. 
In other words, for him the problem was not because inter-religious dia-
logue was useless, but because there were still few people who were eager 
to be involved in it.138 Sumartana never changed his mind that religions 
could function to support democracy. In his reflection on the religious-class-
ethnic-political conflicts of the late 1990s, he still wrote: “religious values 
actually can be a supporting force for efforts to defend human rights and to 
activate the democratisation process.” 139
Several young activists who joined Interfidei came from the Muslim 
traditionalist student organisation background, PMII. In our discussion on 
theology of liberation earlier, we also mentioned the role of those activ-
ists who gathered in the LKiS in promoting the ideas of liberation in Islam. 
LKiS was established in the early 1990s by some leading PMII activists in 
Yogyakarta as an informal discussion group, and later as an NGO. Since its 
inception, the LKiS has been committed to developing tolerant, democratic 
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and liberating Islamic ideas. One of its important activities was a programme 
called ‘Learning Together about Islam as a Force of Transformation and Toler-
ance’ (Belajar Bersama Islam Transformatif dan Toleran). Funded by the Asia 
Foundation, the programme was started in 1997 and still continues. The 
participants of the programme were senior students of Islamic boarding 
schools (pesantren), university students and activists. There are four top-
ics discussed in the programme: critiques of religious discourses, religion 
and feminism, Islam and politics, and inter-religious dialogue and recon-
ciliation. On the session on inter-religious dialogue and reconciliation, the 
participants were asked to recount their respective concrete experiences 
and impressions with other religious believers. These experiences were then 
discussed together with an expert or activist in the field. Christian activists 
and intellectuals have been frequently invited to contribute their knowl-
edge and experience to this programme. The influence of this programme 
on the young Muslims has probably been very limited but it is obviously a 
positive Muslim initiative. 
In Jakarta, as in Yogyakarta, there were also initiatives to carry out 
inter-religious dialogue. One of the important Muslim NGOs in Jakarta to 
be mentioned here is the Paramadina Foundation established in 1986. The 
most important person behind Paramadina is none but the promoter of the 
non-ideological view of Islam in the early 1970s, Nurcholish Madjid. The idea 
of establishing this institution was originally Dawam Rahardjo’s and Madjid 
demanded that Utomo Dananjaya be involved as an organizer. 140 By the end 
of the 1970s, Madjid had gone to follow a doctoral programme at the Uni-
versity of Chicago, where he had the opportunity to study with the Pakistani 
scholar, Fazlur Rahman. Having completed his PhD degree in 1984, he came 
back to Jakarta and established the Paramadina, which was intended to be 
an institution where he could develop and disseminate his ideas. The audi-
ence targeted by the Paramadina was the middle and upper class Muslims, 
whose position was considered influential on the socio-political develop-
ment of the country. The most important activity of Paramadina was the 
Religious Study Club (Klub Kajian Agama, KKA) in which middle and upper 
class Muslims could learn and discuss Islamic teachings openly. Discussions 
were usually held in very fine hotels in Jakarta, and Madjid was the main per-
son who determined the theme of the discussion. Usually Madjid presented 
a paper on a certain topic, while another invited speaker would speak about 
the same topic but from a different perspective.
The early topics of the KKA were much more focused on Islam in gen-
eral, particularly on the question of Islamic reform and its relevance to mod-
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ern life. In this regard, besides developing his early ideas on Islam and mod-
ernization, he also developed an Islamic inclusive theology.141 What I mean 
by ‘inclusive’ here is a theological view which tries to embrace the other 
faiths without neglecting one’s distinctive religious identity. Madjid argued 
that the Qur’anic use of the term ‘Islam’ sometimes refers to the teachings 
revealed to Muhammad, and in other passages refers to the message sent 
to earlier prophets as well. In this context, the term ‘Islam’ should be under-
stood in its generic meaning, that is, a total submission to God. According 
to this interpretation, although the form of Islam revealed to Muhammad 
is somehow the perfect one, it does not abrogate the other Islams. Those 
who believe in other Islams, therefore, can attain salvation. Who are they? To 
answer this question, Madjid refers to the Qur’anic term ahl al-kitāb, which 
means ‘people of the book’. According to the classical Qur’anic exegesis, the 
term refers exclusively to Jews and Christians, but with reference to Rashīd 
Ridā, Madjid argued that the term also includes Buddhists, Hindus and Con-
fucians. 
By the second half of the 1980s, Madjid’s theological views on other 
religions were already widely debated but they became a subject of contro-
versy after he delivered a speech on the subject in the prestigious cultural 
centre in Jakarta, Taman Ismail Marzuki in 1992.142 While Madjid’s supporters 
argued that this theology was relevant to a modern and pluralistic society, 
the Muslim reformists of the DDII saw it an attempt to destroy Islam from 
within. The Christians, on the other hand, gave sympathetic comments. Franz 
Magnis-Suseno for instance said that although he was a Catholic, he hoped 
that he would be a Muslim in its generic meaning, that is, a person who total-
ly submitted to God.143 Likewise, the Catholic theologian, J.B. Banawiratma 
wrote that Madjid’s idea on Islam in its generic meaning was similar to Karl 
Rahner’s idea on ‘anonymous Christianity’.144 However, it should be noted 
that the Christians were sometimes also disturbed by Madjid’s apologetic 
tendencies. His apologetics are primarily related to his attempts to justify 
his view that Islam is much more ‘modern’ in substance than Christianity by 
referring to some historical incidents in the West when the Church opposed 
scientific development. He sometimes also opposed the Christian doctrine 
of the Trinity by referring to some works of the Western scholars. Franz Mag-
nis-Suseno reacted critically to these apologetic tendencies.145 
Madjid’s inclusive theology was then developed further by intellectu-
als affiliated with Paramadina. In contrast to the PMII activists in Yogyakar-
ta who were attracted to liberation theology, the middle and upper class 
Muslims in Jakarta were apparently much more interested in Sufism, the 
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spiritual teachings of Islam. Thus, the discourse on Islam in Paramadina also 
moved towards the need of its market. However, like liberation theology, in 
general Sufism also encourages religious tolerance. In this context, Budhy 
Munawar-Rachman, a young reformist Muslim intellectual who worked in 
Paramadina, tried to develop Madjid’s inclusive theology further into a plu-
ralistic theology based on the so called ‘perennial philosophy’ or al-hikmah 
al-khālidah.146 This philosophy was known in Indonesia through the works 
of Frithjof Schuon, Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and the like. Accord-
ing to this philosophy, every authentic religious tradition has two levels of 
truth: the esoteric and the exoteric. Religions are different only at the exo-
teric level, but at the esoteric level they are the same. In other words, there is 
a transcendental unity of religion. Two other activists of Paramadina, Komar-
uddin Hidayat and Wahyuni Nafis later co-wrote a book on the perennial 
philosophy.147 The interest in the perennial philosophy was strongly related 
to the increasing interest of some of the Indonesian Muslims in the study of 
speculative Sufism of Ibn al-‘Arabī, ‘Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī and the like. In this 
context, Kautsar Azhari Noer, another activist of Paramadina, introduced 
Sufism as a tolerant and pluralistic tradition of Islam. Noer was a lecturer 
on comparative religion at the IAIN Jakarta and wrote a PhD thesis on Ibn 
al-‘Arabi which was published by Paramadina.148 Noer has been apparently 
involved in Paramadina activities since the second half of the 1990s.
In general we can say that compared with the controversy in the early 
1970s, the new theological ideas introduced by Madjid and his friends in 
the 1990s had a much wider audience and supporters. Perhaps, these ideas 
significantly influenced a number of Muslim middle and upper class but cer-
tainly not the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Few Muslim reformist intel-
lectuals of Muhammadiyah like Amin Abdullah and Abdul Munir Mulkhan 
supported these ideas, but they were a minority in the organisation.149 The 
inclusive theology and perennial philosophy were not so attractive to NU 
intellectuals either because the latter felt more comfortable with develop-
ing a new interpretation of fiqh (close to the Christian liberation theology) 
rather than abstract theological reflections. However, at least these ideas 
successfully stimulated discussions among Muslim intellectuals and stu-
dents in the 1990s.
The dissemination of the new ideas among the Muslim intellectuals 
and the Muslim middle class in general was partly facilitated by a journal 
called Ulumul Qur’an. This journal was established in 1989 by the Institute 
for the Study of Religion and Philosophy (Lembaga Kajian Agama dan Fil-
safat, LSAF). The editor of the journal was the director of LSAF, M. Dawam 
I N T E R - R E L I G I O U S  D I A L O G U E
290
F E E L I N G  T H R E A T E N E D
Rahardjo, the Muslim intellectual whom we have met before as one of the 
proponents of the Islamic renewal movement in the early 1970s and the 
prominent activist of LP3ES who was interested in developing an Islamic the-
ology of liberation as well as the person who originally proposed the estab-
lishment of Paramadina. Rahardjo explained that the journal was intended 
to be a medium of critical discussion on science and culture in the spirit of 
the Qur’an, that is, the first revelation to the Prophet, Iqra’ (read!). He also 
emphasized that the journal was directed to the Muslim middle class and at 
the same time it was also open to non-Muslims who shared the same con-
cerns to develop human civilization.150 Therefore, besides articles on Islamic 
philosophy, theology, mysticism and other Muslim social and cultural issues, 
the journal also published articles on non-Islamic religions written by Mus-
lim and non-Muslim authors. The Protestant theologian Victor E. Tanja and 
the Jesuit Magnis-Suseno were among the contributors to this journal. Dur-
ing the New Order period, Ulumul Qur’an proved to be a successful journal 
and its distribution reached even the cities outside Java. 
In the mid-1990s, the activists of Paramadina developed contacts 
with the Christian intellectuals from the KWI and PGI to discuss the pos-
sibility of creating an institution for dialogue. On 10 November 1995, they 
had a meeting in the office of the Christian magazine, KAIROS, Jakarta, fol-
lowed by another meeting in the PGI office. The result was that they eventu-
ally agreed to establish a society for inter-religious dialogue called MADIA 
(Majelis Dialog Antar Agama).151 The members of MADIA include not only 
Muslims and Christians but also intellectuals of other religious groups. Djo-
han Effendi was also active in the background behind MADIA. In the begin-
ning, MADIA’s activity consisted of discussions on theological issues held in 
different places: in Paramadina, KWI or PGI offices. One interesting thing in 
MADIA’s activity was that they usually closed their meetings with prayers, 
offered alternately according to the respective religions of the participants. 
The MADIA activists became much more responsive to socio-political issues 
by the late 1990s when incidents involving religious symbols happened in 
the country. MADIA sometimes made public statements voicing religious 
tolerance and cooperation and received strong support from Abdurrahman 
Wahid.152 
It is also noteworthy that the theological discourse on pluralism also 
developed among the Christians during this period. We have mentioned 
in the first section of this chapter that, started in 1981, the Research and 
Development Office of the PGI organised a Seminar of Religions every year. 
The fifteenth Seminar of Religions was held in September 1995 in Salatiga 
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and the topic was “theologising in the context of religions in Indonesia.” In 
this seminar, Th. Sumartana and E.G. Singgih were the Protestant speakers 
who developed theological reflections on pluralism. In his paper, Sumartana 
urged that the Christians should develop a Christian theology in the context 
of religious pluralism or what he called ‘theologia religionum.’ This theology, 
he said, should emphasise the universal dimensions of the existing Christian 
theology without sacrificing its uniqueness. He suggested that the univer-
sal dimensions of the doctrine of the trinity could be developed in theol-
ogy and pneumatology rather than Christology. For him, the problem with 
the existing Christian theology in relation to other religions lies in its too 
much emphasis on Christology and therefore, it became exclusive. For him, 
only when the universal dimension of the Christian theology was developed 
were the Christians able to talk with other religious groups about common 
problem and common mission.153
In line with Sumartana, E.Gerrit Singgih argued that, in the existing 
Christology, there was too much emphasis on the divinity of Christ rather on 
his human nature. Thus, the balance between Christ’s divinity and human-
ity should be re-emphasised in order to develop a contextual theology. He 
also criticised the Christian theological view that salvation could only be 
obtained through faith in Christ. For him, this was the reason why certain 
churches were involved in ‘Christianisation’, that is, they tended to use social 
services as a means to convert others. By developing a scriptural exegesis, he 
argued, in the context of the present pluralistic society, Christian theology 
should look at good work as a realisation of, rather independent from, faith. 
With this theological understanding, he said, instead of using social services 
to convert others, the Christians should be open to cooperate in carrying 
out good works with other religious believers.154 Similarly, the prominent 
Catholic theologian, J.B. Banawiratma, suggested in the seminar that Chris-
tian theology should be developed in a dialogical, critical and contextual 
approach in which the integrity of Christian belief in Christ was maintained 
but at the same time it was open to others. For him, sharing religious experi-
ence, theological reflections, socio-ethical analysis and common actions, all 
of these could be the basis of the theology of religions. 155 
Nonetheless, this type of Christian theological thought was apparent-
ly still marginal among the mainstream Indonesian Christians. Among the 
Protestants, a few promoters of this theology can be found in the Christian 
Academy of Theology, Jakarta and the Faculty of Theology, Duta Wacana, 
Yogyakarta. One of these theologians told me that although he developed 
liberal theological ideas in the academic circle, he did not dare to propose 
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them to his own congregation.156 The Catholics were apparently also very 
cautious with the pluralist theology. The priest who initiated inter-religious 
dialogue in 1967, C. Groenen wrote in 1994 that a Christian theology that 
was not concerned with soteriological Christology (the doctrine of salva-
tion through Christ) could not be the basis for honest dialogue, being too 
abstract and unrealistic. It was unrealistic because of the fact that evangeli-
sation was still the characteristic of Christianity. He also said that, although 
the Catholic Church positively encouraged dialogue, the position of the 
Church was in fact very traditional and conservative, because it asserted 
that Christ is the alpha and omega, and that in him the perfect revelation 
and all means of salvation are found.157
Clashes in the Late 1990s and Dialogue as a Response 
In 1996 and 1997, some violent incidents occurred in different cities 
of Indonesia such as Situbondo, Tasikmalaya, Banjarmasin and other places 
in which a high number of churches were burned by the rioters. As a reac-
tion to these incidents, inter-religious meetings were organised either by 
the Government or by the religious groups themselves. In this section, we 
shall restrict our discussion to the Situbondo incident. In addition, we will 
also discuss some Government initiatives to reinforce the project for reli-
gious harmony in this period.
On 10 October 1996, a riot occurred in Situbondo, a city dominat-
ed by the Muslim traditionalists of the NU, most of them ethnic Madurese, 
and with a vibrant, mostly ethnic Chinese, Christian minority.158 In the riot, 
24 churches, some Christian schools and a number of Chinese shops were 
burned or attacked, and five people were killed. The incident started at the 
courthouse where the trial took place of a person named Saleh who was 
accused of promoting heretical Islam and insulting the respected religious 
leader of Situbondo, K.H. As’ad Syamsul Arifin. The crowd that gathered 
in the courthouse was apparently not satisfied with the verdict and then 
tried to attack Saleh. Along with the police and the prosecutors, Saleh then 
escaped from the back door of the courthouse. In that situation, somebody 
improbably cried: “he is in the church” and the crowd moved to the nearby 
church and burned it. The crowd then continued burning the other church-
es, Christian schools and Chinese shops.
There was strong evidence that the riot was engineered. The rioters 
were mostly not local people: they were carried by special trucks from out-
side the town. When they burned the churches, these people moved system-
atically under the instruction of their leaders. The Saleh affair was also very 
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curious. Local people considered Saleh to be mentally ill, so it was not sig-
nificant to prosecute him. The prosecutor, however, proceeded and charged 
him with blasphemy. After the incident of 10 October 1996, rumours spread 
that some of the NU people arrested by the police were tortured in prison, 
and even that one of them, Ahmad Siddik, was dead. A tape recording cir-
culated on which a man claiming to be Ahmad Siddik said he had been tor-
tured by a Christian military interrogator. 
As noted, the Chairman of NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, was the most 
important opposition voice to the Government in this period. Having inves-
tigated the incident, the NU activists were convinced that it was engineered 
by anti-Wahid agents to discredit his leadership. They believed that the inci-
dent was orchestrated to provoke conflicts between NU’s followers and the 
Christians to indicate that Wahid’s political claim for democracy and reli-
gious tolerance was nonsense. Wahid himself publicly pointed his finger at 
the General Secretary of ICMI, Adi Sasono and his subordinate, Eggy Sudjana 
as the masterminds of the riot but they denied the accusation. Hefner noted 
that Wahid was also informed that certain army generals close to the Chair-
man of ICMI, B.J. Habibie, were involved in providing logistical support to 
the rioters.159 
What was the effect of the riot on Muslim-Christian relations? Both 
NU and Christian leaders had the same perception that the incident was 
engineered. Therefore, they initiated some private meetings to prevent fur-
ther violence. Having realised that the tape-recorded interview of Ahmad 
Siddik was a deliberate provocation, both NU and Christian leaders agreed 
to block its circulation.160 As an expression of solidarity with Ahmad Siddik, 
Christian leaders paid a visit to his family and distributed charities.161 Wahid 
also mobilised the activists of the NU paramilitary group, Banser Ansor, to 
protect churches from further attacks. One week after the incident, on 17 
October 1996, the leaders and activists of the NU and the Christians organ-
ised a meeting in the Satellite Hotel, Surabaya. In the meeting, the Christians 
and the Muslims made a common statement condemning the incident, ask-
ing the Government to maintain security in the city and to put those who 
were responsible to trial. In the same meeting that was attended by about 
200 participants, Wahid gave a lecture in which he explained his fear that 
a similar incident might happen again and urged those present to do their 
best to prevent it. He also explained that since the second half of the 1970s, 
he already had good relations with the Christians in East Java, particularly 
through his involvement in the training courses for ministers of the East Java 
Church (GKJW). Wahid argued that, instead of trying to establish a peaceful 
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co-existence, the Muslims and the Christians should develop mutual under-
standing through honest dialogue, “like the dialogue carried on by Inter-
fidei.” He reminded the audience that as a Muslim leader he saw it as his 
duty to exercise self-critique. He explained that he had often criticised the 
Muslim’s misunderstanding of non-Muslims, and the interpretations of cer-
tain Qur’anic verses used by certain Muslim preachers to promote animosity 
towards Christians.162
One important lesson from the incident for the Christians was that to 
be close to the Government did not mean that the regime would always pro-
tect them. Cooperation with the Muslims was apparently more important 
than with the Government authorities. In this context, the Christian leaders 
and activists in Surabaya regretted that the PGI leadership in Jakarta did 
not react immediately to voice the concerns of the Christians in Situbondo. 
Because of the indifferent attitude of the PGI, the Christians then established 
the Communication Forum for Christians in Surabaya (FKKS).163 Moreover, 
the FKKS initiated private investigations of the incident, including making a 
number of photographs of the burned churches and then published them 
on the internet.164 Some of these pictures were later published in a book, 
and its English version was sent to foreign countries.165 
As noted earlier, there were other similar incidents in Indonesia, 
which occurred in different places in 1996 and 1997. These gave a bad 
impression of the Government; and worse than that, the conservative 
Christian lobby in the USA tried to eliminate Indonesia from the list of 
privileged trade partners. In reaction to this development, the Minister of 
Religion, Tarmidzi Taher, travelled to the USA and gave lectures to project 
a positive image of harmonious relations between religions in Indonesia. 
The Government also organised and financed international inter-religious 
meetings. There were at least two international inter-religious conferences 
generously financed by the Government in 1997, one was held in the luxu-
rious Horison Hotel, Jakarta, with the participation of the Hartford Semi-
nary and Temple University; and another was held in Leiden, the Nether-
lands.166 
The Department of Religion also revived the earlier project on reli-
gious harmony that had been rather marginalised in the previous years. This 
project was partly given to the Institute for the Study of Inter-religious Har-
mony (Lembaga Pengkajian Kerukunan Umat Beragama, LPKUB). The LPKUB 
was originally established in October 1993 at the State Institute of Islamic 
Studies (IAIN), Sunan Kalijaga, Yogyakarta. Besides organising inter-religious 
dialogue, in 1995 the LPKUB started an English journal called Religiosa: Indo-
F E E L I N G  T H R E A T E N E D
294
295
nesian Journal on Religious Harmony. The LPKUB appears to have received 
much more funding from the Government after the incidents in the late 
1990s. Like most of the other Government projects, it was finally disappoint-
ing. To use the money, the officials in Jakarta and the people of LPKUB in 
Yogyakarta decided to acquire land for establishing a conference building. 
If one thinks of efficiency, this decision was strange because there are plenty 
of places in Yogyakarta that can be rented with much less cost. Worse than 
that, after the land was bought (located near to the Yogyakarta airport), it 
ended with a series of land disputes. In 1998, the building was half finished, 
but the money was already gone. The head of the LPKUB was Burhanuddin 
Daya, a professor of comparative religion at the IAIN Sunan Kalijaga. He was 
personally also disappointed with the project but too weak to confront the 
high officials above him. 167 
Besides his activity in the LPKUB, Burhanuddin Daya had been 
engaged in dialogue on several occasions in Indonesia and abroad. How-
ever, he seems to have been pessimistic about the efficacy of dialogue. He 
acknowledged that the dialogue organised by the Government often led 
to formal conversations rather than open communication. However, he was 
not satisfied with the dialogue organised by private institutions either. He 
said, most of the privately organised dialogues were funded by the Chris-
tians, so the Muslim participants would have psychological difficulties in 
talking openly. He also believed that Christianisation was real and to deny it 
was like hiding behind a piece of grass. For him, the main problem of inter-
religious relations was not religion, but the socio-economic gap between 
the rich Christians and the poor Muslims.168
By this period, the Government also financed two big research projects 
on the violent incidents in general and inter-religious relations in particular. 
The project on the violent incidents was carried out by a team in Yogyakarta 
under the supervision of Loekman Soetrisno, a Catholic and leading anthro-
pologist of Gadjah Mada University. The team consists of Muslim and non-
Muslim social scientists and activists. The second project investigating the 
view of religious preachers on other religions was conducted by the team of 
the Office of Research and Development of the Department of Religion, the 
Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM) IAIN Jakarta, the Institute 
for the Study of Politics and Economy, University of Indonesia (LSPEUI), the 
Rectors of the Academy of Theology (STT) Jakarta, the Academy of Philoso-
phy, Driyarkara, the Academy of Buddhism, Nalanda, Jakarta, and Hindu Uni-
versity in Denpasar. The psychologist of the University of Indonesia, Sarlito 
W. Sarwono (a Muslim) was the head of the whole team. The Rectors of the 
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religious academies helped create a team in their respective institutions to 
carry out research in the field.
Compared with the reports of similar research projects in the 1970s 
that were full of embellished statements, the report of this research project 
was much more critical. Perhaps, the incidents of the late 1990s pushed the 
teams of the research to be critical. The result of the first research project gave 
us some important and critical analysis of the socio-economic, political and 
religious background of the incidents in Sanggau Ledo, East Timor, Tasikma-
laya, Banjarmasin, Sampang, Situbondo and Pekalongan. The conclusion of 
the research suggested that there were some social factors contributing to 
the violent incidents, namely the wide economic gap between one group and 
another in the structure of society, the psycho-social anxiety of the under-
privileged group about the Government development projects, distrust of the 
Government bureaucracy, socialisation of militant religious teachings and the 
distrust of religious communities towards their respective leaders.169 
The second research project suggested that after analysing the ques-
tionnaires and interviews conducted with 1216 religious preachers of the 
five religions in nine cities, namely Metro (Central Lampung), Maumere 
(East Nusa Tenggara), Temanggung (Central Java), Malang (Est Java), Badung 
(Bali), Sumenep (Madura), Minahasa (North Sulawesi), Pontianak (West Kali-
mantan) and Samarinda (East Kalimantan), the team concluded that in gen-
eral, in terms of social interaction with the people of other religions, the reli-
gious views of the preachers were moderate. However, in theological terms, 
most of the non-Muslim respondents had an inclusive attitude while those 
of most of the Muslims were exclusive. The team also said that because the 
Muslims were the majority in the country, this exclusive attitude poten-
tially strengthened inter-religious tensions. The team also suggested that 
the Government regulations on inter-religious relations and MUI’s fatwa on 
Christmas celebration (all discussed in Chapter 2) did not create but dis-
turbed religious harmony in society. Therefore, the team suggested that 
the Government should reduce the regulations and let the religious groups 
themselves decided what was the best for them.170 
 Conclusion
The rise of the promoters of the non-ideological view of Islam that 
happened in the early 1970s, and became stronger in the following dec-
ades, was certainly an important force behind the development of inter-
religious dialogue in Indonesia. For the Christians who had been afraid of 
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the threat of an Islamic State, the promoters of the non-ideological view 
of Islam were naturally good potential allies. Without the ideological gap, 
the Christians felt that they could talk about a common concern with these 
Muslims. In the early 1970s, these Muslims who worked in the Govern-
ment, particularly A. Mukti Ali and Djohan Effendi, started the project on 
dialogue. The project was intended to create the conditions of the so-
called religious harmony, that is, inter-religious peaceful co-existence. The 
common concern defined in this official dialogue was nothing but a Gov-
ernment project on development. The project might have initially helped 
open inter-religious communication among religious leaders but did not 
truly create inter-religious understanding and cooperation. In most cases, 
it was the Government rather than the religious leaders that determined 
the topic of the dialogue. Thus, the dialogue became simply a formal meet-
ing of religious leaders in which mutual suspicions were suppressed under 
the sweet smile of the participants. The other Government related initia-
tives such as the research on inter-religious issues and the joint-visit to 
places of worship, were not free from the same tendency either. Due to 
the incidents, in the 1990s, the Government revived this project. In this 
respect, besides the report of the research project that was unusually criti-
cal, the other initiatives seem to have served the organisers rather than to 
have enhanced inter-religious cooperation in society.
Some of the Christians and Muslims eventually felt that they should 
develop dialogue by themselves. As a reaction to the Government pro-
posed discourse on the role of religion to support development, these 
Muslim and Christian intellectuals developed a critical discourse on devel-
opment through the theology of liberation. In this context, the Christians 
and Muslims found that social justice was to be the common concern for 
all in relation to the Government led development programmes. In reac-
tion to Soeharto’s shift in political alliance from abangan Muslims and 
Christians to reformist Muslims in the 1990s, some Muslim and Christian 
intellectuals cooperated in promoting democracy and pluralism. The 
political shift apparently made some Christian leaders more convinced 
that cooperation with the Muslims, particularly the Muslim proponents of 
democracy, would be better than maintaining the Christian dependence 
on the regime. It was in this period that some of the prominent Muslim and 
Christian intellectuals developed theological ideas to support a tolerant 
and open attitude towards other religious believers. Although these theo-
logical ideas only had a limited influence on people’s behaviour, they rep-
resented a serious attempt on the part of Muslims and Christians to create 
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better inter-religious relations. One might say that no matter how good 
the Muslim-Christian discourse on religious tolerance and pluralism was, 
it would have little impact on inter-communal relations in real life. Indeed, 
the socio-political cooperation between Muslims and Christian was still 
rare. However, if we remember the Situbondo case in which Muslim and 
Christian leaders successfully cooperated to prevent further violence, we 
should not be so pessimistic.
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 Conclusion
 
Muslim-Christian relations have been an important element of the 
social and political dynamics of Indonesia during the New Order period, and 
an ever sensitive object of Government policy. In this study, I have focused 
on the discourses and political behaviour of Muslim and Christian leaders as 
well as the state elites concerning inter-religious relations in order to better 
understand the nature of these relations and their development over time. 
These discourses were analysed through a reading of utterances on a wide 
range of occasions and in different socio-political contexts, including Par-
liamentary sessions, Government organised meetings, religious sermons, 
meetings of religious organisations, demonstrations, conferences and semi-
nars. The development of power relations between the Islamic groups, the 
Christians and the state strongly influenced the features of the discourses. 
There were antagonistic as well as common discourses between the Mus-
lims and the Christians. In response to the Muslim-Christian antagonistic 
discourses, the state often adopted an ambiguous position that eventually 
led to further controversies between the two religious groups. On the other 
hand, the state determined and imposed a certain discourse as a common 
discourse for all. Some Muslim and Christian leaders responded positively 
to this state-imposed common discourse, while others opposed it and pro-
posed an alternative common discourse. The Muslim-Christian discourses 
certainly influenced the mutual perceptions and actions of the two religious 
communities. The discourses also shaped state policies on religio-political 
issues, and how they were implemented in reality. 
The relations between Muslims and Christians have been tense 
because of mutual suspicions existing between them. These mutual sus-
picions have been reflected in, and exacerbated by, the antagonistic dis-
courses in which the Muslim and Christian leaders perceived each other as a 
threat against their respective religious communities. Among the Muslims, 
the Christian threat has been called ‘Kristenisasi’ (Christianisation). In the 
Muslim discourse, Christianisation meant unfair and aggressive efforts to 
convert Muslims to Christianity such as by offering money, food, education, 
and health care to the poor Muslims; building a church in a Muslim majority 
area; encouraging Christians to marry Muslim partners in order to convert 
the latter; inviting Muslims to participate in Christmas celebrations under 
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the pretext of religious tolerance; and teaching Christianity to Muslim stu-
dents in Christian schools. In the Muslim discourse, Christianisation could 
also mean a political conspiracy of the Christians with other enemies of 
Islam, particularly the secularists, inside and outside the country, to weaken 
the Islamic groups culturally, politically and economically. Christianisation 
was therefore described as a ‘new style of crusade’, ‘religious expansionism’, 
‘foreign intervention’, ‘arrogance of cultural superiority’ inherited from the 
West, and ‘intolerant to Muslim feelings.’ 
The discourse on the threat of Christianisation sometimes led sev-
eral Muslims to violent action, by attacking church buildings and Christian 
schools. Moreover, the Muslims also demanded that the Government control 
and restrict Christian missions by (1) making strict requirements for obtain-
ing permission to erect a new place of worship; (2) restricting religious prop-
agation only to those outside the five recognised religions; and (3) control-
ling foreign aid for religious institutions; (4) prohibiting inter-religious mar-
riage; (5) requiring that religion classes given at schools should be taught 
by a teacher whose religious background was the same as that of students. 
The Muslim leaders also tried to intensify Islamic propagation (da‘wah) pro-
grammes to compete against the Christian mission. To protect the Islamic 
community from the perceived threat of Christianisation, the Muslim lead-
ers developed exclusive interpretations of religious doctrines, such as a total 
rejection of freedom to convert from Islam by reaffirming the classic Islamic 
doctrine on apostasy (an apostate could be killed, though it was noted that 
this could not be applied in a non-Islamic state like Indonesia); prohibiting 
Muslims from participating in Christmas celebration by emphasising that 
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity could endanger Muslim monotheistic 
belief; prohibiting inter-religious marriage between a Muslim and non-Mus-
lim based on the idea that the prevention of possible harm (conversion from 
Islam of the Muslim partner and his or her children) has priority over obtain-
ing benefits of marriage. The political marginalisation of the Islamic groups 
by the regime apparently helped increase the Muslim exclusive religious 
outlook. 
The Christians, on the other hand, denied the existence of what the 
Muslims called Christianisation efforts. Moreover, for the Christians, the five 
aforementioned Muslim demands to the Government were opposed to the 
idea of religious freedom. For the Christians, religious freedom meant: the 
freedom to build churches in all regions of Indonesia, including the Muslim 
majority areas, the freedom to preach religion to anybody, the freedom to 
change religion, the freedom to cooperate with co-religionists outside the 
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country (that is, to receive foreign aid), the freedom to participate in religious 
celebrations of another religion, the freedom to follow religious teachings 
without any pressure from the state; and the freedom to teach Christianity 
to all students in Christian schools, as long as they or their parents agreed. 
The Christians used two important arguments to support their understand-
ing of religious freedom, namely nationalism and human rights. Nationalism 
for them meant that all citizens are equal before the state on the basis that 
all of them shared the same nationality. Other allegiances such as religion, 
race, geographic origin, should be submitted to nationality. In this sense, 
nationalism is in line with individual human rights, particularly the right to 
religious freedom. Thus, for the Christians, the five aforementioned Muslim 
demands to the Government were against nationalism and human rights. 
Moreover, although in terms of religious doctrines, inter-religious marriage 
(and probably conversion from Christianity too) was a controversial issue 
among the Christian Churches, as a religious minority, they never hesitated 
to support religious freedom. Likewise, it was the idea of religious freedom 
that led the Christians to demand state recognition of marriages based on 
Javanese Mysticism, while the Muslims opposed it. Certainly, we cannot 
also ignore that the supporters of Javanese Mysticism (who were mostly 
abangan) were the likely political allies for the Christians. In contrast, for the 
Muslim leaders, the adherents of Javanese Mysticism were actually Muslims 
(but less Muslim than the santri), and therefore, they should marry accord-
ing to Islam. This case apparently reflects the Muslim struggle against local 
religious customs and beliefs. 
The responses of the regime to the Muslim discourse on Christianisa-
tion and the Christian defence of religious freedom were always ambigu-
ous. In certain periods, when the regime felt it the need for reconciliation 
with the Islamic groups, the former accommodated certain demands of the 
latter in the Government decrees. However, because the Christians consist-
ently opposed these decrees, they were not strictly implemented. This was 
because the interest of the regime lay neither in curbing Christian missions 
nor in enhancing religious freedom, but in maintaining political power 
and controlling socio-political stability. The joint decree of the Ministers 
of Religion and of Home Affairs in 1969 clearly accommodated the Muslim 
demand to control the erection of new places of worship. This decree has 
created difficulties for Christians wishing to build a new church, especially in 
Muslim majority areas (as Muslims also had difficulties in erecting a mosque 
in Christian majority areas). However, there were also some cases in which 
new churches were built without permission and the Government did not 
C O N C L U S I O N
301
react, until the Muslim protests emerged. Likewise, in 1978 the Govern-
ment issued decrees to restrict missionary activities only to those outside 
the recognised religions, and to control foreign aid for religious institutions. 
In practice, however, the decrees were loosely implemented. With regard 
to inter-religious marriage, the compromise between the regime and the 
Islamic groups resulted in a strange decision: the Marriage Law of 1974 does 
not clearly mention whether inter-religious marriage is allowed or not. In 
practice, whether inter-religious marriage was possible, difficult or even 
impossible, depended very much on the socio-political development in the 
country. While up to the 1980s inter-religious marriage was still possible, 
though sometimes difficult, in the 1990s when the regime was close to the 
Islamic groups, it became almost impossible. Last but not least, in the Educa-
tion Law of 1989, the regime eventually accommodated the Muslim demand 
to require that teacher and students had to be of the same religious back-
ground, but because of the Christians’ objection, this rule was not imple-
mented in private schools. 
Apart from the Government ambiguity, did Christianisation truly hap-
pen? In the Introduction, I noted that according to the Government statistic 
for the year 2000, the percentage of population that is Muslim is 88.22% 
(177.5 million), and this was almost similar to the previous Government 
statistics. On the other hand, the Christian population has increased from 
7.39% (8.74 million) in 1971 to 8.92% (17.95 million) in 2000 with an average 
rate of growth of 2.4% annually, and this is higher than the rate of growth of 
the whole population (1.83%). If the statistics are reliable, then we can say 
that Christianisation of those who already adhered to Islam did not widely 
happen because the Muslim population was generally stable. The increase 
of the Christian population was probably due to the success of Christian 
missions directed to the people living in several remote areas of the country, 
that is, to those who did not belong to one of the recognised religions. 
Despite the statistics, after the fall of Soeharto, the Muslim discourse 
on Christianisation continued influencing Muslim-Christian relations. Dur-
ing the making of the Education Law of 2003 there was a hot controversy on 
the issue of religion classes. Despite strong opposition from the Christians, 
the Islamic groups successfully included in the Law a provision stating that 
students are entitled to religious education in their own religion and to be 
taught by a teacher of the same religion. This was obviously a culmination 
of what had happened on this issue during the New Order period. Likewise, 
based on the Government decree of 1969 on the rules of erecting new plac-
es of worship, in October 2004, a group of Muslims barricaded a Catholic 
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school in Cileduk, Jakarta because it was illegally used for religious services, 
and for the same reason, 23 churches were closed by Muslims in West Java in 
September 2005. There has also been a controversy on the Muslim proposal 
for what is called the ‘Religious Harmony Bill’ (RUU-KUB), which is actually an 
effort to enhance the legal status of the Government decrees of 1969 and 
1978 to the position of law ratified by Parliament. By the end of September 
2005, the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI) reaffirmed its earlier fatwa on 
the prohibition of inter-religious marriage and at the same time it prohib-
ited Muslims from participating in a common prayer in which believers of 
different religions come together to pray alternately for the sake of a com-
mon interest. The MUI also declared that pluralism, liberalism and secular-
ism are against Islam. In contrast to what happened during the New Order 
period, however, there have been more Muslim activists and intellectuals 
who openly opposed these Muslim exclusive religious attitudes. 
Whereas the Muslims felt insecure and threatened by Christianisation, 
the Christians were afraid of the threat of an Islamic State. For the Christians, 
to have to live under an Islamic state in which the sharī‘a law was imple-
mented would mean that they would be turned into second-class citizens. 
As a religious minority, the Christians preferred the secular political view of 
separation of religion and state. After the Communist Party (PKI) was physi-
cally and politically destroyed in the late 1960s, the Islamic groups felt more 
confident in pursuing their ideological ambition. On the other hand, to 
protect themselves from the threat of the Muslim ideological ambition, the 
Christians decided to ally with the emerging power of the army. This political 
choice was apparently natural for the Christians because, like the politically 
secular-oriented Muslims among the civilians, the army was known as the 
strongest proponent of the nationalist (as opposed to the Islamic) ideologi-
cal outlook.
The Christian political choice eventually produced certain conse-
quences. One was that the Christians became the supporters, or even con-
tributors to the making of the authoritarian New Order regime. While T.B. 
Simatupang, the leader of PGI, still hoped that the military regime would 
willingly support democracy, an important group among the Catholics 
established a strong alliance with the regime in some important political 
institutions, namely in the state intelligence operations, in the Government 
party, Golkar, and in the think tank called the Centre for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (CSIS). The CSIS intellectuals were involved in developing 
the official interpretation of the state ideology, Pancasila, in which the secu-
lar political view was combined with Javanese ideals of family-ism. They also 
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played an important role behind the Government secular policies on educa-
tion and culture.
Although the CSIS, at least to the mid-1980s, actually represented 
much more the state than the Catholics, the involvement of the Catholic 
intellectuals in this think-tank helped create a bad image of the Catholics 
among the Muslims. It often happened that the Muslim political frustration 
with the regime manifested itself as a strong negative perception of the 
Catholics. On the other hand, when the regime became more accommo-
dating to Islamic ideological demands, the Muslim-Christian antagonism 
did not stop because while the regime was not always consistent with its 
ideological position, the Christians were consistent in their opposition to 
the Islamic ideology. When the regime accommodated the demands of the 
Islamic groups during the controversy on the marriage bill in 1973, or when 
the regime proposed the Religious Court Bill in 1988, both Catholic and Prot-
estant leaders cooperated to oppose it. 
The Muslim-Christian antagonism also continued in the 1990s, the 
period when the regime allied with the Islamic groups. In the late 1980s, 
Soeharto had a conflict with some important army generals who had previ-
ously supported him. In order to maintain his power, Soeharto then allied 
with the Islamic groups, particularly the reformist Muslims. In 1990, Soeharto 
supported the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intel-
lectuals (ICMI). Many of the ICMI activists then became the representatives 
of the Government party, Golkar, and some of them were appointed as min-
isters in Soeharto’s cabinet. Just as in the early 1970s a certain group of Cath-
olics in cooperation with the military had established the CSIS, so now ICMI 
established the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) 
which was also intended to become a think tank for the Government. It was 
said that certain ICMI leaders felt it was the time to take ‘revenge’ on the 
Christians. There is no doubt that the Christians and other religious minori-
ties were very scared of this political development. Moreover, the favouring 
of Muslims over Christians in this period had disturbed the old balance of 
power between the two communities in such places as the Moluccas. The 
civil war in the Moluccas which occurred after the fall of Soeharto was partly 
because the Christian elites try to regain what they have lost. 
It should be noted, however, that although the regime accommodat-
ed some Muslim demands, it never tolerated the idea of Islam as an alter-
native political ideology to Pancasila. The New Order regime continuously 
prohibited people from speaking publicly about support for an Islamic State 
or the Jakarta Charter, and by the mid-1980s it forced all social organisa-
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tions, including religious ones, to adopt Pancasila as the sole basis in their 
respective constitutions. Through an indoctrination programme started by 
the late 1970s, the state tried to impose its own interpretation of Pancasila 
based on family-ism and corporatism. This official interpretation was then 
opposed to three other ideologies: Islam, Communism and Liberalism. It is 
not surprising that under these political circumstances, the non-ideological 
view of Islam became dominant in the public sphere. 
The non-ideological view of Islam, however, could not be simply per-
ceived as a temporary political option, particularly for its proponents who 
took this view out of long internal discussions since the early 1970s. After 
the fall of Soeharto in 1998 and the rise of democracy in Indonesia, we can 
see that, unlike the situation in the 1950s and the late 1960s, the Islamic 
ideology is not the common cause for all Islamic groups anymore. It is the 
nationalist outlook rather than Islam that has become the official basis of 
the two important Muslim political parties: PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa) 
established by the Muslim traditionalist leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, and 
PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional) established by the Muslim reformist leader, M. 
Amien Rais. In addition, although after the fall of Soeharto the top leader of 
Golkar have been reformist Muslim activists (Akbar Tanjung and then Jusuf 
Kalla), this party has never changed its nationalist ideology into the Islamic 
one. Without support of these three important political parties, it is certainly 
difficult for the other Muslim political parties officially based on Islam such 
as PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang) and PKS 
(Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) to realise their ideological ambitions. In other 
words, the threat of an Islamic state is not as serious as before. 
Besides the antagonistic discourses on the threat of Christianisation 
and the Islamic State, there were also Muslim-Christian common discourses 
imposed by the state or developed by Muslims and Christians themselves. 
The state claimed that the common cause for the nation after the fall of 
the Soekarno regime was economic restoration. Therefore, the common dis-
course for the state was development and modernisation or the so-called 
‘Pembangunan’. State officials often emphasised the claim that the develop-
ment programmes could not work without political stability, and therefore, 
they urged religious leaders to avoid conflicts and to create inter-religious 
harmony, that is, peaceful inter-religious co-existence. State officials also 
encouraged religious leaders to engage religion as a supportive force for the 
development programmes. The Government project on inter-religious dia-
logue in particular and religious harmony in general was primarily directed 
to these ends. 
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In the early years of the New Order, the Christian leaders appeared to 
be quite supportive of the Government discourse on development, while 
the Muslim groups were still sceptical, if not opposed to it. By the mid-1970s, 
however, critical voices against the Government development programmes 
emerged in Christian and Muslim intellectual circles. Influenced by the Cath-
olic liberation theology of Latin America, these intellectuals tried to develop 
a critical religious discourse on development, by emphasising the universal 
value of social justice. Thus, social justice became the common cause for all, 
and this idea was developed further among several younger Muslim activ-
ists in the 1990s, and became their ideology of social action. 
The Muslim-Christian common discourse developed primarily because 
of the emergence of the non-ideological view of Islam in the early 1970s that 
became stronger in the following decades. This view of Islam certainly pro-
vided a religious justification for the regime, but at the same time it showed 
a peaceful face of Islam for the Christians who had been afraid of the threat 
of an Islamic State. Like the Christians, the proponents of non-ideological 
Islam considered Pancasila as the best ideology of the state. Thus, when the 
state imposed Pancasila as the sole basis for social organisations, they did 
not have any problem. However, along with some Christian and other intel-
lectuals, these Muslims tried to oppose the state interpretation of Pancasila. 
In the 1990s, in response to the Soeharto’ political alliance with the Muslim 
reformists, some prominent Muslim and Christian intellectuals cooperated 
in developing a common discourse on democracy and pluralism. 
All in all, our discussion demonstrates that religion in Indonesia was 
(and is) very much a public issue, and had been increasingly so during the 
New Order period. The ideological compromise between the secular and 
the Islamic oriented group, that Indonesia is neither secular nor Islamic, 
certainly provides a grey area for debates, negotiations and compromises 
between the secular and the religious. This study also indicates that Muslim 
and Christian leaders have been involved in debates on almost all impor-
tant socio-political issues, including state ideology, law, culture, education, 
democracy and development. The significant political influence of both 
religious communities in Indonesia is indicated by the fact that the state 
could not totally suppress either the voices of the Muslims or the Christians 
in those debates, and even it tried to accommodate both, resulting in the 
ambiguities. Thus, the issues of Muslim-Christian relations are too impor-
tant to neglect for anyone who wants to understand this country and who 
expects the best for its future. 
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Because most, if not all, of the Muslim-Christian issues are in fact 
political problems, they should be resolved, I believe, through a ‘suitable’ 
political system and culture. Perhaps, the current democratic political sys-
tem is one of the answers, but a democratic system will not work without 
support of democratic culture in society. The respect for human rights and 
the mutual trust between groups in society will certainly not come out of 
the blue. Mutual trust between religious groups cannot develop if their 
leaders make a protest when their own group is discriminated against but 
become silent when it happens to another group. The religious leaders not 
only should support and develop the discourses on the principles of democ-
racy and human rights but also should prove, in response to actual cases, 
that they truly hold these principles. I believe that both Islam and Christian-
ity also teach these principles.
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 Samenvatting
Indonesië is het grootste moslimland ter wereld. Temidden van die 
moslim meerderheid vormen de christenen de belangrijkste minderheid. 
In sommige provincies is het christendom de godsdienst van de meerder-
heid, en in andere gebieden is het de godsdienst van een grote minder-
heid. Bovendien was (en is) godsdienst in Indonesië een belangrijke maat-
schappelijk aangelegenheid, en was het dat in toenemende mate tijdens de 
Orde Baru (nieuwe orde) van 1966-1998, de periode die centraal staat in dit 
onderzoek. De relaties tussen moslims en christenen behoren dan ook tot 
één van de belangrijke politieke onderwerpen in Indonesië.
 Deze studie geeft een analyse van teksten en politieke gedragingen 
van islamitische en christelijke leiders alsmede van nationale politieke figu-
ren ten aanzien van de interreligieuze relaties. Op deze manier wijst deze 
studie erop, dat er zowel antagonistische als meer neutrale uiteenzettingen 
waren tussen de moslims en christenen. In antwoord op de felle debatten 
tussen moslims en christenen, nam de staat vaak een tweeslachtige positie 
in die uiteindelijk vaak leidde tot verdere controverses tussen de twee gods-
dienstige groeperingen. Aan de andere kant bepaalde en verplichtte de staat 
soms een bepaalde opvatting als algemeen geldig. Sommige islamitische en 
christelijke leiders reageerden positief op dit door de staat opgelegde alge-
meen geldige standpunt, terwijl anderen hier tegen waren en alternatieve 
opvattingen voorstelden. Zeker is dat de debatten tussen moslims en chris-
tenen de onderlinge inzichten en het optreden van de twee godsdienstige 
gemeenschappen beïnvloed hebben. De discussies hebben ook de staats-
politiek ten aanzien van religieus-politieke onderwerpen gemodelleerd, als 
ook de wijze waarop ze in werkelijkheid tot uitvoering werden gebracht. 
 De relaties tussen moslims en christenen waren gespannen van-
wege het wederzijdse wantrouwen. Dit wederzijdse wantrouwen werd 
weerspiegeld in en verergerd door de vijandige discussies waarin de mos-
lim en christelijke leiders elkaar beschouwden als een bedreiging voor hun 
respectievelijke religieuze gemeenschappen. Onder de moslims wordt de 
christelijke bedreiging Kristianisasi (poging tot kerstening) genoemd. Dat 
betekent volgens hen het gebruik van oneerlijke en agressieve methoden 
om arme moslims tot christenen te bekeren zoals via het schenken van geld, 
voedsel, onderwijs en gezondheidszorg, het bouwen van een kerk midden 
in een typisch moslim omgeving, het aanmoedigen van huwelijken tussen 
christenen en moslims, waarbij de moslim partner zich dan moet bekeren, 
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het uitnodigen van moslims bij christelijke feesten onder het mom van 
religieuze tolerantie, en tenslotte het onderwijs van het christendom aan 
moslimstudenten op christelijke scholen. Kerstening kan ook een politieke 
samenzwering inhouden van christenen met andere vijanden van de Islam, 
met name met de secularisten, in binnen- en buitenland, om islamitische 
groeperingen cultureel, politiek en economisch te verzwakken. 
 De discussie over de bedreiging van kerstening heeft verschillende 
moslims tot gewelddadige acties gebracht, bijvoorbeeld door christelijke 
kerkgebouwen en scholen aan te vallen. De moslims vragen ook dat de 
regering de christelijke missie controleert en beperkingen oplegt door 1° 
strikte eisen te stellen voor het verkrijgen van toestemming om een nieuw 
gebedshuis op te richten; 2° religieuze propaganda te beperken tot de 5 
erkende godsdiensten; 3° buitenlandse hulp aan religieuze instellingen te 
controleren; 4° gemengde huwelijken te verbieden; 5° te eisen dat de gods-
dienstlessen op school gegeven zullen worden door een leraar die dezelfde 
religieuze achtergrond heeft als de leerlingen. De moslimleiders probeer-
den ook de programma’s van islamitische propaganda (da‘wah) te intensive-
ren als tegenwicht tegen the christelijke missie. Bovendien ontwikkelden de 
moslimleiders exclusieve interpretaties van religieuze leerstellingen, zoals 
een totale afwijzing van de vrijheid om je te bekeren tot een ander geloof, 
een verbod om deel te nemen aan christelijke vieringen, en een verbod op 
een huwelijk tussen een moslim en niet-moslim. 
In antwoord op deze discussie onder de moslims over kerstening, 
benadrukten de christenen stelselmatig de noodzaak van algehele en onbe-
perkte vrijheid van godsdienst, ondanks de steeds wat weifelachtige reac-
ties van de regering op dit punt. In bepaalde perioden, als de regering een 
nauwe band met islamitische groeperingen nodig had, zorgde zij ervoor 
dat bepaalde eisen van moslims in regeringsbesluiten werden verankerd. 
Omdat de christenen zich echter stelselmatig tegen deze besluiten verzet-
ten, werden ze niet consequent ingevoerd. Dit gebeurde omdat het belang 
van de regering noch lag in het beperken van de christelijke missie noch 
in het benadrukken van de godsdienstvrijheid, maar in het behouden van 
politieke macht en het beheersen van de sociaal-politieke stabiliteit.
Daar waar de moslims zich onzeker en bedreigd voelden door de ker-
stening, waren de christenen bang voor de gevaar van de Islamitische staat. 
Te moeten leven in een islamitische staat waar de sharī‘a als wet zou zijn 
ingevoerd, zou voor de christenen betekenen dat ze werden beschouwd als 
tweederangs burgers. Als een religieuze minderheid geven de christenen 
de voorkeur aan het seculiere politieke idee van scheiding van kerk en staat. 
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Om zich zelf te beschermen tegen de dreiging van de ideologische aspira-
ties van de moslims, besloten de christenen zich aan te sluiten bij de opko-
mende macht van het leger. Deze politieke keuze was een natuurlijke optie 
voor de christenen aangezien, evenals de seculier georiënteerde moslims 
burgers, het leger werd gezien als de sterkste voorstander van de nationalis-
tische ideologische zienswijze, als tegenovergesteld aan de islamitische.
Deze christelijke politieke keuze zou uiteindelijk zekere consequen-
ties hebben. Een daarvan was dat de christenen de verdedigers, of zelfs 
de aanstichters werden van het ontstaan van de autoritaire ‘Nieuwe Orde’ 
regering van Soeharto. Een belangrijke groep katholieken vormde zelfs een 
sterke coalitie met de regering in enige belangrijke politieke instellingen, 
namelijk bij de activiteiten van de geheime diensten, in de regeringspar-
tij Golkar, en in de denktank, Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS). Hoewel het CSIS, tenminste tot midden de jaren 1980, in feite veel 
meer de staat dan de katholieken representeerde, heeft de betrokkenheid 
van katholieke intellectuelen in deze denktank geholpen om onder de mos-
lims een slecht imago van de katholieken te creëren. Het gebeurde zeer vaak 
dat de politieke frustraties van de moslims ten opzichte van de regering zich 
manifesteerden in een sterk negatief beeld van de katholieken. Het wan-
trouwen van de moslims ten aanzien van de christenen werd ook versterkt 
in de latere periode, toen de regering zich tot op zekere hoogte schikte naar 
de ideologische ambities van de moslims. Dit was deels omdat de christe-
nen consequent bleven in hun protest tegen de islamitische ideologie, ter-
wijl de regering niet altijd even consequent was.
Naast de vijandige discussies over de dreigingen van kerstening en 
de Islamitische staat, waren er ook algemene gesprekken tussen moslims en 
christenen, door de staat geëntameerd of ontwikkeld door moslims en chris-
tenen zelf. De staat eiste economische herstel op als de publieke zaak voor 
de natie. Daarom ging het publieke debat voor de staat over ontwikkeling of 
pembangunan. Hoge regeringsambtenaren beklemtoonden vaak dat ont-
wikkelingsprogramma’s alleen effect konden hebben bij politieke stabiliteit 
en daarvoor spoorden zij religieuze leiders aan conflicten te vermijden en 
een interreligieuze harmonie te realiseren dat wil zeggen, vreedzame inter-
religieuze coëxistentie. Staatsambtenaren moedigden eveneens religieuze 
leiders aan om de religie te gebruiken als een helpende kracht voor ontwik-
kelingsprogramma’s. Het regeringsprogramma van de religieuze dialoog in 
het bijzonder en religieuze harmonie in het algemeen was primair gericht 
op deze doeleinden.
S A M E N V A T T I N G
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In de beginjaren van de Nieuwe Orde schenen de christelijke leiders 
de gouvernementele discussie over ontwikkeling redelijk te steunen, ter-
wijl de moslimgroeperingen sceptisch bleven, of zelfs er tegen waren. Rond 
midden jaren 1970 echter, doken er in intellectuele christelijke en moslim 
kringen kritische geluiden op tegen de gouvernementele ontwikkelings-
programma’s. Beïnvloed door de katholieke bevrijdingstheologie van Zuid-
Amerika probeerden deze intellectuelen een kritisch religieus debat over 
ontwikkeling te ontwerpen, door de universele waarde van sociale gerech-
tigheid te benadrukken. In de jaren 1990 verwisselde de regering zijn poli-
tieke overeenkomst met de abangan (nominale) Moslims en met de christe-
nen voor een alliantie met de santri (praktiserende) reformistische moslims. 
De regering ondersteunde de elite van de Associatie van Indonesische Mos-
lims Intellectuelen (ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia). Veel van 
de ICMI activisten werden toen vertegenwoordigers van de regeringspartij, 
Golkar, en sommigen van hen werden tot minister in het kabinet benoemd. 
De christenen en andere religieuze minderheden waren zeer bevreesd voor 
deze politieke ontwikkeling. Het was binnen deze context dat enkele promi-
nente moslim- en christenintellectuelen samenwerkten om gezamenlijk te 
komen tot een discussie over democratie en pluralisme.
(Nederlandse vertaling door Dr. Paule Maas)
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